Should We Tolerate Benevolent Absolutisms?

Maffettone, Pietro

doi:10.5840/soctheorpract201642315

Should We Tolerate Benevolent Absolutisms?

Maffettone, Pietro

Authors

Pietro Maffettone

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that the real problem with Rawls’s view of international toleration is that, properly understood, it seems not too inclusive, but not inclusive enough. I examine the standing of what Rawls calls “benevolent absolutisms.” According to Rawls, their lack of internal mechanisms of collective will-formation means that benevolent absolutisms cannot be seen as members in good standing of the Society of Peoples. I claim that if we accept the best reconstruction of Rawls’s argument for tolerating decent peoples, then The Law of Peoples does not provide conclusive reasons not to tolerate benevolent absolutisms.

Citation

Maffettone, P. (2016). Should We Tolerate Benevolent Absolutisms?. Social Theory and Practice, 42(3), 525-554. https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract201642315

Journal Article Type	Article
Acceptance Date	May 25, 2016
Online Publication Date	Jul 1, 2016
Publication Date	Jul 1, 2016
Deposit Date	Mar 10, 2017
Publicly Available Date	Mar 13, 2017
Journal	Social Theory and Practice
Print ISSN	0037-802X
Electronic ISSN	2154-123X
Publisher	Philosophy Documentation Center
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	42
Issue	3
Pages	525-554
DOI	https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract201642315
Publisher URL	https://www.pdcnet.org//pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=soctheorpract&id=soctheorpract_2016_0042_0003_0525_0554&onlyautologin=true