**Liberty as welfare: the basecamp counterpart of positive freedom**
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**Abstract**

L.T. Hobhouse’s concept of liberty – the concept at the heart of new liberalism – is based on T.H. Green’s positive freedom. However, this paper demonstrates that the former has its own distinct nature and can be usefully defined as ‘liberty as welfare’. In a context of renewed interest in the link between liberty and ability/personal development, scholars have looked back to Green’s positive liberty. But the complex nature of latter has led to scholarly disagreement about its definitive features. The paper argues that Hobhouse’s liberty has achieved what neither of Green’s two liberties, juristic and true (or positive), have: accommodate concerns with personal development and social justice in a ‘primary’ concept of freedom. It is demonstrated that only Green’s positive freedom internalises commitment to development and social justice, but for a number of reasons reviewed in the paper, it is not a primary concept. The first section of the paper examines and criticises Green’s dismissal of juristic freedom and outlines the ways in which this concept could have been more viable. The second section demonstrates how Hobhouse’s liberty achieves what Green’s juristic freedom could have but did not – accommodate personal development and social justice in a concept of liberty that remains an opportunity concept.

**1. Introduction**

T.H. Green has secured himself a solid place in the history of liberalism as the transition from old to new liberalism is associated with his concept of positive freedom. Hobhouse who was one of the main spokesmen of new liberalism is seen as merely having adopted Green’s concept of liberty. In the dramatic ideological turns of twentieth century liberalism positive freedom was at its lowest ebb during the Cold War, after Berlin’s critique of it channelled the anxiety of a generation: the disquiet about the link between the concept and totalitarian regimes. The concept, however, resumed vitality in the 90ties when communitarian critiques of liberalism gained prominence. Currently positive freedom is deemed controversial but legitimate in well specified terms. In this paper I would like to focus on those aspects of positive freedom that got embedded in the ideology of new liberalism: on the link between liberty and welfare. Now, a century after Hobhouse’s *Liberalism* was published, the
debate on the link between liberty and the role of the state is vibrant as ever and the
association between liberty and wellbeing is at a high point, not least due to the
impact of Sen and certain strands of feminism on contemporary political theory.⁶ In
this context of resumed interest in the link between liberty and capacity to do things, I
wish to go back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth century and argue that
although the seeds of this link were laid in Green’s positive freedom, it was more
consistently expressed in Hobhouse’s understanding of liberty.

The argument here is that Hobhouse’s theory of liberty outlines a concept that is
relatively new, and indeed missing in a clear cut form from Green’s liberty map. As
Green’s scholars know well, Green developed a dual conceptualisation of liberty that
was not dissimilar to Berlin’s. The dynamic between Green’s ‘juristic’ and ‘true’
freedoms (the latter also referred to as ‘positive’ or ‘real’) anticipated some of the
tensions between Berlin’s ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ freedoms. In current liberal
debates, Green’s positive freedom has acquired the status of a paradigmatic positive
liberty concept.⁷ But I will argue that the lines between or around Green’s juristic and
true/positive freedoms could have been drawn differently and indeed, better. Had
Green done so, he would have ended with two, not one, viable concepts of freedom.
Green’s conceptual framework makes it difficult to pinpoint where liberty as ability
for personal growth would fit. Should we see it as juristic or as positive freedom?
Many are inclined to say that it is a form of positive freedom,⁸ but I will argue that
Green’s positive freedom straddles two aspects of liberty that should ideally belong to
two different concepts: one as the ability to engage with moral action and the other,
liberty as experienced in moral action itself. It is the first aspect that Hobhouse adopts
as the mainstay of his liberalism.
The benefit of re-drawing the lines between juristic and positive freedom would be to produce a primary concept of freedom that internalises the insights of Green’s moral theory: commitment to social justice and to a developmental concept of personality. Currently, only Green’s positive freedom internalises these commitments. Juristic freedom remains a lame concept of liberty precisely because it fails to internalise Green’s moral theory. The problem resulting from this is that Green ends up with a deficient ‘primary’ concept of liberty and overly rich ‘metaphorical’ concept. It is no accident that, Green’s ‘metaphorical’ concept, that is, positive freedom, becomes his ‘real’ freedom. But is the laming of juristic freedom beneficial for Green’s freedom theory? Green’s juristic freedom has two features that would make its dismissal very costly: its ‘primary’ nature and its role of a stepping stone towards positive freedom. What Green could have done is revise the contents of juristic freedom in the light of the contents of positive freedom. Arguably, Hobhouse’s liberty does exactly this as it succeeds in internalising commitment to social justice and personal development and in remaining a primary concept.

In section 2 the paper develops a critique of Green’s philosophy of liberty that lays the background for explaining the nature and assessing the significance of Hobhouse’s understanding of liberty. By analysing Green’s concept of juristic freedom, the section sketches the features of a ‘primary’ concept of liberty. It makes the case that juristic freedom should not have been abandoned but reconceptualised in the light of the ideals of positive freedom. This would have resolved a problem stemming from the complexity of Green’s positive freedom. I argue that the latter straddles two meanings of freedom: a positive/ability one and a positive/true one.
Hobhouse’s liberty as welfare corresponds to the positive/ability freedom. Section 3 explains the rationale of Hobhouse’s liberty and makes several observations in support of the claim that his is a primary concept. These include his distinction between rights and duties, his critique of Bosanquet’s metaphysics and his unease with the socialists’ abandonment of the ideals of old liberalism.

2. T.H.Green, the status of juristic freedom and the duality of positive freedom

Green’s two lectures on liberty, ‘The Different Senses of Freedom’ and ‘Lecture on Liberal Legislation’, leave us with a set of problems, which, considered together, could suggest a possible solution. ‘The Different Senses of Freedom’ introduces two legitimate senses of freedom, juristic and true, while ‘Lecture on Liberal Legislation’, only one, positive, arguably corresponding to true. What happens to juristic freedom? Why is it missing in ‘Lecture on Liberal Legislation’ and why is it not related in some form to positive freedom? The ‘Lecture on Liberal Legislation’ is written two years after ‘The Different Senses of Freedom’ and we can see that the concept of positive freedom has content that is richer than that of the true freedom from ‘The Different Senses of Freedom’. Certain development has occurred as a result of which juristic freedom has been left behind while positive freedom has enriched its contents. The solution that I will suggest is that in practice ‘Lecture on Liberal Legislation’ has reconstructed juristic freedom: not as a concept in its own right, but as a part of the concept of positive freedom. The latter has become so rich that it contains the true freedom from ‘The Different Senses of Freedom’ as well as the reconstructed juristic freedom. In this section I will review the outlined problems in more detail. First, I will look at the nature of juristic freedom and explain the reasons why it is indispensable.
as a liberty concept. Then I will demonstrate the way in which positive liberty straddles two concepts of freedom: freedom as power to develop and contribute to the common good and freedom as actual engagement with moral action. The latter of these is the true freedom from ‘The Different Senses of Freedom’, but the former is the one of greater interest here. It can be seen as a superior version of juristic freedom. Phrased differently, it could be seen as a primary concept of freedom that internalises Green’s commitment to personal development and social justice. It is this concept that corresponds to Hobhouse’s liberty.

The thrust of this section is very much the opposite of the thrust of ‘The Different Senses of Freedom’ and some of its constructive interpretations. But the reason for this is that I assume, i.e., take as proven, what Green and his sympathetic critics, Peter Nicholson in particular, try to prove - the validity of his concept of true freedom. The logic of my argument is: if true freedom exists then juristic freedom is more significant than Green would be prepared to concede. So although I am moving in the opposite direction – not from juristic towards true, but from true towards juristic - and partly disagreeing with some of Green’s and Nicholson’s observations, I am also relying on their much harder achievement – the demonstration of the ontology of true freedom.

There are four observations that aim to strengthen the ambivalent, non-‘real’, status of juristic freedom. The first is about its practical function as a ‘stepping stone’ towards the attainment of true freedom; the second is its methodological function in the explanation of true freedom; the third is its political profile that is lacking from true freedom; and finally is the fact that true freedom loses some fundamental
characteristics of the primary sense of freedom: choice and opportunity. I will review these in turn. The conclusion will be that juristic freedom is not simply indispensable for the attainment of true freedom, but that it is a fundamental meaning of freedom that cannot be put aside even when true freedom is attained. True freedom may supersede juristic freedom on a personal level, from the point of view of the agent who chooses to give up juristic for the sake of true freedom, but not universally, or as a matter of principle. It is not simply one ‘stepping stone’ among others on the path to true freedom. A better analogy here will be a ‘basecamp’. Climbing the summit, that is, attaining true freedom may be the ultimate achievement, but the basecamp makes the mission a possibility. For the four reasons that will be reviewed, it is a ‘primary’ concept of freedom.

For Green, juristic freedom is ‘power to act according to preference’, while true freedom is attained when one becomes ‘what he should be, what he has it in him to be’.\(^1\) Briefly stated, juristic freedom is experienced while doing as you like, while true freedom in doing as you should.\(^2\) The two freedoms represent two consecutive stages in the development of the individual. Juristic freedom is the first kind of freedom one seeks, but once attained it ceases to provide satisfaction. It is a ‘possibility rather than a reality’.\(^3\) Until one’s capacities are fully developed and engaged in the performance of duty, he lives with ‘a consciousness of impeded energy’ as of one who is ‘for ever thwarted and held back’.\(^4\) Therefore only true freedom, experienced in the fulfilment one’s moral potential, is ‘real’ freedom: only then is freedom not about possibilities of what one could do or be, but about the reality of being and doing the maximum of what one could and should.
This relationship between juristic and true freedom gives us some idea about the scale of significance of the former. In Nicholson’s words, it ‘is subordinate to real freedom as means is subordinate to the end’, but it is ‘a part of freedom’. Is this all? If it is a means to an end, does it mean that once we attain the end, we could survive without it? Nicholson claims that juristic freedom is ‘relatively good’, while real freedom is ‘absolutely good’. I would argue that this ‘subordinate’ status goes either way: true freedom can also be seen as subordinate to juristic freedom, as the former is unthinkable without the latter. Green calls juristic freedom also freedom in the ‘primary’ sense. Isn’t there a tension in the fact that it is both ‘primary’ and ‘subordinate’? This leads us to the second observation about the methodological function of juristic freedom in the process of defining true freedom.

In the context of its methodological role, the ‘primary’ position of juristic freedom also comes to the fore. At the opening sections of ‘The Different Senses of Freedom’ Green claims that ‘every usage of the term [freedom] to express anything but a social and political relation of one man to others involves a metaphor’. The basic meaning of freedom is ‘exemption from compulsion by others’ and this fits with juristic freedom which expresses ‘the condition of a citizen of a civilized state’. This is an acknowledgement that there is a basic understanding of freedom, of which the juristic meaning is an example, and that this basic meaning serves as an anchor to all derivative meanings. Throughout his lecture, Green is consistent in demonstrating the link between the basic meaning of liberty, that reflects relations of non-compulsion, and more complex concepts, like his own, that cast freedom in terms of “the conditions of a man who is inwardly ‘master of himself’”. But in the end, it is the true freedom that is the real one, and we are again facing a tension about the status of
juristic freedom that is simultaneously the primary and the less real freedom. It must be the case that true freedom is a metaphor that acquires ontology of its own and stops being a metaphor. Green does not say this – that on analysis, true freedom should not be seen as a metaphor but as a genuine meaning of freedom – but his lecture makes the thick ontology of true freedom abundantly clear.

What could be seen as controversial, I argue, is not the raised status of true freedom from a metaphor to a real meaning, but the quiet suspension of juristic freedom from its initial status of a primary, and implicitly, real, freedom. Green’s argument took the format: we start with one real sense of freedom but end up with a different real sense of freedom. Arguably, it would not have lost potency if it took the format of: we start with one real sense of freedom but end with two. In summary, by calling true freedom a ‘metaphor’, Green acknowledges the primary status of juristic freedom in the process of revealing the nature of true freedom, but by also calling true freedom ‘real’ freedom, he not only denounces the primary nature of juristic freedom, but dismisses it even as a freedom of equal significance. This however, would undercut the credibility of true freedom. The ‘community’ of meaning between the two concepts gave vitality to the true freedom metaphor and helped its transformation into a ‘real’ concept. It would be the methodologically wrong thing to do, if subsequent to this achievement, Green were to drastically undercut the significance of juristic freedom.

The third reason to keep juristic freedom firmly in the frame is its overtly political nature. Juristic liberty has a political dimension which true liberty lacks. Here again, I am adhering to the initial terms in which Green sets out his theory. While juristic freedom expresses ‘social and political relation of one man to others’, the metaphorical senses of freedom tend to express ‘a state of the soul, as distinct from a
As the term ‘juristic’ suggests, the concept has a legal dimension. It reflects political agreements and arrangements that regulate relations between people to the effect that everybody should be allowed to do as they like so long as he or she is not impinging on the same freedom of others. Juristic freedom is a form of political achievement as it expresses ‘the condition of a citizen of a civilised state’.  

True freedom also depends on relations with others, but not in the direct sense of being constituted by other people’s abstinence from interference. It is also political, but in a moral, rather than legal fashion. Personal perfection and the fulfilment of one’s moral duty can be achieved, according to Green, only by sincere commitment to the common good. You cannot be truly free without a society which you can serve. However, you could be truly free in a society where the civil liberties are not part of the political establishment. Juristic liberty is a precondition for true liberty in the personal, but not in the political sense. You need to be able to do what you like, in order to choose voluntarily to do what you should: but all you need from the others is that they do not put obstacles to the performance of your duty, and not just to anything you may want to do. The truly free person does not have political demands for her own rights. In this sense, it is juristic freedom that has clearer and more robust political demands in terms of legislation protecting basic liberties.

Finally, juristic freedom is a fundamental sense of liberty, because true freedom, on analysis, loses some essential aspects of liberty: choice and opportunity. You are truly free when you exercise the moral choice you have already made. This is inherent in the dialectics of choice: once you make a choice, you no longer have a choice. In the case of true freedom the trade-off between having options to choose from and
consummating the choice you have made is even more pronounced. The decision to
fulfil your duty implies that you have given up the spectrum of possibilities you had
to engage in actions not conducive to the common good. It is not simply choosing one
among many like possibilities, but selecting a line of behaviour that implies giving up
anything that lacks social value. True freedom does not have the open horizon of
opportunity or of choice but the sense of accomplishment, of reaching the target, of
completion. In this context, juristic freedom acquires significance in two ways. First,
only it, as a concept of freedom, contains the availability of opportunity and choice.
True freedom may have other freedom related properties, but not these. Second, it is a
default prerequisite of true freedom, as the latter has to be freely chosen. Because
moral freedom cannot be imposed it has to be chosen in a framework of freedom that
functions as choice, that is, juristic freedom. So, in terms of its genealogy, true
freedom is by default a secondary concept as it needs the framework of a freedom that
allows choice which therefore has to be a different freedom.

In concluding the review of the status of juristic freedom, we can say that juristic
freedom is a ‘primary’ sense of freedom, not in terms of ontological superiority, but in
the four contexts specified above. I would argue that the two freedoms are equally
‘real’ and equally important, even though they supersede each other in different ways.
True freedom has the completeness and the ultimate sense of satisfaction which
juristic freedom lacks, but juristic freedom is a primary sense of freedom because it is
a vital stepping stone towards true freedom, because true freedom builds its meaning
on the foundation provided by it, because it has clear political requirements and
because it is the default setting of true freedom due to the fact that it contains the
choice and opportunity that instil ‘freedom’ in the true freedom’s moral action. It is
primary in the way a basecamp has a primary function: it does acquire meaning and
significance as an aid to climbing the summit, but it carries the resources that make an
ambition of such scale possible.

The move from ‘The Different Senses of Freedom’ to ‘Lecture on Liberal Legislation’
does not simply transfer the discussion of freedom from a philosophical to a political
context, thus spelling out the political implications of true freedom. ‘Lecture on
Liberal Legislation’ generates an enlarged concept of ‘positive’ freedom that contains
true freedom but also a brand new concept of freedom. Therefore I partly agree but
partly disagree with Nicholson who argues that in ‘Lecture on Liberal Legislation’
Green does not introduce yet another sense of freedom.24 His claim is that the
differences in the two lectures can be explained with the change of perspective, from
academic in ‘The Different Senses of Freedom’ to that of ‘a public address to a
popular audience’ that ‘has an undisguised political message’ in ‘Lecture on Liberal
Legislation’.25 Nicholson argues that although the term ‘juristic freedom’ is not
mentioned in ‘Lecture on Liberal Legislation’, the concept is still present there and in
a similar way, positive freedom is ‘sharply marked off from and contrasted with’ it.26
The following quote from Green demonstrates both the type of freedom against which
positive freedom is marked off and the breadth of meaning of positive freedom:

But when we … speak of freedom, we should consider carefully what we
mean by it. We do not mean merely freedom from restraint or compulsion.
We do not mean merely freedom to do as we like irrespectively of what it
is that we like. We do not mean a freedom that can be enjoyed by one man
or one set of men at the cost of a loss of freedom to others. When we
speak of freedom as something to be so highly prized, we mean a positive power or capacity of doing or enjoying something worth doing or enjoying, and that, too, something that we enjoy in common with others.²⁷

There are three features of the rejected freedom here: lack of restraint, ability to do as one likes and the potential to exercise this freedom in an oppressive manner. The first two features coincide with these of juristic freedom but not the last one. We could interpret this in either of the following ways. We could argue, with Nicholson, that this is in essence juristic freedom. But then the puzzling thing to observe would be that in ‘Lecture on Liberal Legislation’ Green fundamentally rejects this freedom as a legitimate one: a message that contrasts with the relatively significant function ascribed to juristic freedom in ‘The Different Senses of Freedom’. Another interpretation, however, which I am more inclined to embrace, is that the freedom Green sketches here is not juristic freedom, which corresponds to an essential stage of every man’s development, but the ‘old liberal’ freedom as defended by the laissez faire liberals. That freedom as practiced by Green’s opponents in ‘Lecture on Liberal Legislation’ ²⁸ displays a feature which juristic freedom does not: its exploitative nature. So while juristic freedom is normatively neutral, the old liberal freedom is unjust. It could be argued that it is the latter that Green denounces, while the former he simply does not bring into the analysis. My claim is that juristic freedom has sneakily re-entered the picture but in an enriched format: as a concept that has internalised the metaphysics of personal development and the concern with social justice.
Let us turn to the description of positive freedom and try to put together its features. The other two shorthand definitions offered in ‘Lecture on Liberal Legislation’ are these: ‘the ideal of true freedom is the maximum of power for all members of human society alike to make the best of themselves’ and ‘freedom in the positive sense [is] the liberation of the powers of all men equally for contributions to a common good’. We can see from these quotes that positive freedom is a broad church. We can list several features: (1) it is about power or ability to do worthwhile things; (2) power or ability to make the best of yourself; (3) power or ability to contribute to the common good; (4) about liberating others; (5 and 6) enjoying liberty ‘together with others’, which could be read as both ‘in a non-exploitative manner’ and ‘in a manner conducive to increasing the liberty of others’. There is a common characteristic to all these features, namely commitment to personal development and social justice. We could also make the case that there are two overall concepts here: the first is the true freedom familiar from ‘The Different Senses of Freedom’ which is captured by the features 4, 5 and 6, and the other is freedom as ability to develop oneself and to conduct moral action, as captured by features 1, 2 and 3. For clarity we could call the first positive/true freedom and the second, positive/ability freedom.

By doing this, we are not undermining Green’s project to construct a sense of freedom that internalises social justice. It can be demonstrated that both positive freedoms internalise social justice, but each in a different way. Positive/true freedom achieves this in a more straightforward manner. True freedom by definition is freedom committed to moral action, and moral action is linked to social justice. Moral action is service to the common good and Green’s understanding of common good is inclusive of social justice. By being truly free you are, by default, looking after the wellbeing
of others, as this is constitutive of moral action. A truly free person not only does not do unjust things, but he does things conducive to a fairer society. So being truly free and enjoying your freedom together with others are naturally congruent.

It is a much bigger challenge to align ability-based freedom with social justice and we could say that therefore Green had a good reason to drop juristic freedom out of the freedom framework altogether. But arguably this is exactly what Green has accomplished with the concept of positive/ability freedom. The big achievement in ‘Lecture on Liberal Legislation’ is not only its demonstration of how true freedom can yield social benefits, but the articulation of a concept that brings together a primary meaning of freedom and commitment to social justice. How has Green accomplished that? How does a primary, ability-based, concept of freedom, internalise social justice? This is achieved in two ways.

First, the positive/ability freedom internalises social justice in its specific formulation. It is not simply ability to do as you like, but ability to make the best of yourself and to contribute to the common good. The concept is based on an understanding of human agency as capable of moral perfection, where moral perfection implies service to social justice. But there is a difference from positive/true freedom here: the latter is about success in achieving moral perfection, while the former is about the possibility of this achievement. Strictly speaking, however, ability to contribute to the common good is also ability not to contribute to it. It could be argued that ability to do as you like is not categorically different from ability to develop and that therefore, the positive/ability concept is closer to the juristic concept than Green would be prepared to admit. Juristic freedom’s ability to do as you like covers the ability to pursue
spiritual growth and moral perfection. An ability based concept is an open ended concept: it implies choice and opportunity and, in theory, should not limit the spectrum of this choice. Later, in the discussion of Hobhouse’s liberty, we will see that Hobhouse recognises that the concept of liberty as ability for growth cannot place conditions on the direction of this growth.

Therefore, the second way in which the positive/ability concept internalises social justice is arguably the more important one. This second way, however, also demonstrates that it is different from the positive/true freedom concept. The thrust of Green’s argument in ‘Lecture on Liberal Legislation’ is that our freedom is not entirely in our own hands but also in the hands of society. Freedom as ability to do things is not something all of us have by default. By default, some have a lot of it and some very little, or even none. If society and government do nothing, some would be significantly deprived of freedom. So freedom as the ability to do as you like depends on social arrangements that aim at a just society. Green, as we know, sets the bar higher than that: in ‘Lecture on Liberal Legislation’ freedom in not simply ability to do as you like, but ability to develop and be morally good. Although, as I argued in the previous paragraph, these two cannot be seen as categorically different, the point to be made is that making sure that people are free is a high call. By specifying the kinds of things we may ‘like’- not simply anything, but personal moral development – Green wants to show that we are very far from being able to claim that people are free to do as they like. In other words, the pressure to provide the conditions for freedom is even higher. People are not free to do as they like, and given the knowledge of the complexity of what they may like, i.e., moral perfection, the nature of social action aiding people’s freedom has to be much more carefully thought through.
Positive/ability freedom internalises social justice through the emphasis on the provision of socially just conditions: ‘it is the business of the state, not indeed directly to promote moral goodness, for that, from the very nature of moral goodness, it cannot do, but to maintain the conditions without which a free exercise of human faculties is impossible’. Green’s emphasis, however, is not merely on the provision of conditions, but on the creation of a socially just environment. In a situation of scarcity, one cannot exercise freely his faculties. Related to this but also in addition to it, in circumstances of exploitation, one is not likely to develop moral agency: labour should not be sold under conditions of free contract ‘which make it impossible for the person selling it ever to become a free contributor to social good in any form’.

This second way in which positive/ability freedom internalises social justice demonstrates that it is a different concept from true freedom. The arguments in its defence focus on the social arrangements for the provision of the conditions of freedom, and not on the actual engagement with moral action. Interestingly, it is an argument advancing new liberal legislation, that is, a legal provision for freedom, thus supporting our case that positive/ability freedom is a form of juristic freedom.

Different critics of Green have read Green’s positive freedom exclusively as a positive/ability concept or as a positive/true one. Not surprisingly, they have reached conclusions that directly clash with each other. For example, Baldwin and Nicholson (the latter to an extent) have interpreted Green’s positive freedom as positive/true one and on that ground have offered strong challenge to MacCallum’s claim that all freedoms are of the same format and therefore there is no such thing as a second concept of freedom. Simhony, on the other hand, interprets Green’s positive
freedom in terms of ‘ability’ and, interestingly, she finds MacCallum’s triadic reading of liberty acceptable and helpful. For her, Green’s achievement is not to be found in the articulation of a second liberty concept, but in the construction of a superior main concept. The interpretation offered here reconciles these two readings. They are both correct, but it is important to acknowledge the two aspects of Green’s positive liberty together. Green’s positive/true freedom is a distinct meaning of freedom that differs from all primary meanings, because unlike them it does not contain choice and opportunity and unlike them it is based on the experience of achievement and completion. It could not exist as the sole meaning of freedom however, as it can only come to existence in the context of a primary concept that contains opportunity and possibility. But in addition to outlining a distinct second meaning of freedom, Green lays the foundation of a new primary concept of freedom that supersedes other primary concepts that lacked engagement with social justice and developmental understanding of personality. It could be argued that positive/true freedom made positive/ability freedom possible. The former laid out the normative framework within which the latter was generated.

3. Hobhouse and liberty

Green’s positive/true and positive/ability freedoms provide the background against which we can explain the novelty and significance of Hobhouse’s concept of liberty. To start with, it is a form of positive/ability freedom combining the following features: it is a primary concept in the sense that it contains choice and opportunity and it does internalise concerns with social justice and developmental understanding of human agency. It is a concept that has emerged within the horizon of positive/true
freedom, yet it is not Green’s true freedom. Hobhouse’s is a more clear-cut concept of liberty with more clear-cut social implications. His concept does not cover simultaneously two distinct meanings of liberty. In terms of social implications, the two thinkers share some basic convictions, but Hobhouse takes them a step further.36 Both believe that the state should not interfere with the moral reasoning of individuals but should provide conditions that help them exercise their liberty. Yet while Green goes as far as recommending new liberal legislation regulating work and land tenancy contracts, Hobhouse advocates various forms of economic redistribution. It is for this reason, I have chosen to name his concept ‘liberty as welfare’. This naming does not give direct credit to the developmental and social justice implications, but acknowledges them indirectly by emphasising the role of state action and the need for economic support, and by its focus on personal wellbeing. It also highlights the innovative aspect of Hobhouse’s thought as it recognises him as the forerunner of one of the most significant twentieth century developments – the welfare state.37

One way to explain the difference between Green’s and Hobhouse’s concepts of liberty would be through the following observation. While Green places all the key ingredients of liberty – personal growth, social justice, commitment to common good and the provision of the conditions for liberty – at the side of the fulfilled individual, Hobhouse places them at the side of the not yet fulfilled individual. And while Green puts all these ingredients inside his positive/true freedom, Hobhouse does not. His liberty concept is relatively simple – ability for growth. The conditions for that liberty are not part and parcel of the very concept, unlike the case with Green’s true freedom. The diagram (see Figure 1) demonstrates the juxtaposition of the two concepts. The main difference is to do with the agent of liberty. Depending on whether he/she is the
developing individual or the developed individual – the individual who has achieved his or her moral potential – we have either liberty as welfare or positive/true liberty concept. And depending on this location, the different ingredients of liberty interlink in a different way, as explained in the two tables of the diagram (see Figure 1 at the end of the document).

This section has two parts. Part one examines in more detail the links that constitute Hobhouse’s theory of liberty: firstly the link between liberty and personal growth and secondly, between liberty and the provision of its conditions. The latter may not be part of his concept of liberty, but they are part of his overall theory. The analysis of the conditions for liberty has significant public policy implications as it offers the much needed specifications of the general guidelines left by Green. Part two brings attention to three arguments that demonstrate Hobhouse’s commitment to a primary, opportunity based, concept of liberty: his distinction between rights and duties, his critique of Bosanquet’s metaphysics and his critique of socialists who abandon the liberty of old liberalism.

Hobhouse’s understanding of liberty is shaped around his understanding of human agency and the potential for growth is the definitive feature of the latter. The belief that liberalism is the best creed is based on the belief that human personality is the greatest social capital. ‘Liberalism is the belief that society can safely be founded on [the] self-directing power of personality’. The human ability to develop, to grow, to exceed what one is in any current moment, implies both potential strength and current vulnerability. Investment in the individual is worthy as it will convert into some benefit – either only personal or both personal and social. The common good consists
in helping individuals develop, or in what amounts to the same, in supporting everyone’s liberty. ‘The common good … is founded on personality, and postulates free scope for development of personality in each member of the community.’ But the ability to develop also implies vulnerability, due to the complexity of human personality and the fragility of personal growth: ‘human personality is that within which lives and grows, which can be destroyed but cannot be made, which cannot be taken to pieces and repaired, but can be placed under conditions in which it will flourish and expand, or, if it is diseased, under conditions in which it will heal itself under its own recuperative powers’. We can understand the importance of liberty once we understand the nature of personal growth. Liberty is a personal necessity that carries massive potential for social benefits. Therefore, attending to personal liberty is at the same time a social investment. ‘Liberty then becomes not so much a right of the individual as a necessity of society.’

If the first step is explaining the significance of liberty – it is based on ‘the idea of growth’ – the next step is to see what it takes to obtain liberty. And Hobhouse’s vision of personal growth sketches this rather well. Liberty is as complex and subtle as the process of development. We are not free by default. The fulfilment of our potential relies on personal effort and availability of certain conditions. We could classify these conditions in three categories: material or economic conditions, socially just environment and ethical and functional social institutions. Hobhouse believed that ‘it was the duty of the State to secure the conditions of the self-maintenance for the normal healthy citizen’, by firstly ‘providing access to the means of production’, and secondly, by ‘guaranteeing the individual a certain share of the common stock’. Hobhouse’s specific recommendations included provision of the right to work, a
living wage, state tenancy and state aided insurance, among others. He distinguishes his ideas from what he calls ‘Mechanical Socialism’ and ‘Official Socialism’ and brands his own ‘Economic Liberalism’.

Material conditions, however, are not enough. A socially just environment is needed as well. Although both Green and Hobhouse factor the importance of fair social arrangements, the demand for ‘equality’ is more vocally made by Hobhouse: ‘a liberty without equality’ he claims, ‘is a name of noble sound and squalid result’. But both thinkers make the same argument about the link between liberty and social justice: social inequality leads to exploitation and thus to drastic deprivation of liberty. Both believe that ‘freedom of contract’ and generally, ideas of liberty that ignore social justice, ‘allow the stronger party to coerce the weaker’.

Finally, the conditions of liberty include ethical and efficient social institutions: institutions that embody the moral ideas, and contain the general will, that will allow them to effectively foster liberty. Both of these – the dedication to a particular moral creed and the uniformity of will in serving this creed – have been seen as controversial, illiberal, aspects of Hobhouse’s philosophy. Collini, for example, has argued that, all things considered, Hobhouse is a moral collectivist. But even here, Hobhouse is consistent with his overall argument. Firstly, the level of moral commitment to the liberal ideal is likely to secure a wider scope of personal liberty. In *Democracy and Reaction*, he makes the following point:

> In the lowest societies custom is tyrannical, and there is little scope for individual divergences from the normal type, yet the conception of a
common good is narrow and the means of maintaining order small. In the higher society the requirements of the common good are supreme, yet the establishment of civil order gives more free play to individuality.\textsuperscript{49}

Secondly, the uniformity of will is part and parcel of the efficiency and the legitimacy of the social coercion exerted in the name of liberty.\textsuperscript{50} The coercion that the institutions will be allowed to exert would be constitutive of and not counterproductive to growth: the limits to the value of coercion lie ‘in the conditions of personal life’ as ‘[n]o force can compel growth’ and ‘[t]he function of the State coercion is to override individual coercion’.\textsuperscript{51} Institutions need to embody the ethical ideal of the value of personal growth. Collini’s accusation of ‘moral collectivism’ is based on a unwarranted conflation of the commitment to the common good and collectivism. He fails to acknowledge the contents of the common good – promotion of the value of personal growth - and the mechanism through which it works – a voluntary adoption of its values.

Overall, looking at the constitution of Hobhouse’s liberty, we can say that Hobhouse draws heavily from the resources of British idealism, but he also manages to diminish one of its controversial outcomes: the limitation of the scope of personal liberty resulting from its strong association with morality. Hobhouse’s liberty is associated with the process of growth and not with its actual fulfilment as displayed in moral perfection. And although Collini is right to say that Hobhouse adopts all the main moral values of British idealism, he fails to give him credit for shaping up a distinct concept of liberty. For Hobhouse, the complexity of our personal needs translates into a complex state system for provision of economic conditions and fair social
environment, but not into a complex concept of liberty. In the remainder of this section I will demonstrate that Hobhouse makes the point of distinguishing liberty as an open-ended concept allowing diversity of choice, from values that are closely associated with specific moral actions.

In his *Elements of Social Justice* Hobhouse defines liberty in terms of rights, where the opposition he establishes between rights and duties, makes it clear that opportunity and choice are main elements of liberty. 52

But the bare idea of right is essential to liberty, for it is the distinctive value of a right (as opposed to a prescribed duty) that it is a basis upon which its possessor constructs his own course of action having therein a measure of initiative and free choice. 53

In the footnote to this section he adds ‘Liberty of conscience has as its obverse the obligation of consciousness’. 54 So although Hobhouse advocates significant state involvement in the provision of the conditions for liberty, and that this will entail extra duties for all citizens, liberty should not be seen in terms of duties. What is distinctive about liberty has to be preserved. Freedom does not encompass all social values – it is ‘only one side of social life’. ‘Collective action’ is as important as ‘personal freedom’ but they are nonetheless two different things. 55

Seeing liberty as rights and not as duties, allows one to argue that liberty is a finite, personal good. There is a limit to how much equal provisions and protections all of us can get. This is not the case with true freedom which is achieved in the actual
performance of duty. There is no principal limit to how much true freedom we can exercise through moral action. Liberty as duty unlike liberty as rights does not rely on provision of resources. The lack of competitiveness in the pursuit of true freedom is one of its virtues, as Green teaches us in his discussion of the common good. By contrast, Hobhouse makes it clear that liberties seen in terms of rights could be mutually exclusive. ‘Political liberty, so often spoken of as a guarantee to the individual of his other rights, in reality secures very little to the individual as such, precisely because it has to be shared with so many.’

The following statement made in The Elements of Social Justice demonstrates best the common root as well as the difference between Hobhouse’s liberty and true freedom: ‘The ultimate foundation of liberty, then, is that it is a condition of spiritual growth. The price we pay for it is that so far as a man is free to do right he is also free to do wrong.’ This links back to the comment I made earlier about Green’s positive/ability freedom. It was defined in terms of ability to make the best of yourself and serve the common good, but I argued that in principle the ability to do good is the same as the ability to do anything you like. Hobhouse makes this point explicitly. ‘He cannot be free to make the best of himself without also being free to reject the best, and those who seem to suggest the contrary are, I fear, trying to get the best of two incompatible worlds.’

We can find more evidence in support of the claim that Hobhouse sees liberty as a primary concept, that embraces choice and opportunity, in his critique of Bosanquet’s metaphysics. The Metaphysical Theory of the State demonstrates Hobhouse’s conviction that some aspects of the British idealist moral philosophy may threaten the
values of diversity and spontaneity. Hobhouse criticises Bosanquet’s notion of the
general will because it is based on the argument that all rational desires are
simultaneously desires to serve the common good. For Hobhouse, personal desires are
more complex than that: they may be rational but lacking in obvious social value. He
claims that one is free ‘not because the social will is his own, but because he has as
much scope for expression as any one man can have if all are to have it and yet live
and act together’.60 Hobhouse’s critique of Bosanquet’s metaphysics is both puzzling
and insightful. It is puzzling because, in essence, he targets one of the core ideas of
British idealism: the possible identity between the personal good and the common
good, which is constitutive of moral action and true freedom respectively. Hobhouse’s
attack on Bosanquet’s general will is by the same token an attack on the British
idealist phenomenology of moral action. We have already demonstrated, however, the
significant degree to which Hobhouse’s theory of liberty is founded on British idealist
philosophy.61

Hobhouse’s critique, however, is also insightful and can be interpreted as setting a
direction in which the British idealist moral philosophy could be constructively
revised. His argument is complex, but its basic thrust is along the following lines. The
adoption of the general will, or, which is the same, commitment to moral action, does
suppress a spectrum of alternative personal choices. And while the British idealists
would argue that these alternative choices lack social and moral value and their
suppression will not constitute significant loss, Hobhouse observes that some of these
alternative choices are also valuable. The problem is that our concept of duty is
largely based on conventional moral norms. Therefore the fact that some of our
personal desires clash with conventional morality is not sufficient to delegitimize
them. These, allegedly non-moral, desires carry value in terms of personal self-expression, in terms of experimentation towards articulating new moral norms, and in terms of an opportunity to construct a personal interpretation of social value. In essence, Hobhouse’s argument in *The Metaphysical Theory of the State* is a subtle critique of the concept of true freedom. He does not negate the possibility of seeing duty as a form of self-expression, and therefore, freedom, but he emphasises the likelihood that duty embodies conventional morality and as such carries the potential to suppress socially unrecognised forms of self-expression. Hobhouse calls the latter ‘personal conscience’.\(^\text{62}\) The defenders of British idealism, myself including, could plausibly argue that, seen in the Hobhousian way, personal conscience is a form of true freedom. Yet Hobhouse’s message here is that true freedom hides unrecognised threats to personal liberty, due to the fact that duty, commonly understood, is based on conventional morality and not on processes of personal experimentation.

Finally, a look into the way Hobhouse manoeuvred one of his principal dilemmas – that between liberalism and socialism - will give us further evidence about the nature of his liberty concept. The balance Hobhouse draws between the two ‘creeds’ is representative of his own, not very different from the British idealist, reconciliation between the demands of personal liberty, on the one hand, and the demands of the social institutions that can create conditions for liberty. It is a difficult reconciliation, because due to the complex nature of liberty, the provisions for it rely on an economically and socially active State. So for Hobhouse, the liberal creed provides the explanation and defence of liberty, while the socialist creed provides the vision of the type of society that can effectively administer the economic conditions and social justice needed to secure liberty.\(^\text{63}\) The liberalism Hobhouse espouses and which he so
elegantly reconciles with socialism is ‘new liberalism’ - a liberalism that has overcome the old individualistic concept of liberty, and in the process has moved very close to socialism. However, one of the differences between Hobhouse, as a new liberal, and the socialists is to be found in their attitude towards old liberalism. Although Hobhouse was proud that ‘the teachings of Green and the enthusiasm of Toynbee were setting Liberalism free from the shackles of an individualist conception of liberty’ he also made it clear that whoever thought that ‘the work of old Liberalism was done’ was making ‘a too hasty assumption’.64 The socialists, on the other hand, had no hankerings for the old liberalism. And this, Hobhouse argued, had some undesirable political implications, as he saw a link between the full dismissal of the old liberal ideals and the Imperialism of late nineteenth and early twentieth century. ‘The socialistic development of Liberalism paved the way for Imperialism by diminishing the credit of the school which had stood most stoutly for the doctrines of liberty, fair dealing, and forbearance in international affairs.’65

The earlier discussion of Green’s positive freedom highlighted Green’s uncompromising rejection of the old liberal freedom in his ‘Lecture on Liberal Legislation’. This rejection contrasted with his explicit acknowledgement of the continuity between the early and the current liberal cause66 and also with his appreciation of the role and pace of juristic freedom in ‘The Different Senses of Freedom’. It could be argued that his dismissal of both old liberal and juristic freedom in ‘Lecture on Liberal Legislation’ demonstrates the uncertainty of his commitment to a primary concept of freedom. Along these lines, we could say that Hobhouse’s critique of those who dismiss unconditionally old liberalism is also an evidence of his
success in developing a new concept of freedom that remains nonetheless an opportunity concept.

Conclusion

Richard Bellamy claims that although Hobhouse’s *Liberalism* was seen as ‘the best formulation of the new English liberalism’, it is not ‘a timeless statement of liberal ideas’ as his ‘alignment with liberalism had been far from automatic’.67 This, I believe, demonstrates how radical was the development marked by new liberalism. To a contemporary reader, Hobhouse comes across as someone closer to the socialist than the liberal creed. In a similar vein of thought, one can point out that his concept of liberty is rather different from the classical ‘negative’ concepts of Berlinian, Hayekean, even Rawlsian type. Associating liberty with the provision of economic conditions and socially just environment has been seen as a feature of a positive concept of liberty. This paper aims to demonstrate that although Hobhouse’s liberty is founded on British idealist moral and political philosophy, it is a distinct concept, different from T.H.Green’s positive freedom in particular. I think it can be seen in terms of ‘welfare’ as it simultaneously achieves the following things: 1) internalises commitment to social justice; 2) remains a primary, opportunity, concept and 3) develops Green’s social theory further by making a clear case for the need of the state’s economic intervention.

The reading of Hobhouse’s liberty as ‘welfare’ offered here is similar to Avital Simhony’s reading of Green’s liberty as ‘capabilities and opportunities’.68 I have demonstrated, however, the way in which Green’s positive freedom straddles two
meanings of liberty which I have called positive/ability and positive/true freedoms: so Simhony’s reading accounts for only a half of Green’s positive freedom. It is the positive/ability freedom that corresponds to Hobhouse’s liberty as welfare. The downside - the numerous benefits set aside - of Green’s theorisation of positive freedom is that positive/true freedom casts a shadow on the positive/ability one, by making his position on a primary concept of freedom uncertain and by containing hidden threats to constructive forms of self-expression.

It would be a subject of another paper whether Hobhouse’s theorisation of liberty is deficient due to the lack of a second liberty concept. I would argue there, it is, but the benefit of this lack is that there is no shadow over his concept and it manages to stay firmly a primary one.

NOTES


Hobhouse’s *Liberalism* was published in 1911.


DSF, p. 241; pp 240-1.


DSF, p. 241.

DSF, p. 241.

Nicholson, The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists, p. 121.

Ibid., p. 119.

DSF, p. 229.

DSF, p. 229; p. 240.

DSF, p. 240.


DSF, p. 228; p. 352.

DSF, p. 240. On the idea that juristic freedom represents a stage of social development see Nicholson’s discussion of Green’s senses of freedom as reflecting ‘Hegel’s three moments of the will’, The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists, p. 120.


Nicholson, The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists, p. 121.

Ibid., p. 121.

Ibid., p. 121.

LLL, p. 199.

In LLL Green defends newly proposed liberal legislation aiming to restrict freedom of contract and protect the rights of workers and land tenants, and to restrict the free sale of alcohol. The opponents of this legislation objected to it by claiming that it undermined freedom. Green’s argument is that his opponents’ reading of freedom was faulty and that the correctly understood freedom should be along the positive concept he sketches.

Ibid., p. 201.

See Baldwin, ‘MacCallum and the Two Concepts of Freedom’. He argues that Green’s conceptualisation of positive freedom offers the most successful challenge to MacCallum’s argument, as Green’s positive freedom cannot be seen as an opportunity concept. Nicholson makes the same point: ‘To be negatively free it is enough to have opportunity to act: to be really free you must exercise the opportunity in a particular way.’ (*The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists*, p. 124).

See Simhony, ‘Beyond Positive and Negative Freedom: T.H.Green’s View of Freedom’, pp. 30, 36-8, 40-2. She makes a number of claims that resonate with the argument developed here: that the most significant and innovative aspect of Green’s conceptualisation of freedom is the focus on ability, as this challenges the mainstream individualistic reading of liberty as distinct from ability (p. 30); that both juristic and positive freedom are based on ability (p. 37); that after analysing the nature of internal and external abilities we can make the claim that Green’s positive freedom is about ‘opportunities and capacities’ (p. 38, p. 41).

Gerald MacCallum, ‘Negative and Positive Freedom’, *Philosophical Review* 76 (1967) 312-34. MacCallum argues that all kinds of freedom have essentially identical, triadic formal structure, the three elements of which are the agents, the lack of obstacles and the objectives they have. Simply put, all freedoms are both ‘from’ and ‘to’, therefore no freedom is exclusively negative or exclusively positive.


*Liberalism*, p. 6.

Ibid., p. 70.

Ibid., pp. 65-6.
41 Ibid., p. 66.

42 Ibid., p. 66.

43 Ibid., p. 91. See also Dimova-Cookson, ‘Welfarist and Moral Justifications of the Strong State: Reconciling Hobhouse’s and Bosanquet’s Perspectives on the Role of the State’.

44 Liberalism, pp. 83, 92, 93.


46 Liberalism, p. 48.

47 Ibid., p. 75.


49 Hobhouse, Democracy and Reaction (London, T, Fisher Unwin, 1904), p. 111. Hereafter DR. See also Hobhouse’s Social Evolution and Political Theory (New York, The Columbia University Press, 1911) where he argues that the modern state ‘exhibits the most complete reconciliation yet achieved on the large scale of social cooperation with the freedom and spontaneity of the component individuals, localities, and nationalities’. (p. 148)

50 Liberalism, p. 78.

51 Ibid., p. 77, p. 78.


53 Ibid., p. 91.

54 Ibid., p. 92.

55 Liberalism, p. 67.

56 See Green’s discussion of the non-competitive nature of the common good in Prolegomena to Ethics, Book 3, section 245.

57 ESJ, p. 97.

58 Ibid., p. 75.

59 Ibid., p. 75.


62 MTS, pp. 90-1.

63 DR, pp. 226-7.


65 DR, p. 12.

66 LLL, p. 196.

67 Bellamy, Liberalism and Modern Society, p. 49.

## Growth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agent of liberty</th>
<th>The individual in process of development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of liberty</td>
<td>Hobhouse: liberty as welfare &lt;br&gt; Green: positive/ability freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral contents/Common Good</td>
<td>Present through the provision of the conditions for liberty; also present in the agent of liberty but only in potential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Justice</td>
<td>Provided by the conditions for liberty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agent of liberty</th>
<th>The developed individual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of liberty</td>
<td>Green: positive/true freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral contents/Common Good</td>
<td>Delivered by the agent of liberty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Justice</td>
<td>Provided by the agent of liberty as part of his/her moral action</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>