K. Kamei
Reputation Transmission without Benefit to the Reporter: a Behavioral Underpinning of Markets in Experimental Focus
Kamei, K.; Putterman, L.
Authors
L. Putterman
Abstract
Reputation is a commonly cited check on opportunism, but it is often unclear what motivates an agent to report another's behavior when it is easy for the aggrieved individual to move on. In a sharply focused laboratory experiment, we find that many cooperators pay to report a defecting partner without the possibility of pecuniary benefit when this has the potential to deprive the latter of future gains and to help his next partner. We illustrate how a social preference can explain such costly reporting, and also discuss evidence for a role of emotions. (JEL C91, D03, D63)
Citation
Kamei, K., & Putterman, L. (2018). Reputation Transmission without Benefit to the Reporter: a Behavioral Underpinning of Markets in Experimental Focus. Economic Inquiry, 56(1), 158-172. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12477
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Acceptance Date | May 9, 2017 |
Online Publication Date | Aug 10, 2017 |
Publication Date | Jan 1, 2018 |
Deposit Date | May 10, 2017 |
Publicly Available Date | Aug 10, 2018 |
Journal | Economic Inquiry |
Print ISSN | 0095-2583 |
Electronic ISSN | 1465-7295 |
Publisher | Wiley |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 56 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 158-172 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12477 |
Public URL | https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1387720 |
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Copyright Statement
This is the accepted version of the following article: Kamei, K. & Putterman, L. (2018). Reputation Transmission without Benefit to the Reporter: a Behavioral Underpinning of Markets in Experimental Focus. Economic Inquiry, 56(1): 158-172, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12477. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
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