K. Kamei
Endogenous Reputation Formation under the Shadow of the Future
Kamei, K.
Authors
Abstract
Recent research has shown that making people’s decisions known to others may enhance cooperation in infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games with random matching. This paper experimentally studies whether people can cooperate with each other by endogenously showing their identities and building cooperative reputations when there is an option to hide the identities. Our experiment shows that a non-negligible fraction of subjects choose to conceal their identities and accordingly subjects fail to cooperate with each other in communities if hiding is cost-free. However, almost all subjects disclose their identities and successfully achieve cooperation if a cost is charged for the act of hiding. This finding has a broad methodological implication for the study of reputation mechanisms when infinitely repeated games are used in an experiment, as people’s behavior may be determined by their ability to hide identities.
Citation
Kamei, K. (2017). Endogenous Reputation Formation under the Shadow of the Future. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 142, 189-204. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.012
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Acceptance Date | Jul 11, 2017 |
Online Publication Date | Jul 18, 2017 |
Publication Date | Jul 18, 2017 |
Deposit Date | Jul 12, 2017 |
Publicly Available Date | Jan 18, 2019 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization |
Print ISSN | 0167-2681 |
Publisher | Elsevier |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 142 |
Pages | 189-204 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.012 |
Public URL | https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1382614 |
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Copyright Statement
© 2017 This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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