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Endogenous Reputation Formation under the Shadow of the Future

Kamei, K.

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Authors

K. Kamei



Abstract

Recent research has shown that making people’s decisions known to others may enhance cooperation in infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games with random matching. This paper experimentally studies whether people can cooperate with each other by endogenously showing their identities and building cooperative reputations when there is an option to hide the identities. Our experiment shows that a non-negligible fraction of subjects choose to conceal their identities and accordingly subjects fail to cooperate with each other in communities if hiding is cost-free. However, almost all subjects disclose their identities and successfully achieve cooperation if a cost is charged for the act of hiding. This finding has a broad methodological implication for the study of reputation mechanisms when infinitely repeated games are used in an experiment, as people’s behavior may be determined by their ability to hide identities.

Citation

Kamei, K. (2017). Endogenous Reputation Formation under the Shadow of the Future. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 142, 189-204. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.012

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Jul 11, 2017
Online Publication Date Jul 18, 2017
Publication Date Jul 18, 2017
Deposit Date Jul 12, 2017
Publicly Available Date Jan 18, 2019
Journal Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Print ISSN 0167-2681
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 142
Pages 189-204
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.012
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1382614

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