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Durham Research Online
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Credit ratings and managerial voluntary disclosures.

He, G. (2018) 'Credit ratings and managerial voluntary disclosures.', Financial review., 53 (2). pp. 337-378.

Abstract

This study investigates whether managers influence credit ratings via voluntary disclosures. I find that firms near a rating change have a higher incidence of a disclosure regarding product and business expansion (PBE) plans. This finding is more evident for firms that are subject to lower proprietary costs of disclosures, which implies that managers do trade off both the benefits and costs of the disclosures. I find no evidence that firms close to a rating change selectively release good news or suppress bad news on PBE. Overall, my results suggest that firms generally exhibit a credible commitment to maintaining disclosure transparency for a desired credit rating.

Item Type:Article
Full text:Publisher-imposed embargo until 02 April 2020.
(AM) Accepted Manuscript
First Live Deposit - 05 December 2017
File format - PDF
(1010Kb)
Status:Peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12149
Publisher statement:This is the accepted version of the following article: He, G. (2018). Credit ratings and managerial voluntary disclosures. The Financial Review 53(2): 337-378, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12149. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
Record Created:05 Dec 2017 10:43
Last Modified:05 Apr 2018 09:43

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