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Dis-positioning Euthyphro

Page, Ben T.

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Authors

Ben T. Page



Abstract

The Euthyphro objection is often perceived, rightly or wrongly, as the king objection to theistic meta-ethics. This paper proposes a response that hasn’t been much explored within the contemporary literature, based on the metaphysics of dispositions and natural law theory. The paper will first contend that there is a parallel between ways theists conceptualise God’s role in creating laws of nature and the ways God creates goods. Drawing upon these parallels I propose a possible response to the dilemma, where this response parallels the dispositionalist response as to how God creates laws of nature. I do this by first explicating a natural law theory of goodness, then suggesting how the ontology of dispositions can be used in a novel way to account for goods, and finally by explaining how all this relates to the dilemma. I conclude the paper by posing some objections to myself and providing some replies.

Citation

Page, B. T. (2017). Dis-positioning Euthyphro. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 84(1), 31-55. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-017-9632-3

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date May 25, 2017
Deposit Date Feb 27, 2018
Publicly Available Date Feb 27, 2018
Journal International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
Print ISSN 0020-7047
Electronic ISSN 1572-8684
Publisher Springer
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 84
Issue 1
Pages 31-55
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-017-9632-3

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Publisher Licence URL
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Copyright Statement
Advance online version © The Author(s) 2017. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.





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