Cookies

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. You can change your cookie settings at any time. Otherwise, we'll assume you're OK to continue.


Durham Research Online
You are in:

Optimal taxation with Cournot oligopoly.

Reinhorn, L. J. (2005) 'Optimal taxation with Cournot oligopoly.', B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy : advances., 5 (1). p. 6.

Abstract

This paper studies optimal linear taxation in a general equilibrium model with Cournot oligopoly. The main result is the following. With imperfect competition the tendency toward “inverse elasticities” tax rules will be weakened and may even be reversed. That is, an upward sloping relationship may exist between an industry’s optimal tax rate and its own-price elasticity of demand, unlike the perfectly competitive case.

Item Type:Article
Keywords:Optimal taxation, Cournot oligopoly.
Full text:PDF - Published Version (303Kb)
Status:Peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/2005.html
Publisher statement:Copyright c 2005 by the authors. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher, bepress, which has been given certain exclusive rights by the author. Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy is produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://www.bepress.com/bejeap
Record Created:18 Aug 2008
Last Modified:19 Aug 2011 09:50

Social bookmarking: del.icio.usConnoteaBibSonomyCiteULikeFacebookTwitterExport: EndNote, Zotero | BibTex
Usage statisticsLook up in GoogleScholar | Find in a UK Library