On the efficiency of the first price auction

Hernando-Veciana, Ángel; Michelucci, Fabio

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.003

On the efficiency of the first price auction

Hernando-Veciana, Ángel; Michelucci, Fabio

Authors

Professor Angel Hernando-Veciana angel.hernando-veciana@durham.ac.uk
Visiting Professor

Fabio Michelucci

Abstract

We provide a natural setting in privatizations in which the equilibrium of the first price auction gives greater expected surplus than any equilibrium of the open ascending auction.

Citation

Hernando-Veciana, Á., & Michelucci, F. (2017). On the efficiency of the first price auction. Economics Letters, 156, 159-161. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.003

Journal Article Type	Article
Acceptance Date	May 5, 2017
Online Publication Date	May 15, 2017
Publication Date	Jul 1, 2017
Deposit Date	Jun 15, 2018
Publicly Available Date	Nov 15, 2018
Journal	Economics Letters
Print ISSN	0165-1765
Publisher	Elsevier
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	156
Pages	159-161
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.003
Public URL	https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1328880

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Publisher Licence URL
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Copyright Statement
© 2017 This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/