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Second best efficiency and the English auction

Hernando-Veciana, Ángel; Michelucci, Fabio

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Authors

Fabio Michelucci



Abstract

We study the second best in a single unit sale to two bidders. This is the allocation that maximizes the expected social surplus subject to the biddersʼ incentive compatible constraints when the first best is not implementable. We prove that Maskinʼs (1992) result that any first best allocation that is deterministic and monotone can be implemented with the English auction carries over to the second best.

Citation

Hernando-Veciana, Á., & Michelucci, F. (2011). Second best efficiency and the English auction. Games and Economic Behavior, 73(2), 496-506. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.04.003

Journal Article Type Article
Online Publication Date Apr 21, 2011
Publication Date Nov 1, 2011
Deposit Date Jun 15, 2018
Publicly Available Date Mar 28, 2024
Journal Games and Economic Behavior
Print ISSN 0899-8256
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 73
Issue 2
Pages 496-506
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.04.003
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1324087

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