The Role of Visibility on Third Party Punishment Actions for the Enforcement of Social Norms

Kamei, K.

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2018.07.043

The Role of Visibility on Third Party Punishment Actions for the Enforcement of Social Norms

Kamei, K.

Authors

K. Kamei

Abstract

This paper presents results from a prisoner’s dilemma game experiment with a third party punisher. Third party punishment was frequently observed, in line with previous studies. Despite the prevalence of punishment, having one third party punisher in a group did not make one’s defection materially unbeneficial because of the weak punishment intensity observed. When a third party player’s action choice was made known to another third party player in a different group, however, third party punishment was sufficiently strong to transform the dilemma’s incentive structure into a coordination game, through which cooperation norms can be effectively enforced.

Citation

Kamei, K. (2018). The Role of Visibility on Third Party Punishment Actions for the Enforcement of Social Norms. Economics Letters, 171, 193-197. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.07.043

Journal Article Type	Article
Acceptance Date	Jul 30, 2018
Online Publication Date	Aug 4, 2018
Publication Date	Oct 1, 2018
Deposit Date	Jul 31, 2018
Publicly Available Date	Feb 4, 2020
Journal	Economics Letters
Print ISSN	0165-1765
Publisher	Elsevier
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	171
Pages	193-197
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.07.043
Public URL	https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1325101

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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Copyright Statement
© 2018 This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/