Atkinson, A. P. and Wheeler, M. (2004) 'The grain of domains : the evolutionary-psychological case against domain-general cognition.', Mind and language., 19 (2). pp. 147-176.
Prominent evolutionary psychologists have argued that our innate psychological endowment consists of numerous domainspecific cognitive resources, rather than a few domaingeneral ones. In the light of some conceptual clarification, we examine the central inprinciple arguments that evolutionary psychologists mount against domaingeneral cognition. We conclude (a) that the fundamental logic of Darwinism, as advanced within evolutionary psychology, does not entail that the innate mind consists exclusively, or even massively, of domainspecific features, and (b) that a mixed innate cognitive economy of domainspecific and domaingeneral resources remains a genuine conceptual possibility. However, an examination of evolutionary psychology's 'grain problem' reveals that there is no way of establishing a principled and robust distinction between domainspecific and domaingeneral features. Nevertheless, we show that evolutionary psychologists can and do live with this grain problem without their whole enterprise being undermined.
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|Publisher Web site:||https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2004.00252.x|
|Record Created:||02 Apr 2007|
|Last Modified:||10 Mar 2017 11:35|
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