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Deposited in DRO:
12 August 2010

Version of attached file:
Accepted Version

Peer-review status of attached file:
Peer-reviewed

Citation for published item:

Further information on publisher’s website:
http://www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk/catalogue/book.asp?id=1134

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Chapter 8

1559–60: From rebellion to revolution

I. From Perth to Leith: the course of the rebellion

In the course of a few days in May 1559, Scottish Protestantism went from being an underground movement in an outwardly Catholic country to an armed revolt against established authority which was implementing dramatic changes in the territory it controlled. The revolt quickly escalated into civil war, as the rebels amassed an impressively wide body of support from within the country. Scotland’s neighbours hastened to intervene. The first foreign troops arrived in August 1559, and by the early months of 1560 the war had turned into a brutal slogging match between English and French expeditionary forces. The English victory of that summer cemented what the Protestant rebels had achieved, and allowed them give those achievements a degree of legal backing. The result was a violent social, political, diplomatic and religious rupture, and the creation of a new, Protestant, pro-English Scotland.

This extraordinary series of events presents its own set of historical problems. Having spent most of this book piecing together scattered shards of evidence, we now find ourselves deluged with evidence, as all of western Europe focused its attention on Scottish Protestantism. What happened during 1559–60 is therefore tolerably clear. But the sheer oddity of those events makes the questions all the more pressing. How did this local rebellion become an international war? What drove the different groups of rebels, and what breadth of support were they able to command? How was it possible for them to turn for assistance to the auld enemy without being damned as English stooges? How were the English, who had lost an internationalised war in Scotland in the 1540s, able to win one ten years later? And how did the war affect the religious life of Scottish parishes?
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The rebellion itself may be thought of as a drama in three acts.\(^1\) In Perth, on 11 May 1559, following a sermon by John Knox, there was an iconoclastic riot. The city’s churches and monasteries were stripped of the paraphernalia of Catholic worship and taken over for Reformed usage. Mary of Guise, the queen regent, decided to suppress this open defiance by force. A loosely organised band of Protestant lords, lairds, townspeople and preachers prepared to defend the town. A truce was negotiated, allowing Guise’s forces entered Perth. However, the Protestants, styling themselves ‘the Congregation’, did not disband their forces. Indeed, when Guise was seen to have violated the terms of the truce by her actions in Perth, two of Scotland’s most powerful nobles went over to the rebels – the earl of Argyll, and Lord James Stewart, James V’s illegitimate son. The Congregation now proceeded through Fife, ransacking Catholic churches as they went, and in mid-June they ‘reformed’ St. Andrews itself. Significant parts of the country – Angus, the Mearns, Fife and substantial areas of the south-west – were under the Congregation’s effective control. The rebels also began to put out feelers to Elizabeth I’s England, in search of support. Meanwhile, their armies turned towards Edinburgh, and after a brief stand-off in Fife, Guise’s forces fell back without a fight. At the end of June the Congregation occupied the capital. It felt like victory.

The second act of the drama showed that Guise was not to be written off so easily. From her refuge in Dunbar, she fought back on several fronts. Her propaganda impugned the Congregation’s motives, insinuating that Lord James was plotting to seize his father’s throne. It was probably not true, but it was both plausible and effective. At the same time, she negotiated with the rebels, deliberately dragging out the talks. Time was on her side. The Congregation’s forces were feudal levies, liable to serve only for short periods, while Guise’s own French troops were expecting reinforcements. By the end of July, the stalemate was turning against the Congregation. They agreed a truce, and withdrew from Edinburgh to their bases in Fife and in the west. The truce permitted some Reformed worship, but its terms were...
unclear and the Congregation were probably right to doubt whether Guise would keep her word. They regrouped, and began to look in earnest to England. Elizabeth I’s Protestant regime was sympathetic, but wary of giving open assistance. Eventually, however, some English money made its way to the Congregation, with promises of more to follow.

Meanwhile, Guise used her French reinforcements to fortify Leith, the port which has since been swallowed by Edinburgh but which was then a separate town. This provoked genuine alarm, and brought some significant newcomers to the Congregation’s ranks: in particular James, duke of Châtelherault, the heir to the throne. Châtelherault’s commitment to the religious cause was always lukewarm, but that of his son, the young earl of Arran, newly escaped from gilded captivity in France, was passionate. Buoyed by these new supporters and by English money, the Congregation re-occupied Edinburgh on 16 October. They demanded that the fortification of Leith cease and the French soldiers leave the country, and when Guise rebuffed them, they ceremoniously declared that she was deposed. They hoped to take Leith by assault. However, their enthusiastic, ill-equipped and disorganised forces were no match for professional French troops. The first few skirmishes proved humiliating for the rebels. At the same time, Guise succeeded in choking off their financial lifeline by intercepting £1000 sterling which the English had sent to keep their soldiers in the field. The Congregation’s support melted away with embarrassing speed, and on 6 November they left Edinburgh for the second time, in something close to a rout. Guise had successfully called their bluff.

The third act opened with a last, desperate plea being sent from the retreating Congregation for English help. As they waited, the enemy brought the battle to them. In December and into January, French forces rode a series of brutal, punitive raids into the Congregation’s heartlands, and in particular into Fife. Guise received further reinforcements from France, although fewer than she hoped: more than a thousand men were drowned in December shipwrecks en route to Scotland. Finally, Elizabeth was persuaded to act. In
January 1560, an English navy arrived off the east coast of Scotland, blockading any French traffic. The French troops in Fife were left exposed, and hastened back to Edinburgh. French raids continued in the west, but in April a substantial English army arrived. The Congregation’s forces rallied, and many previously undecided Scots now joined them. They entered Edinburgh for the third and last time. Guise’s army was now bottled up in Leith, and a grim little siege began. Guise herself, her health deteriorating fast, withdrew to the neutral ground of Edinburgh castle. The siege was tense, bloody and anticlimactic. A major English assault on 7 May was botched. The English feared that Guise’s forces would be reinforced by French or, worse, by Spanish troops, but no reinforcements came. Instead, as Leith was battered and its food and ammunition became scarce, a French delegation arrived to negotiate a surrender.

France’s growing internal turmoil made prosecuting a war on the other side of the North Sea an impossibility. Moreover, Guise herself was now mortally ill; she died on 11 June. Within a week, a ceasefire was agreed, and a treaty followed on 6 July. The French – more than 4000 of them, including women and children – were evacuated. The English forces also withdrew. Scotland continued formally to acknowledge its French king and queen, but its government was now, in effect, committed to the Congregation. In August, a parliament sealed the victory by reaffirming the new English alliance, and by passing a series of acts which established Reformed Protestantism as the official religion of Scotland.

II. Gathering the Congregation

It is plain enough that, by May 1559, attempts at religious compromise in Scotland had failed. It is less clear why that failure provoked open rebellion. It was a shift which the regime clearly did not expect. If the iconoclasm of May 1559 forced the lairds in Perth to choose...
sides, why did they choose rebellion, rather than the safer cause of law and order? And when they had done so, how did they prove able to recruit steadily more Scots to their cause – nobles, lairds and commoners?

The obvious answer is religious zeal. Yet such answers often make historians uneasy. We are well aware that religion was commonly used as a hypocritical cloak for all kinds of uglier motives. A historical figure who claims religious motivation, or claims a higher moral purpose, invites scepticism. In such a case, we are inclined to search for ulterior motives, and if we find them, to assume that they discredit any more idealistic pretensions. However, excessive cynicism in this area can be as misleading as excessive credulity. Even the finest religious and moral convictions are rarely uncontaminated by baser concerns. Yet merely because someone may benefit from professing a belief does not mean that that profession is false. Indeed, many people find it easier sincerely to embrace beliefs if they stand to gain from them. The danger of underestimating the power of religious motivation is real.

And indeed, the religious issue was at the centre of the Congregation’s programme not only when the revolt first broke out, but throughout the war. Their earliest negotiations with Guise focused exclusively on their demand for religious freedom. In May 1559, even when they appealed to Scotland’s Catholic nobles for support, they had no other issue to raise but religion, stressing the injustices they had endured and the clergy’s corruption. Religious freedom was the focus of the band which united the eastern and western forces on 31 May 1559. Another band, drawn up in Edinburgh in mid-July, committed the signatories to ‘maintaining of the true religion of Christ, and down-putting of all superstition and idolatry’, without mention of political or nationalistic questions. The truce or ‘Appointment’ agreed with Guise at the end of July likewise focused on the religious issue. In mid-June the English agent Sir James Croft was clear about the Congregation’s priorities: they were ‘fully bent to set forth God’s word’.2
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One of the rebellion’s most striking features is the respect which the lords accorded to their preachers. John Knox was an unlikely diplomat, but from May 1559 to January 1560 he was the Congregation’s principal secretary. His responsibilities included delicate negotiations with an English regime which he had gravely insulted by his ill-timed fulmination against female monarchy. In May, he and his more level-headed colleague John Willock were responsible for securing the earl of Argyll and Lord James Stewart’s agreement to guarantee the truce at Perth. The peak of the ministers’ influence, however, came in the autumn. Knox took the lead in cajoling potential sympathisers into providing real military support in the run-up to the second occupation of Edinburgh; and he was more than a go-between. An English journal of the second occupation emphasises that almost every day, the lords convened to hear a sermon from Knox, Willock or Knox’s friend Christopher Goodman. Before taking important policy decisions they regularly heard sermons, in which the preachers expounded the godly view of the question before them. During that occupation the Congregation also named a council governing religious policy, consisting of Knox, Willock, Goodman and the evangelical bishop of Galloway, Alexander Gordon. Knox was also asked to oversee a proposed scheme to turn some of the old church’s incomes to military use. These plans came to nothing as the Congregation were forced into a rapid retreat, but when they rallied at Stirling on 8 November, Knox preached what he clearly felt was the sermon of his life to the lords. Lord Herries believed that Knox’s preaching on that occasion was responsible for reviving the Congregation’s courage and determination. The ministers were not window-dressing for this rebellion; they were at the heart of its counsels. Nor would the lords have subjected themselves to such a punishing regime of preaching if their religion had been merely for show.

Their commitment showed itself in more than sitting through sermons. The Congregation’s three main leaders were unmistakably sincere in their Protestantism. Lord
James Stewart, the earl of Argyll and the young earl of Arran had all shown their commitment to the new faith during the 1550s, when they had nothing to gain from doing so. All would continue to do so after the rebellion, despite the vicissitudes of politics and (in Arran’s case) the onset of madness. In 1559-60, these three idealistic young men – all in their mid-twenties – impressed all around them with their zeal and sincerity. The gushing English emissary Thomas Randolph marvelled at their ‘singular wisdom and godliness’. Nor were religious motives confined to this core group of leaders. In December 1559, Maitland of Lethington claimed that religious opinion was the decisive factor in determining support for the Congregation. Those who were animated merely by dislike of the French he saw as effectively neutral. Even in the midst of the siege, Guise’s negotiations with the Congregation’s leaders centred on the religious question. Maitland, Lord James and the master of Maxwell were insistent on the issue, and their colleague Lord Ruthven was ‘more unyielding than any of the others’. If the Congregation’s leaders were not personally committed to the new religion, most of them found it politic to pretend to be so.

There is also evidence of wider support for the reformers during 1559-60: not a majority of the country by any means, but a significant movement in some areas. William Kirkcaldy of Grange claimed that in the Congregation’s heartlands, in Fife, Angus and the south-west, ‘by the forth-setting of religion and hatred of the Frenchmen we get the hearts of the whole commonalties’. Lord Herries agreed that in those regions the reformers ‘had the affections of the people’. In St. Andrews, the band of July 1559 in support of the Protestant cause was signed by 304 men: perhaps a third of the entire adult male population of Scotland’s ecclesiastical capital, including the provost of the town and at least some of the bailies. In other towns, the reformers did more than sign bands. If we are to believe Knox, the sack of Bishop Hepburn’s palace and of nearby Scone Abbey in May 1559 was the work of Dundee rioters who blamed Hepburn for Walter Myln’s death. In the same way, the friaries
in Edinburgh were looted shortly before the Congregation’s first occupation of the town; local reformers were taking advantage of a temporary power vacuum to finish the business they had started when they had attacked the St. Giles’s day procession the year before. By midsummer, Protestant support within Edinburgh was considerable, although well short of a majority. Bishop Leslie remembered bitterly that ‘the people’ of Edinburgh were ‘allured with hope ... of liberty, and a new kind of life’. The real test of Edinburgh’s allegiance came when the Congregation withdrew in July 1559. The ‘Appointment’ made with Guise permitted Edinburgh freedom of religion, but what this meant was unclear. Was the town to make a collective decision, or were its citizens each to be free to pursue his or her chosen faith? Guise proposed a public meeting at which a vote would be taken, but the reformers vigorously protested at the idea that ‘our religion now established ... shall be subject to voting of men’. In other words, both sides assumed that the Catholics would win any such vote. Yet the reformers were numerous enough. When they ‘answered with one voice that [they] would not leave their profession’, Guise was forced to abandon her scheme. They were permitted to retain St. Giles’s church until the second expulsion of the Congregation in November. Guise’s forces taunted them but did not attack them.6

This episode is revealing both of the weakness and the strength of Scottish Protestantism at this point. Numerically, it was not particularly strong. Yet the determination of its adherents was unnerving. When the Congregation evacuated the town for a second time in November, a significant number of Edinburgh Protestants left with them, preferring to abandon their homes than to conform in their religion and appeal to Guise’s mercy.7 Guise’s supporters and the neutrals lacked all conviction; the reformers were full of passionate intensity. This gave the committed Protestants a power out of all proportion to their numbers.

Belatedly, as Mary of Guise recognised the determination of the coalition which was forming against her, she set about trying to break it apart and to isolate its leaders. This was
not an obviously hopeless task, but in the event she was almost wholly unsuccessful. If the committed core of Protestant nobles was small, Guise could have counted her faithful lords on her fingers. She was staunchly supported by Lord Seton and by several of the bishops, including Archbishop Hamilton. The earls of Bothwell, Eglinton and Cassillis remained more or less loyal. Most of the rest of Scotland’s magnates were fair-weather friends at best. The reasons for Guise’s failure to mobilise any wider support are important, because they shed light on the initial motives of the Congregation; on how the rebels eventually succeeded in building such a broad coalition; and on the underlying weaknesses of Guise’s regime. Her central allegation was that the Congregation were guilty of sedition or outright treason, and while at some points this rang uncomfortably true, she was never able decisively to discredit them.

The most obvious accusation to which the Congregation’s leaders were open was that they were usurpers. The duke of Châtelherault and his son, young Arran, had been heirs presumptive to the Scottish throne since the death of James V, but were painfully aware that the prospect of Queen Mary’s having children endangered this position. Lord James Stewart was James V’s son, and his illegitimacy did not necessarily render an attempt on the crown impossible. In October 1559 Guise was telling anyone who would listen that the Congregation’s religious motives had been hijacked by dynastic ambition. English observers, familiar with a more rough-and-ready approach to dynastic legitimacy, seem to have assumed that one or both of these claims lay behind the Congregation’s actions. In August 1559, England’s perennial ambassador to Scotland, Ralph Sadler, was even instructed to urge Châtelherault and Lord James to see the revolt in these terms. Some in the French court, too, feared that religion was a cloak for an attempt by Lord James to seize the throne.

These charges were dangerous, but, it seems, ill-founded. Lord James and the Hamiltons must have entertained the possibility of usurping the crown, but they made no real
moves in that direction, either in 1559-60 or at any other time. If we are looking for evidence that Lord James coveted the throne, the closest we can come is the comment of Elizabeth I’s chief minister, William Cecil, when he first met Lord James in June 1560. According to the Victorian edition of the Scottish correspondence, Cecil told his queen that Lord James was ‘not unlike either in person or qualities to be a king soon’. However, this is a mistranscription. The original letter plainly says, not that Lord James would be ‘a king soon’, but that he was ‘a king’s son’ – which was of course a simple statement of fact. The previous year Lord James had even offered to accept voluntary exile if his religious petitions were granted (admittedly a bluff which was most unlikely to have been called). The ambitions of the Congregation’s leaders were real – Lord James presumably wished to be regent, and young Arran wished both to maintain his family’s rights to the succession and also to marry the English queen – but those ambitions were both limited and passably honourable.¹⁰

Guise’s accusations of sedition worried the Congregation’s leaders. Aware that such accusations were damaging them, they insisted that their cause was simply one of religion. This in itself is an intriguing fact: initially, the Protestants clearly felt that they could recruit more support by appealing to religion than by opposing tyranny. Justifying their tactics to the English in August 1559, they lamented ‘how difficult it is to persuade a multitude to the revolt of an authority established’.¹¹ It was not only the multitude that needed persuading. There were several prominent Protestants who refused to join the revolt, either from loyalty to the established authority or from distaste for working with the auld enemy. Lord Erskine had heard Knox preach in the mid-1550s and had been one of the five signatories of the band of 1557, but in 1559, despite the expectation that he would declare for the rebels, he remained studiously neutral. Edinburgh castle was under his command, and he refused to yield it either to the Congregation or to Guise. He used the bargaining power which control of Scotland’s most powerful stronghold gave him to press both sides towards negotiations, and in 1560 he
allowed Guise to retire there to die. Nevertheless he was an enthusiastic supporter of the parliamentary Reformation in August 1560. Another signatory of the first band, the earl of Morton, was equally dilatory during the war and equally committed after it, although in his case personal rivalry with the Hamiltons may have been as significant as loyalty to the regime. Robert Lockhart was a long-standing Protestant whose sincerity even Knox affirmed, but in the autumn of 1559 he was persuaded to act as a mediator between Guise and the Congregation.

The earl Marischal’s case is more striking still. His Protestantism is unmistakable. He was pardoned for using heretical books in 1544. He attended George Wishart’s sermons in 1544-5 and John Knox’s in 1556, and recommended Knox’s preaching to the queen regent. He stoutly supported the Protestant Confession of Faith in the August 1560 parliament. He was also an early advocate of the English alliance: he was one of the ambassadors who negotiated it in 1543, and in 1545 bound himself afresh to the English cause. Yet in 1559-60 he gave no open support to the Congregation during the rebellion, and firmly opposed the English alliance he had once advocated. The English ambassador described Marischal as one of the leading opponents of the new order in general and of the rapprochement with England in particular. Perhaps he no longer trusted England; or perhaps he would not break faith with the queen regent, whose deathbed he attended in 1560. It is commonly implied that the rebels of 1559-60 had to turn to political grievances in order to muster support, because their religious agenda was only a minority interest. The reminder that some powerful magnates were sympathetic to the Congregation’s religious agenda but balked at open rebellion suggests a different view. The Congregation’s recruitment problem was not only a matter of persuading those uninterested in Protestantism to join their cause. Equally significantly, they needed to persuade those sympathetic to the Protestant cause that rebellion was both a just and a necessary means to advance it.
In the rebels’ recruitment generally, necessity was probably more important than justice. The Congregation succeeded in persuading large numbers of Scots to support them not so much because their arguments were irrefutable as because they were seen to be winning. Likewise, for some crucial figures, the decision was dominated by questions of personal rather than of national interest. In the battle which was fought during the summer of 1559 to secure the allegiance of the duke of Châtelherault, Scotland’s most eminent and least decisive nobleman, the critical question was the fate of the duke’s son, the young earl of Arran. One of the earliest and most vital favours which the English performed for the Congregation was to assist in smuggling Arran out of France and back to Scotland. The Congregation knew that securing Arran’s escape was an absolute precondition if Châtelherault were to join them.  

Châtelherault did at least remain firmly committed to the Congregation thereafter (his son’s zeal perhaps left him little choice). Many other waverers came and went according to the perceived fortunes of war. Indeed, much of the Scottish political nation was never actively committed to either side. A large minority supported the Congregation; a much smaller number were staunchly loyal to Guise; the majority watched from the sidelines. Most of them wished, as Richard Maitland put it, to ‘lie lurk and do no more / To see which side shall have the victory’. When the reformers had the wind at their backs, as in October 1559, their following increased, and it was said that if they could guarantee English support, ‘the hole country would follow’. Inevitably, however, friends who had been won so easily disappeared when the rebels’ fortunes turned. As the second occupation of Edinburgh unravelled in November 1559, magnates who had been promising support fell dumb and soldiers began to desert. As the Congregation withdrew from the town,

the spiteful tongues of the wicked railed upon us, calling us traitors and heretics: every one provoked other to cast stones at us. One cried ... ‘Fie, give advertisement
to the Frenchmen that they may come, and we shall help them now to cut the throats of these heretics.

The arrival of English forces in 1560 swung the pendulum the other way. Guise’s Scottish forces suddenly scattered; even those loyal to her, such as Lord Home, began quietly to negotiate with the English. The arrival of the English army in April produced another flood of Protestant recruits, but many of these – including the earl of Morton – quickly withdrew as the possibility of a negotiated settlement resurfaced. As the siege closed around Leith, the neutrals returned. After a fire in the besieged town seemed to herald a French defeat, the duke of Norfolk wrote that ‘the Scots do marvellously come in’. If Leith fell, he wrote, ‘there will be left but few Scots in Scotland, but that they will be open enemies to the French’.¹⁷

Conservative burghs such as Aberdeen and Peebles began to hedge their bets, providing token assistance to the Congregation. Some magnates did the same, often trying to negotiate favourable religious or political terms for themselves. The earl of Huntly played a complex double game for most of the spring and summer of 1560, allowing his illegitimate brother Alexander Gordon to support the reformers, while he himself gave them little but warm words. His price for greater support was to be allowed ‘supreme authority in the north’ and to be rewarded with lands seized from die-hard supporters of Guise. But although he was not given any such assurances, he eventually, and reluctantly, signed the reformers’ third band anyway. By then, it was prudent to back the unmistakable winners.¹⁸

Both sides put a great deal of effort into wooing these neutral lords, but it is not clear whether it was worth it. The neutrals’ military contribution to the civil war was marginal. In January 1560, the master of Maxwell recruited a group of Dumfriesshire lairds to the Congregation, but he had little faith in ‘so great a number of inconstant and broken men’.¹⁹ Such indecision was common in 1559-60, but the indecisive had little effect on the outcome. A seventeenth-century earl of Leven began his history of this with the following observation:
Rational men may be said most ordinarily to be acted in all their undertakings either by a religious or civil principle, as they are swayed either by conscience or interest. It is obvious to the observation of all that such as are led by the former are more tenacious than those who are ruled by the latter.\textsuperscript{20}

The rebellion was led, and its outcome determined, not by the majority of waverers who pursued self-interest, but by the tenacious minority who were ruled by their consciences.

\textit{III. The end of the Auld Alliance}

It is a commonplace that, as the 1559-60 war progressed, the Congregation’s avowed purposes shifted from being narrowly religious to become more nationalistic. Protestantism became less important than anti-French sentiment, and the Congregation also led the political nation in embracing the English alliance which had been so firmly rejected a decade before.

Yet if religion was as central to the rebellion as I have argued, how did the religious and nationalistic issues come to be so intertwined? And how was it possible for so many Scots to turn with such alacrity to the auld enemy?

From the beginning of the revolt, one of the Congregation’s demands was that Guise’s French troops should have no part in Scottish affairs. The truce at Perth in May 1559 required that French soldiers be barred from the town. By early July, during the first occupation of Edinburgh, this had grown to a demand that all French troops should leave the country.

Indeed, the Congregation’s most controversial action during that occupation was probably an attempt to undermine the French presence: they seized the coining-irons used to mint money. Their justification was that Guise had been debasing the coinage, which was true; but the debasement had been carried out largely so that the French troops could be paid, and the Congregation were clearly interested in putting a stop to this. Seizing the coining-irons – a
symbol of sovereignty – was a tactical error, since it allowed Guise to paint the Congregation as rebels and robbers. By the time Edinburgh was abandoned in late July, there was no more talk of expelling all the French, but the ‘Appointment’ drawn up with Guise did specify that Edinburgh itself should be demilitarised.\textsuperscript{21} The arrival of fresh French forces during August, and the fortification of Leith, turned this into the Congregation’s dominant theme. From then on, their principal and unwavering demand was for a complete withdrawal of French forces. The Protestant crusade had become an anti-French purge.

There was an obvious logic to this. Guise’s French army was the principal obstacle to a Protestant settlement. Its removal was a necessary prerequisite for a Protestant establishment. As Clare Kellar puts it, ‘the forces of their foreign oppressors were the legions of Antichrist, and their fight for freedom and for the true faith was one and the same struggle’.\textsuperscript{22} The Congregation’s willingness to call on English help can also be seen as merely instrumental: a necessary means to an end. However, this will not quite do. Many of those who joined the Congregation during the course of the rebellion were clearly much more anti-French than pro-Protestant. Moreover, the Congregation’s leadership themselves became increasingly committed to the anti-French cause. It was a cause which, by the autumn of 1559, had acquired a life of its own.

As Lord Herries later put it, hatred of the French ‘was the occasion that many of [the] Queen Regent’s best friends in Scotland joined with the Congregation, although they differed from them in religion’. This does not, of course, mean that anti-French sentiment was stronger than Protestantism, merely that it was more widespread. Nevertheless, it is clear that while the Scottish elites were divided over religion, by the early autumn of 1559 they were becoming united by their opposition to France. When the earl of Argyll was raising support from the McConnells and other Highlanders in September 1559, his only message was that France was conquering Scotland by stealth. In early October, young Arran was trying to win
over the Catholic Lord Sempill. He acknowledged that Sempill was ‘not resolute in your conscience towards the religion’ – a polite evasion – but he emphasised French oppression and appealed to Sempill to protect ‘the commonwealth and liberty of this your native country’. Sempill himself was not persuaded, but Archbishop Hamilton feared that Arran’s wider efforts to win support in this way were bearing fruit. The reformers believed that although many Scottish lords might be neutral in religion, there was none ‘so blind that he sees not the manifest ruin of our commonwealth ... intended by the French, so imprudent that he considers not his own peril’. According to the duke of Norfolk, the Borderers who joined the Congregation in January 1560 supported the rebels ‘so far forth as concerneth the expulsion of the French authority and rule out of Scotland’, but were not persuaded of the religious cause. The Congregation’s final appeal to the neutral lords, in March 1560, made no mention of religion, but appealed to them as ‘true native Scotsmen’ to resist French tyranny – and also referred unproblematically to the impending arrival of English forces, as if it were natural for ‘true native Scotsmen’ to look for help from that quarter.²³

The universal testimony of Scottish and foreign observers is that, by the end of 1559, the French were widely loathed as tyrants and oppressors. The duke of Norfolk initially feared that this was an elaborate charade intended to lull English suspicions of the Scots before a fresh Franco-Scottish invasion, but when he arrived in the north he was persuaded otherwise. ‘The enmity and daily hostility between the French and the Protestants is so manifest ... as I cannot judge that they would make any such train to trap us.’ However, it is also clear that this common hatred was grounded in several distinct grievances. William Cecil emphasised in June 1560 that there were many factors which had fired anti-French feeling, and commented that ‘all this nobility of Scotland hate the French, and be devoted to England, yet some be for one respect and some for another’.²⁴
As we have seen, until 1559 the latent suspicion towards France and French motives in 1550s Scotland remained merely latent. It became inflamed partly because the Congregation deliberately exacerbated it. When Argyll was trying to persuade the McConnells to join the cause in September 1559, his argument was that the French are coming in and setting down in this realm to occupy it and to put forth the inhabitants thereof, and suchlike to occupy all other men’s rooms piece and piece, and to put away the blood of the nobility.

As a warning, he cited the example of Brittany, another independent realm which had been joined to France by a marriage alliance, only to be absorbed into the French state. Argyll was not alone in this approach. At the height of the propaganda war, in October 1559, the Congregation were busily picking at old wounds, real or imagined, which could be blamed on France. Two formal manifestos drawn up early that month claimed that the French had been secretly plotting a takeover of Scotland ever since 1548. They cited the steady exclusion of Scots from positions of authority; the billeting of a rapacious and underpaid French army on Scotland; and the debasement of the coinage. They also made much of the young earl of Arran’s imprisonment. All this was held up against the promise made in 1548 that Scotland’s laws and privileges would be respected. The lords’ formal declaration that Guise was deposed harped on these same injuries, lamenting how an ‘army of strangers ... was laid by her Grace upon the necks of the poor community of our native country’. The Congregation’s ulterior motive for attempting to irritate their countrymen against France is plain enough, but they did have some genuine grievances on which to work.

In truth, however, these long-standing complaints were merely pretexts. Until 1559 Guise herself had been trusted and the protection of France accepted as, if nothing more, the lesser of two evils. It was only immediately before and during the rebellion that these views
changed. They did so almost entirely in response to actions taken by Guise and by the forces under her command.

The pattern was set during the very first confrontation of the rebellion, at Perth in May 1559. As Pamela Ritchie has recently argued, this situation was badly mishandled by the queen regent. In order to defuse the immediate crisis, Guise agreed a truce whose terms she would not or could not keep: demilitarisation of the town, an amnesty for the iconoclasts and a promise to consider the religious issue at a forthcoming parliament. She may have hoped to bend, rather than break this agreement. Her decision to occupy the town with Scots soldiers, rather than Frenchmen, indicates such an approach. However, the assertive manner of her entry and the trigger-happy behaviour of her troops (who shot dead a boy during the reoccupation of the town) suggests that re-establishing her authority mattered more to her than meticulously observing the terms of the truce. Guise was, as Ritchie has argued, convinced from the beginning that the rebels’ religious agenda was a cloak for more sinister motives. Her suspicions were seemingly confirmed by the Protestants’ sacking of the Charterhouse, where King James I was buried. She was, simply, unwilling to negotiate with traitors. Yet the most powerful Protestant nobles, Argyll and Lord James Stewart, took a different view of the Perth affair. Urged on by their rebellious friends, they used the occasion to test Guise’s good intentions by acting as personal guarantors of the terms of the truce. If she had observed those terms, it would have demonstrated her good faith, and the Protestant advocates of confrontation would have been isolated. But if, as turned out to be the case, she broke her word, she could be openly opposed as a tyrant. It was an important step in persuading instinctive loyalists that Guise could not be trusted.

Her reputation, and that of France, suffered worse damage after the second truce of the rebellion, the July ‘Appointment’. Guise had successfully faced the Congregation down and forced them to withdraw from Edinburgh. Their seizure of the coining-irons had seemed
to demonstrate that their motives were indeed more political than religious. Her accusations of rebellion, Knox admitted, ‘made us odious in the ears of the people’. Some parts of the country, notably the Borders, were beginning to mobilise for the queen regent. It may be, of course, that the Appointment was inherently unstable. The promise of a parliament to tackle the religious question had done no more than postpone the conflict, and the Congregation, too, were endangering the peace, by seeking English military support. However, it was Guise who more bluntly signalled an end to negotiation. The arrival of more than a thousand fresh French troops in late August 1559, and the subsequent fortification of Leith, did more than anything else to reverse the Congregation’s fortunes. The English had been warning that the Guise faction now in control of France intended to extend its newly militant anti-Protestant policy to Scotland, and the arrival of the troops seemed to confirm this. It was widely read as a violation of the Appointment, providing a pretext for Scotland’s most senior nobleman, Châtelherault, to join the rebels. Châtelherault had guaranteed the truce at Edinburgh in much the same way as Argyll and Lord James had at Perth, and with much the same effect. Moreover, it was this violation which galvanised the Congregation to reoccupy Edinburgh in October; and it was Guise’s refusal to vacate Leith which was at the heart of their case for deposing her.28

The fortification of Leith provoked genuine outrage. It gave credence to the claim that the French intended conquest, and were establishing a permanent and unassailable base of operations. By the end of September the Congregation were assuring the English that ‘our defection from France is great’, and that the fortification of Leith was the main reason for this. When young Arran appealed to Lord Sempill to defend his country, the fortification of Leith was his best evidence of French malice. Like others, he thought it particularly ominous that the French soldiers were accompanied by their wives and children. This looked less like a temporary expeditionary force than a conquering army. Rumour claimed that the French
troops were jokingly awarding the rebels’ titles to themselves. ‘One was styled Monsieur de Argyll; another, Monsieur le Prior; the third, Monsieur de Ruthven.’ True or not, such rumours could only reinforce the impression that Guise intended a plain conquest. Nor did Guise or her troops do anything to dispel this impression. After the Congregation’s second retreat from Edinburgh, the Protestant worship which had been tolerated there during the autumn was suppressed, and French troops were garrisoned in the capital itself: a normally terse chronicler observed with displeasure that foreign soldiers had never been lodged in Edinburgh before. In September, the level-headed Protestant Henry Balnaves thought that ‘the enterprise of Leith hath inflamed the hearts of our people to a wonderful hatred and despite of France, wherethrough I think there shall follow a plain defection from France for ever’. 29

Worse was to come during the winter of 1559-60, the darkest phase of the war for the Congregation. Their attempt on Leith in early November having failed, their military weakness was painfully exposed. The French now launched a series of merciless counterattacks which confirmed all the Scots’ worst fears. ‘The oppression and violence used by the French,’ Lord Herries remembered, was ‘the greatest cause’ which alienated the Scots from them. Even during the skirmishes of November 1559, the French were reckless of civilian casualties in Edinburgh. Thereafter, they behaved like an army of occupation – or, as Knox put it, ‘four thousand of the most desperate throat-cutters that were to be found in Europe’. Two expeditions became particularly notorious. In January 1560, a French raiding party marched deep into Fife, systematically destroying crops and households. ‘Wherever they passed,’ one witness wrote, ‘there was great harm done to the poor by the men of war.’ Local landowners were ordered to destroy their own fields and mills, so as to deny provisions to the Congregation’s forces. The Congregation’s resistance to this raiding party was limited to guerilla action and piracy, but there seems to have been some spontaneous resistance from
the local population. It did not help that the French were indiscriminate in their destruction, with Guise’s supporters suffering alongside the Congregation.\textsuperscript{30} A second major raid, by 2000 men to Glasgow in March, showed the same face. This time there was a pitched battle, against a much smaller Protestant force under the command of the earl of Glencairn’s son, which was cut to pieces after a fierce resistance. Most of the Protestant captives were hanged on the spot. However, the French forces were unable to devastate the country as they had before. Thomas Randolph, the English agent in Glasgow, reported that their behaviour was so intolerable that they engendered unto themselves much hatred of many that otherwise favoured them well. The country gathered so fast upon them that they departed both sooner then they determined, and in better order then they came, for fear to have been fought with.

Nevertheless, they inflicted considerable damage on the way home. Soon after this, when the French withdrew into their fortress at Leith in the face of the English advance, they did their best to lay waste the surrounding countryside, and ‘left no thing which the very enemies could have devised’. It was indeed as national enemies that they were now being seen.\textsuperscript{31}

Sixteenth-century warfare was not a gentle business, and the brutal tactics of the French made some military sense. However, there is no doubt that they profoundly alienated most Scots and gravely undermined the legitimacy of their cause, even amongst Guise’s supporters. In December 1559, it was reported that French soldiers’ cruelties had driven Lord Seton, Guise’s most faithful noble backer, to withdraw to his own estates. The earl of Bothwell allegedly sheltered a fugitive from the French, and the earl of Huntly was distancing himself from the queen regent. Other loyalists suffered directly from the French raids. In February 1560, even Archbishop Hamilton was backing away from Guise. ‘Their case is pitiful,’ crowed Randolph, ‘when their clergy beginneth to fail them.’ One episode from the January raid could stand as a symbol of the whole enterprise. During the French
retreat, the Congregation’s light forces under Kirkcaldy of Grange tried to cut them off at Tullibody by destroying the bridge there. However, the French escaped by demolishing the parish church and using its roof timbers to build a makeshift bridge. This was a resourceful and professional army, but the ruthlessness of its methods was trampling the Catholic cause in Scotland underfoot.  

We have already seen how the callous brutality and imperial pretensions of English policy towards Scotland in the 1540s alienated any Scottish support England might have had. In 1559-60, France fell into the same trap. By the spring of 1560, the Scots were still divided over the religious question, but no-one dared avow support for the French alliance as it then stood. In April 1560, Randolph wrote: ‘I see all men here so affectioned to the utter expelling of the French from hence, that whosoever has any thought to the contrary is esteemed no less the enemy to the cause than if [he] had cut five hundred throats.’ When the French garrison in Edinburgh withdrew that month, their departure was followed by mob violence directed at those Frenchmen who had been foolhardy enough to remain in the town. In July, after the treaty, when English ships were evacuating the French survivors, William Cecil wrote with dark irony: ‘Here is goodwill of all parts: the French to be gone, we to carry them, and the Scots to curse them hence.’ The ‘auld alliance’ ended bitterly.

By mid-1560, that bitterness was matched with a remarkable degree of trust between the Scots and their ‘auld enemies of England’. It was a trust which came late in the day. Knox’s idiosyncratic Anglophilia apart, the Congregation’s early appeals to England had some wariness about them, and understandably so. They were treacherously negotiating with a foreign power, and knew that if they succeeded they might find themselves riding a tiger. It was necessity rather than affection which drove the reformers into the arms of the English. This wariness continued into the autumn of 1559. In September the English Borderers were still carrying out raids in the west, from which some of the Protestant lords suffered. Yet
English help was keenly looked for and warmly received when it began to arrive. The care with which English agents smuggled the young earl of Arran from his refuge in Geneva to England and thence to Scotland was rewarded with considerable gratitude, not only from his father Châtelherault but apparently from a great many Scots. Young Arran was second in line to the throne; the French had imprisoned him but the English had set him free. It was a sign that times were changing. While the Congregation were still insisting that England agree to respect Scotland’s ‘liberties, laws, and privileges’, they were now also suggesting that England occupy fortresses such as Eyemouth and Broughty Crag, which England had held under unhappier circumstances in the 1540s. By November 1559, the Congregation’s appeals to England had become much more full-hearted, with only the briefest of reference to Scotland’s status as a realm subject to the new king and queen of France. This reflected the reformers’ desperation at that point of the war, but it also reflected the real trust that had begun to be built between the old enemies.35

That trust bore fruit when English forces arrived in Scotland. The enthusiasm with which the Scots greeted their new-found English friends surprised everyone, not least the English. A Scottish witness remembered that in January 1560, Admiral Winter’s ships ‘were thankfully received and well entreated, with such quietness and gentle entertainment betwixt our nation and them, as no man would have thought that ever there had been any variance’. Randolph agreed that the arrival of the English ships sparked celebrations. ‘I never saw people make greater joy of any felicity that ever befell unto them than these do.’ And he added: ‘There hath been an old prophesy that there should be two winters in one year, which, now they say, now is fulfilled by reason of Winter the admiral’s arrival upon the seas; in which year many wonders should chance in Scotland.’ An English herald travelling overland to Edinburgh in February met an equally warm reception. Scots he met en route were pressing him to know when the English were coming ‘to deliver them out of their misery and
captivity of the French’. When the army finally arrived in April, Scots and Englishmen ‘with
great humanity embraced each other as if there had never been hatred or enmity’. The English
were surprised by how easily the allies worked together: the Scots ‘have not broken their
promises, but rather amplified them’. Even the soldiers of the two armies avoided any
confrontations. In June, Randolph claimed that ‘since our camp arrived here there was never
quarrel or disorder between the English and Scottish that ever blow was given or sword
drawn’ – it was, he said, ‘a miracle’.36

A more tangible sign of this miracle was the unexpected ease with which the English
forces in Scotland secured supplies locally. Victuallers flocked to them. One soldier noted,
with surprise, that provisions were considerably cheaper in Edinburgh than they had been in
Berwick. Even in rural areas, despite the damage done by French raids and unfamiliarity with
English coins, the army was able to secure sufficient rations at a reasonable price. Knox
explained that ‘the people of Scotland so much abhorred the tyranny of the French, that they
would have given the substance that they had, to have been rid of that chargeable burden’.37

Yet while enmity with France was a necessary condition for Anglo-Scottish
reconciliation, it was not sufficient. If the French fell into the English trap of the 1540s, the
English, critically, avoided it. Partly by good judgement, and partly by good luck, the English
managed to convince most Scots that their ambitions in Scotland in 1559-60 were limited and
honourable. There was no fear that the English intervention would be, as so often before, a
prelude to attempted conquest. This was partly because England went out of its way to
demonstrate its friendly intentions. William Cecil and others in the new English regime had
served under Protector Somerset and had seen his mistakes at first hand. They were
determined not to repeat them. A key memorandum on English policy towards Scotland in
August 1559 took as a truism that Scotland could be governed only by a Scot. This was given
substance by England’s assisting one likely governor, the young earl of Arran, to return
home. Cecil was well aware of the goodwill which this generated and worked to exploit it. Even when the Congregation pleaded for English intervention in December 1559, Cecil was still scrupulous about respecting Scottish sensibilities. He rejected the possibility of English forces’ garrisoning an entire Scottish town as a guarantee of the Congregation’s fidelity, claiming that England ‘would rather maintain all the towns in the Scots’ hands than have them out of theirs’. The English army’s model behaviour was not due to mere soldierly goodwill. The duke of Norfolk insisted that ‘foraging, robbing, and wasting of the country where they be is not now to be suffered, except we would make enemies of friends’ – as the French had done. When some Scottish merchandise which had been seized at sea by the French fell into English hands, it was carefully returned to its owners. During the Anglo-French negotiations which ended the siege, Cecil repeatedly insisted that the Scots not be excluded; rather, the commissioners were to ‘deal plainly with them in the whole matter’. In particular, he refused to countenance any deal which compromised Scottish religious liberty. The English did their best to behave towards Scotland as good neighbours.

This attitude was not entirely false. Plenty of English Protestants had an internationalist outlook after their years of exile, and saw assisting Scottish Protestantism as a matter of conscience. John Aylmer’s view in 1559 was that ‘he is one of our brethren, if he be a faithful Christian; it is manners, faith and behaviour, and not nations, that make men strangers one to another’. Even Cecil prayed, no doubt sincerely, that ‘this terrestrial kingdom of Christ may be dilated through this noble Isle’. Yet Cecil’s concerns, and those of most other English observers, were dominated by other matters. Aylmer’s religious internationalism was matched by a pungent nationalism which drew him into the unguarded, notorious and much misunderstood claim that ‘God is English’. And although the regime itself took care not to talk about imperial union or English suzerainty to the Scots’ faces, those ideas had not disappeared. As Stephen Alford has shown, the claim of English
suzerainty was one of the ways in which Cecil persuaded his suspicious queen that she had a right to intervene in Scotland.\textsuperscript{40}

However, the English regime’s thinking was dominated neither by religious idealism nor by imperialist aspirations, but by brutally practical concerns. One anonymous note from 1559 lists the advantages to be had from ‘amity and friendship’ with Scotland, including access to Scottish fishing and (more dubiously) to Scotland’s gold mines. For this author and for every observer, however, the main fear was that French domination of Scotland was a prelude to a conquest of England. The English helped the Congregation because doing so offered a chance to disrupt the Franco-Scottish alliance and so to secure England’s northern border. It was a chance which observers of Scottish affairs feared might not return. Cecil’s most substantial discussion document on Scottish policy, drawn up in August 1559, offered many reasons why England should not intervene, but only one why it should: self-defence.\textsuperscript{41}

Paradoxically, this bluntly self-interested approach did more to foster Scottish trust of England than any amount of diplomatic soft soap. In 1559, the weakness of England’s international position was painfully obvious. A queen whose succession was disputed had inherited a divided country which had just suffered a humiliating military defeat at French hands. England was in no position to embark on any foreign adventures. Its parsimonious and conservative queen was already showing the scepticism to grandiose plans and imperial glories which would colour English diplomacy for decades. The British rhetoric of the ‘Edwardian moment’ had no interest whatsoever for Elizabeth.\textsuperscript{42} Compared to Henry VIII’s alarming enthusiasm for intervention in Scotland in 1543, her manifest reluctance either to risk her resources on a Scottish expedition, or to risk open confrontation with France, was positively reassuring to Scots. English caution about any kind of intervention in Scotland throughout 1559 was intensely frustrating to the Congregation, but it certainly made it clear that England had no imperial ambitions. Indeed, it was the Scots who were pleading for
English troops. They even compared Elizabeth unfavourably to Henry VIII, complaining that he had been far more willing to commit resources to Scotland than she was. But the English dragged their feet. They were much readier to offer the Scots encouragement than substantial support. Cecil even asked the Scots for advice on how to solve their dilemma: how could they help the Congregation without provoking the French? Although Cecil himself was quickly convinced that intervention was worth the risk, the queen was far more sceptical. In November, when £1000 sterling sent from England to support the Congregation was stolen en route by the earl of Bothwell, Cecil was so afraid that Elizabeth might wash her hands of the whole enterprise that he did not even dare tell her about the theft for more than a week. Throughout 1560, the queen worried about the Scottish campaign’s prospects, begrudged its cost and doubted its value.\(^43\) No-one could doubt her determination to withdraw her forces from Scotland as soon as possible. During 1559-60, for the first if not the last time, Elizabeth demonstrated the political power of playing hard to get: a policy which was all the more effective because the reluctance was genuine.

One final piece of good luck helped to ensure that Scotland saw England as more trustworthy than France in 1559-60. Since James V’s death, the presence of a female sovereign had destabilised Scotland’s international position. During the 1540s, the competition between England and France was not for a Scottish alliance, but for a Scottish marriage which would allow the victor to swallow the kingdom entirely. In 1559, however, Mary Stewart was married and England had an unmarried queen regnant of its own. There was now no danger that England absorb its neighbour by marriage. Indeed, many Scots and some Englishmen hoped that the situation had been reversed. Elizabeth was being pressed to Arran, who was second in line to the Scottish crown; a dynastic union might conceivably have emerged, but this time with the smaller country providing the husband.\(^44\) In fact, Elizabeth herself appears never seriously to have considered the marriage, and by 1561
Arran’s growing mental instability had made it impossible. During the critical months of the rebellion, however, this helped to persuade the Scots that an honourable friendship with England was a real alternative to a suffocating French embrace. The diplomatic revolution was complete.

IV. Winning the war

The propaganda war, then, was decisively won by the Congregation and the English. This, however, need not have been decisive. Realms are not conquered by books, but rather by blood. The Congregation’s helplessness in the face of the French onslaught, and England’s obvious international weakness, helped to cement the Protestant alliance, but hardly made that alliance terrifying. How, in the end, was the war won?

The Congregation’s weakness was clear enough. While the lords could sometimes field a substantial army, they could neither equip it to the most modern standards nor maintain it in the field for any length of time. This, more than anything else, accounts for the war’s peculiar ebb and flow. Cecil understood the Scots’ weaknesses: ‘the way to overcome them,’ he wrote in August 1559, ‘is to prolong time, and not to fight with them, but stand at defence’. This was exactly what the French did: fortify an almost impregnable base at Leith, which could receive supplies by sea, and serve as a base for punitive raiding. These tactics may not have won the Scots’ hearts and minds, but they were brutally effective. The French could outlast, outspend and outmanoeuvre the Congregation’s jury-rigged forces. The Congregation’s first withdrawal from Edinburgh, in July 1559, was a result of thinning forces and dwindling food supplies. By mid-August the Congregation had only five hundred men under arms. The attempt to re-mobilise in the autumn was delayed by bad weather, which slowed the harvest and meant that men could not be spared. The second occupation of
Edinburgh was a fiasco. An assault on Leith was planned – ladders ordered, artillery brought into position, and wood prepared for firing the ditches. Yet even before the first skirmishes in early November, the rebels were running out of money. The theft of a thousand pounds sent from England cut off their only financial hope, and their army dissolved. Their untried and inexperienced forces had also, as young Arran admitted, been outclassed in battle. By mid-November their position was desperate. Knox was pursuing a half-baked scheme to raise funds from private donors in England. When the French offensive was renewed in January, the Congregation had difficulty even maintaining guerilla forces. When the Congregation did engage the French, they did so in a dangerously disorganised way. The earl of Argyll and Lord James Stewart were close to bankruptcy. The eastern and western Protestant centres were quarrelling, and were in danger of being cut off.\textsuperscript{45}

As the Congregation weakened, the French forces were gathering strength. From August onwards, Guise received a steady trickle of reinforcements. By the end of the year she had some four thousand men under arms. France was also pressing for the pope to send an inquisitor to Scotland to enforce Catholic orthodoxy. Guise’s own leadership was also a considerable asset, her charisma and fighting spirit respected on all sides. But the French had problems of their own. Guise was seriously ill from October 1559 onwards, and preparations were made to recall her to France. In November it was rumoured that she was dead, but she was tougher than her enemies hoped. She was very sick, but, Randolph said, ‘some say the devil cannot kill her.’ In April, however, her sickness returned with renewed force, and she died in June. Throughout this period, then, her effectiveness as a leader was much reduced.\textsuperscript{46}

Moreover, the war was straining France itself. King Henry II had died on 10 July, following a gruesome jousting accident. Francis and Mary, king and queen of Scots, now became king and queen of France, and real control passed to Mary of Guise’s brothers, the duke of Guise and the cardinal of Lorraine. \textit{Les Guise} quickly ran into difficulties, however.
Over the winter, the supply of troops to Scotland faltered. The sheer technical difficulty of transport across the North Sea in winter was a part of the problem. Two separate shipwrecks off the Dutch coast cost the lives of well over a thousand French soldiers, and prompted rumours that the whole enterprise had provoked God’s wrath. More importantly, raising the necessary money and men within France was proving unexpectedly difficult and controversial. The huge expenses and disruption associated with the Scottish war, let alone a possible English war, provoked talk of a compromise. France had only just concluded a ruinously expensive European war and was gravely in debt. The regime was trying to hire German mercenaries rather than raising French troops, but even these would have had to be paid. Worse, religious disaffection in France itself was slipping out of control. There were rumours of religious unrest, and the cardinal of Lorraine apparently feared that, like his counterpart at St. Andrews, he might be assassinated. In March 1560, a scheme by French Protestants to seize the young king at Amboise was unmasked, thoroughly alarming the already unsettled regime. As these domestic threats mushroomed, the possibility of sending further reinforcements to Scotland receded. Promises of more troops continued through the spring and summer, but the date on which they could be expected to arrive kept slipping back. By April, France was reduced to asking Protestant Denmark to send troops to Scotland, unpaid, a request which was rejected with polite contempt. Bishop Leslie’s judgement was clear: the French were unable to intervene decisively in Scotland because they were ‘wholly engaged in repressing the seditions’ in their own country.\footnote{47}

Guise’s last realistic chance for reinforcements came from an unexpected quarter: Spain. The mere fact of the involvement of Spain, Germany and Denmark demonstrates how, by the spring of 1560, the struggle over Scotland had become western Europe’s main flashpoint. Spanish interest, particularly, was a sign that religion was becoming the fault-line of European politics, for it was remarkable that the king of Spain should even consider
helping his old enemies, France, against his old allies, England. Philip II had been watching Scottish events with close interest since the autumn, but had forbidden his subjects to assist either side. After the conspiracy at Amboise, however, rumours began to circulate in France that Spain would take up the Catholic cause in Scotland. In April 1560 England was suddenly gripped with fear of Spanish intervention. Nicholas Wotton, one of England’s most experienced diplomats, was convinced that a Spanish expeditionary force was coming, and that England should rapidly make whatever peace it could to avoid the nightmare of simultaneous war with both France and Spain. The English army in Scotland even asked for instructions on how to respond to Spanish forces if they landed. Philip denied having any such plans, but rumour in the Spanish Netherlands contradicted him. In mid-April preparations for a sizeable sea-borne military expedition were being made in Antwerp, said to be destined for Scotland. Intriguingly, the Dutch political establishment was vehemently opposed to this. The English ambassador in Antwerp was taken aback by the strength of pro-English feeling, which blamed the supposed war on ‘the practice of the Spaniards and priests’. In fact, however, this planned expedition appears to have been mere bluff. The ships and troops remained in the Netherlands. While Philip wished to deter the English if he could, he was not willing to intervene directly. At best he was willing to lease ships to France – a safe offer to make, given France’s near-bankruptcy. The possibility faded, and Guise and her troops were left alone.48

This isolation was the fundamental reason for Guise’s defeat. Victory depended on the regular supply of fresh men and materiel. In 1560 that supply dried up, principally because Scotland was not the only country afflicted by religious discord. France was beginning its own long descent into religious civil war. As William Ferguson has observed, French rule over Scotland was the first casualty of the French wars of religion.49 However, this was more than bad luck. The French and Scottish Reformations were connected. Scots
such as the young earl of Arran had been converted in France, and Scottish and French
Protestant nobles were in regular contact.\textsuperscript{50} Even in the Netherlands, there are hints that the
rumours of a Spanish invasion of Scotland were inflaming religious discord. The same
religious contagion that had burst out in Scotland was incubating in France and elsewhere,
and contact with the Scottish outbreak only served to exacerbate the condition. Just as
revolutionary religion had been decisive in the beginning of the Scottish rebellion, so it was
decisive in determining that rebellion’s outcome.

The result of the Congregation’s military weakness, and of France’s failure to
resupply Guise, was that the war in Scotland in 1560 was on a rather small scale. This meant
that even in its weakened state, a second-rank power such as England could tip the balance.
Nevertheless, the victory was not easily won. Leith was, one English witness recorded,
‘marvellously fortified trenched and replenished with a sufficient number of valiant soldiers’.
The best hope always lay in starving it out, and from the first despatch of naval forces this
was the principal English objective. The naval blockade set up from January certainly
alarmed the French. From the first arrival of the English, French cargo ships were being
seized or run aground. Yet the blockade was not impenetrable. The first English target was
the small French base on the island of Inchkeith, in the Firth of Forth, which they apparently
hoped could be quickly starved into surrender. However, in February Lord Seton twice
successfully resupplied the French garrison there by night, and in March three French
munitions ships reached the island. In June, the Inchkeith garrison even managed to seize an
English supply ship; another small French garrison, at Dunbar, had done likewise in May.\textsuperscript{51}

When English land forces arrived in April, their situation was precarious. Fully
expecting French or Spanish reinforcements to arrive, they did not expect to have the leisure
to starve Leith into surrender. Their Scots allies were keen to assault the fortress, but the
more experienced English soldiers were daunted by Leith’s fortifications. When Lord Grey of
Wilton, the commander of the English force, first saw Leith, he doubted that it could be assaulted, and pressed for a negotiated solution – much to the dismay of the Congregation. However, he also threw a noose around the town, and began to tighten it. The siege proper began on 6 April, when a French sortie from Leith was forced to retreat. From 12 April onwards there were daily bombardments of the town. By the following day the English were digging trenches. 14 April was Easter Sunday, and high Mass was celebrated in the besieged town by one of Archbishop Hamilton’s chaplains: during the service an English cannonball smashed through the window of the church. (No-one was hurt, which the French understandably saw as miraculous.) The following day, a major French raid on the English positions destroyed four of their cannon and inflicted heavy casualties. After this the English became both more cautious and more merciless. During the night on Easter Wednesday, the town was subjected to a general bombardment. One soldier recalled that the English shot very terribly, from eleven o’clock till it was two in the morning, that the stones in the street, the tiles, and slates of the houses flew so about the street that the women and children made such piteous noise and cry that it was heard in our camp.

There were daily skirmishes. On 22 April English cannon brought down the spire of Leith’s church. The English earthworks were creeping closer to Leith, under constant fire – and also constant rain; heavy storms reduced the entire battlefield to a quagmire. The ground was ‘marshy and rotten’ at the best of times, but the rain made it ‘so deep and foul’ that heavy guns could not easily be placed. Nevertheless, the English commanders’ hopes of a successful assault were rising. On 30 April, a fire broke out in Leith, much to the excitement of the besiegers. Grey’s report of it, written that night, bears the excited postscript: ‘Yet it burns, yet yet.’ It was a hopeful sign.52

The assault came on 7 May, and was a disaster. The English artillery failed to breach Leith’s fortifications, and, catastrophically, the ladders which had been prepared to scale the
walls turned out to be too short. Apparently no-one had anticipated that ladders set on a field of mud and weighed down with soldiers would sink some way into the ground. The result of this miscalculation was a slaughter. The assailants suffered at least a thousand men dead and injured; the survivors’ morale was badly shaken. The Congregation’s forces, which had participated ineffectually in the assault, melted away, and the English, too, suffered from considerable desertion. The English commanders blamed one another. The duke of Norfolk, who had previously been an enthusiast for the assault, now thought that another fifteen thousand men would be needed. Indeed, the English briefly felt besieged themselves, with munitions running low and the people of Edinburgh suddenly less keen to welcome such incompetent liberators. Mary of Guise, it was said, roused herself from her sickbed to watch the assault from the ramparts of Edinburgh castle, and once the outcome was clear went to Mass to give thanks for victory.53

However, the assault was a side-show and the victory an illusion. The war would be won not by tactics but by logistics. English reinforcements continued to arrive, while supplies ran dangerously low in Leith. The French had been reduced to eating their own horses as early as April. On 12 May a French party stole out of Leith to gather cockles and periwinkles on the seashore, only to be set upon by English cavalry and to suffer dozens of casualties. A month later they tried to gather shellfish again and suffered the same fate. An English wag composed a poem taunting them: ‘As oft as for cockles you run to the sands / God send your brave soldiers to fall in to our hands.’ (He thoughtfully translated this into French and had copies thrown into the besieged town.) One English diplomat recommended that deserters not be allowed to leave Leith, in order to prevent the French from eking out their supplies. Yet deserters did begin make their way out; by June they were spreading tales of a garrison on the brink of famine, reduced to eating unmilled seedcorn and whatever fish they could catch. These stories were probably exaggerated. There does not seem to have been actual starvation
in Leith, although by the end of May the men had been put on reduced rations of ten ounces of bread a day. But while they could hope to catch fish, they had no way of replenishing their exhausted gunpowder and ammunition. Mary of Guise’s death in the early hours of 11 June only reinforced the hopelessness of their position. France sent, not reinforcements, but ambassadors to negotiate a surrender. The terms included the provision that all those in Leith should be safely returned to France. Cecil, who came north to negotiate the peace, was relieved at this outcome. There were over 3600 men left in Leith, and he noted that they ‘are for all their scarcity of victual very well looking, all very well armed. ... If they had stood to, it should have been the occasion of the shedding of a great deal of blood.’

V. Reformation in wartime

The 1559-60 war was, latterly, grim; but it was also localised. Most of Scotland saw little or no fighting, but fell quickly under the control either of the Congregation or of neutral lords who were keen to maintain good relations with the reformers. This control meant that religious reform was not merely a future aspiration. Although a comprehensive settlement of the religious question was not possible until the parliament of August 1560 (if then), reformers on the ground had no need to tarry for the magistrate. They could begin to build the new Jerusalem in the parishes.

Their first priority was, of course, destruction. The iconoclastic ‘cleansing’ of Catholic churches was a vital first step both for theological and political reasons. Theologically, Reformed Protestants were clear that idolatry was intolerable; and politically, iconoclasm was an unmistakable and irrevocable statement of allegiance. It was an act of defiance which brought clarity to a confused political situation, by forcibly dividing a population into supporters and opponents of what had happened. It was also the means by
which a community was physically changed from Catholic to Protestant; and because the
destruction was far easier than any possible rebuilding, it aimed to make that change
irreversible. The vigour of this process in Scotland impressed observers. In August 1559,
John Jewel, in London, summarised the Scottish news for Peter Martyr in Zürich:

Every thing is in a ferment in Scotland. Knox, surrounded by a thousand followers,
is holding assemblies throughout the whole kingdom. ... All the monasteries are
everywhere levelled with the ground: the theatrical dresses, the sacrilegious
chalices, the idols, the altars, are consigned to the flames; not a vestige of the
ancient superstition and idolatry is left. ... You have heard of drinking like a
Scythian; but this is churching it like a Scythian.\textsuperscript{55}

For Englishmen disappointed by their queen’s sober caution, the Scots’ achievement seemed
heady indeed.

The pattern of iconoclasm which was begun in Perth spread across the country. As the
reformers dispersed across Fife in June 1559,

as they passed, where they found in their way any churches or chapels, incontinent
they purged them, breaking down the altars and idols in all places where they came.
And so praising God continually, in singing of Psalms and spiritual songs, they
rejoiced that the Lord wrought thus happily with them.

Their cleansing mission took them to St. Andrews. It was the site of Knox’s first sermon,
twelve years earlier: now he preached again, on Christ’s cleansing of the temple, triggering
another wave of destruction. ‘Before the sun was down, there was never inch standing but
bare walls’ – this chronicler was exaggerating, but not wildly. Some images were
symbolically burned for heresy on the spot where Walter Myln had been executed. The
nearby town of Crail was also ‘ransacked and spoiled’. In Edinburgh, the initial purge took
place even before the Congregation’s forces arrived, allegedly provoked by the friars’ attempts to sell off their goods – for the preachers’ scruples about not looting church property were not universally shared. Whether there was personal violence is less clear. The pro-Catholic historians Bishop Leslie and Lord Herries both claimed that there was, but there is no contemporary evidence to support them. In any case, by the autumn the abbeys of Scone, Melrose, Jedburgh, Kelso, Paisley, Dunfermline and Kilwinning had been purged. In December, the Reformation even reached conservative Aberdeen, when bands of reformers from Angus and the Mearns arrived ‘to destroy and cast down the churches and religious places’ of the burgh. There, as in Edinburgh, the iconoclasts’ job was partly done for them by the burgh council, which removed valuables from the churches in order to prevent them from being looted. The motives were different but the effect was the same.56

This destruction was itself a notable achievement for the reformers. Restoring Catholic worship in the wake of the iconoclasm would have been very difficult, and this was certainly one of the Protestants’ aims. According to Herries, Knox cried in his 11 May sermon at Perth, ‘Pull down the nests, that the crows might not build again!’ It was done. When Guise reoccupied the town and Catholic worship was (briefly) restored there, the priests were forced, Knox noted with satisfaction, to say Mass using a ‘dicing-table’, because ‘all the altars were profaned’. Altars could be reconsecrated, but more costly damage was also done. At St. Andrews, and presumably elsewhere, Mass books were burned, cutting off the church’s liturgical memory.57 Catholic practice could not be stamped out as easily as Catholic buildings could be ransacked, but an earnest attempt was made at this too. One chronicler claimed, regretfully, that once the rebellion had begun ‘none durst say Mass; no sacraments [were] used in the old fashion’. In fact, Mass continued to be said in some areas: it was ostentatiously restored in Edinburgh when Guise’s forces retook the town, and some other clergy celebrated it – or tried to do so. A few religious communities withdrew to less
visible settings where they presumably maintained some of their liturgical life. In Aberdeen, a kind of Catholic ‘privy kirk’ survived for much of the 1560s. Yet the speed and scale of the suppression is still surprising. By August 1560, although the Reformation parliament was worried about priests who ‘stubbornly perseveres in their wicked idolatry’, it believed that this was only done ‘in quiet and secret places’. When the Jesuit Nicholas de Gouda visited Scotland in 1562, he was categorical: ‘No religious rite is celebrated in any part of the kingdom.’\(^{58}\) The suppression of Catholic worship was a remarkable success story.

Catholic structures and property, too, were under threat. In November the Congregation threatened to deprive priests who defied Reformed ministers; in December they took steps to close down the old ecclesiastical courts, some of which were still functioning. The Congregation also began to look to the old church’s property to pay for their own war effort. A proclamation in late October offered substantial pensions for those injured in the war, or for the widows of those killed, ‘and this to be gathered of the papists’ goods’. More systematic attempts to pay for garrisons in this way were also made. These seizures of church property were irregular and, as it turned out, often temporary, but their impact was real enough. In mid-1560, Archbishop Hamilton complained that a large number of clerics’ houses, including those of bishops, ‘has been spoiled from them violently since this insurrection’.\(^{59}\)

The suppression was not, however, principally a matter of violence. If there was violence threatened against the Catholic clergy, it was veiled. We know of a priest in Peebles who felt coerced into conforming, and salved his conscience by drawing up a deed claiming that he had acted ‘for fear of his life ... not from any hatred of his old religion’\.\(^{60}\) However, there were no Catholic martyrs made in the Scottish Reformation, and Catholic clerics and previously loyal lay people conformed to the new church in large numbers and with
remarkable speed. Looking back with disgust on the collapse of Scottish Catholicism, the polemicist Ninian Winzet asked:

How that might be, that Christian men professing, teaching, and preaching Christ and his word so many years, in one month’s space or thereby, should be changed so proudly in so many high matters into the plain contrary men. At Easter and certain Sundays after, they taught with great appearing zeal, and ministered the sacraments to us in the Catholic manner: and by Whitsunday they changed their standards.

A marginal note dates this transformation: ‘A sudden change to be in the faithful, 1559.’ Winzet’s explanation was not that these clergy were compelled, but that they were ‘hypocrites, and temporisers with the time’. If so, however, hypocrisy was remarkably thick on the ground, and thickest at the nation’s spiritual capital, St. Andrews. Knox testified as early as June 1559 that ‘divers canons of St. Andrews have given notable confessions, and have declared themselves manifest enemies to the pope, to the Mass, and to all superstition’.

The most notable of these was their subprior, John Winram, who may have had covert reformist sympathies for some time. By early the following year, some tougher nuts had started to crack. Thirty-eight Catholic priests formally repented of their idolatry and proclaimed their conformity to the new religion in St. Andrews during February and March 1560. Admiral Winter was personally present at one such recantation, but there is no other indication that they were extorted by force. The last of these recantations was the most dramatic. John Grierson was the provincial of the Dominican friars in Scotland, one of the best-disciplined orders; he himself was an exceptionally experienced heresy-hunter. He had been one of Patrick Hamilton’s judges, and one of Walter Myln’s; he had petitioned James V to act against Lutherans in 1534; and in 1559, he was charged with enforcing the rules on clerical celibacy. On 17 March 1560, he formally renounced his allegiance to Rome and his faith in the Mass – although he retained his office of provincial until his death in 1564. Nor
were the high-profile recantations confined to St. Andrews. In February 1560, the provost of the collegiate church of Lincluden declared his intention to marry. There was a string of public confessions in Edinburgh in June 1560: it was even rumoured that Lady Stonehouse, Archbishop Hamilton’s mistress, would join the rush to repent. No doubt some penitents were purely cynical, but these reports have the tang of religious revival about them. The acknowledged corruption of the old church; the muddying of its doctrines by reform efforts; the destruction of the physical fabric which was so important to it; the fervour and apparent moral purity of reformers who were widely perceived as ‘clean fingered’; their sense of momentum; and the unmistakable verdict which God was giving through the Congregation’s victory, would all combine to make genuine conversions during this crisis very possible.

If these personal conversions were to be made national, however, a new, Reformed church would have to be erected in the place of the old one. Here, predictably enough, progress was more piecemeal. Reformation in the parishes could never have been the work of a moment. Yet with all recognition of the importance of continuity, the changes wrought in 1559-60 still seem dramatic enough. In September 1559, Knox claimed that the ministry was established and the sacraments ‘rightly ministered’ in Edinburgh, St. Andrews, Dundee, Perth, Brechin, Montrose, Stirling and Ayr. The reformers were expelled from Edinburgh in November 1559 but swiftly re-established themselves the following April. Ayr, which had had a resident minister since 1557, sent to Edinburgh in 1559 to secure another one. During the war, Ayr’s burgh council even paid for Christopher Goodman to go on a missionary trip to the Isle of Man. Moreover, if full-scale Reformed ministry was initially only established in the burghs, preaching was considerably more widespread. There were Protestant sermons on the east Borders in late August, and even Aberdeen apparently thought it politic to invite preachers to the town in December 1559. The ripples of reform were spreading outwards. One witness claims that after the Congregation’s second retreat from Edinburgh, the
preachers redoubled their efforts, ‘so that, by means of the trouble, the Religion was in all places better reformed and established’. We know that by the end of the year even small towns such as Dalmellington in Ayrshire and Crail in Fife were establishing the ministry. A Protestant establishment was beginning to appear.

The nature of that establishment was not yet decided. Was this to be full-blown Reformed Protestantism in the style of Geneva, Zürich or Emden, or the more traditionally structured English version? Some favoured the latter. There was much talk of ‘Common Prayer’ being used. In January 1560, Randolph wrote that ‘the common prayers’ used in Scotland ‘are the very same, or differ very little, from those of England’, although they were shorn of some of the ceremonies which hotter Protestants found most obnoxious. In July 1559, Kirkcaldy of Grange claimed that when the Mass had been suppressed, ‘the Book set forth by godly King Edward is read in the same churches’. No doubt he expected his English correspondent to be impressed by this. In fact, however, the English made no discernible attempts to impose their brand of Protestantism on their Scottish allies – not yet. This remarkable restraint, coupled with the uncompromising vision of the leading Scottish ministers, meant that even before the Book of Discipline and the Confession of Faith were drawn up in 1560, the wind was blowing strongly in favour of a fully Reformed settlement.

The clearest sign of this was the imposition of discipline, to regulate public morals and control access to the sacraments. This was a particular priority for Reformed Protestants, and eventually the Scots even outdid Calvin by insisting that discipline was a necessary mark of a true church. The first regular, recorded system of discipline was erected in St. Andrews. There was a functioning kirk session there by October 1559, when Robert Roger, a shipwright, did public penance for adultery and so acquired the distinction of being Protestant Scotland’s first recorded moral offender. Further cases followed in November. Another Reformed practice – the structured theological discussions known as ‘exercises’ –
was well established in St. Andrews by 1562, and may also have been in place very early. But St. Andrews was not alone. Randolph wrote in June 1560 that ‘it is almost miraculous to see how the word of God taketh place in this country. They are better willing to receive discipline here than in any country that ever I was in.’ Where kirk sessions had not yet become established, the secular authorities sometimes took it on themselves to impose a similar discipline in the meantime. Edinburgh’s Protestant town council issued a decree against ‘idolaters, whoremasters and harlots’ in June 1560, requiring all such people to testify publicly to their repentance. Six months later Stirling’s burgh council was helping to enforce the church’s stricture against blasphemy in the same way. The willingness of various burgh councils to pay for the new church, from church Bibles through communion bread to clothes for the minister, speaks to the same active support for the emerging structures. It was perhaps inevitable that the collapse of the old church’s systems of enforcement would draw the secular authorities into fulfilling the resulting social vacuum. It was not inevitable that they would do so in the way which the Reformed ministers had hoped, nor that they would subsequently cede their new-found powers to the church.

By the summer of 1560, Scots were being pressed to conform not only to long-established moral standards, but to new doctrinal ones. In Peebles, the rector was publicly denounced in August for failure to act according to what his accuser called ‘the custom and practice of the realm’ – that is, to preach and minister the ‘Common Prayers’. In godlier burghs, those who refused to conform found themselves the targets of discrimination, or worse. In Stirling, a cleric attempting to claim a benefice in July 1560 was opposed on the grounds that ‘he has not as yet recanted his old traditions’. Again, St. Andrews led the way. In May 1560 six people were hauled before the kirk session for making abusive remarks about the new establishment or, in some cases, about Knox personally. More followed later in the year. The new Reformed Eucharist was evidently a particularly contentious point in a new
church’s life. When one deacon had been issuing tokens for admission to the sacrament, a Walter Adie had said to him,

> Will ye give me a ticket to be served the Devil’s dirt? I shall buy a pint of wine and a loaf, and I shall have as good a sacrament as the best of them all shall have.

He was made publicly to repent for this. The new establishment was beginning to enforce itself: less fiercely than the old one, yet more thoroughly.66

The success which the reformers had in beginning to build this new establishment, even while the war was continuing, inevitably raises the question: what would have happened if they had lost that war? If the French had succeeded in securing reinforcements, if the English had withdrawn, and if Guise or her successors had succeeded in reasserting French dominance over Scotland, what would have become of Scottish Protestantism?

The Reformed ministers feared that a French victory would mean full-scale religious tyranny. The rebel lords were not so excitable, but they, too, had clearly lost all trust in France’s goodwill and expected deprivation or worse. These fears matched the hopes of some of their opponents. In the early stages of the war, when France’s mood was shocked but bullish, there was talk in the French court of making examples of Argyll, Lord James Stewart and Erskine of Dun. However, this instinctive reaction was quickly overtaken by realism. From late 1559 onwards, a series of peace proposals were put by the French: the common theme of these was the concession that the Scots might govern their own internal affairs, including religion, as long as they maintained the French alliance and obedience. It was a distasteful concession for the French, in particular for the young king, Francis; in May he personally insisted that his Scottish subjects ‘shall live in the old religion, neither having churches according to their fashion, nor the Interim as they demand, in order to live according to their opinion’. Yet this document may have been a forgery designed to lure the
Spanish into the war by convincing them of the purity of France’s motives; and even if it was genuine, it was quite unrealistic. As early as September 1559, some in France were muttering that it was better to accept a Protestant Scotland as an ally than to compel it to be an enemy.

In March 1560, before the English ground forces arrived, the French proposed a peace deal in which, in exchange for a reaffirmation of Francis and Mary’s just title to Scotland, they would withdraw their troops and allow religious liberty. The old church would be protected, but a Reformed church would be permitted to establish itself as well. Similar offers were renewed in April. They were rejected, largely because the English doubted and the Scots scorned France’s good intentions. Yet it is hard to see these offers as anything but the acknowledgement of a political reality. Scotland was a decentralised kingdom which could only be governed effectively with the co-operation of its magnates. By 1560, too much of that political establishment had become alienated from the old church for Catholicism effectively to be re-imposed. A French reconquest of Scotland was entirely possible but, as Mary Stewart recognised on her return in 1561, the new religion had to be permitted some legal space if that reconquest was to be turned into tolerably stable government.

The Reformed church established itself in 1559-60 with remarkable speed, but also with remarkable firmness. This was not a matter of pre-existing ‘privy kirks’ stepping in to take over Scotland’s religious life. Rather, it was a sudden yet profound change which took place during the war itself, as political events forced Scots rapidly to reassess their allegiances, and to abandon their various attempts at compromise. The collapse of Catholic reform, and the widespread perception of sudden and brutal French tyranny, quickly closed off political options that had been part of the mainstream. Trust in the auld allies could probably have been recovered, but it would have to have been bought back in the currency of religious freedom. French Scotland could have returned after 1559-60. Catholic Scotland
could not.

1 There are several contemporary or near-contemporary narratives of these events, notably those in Knox, I & II; Wodrow Misc., 51-85; Leslie, Historie, II; Dickinson, Two Missions, 57-179. For one of the better modern narratives, see Lee, James Stewart.

2 Knox, I, 326-331, 337-8, 344-5; CSP Scotland, 503; David Hay Fleming (ed.), Register of the Minister, Elder and Deacons of the Christian Congregation of St. Andrews ..., 1559-1582 (Scottish History Society 4: Edinburgh, 1889), 7; NA SP 52/1 fo. 68v (CSP Scotland, 465).


4 NA SP 52/3 fo. 68v (CSP Scotland, 734); CSP Foreign 1559-60, 176; Dawson, Politics of Religion; Lee, James Stewart; Durkan, ‘James, third earl of Arran’.

5 BL Harleian MS 289 fos. 68v-69r (CSP Foreign 1559-60, no. 392); Dickinson, Two Missions, 151-5.

6 NA SP 52/1 fos. 143v, 153r (CSP Scotland, 505.1, 510); Herries, Historical Memoirs, 47; Hay Fleming, Register, 8-10; Knox, I, 360-3, 388-92; VI, 26; Dunbar, Reforming the Scottish Church, 35-6; Leslie, Historie, II, 405; Marwick, Extracts from the Records of Edinburgh, III, 47-9.

7 CSP Scotland, 566.

8 Ibid., 566, 659, 661. The third earl of Cassillis had been a Protestant, but the fourth earl, who succeeded in November 1558, was a staunch Catholic.

9 CSP Scotland, 521, 549, 599; CCCC MS 105 p. 299.
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10 NA SP 52/4 fo. 29v (CSP Scotland, 821); Melville of Halhill, Memoirs, 78-80, 82.

11 Knox, VI, 62

12 Knox, I, 249, 273-4, 375-6, 459; CSP Foreign 1558-59, 908; CSP Scotland, 591, 879; 249HP, II, Appendix 39.


14 Sadler SP, I, 93-4, 99; LP, XVIII(ii), 76; XIX(i), 350, 709.2; XX(ii), 144; RSS, III, 820; Knox, I, 126, 251-2; CSP Foreign 1558-59, 908; HP, II, Appendix 39; CSP Scotland, 812, 879, 881, 886, 891.

15 Donaldson, All the Queen’s Men, 31-2; Donaldson, Scotland: James V to James VII, 86-7; Ritchie, Mary of Guise, 229-31.

16 CSP Scotland, 487, 499.

17 Craigie, Maitland Folio Manuscript, 33; Sadler SP, I, 515; Knox, I, 459-60, 465; CSP Scotland, 628, 629, 641, 698, 713, 722, 728; NA SP 52/2 no. 38, SP 52/3 fo. 151v, SP 59/2 fo. 214v (CSP Scotland, 642; CSP Foreign 1560-61, 2, 23).

18 NA SP 52/2 nos. 25, 43, SP 52/3 fo. 94v (CSP Scotland, 647, 744.5; CSP Foreign 1559-60, 650); CSP Scotland, 682, 744.3-6, 751, 756, 812; Extracts from the Council Register of Aberdeen, 322; Chambers, Charters and Documents Relating to Peebles, 260.

19 NA SP 59/2 fo. 180v (CSP Foreign 1559-60, 562, where wrongly transcribed).

20 Edinburgh University Library, Laing MS III.308, pt. II, fo. 1v. This is a fragmentary and unpublished history of the reign of Mary Stewart.
21 Knox, I, 342, 367, 371-2; CSP Scotland, 485, 503; NA SP 52/1 fo. 143v (CSP Scotland, 505.1).


23 Herries, Historical Memoirs, 50; Cameron, Scottish Correspondence, 426, 427, 429; BL Harleian MS 289 fo. 69r (CSP Foreign 1559-60, no. 392); NA SP 52/2 nos. 25, 96.1 (CSP Foreign 1559-60, 650; CSP Scotland, 699.1).

24 NA SP 52/2 no. 21, SP 52/4 fo. 29r (CSP Scotland, 626, 821); CSP Foreign 1560-61, p. 152 n.254

25 See above, ch. 7.

26 Cameron, Scottish Correspondence, 427; CSP Foreign 1559-60, 42, 45; Knox, I, 444-9.

27 Knox, I, 324, 341-7; Ritchie, Mary of Guise, 214-17; Pollen, Papal Negotiations, 18.

28 Knox, I, 380, 413-17; VI, 23, 81; CSP Scotland, 501, 535, 552; Wodrow Misc., 67-8; CSP Foreign 1558-59, 732, 823, 888.

29 NA SP 52/1 fos. 216r, 258v (CSP Scotland, 545, 577); Cameron, Scottish Correspondence, 429; Knox, I, 397, 406; III, 421; Diurnal of Occurents, 272.

30 Herries, Historical Memoirs, 50; Wodrow Misc., 74-6; Knox, II, 3-14, 61; CSP Scotland, 566, 607, 639; NA SP 52/2 nos. 39, 43 (CSP Scotland, 642, 647).

31 Dickinson, Two Missions, 83-7; NA SP 52/2 no. 94 (CSP Scotland, 697); Wodrow Misc., 80-1; Knox, II, 57.

32 CSP Scotland, 596.4; NA SP 52/2 no. 43 (CSP Scotland, 647); Knox, II, 13-14; Diurnal of Occurents, 55.

33 See above, ch. 4.
34 NA SP 52/3 fo. 68f, SP 52/4 fo. 180v (CSP Scotland, 734; CSP Foreign 1560-61, no. 335); Dickinson, *Two Missions*, 91.

35 Knox, VI, 31; NA SP 52/1 fos. 76cv, 158v (CSP Scotland, 471, 511.1); CSP Scotland, 522, 540; CSP Foreign 1558-59, 998, 1221, 1274; BL Additional MS 23108 fos. 11i-12v (CSP Scotland, 589).

36 *Wodrow Misc.*, 78, 82-3; NA SP 52/2 nos. 38, 58.1, SP 52/3 fo. 83f, SP 52/4 fo. 40f (CSP Scotland, 642, 662.2, 743, 826).

37 CSP Scotland, 649, 703, 709.1; CCCC MS 105 p. 305; Knox, II, 64-5.

38 CSP Scotland, 537; CSP Foreign 1558-59, 1240; NA SP 52/1 fo. 298f, SP 52/3 fo. 245f, SP 59/2 263fo. 195f (CSP Foreign 1559-60, 400, 933; CSP Foreign 1560-61, 133); *Wodrow Misc.*, 79; CSP Foreign 1560-61, 134.


41 CCCC MS 105 p. 283; NA SP 52/1 fo. 76cv (CSP Scotland, 471); CSP Scotland, 486; Sadler SP, I, 378.


43 Knox, VI, 37-8, 69; CSP Scotland, 507; CSP Foreign 1558-59, 1239; CSP Foreign 1559-60, 165, 243; CSP Foreign 1560-61, 32.

44 CSP Scotland, 537; NA SP 52/1 fos. 68cv, 76cv (CSP Scotland, 465, 471); ASP, 605-6.
45 Sadler SP, I, 381; CSP Scotland, 504, 511, 549, 566, 580.1, 613; Knox, I, 452-3; II, 6-7, 40-3, VI, 68, 100-1, 103; NA SP 52/1 fo. 258r (CSP Scotland 577); CCCC MS 105 pp. 308, 314; CSP Foreign 1559-60, 198; Jane Dawson, ‘Clan, kin and kirk: the Campbells and the Scottish Reformation’ in N. Scott Amos, Andrew Pettegree and Henk van Nierop (eds), The Education of a Christian Society (Aldershot, 1999), 220-1.

46 Pollen, Papal Negotiations, 19-23, 35-6; CCCC MS 105 p. 309; CSP Scotland, 549, 585, 590, 591; Sadler SP, I, 499.

47 Knox, II, 4; CSP Foreign 1559-60, 155, 290, 418, 427, 549, 552, 580, 658, 685, 837, 962, 971; CSP Scotland, 685; CSP Foreign 1560-61, 16; Dickinson, Two Missions, 131, 147; Leslie, Historie, II, 444.

48 CSP Scotland, 741-2, 760; CSP Foreign 1559-60, 220, 904, 905, 919, 1025, 1046, 1052, 1082, 1102; 6CSP Foreign 1560-61, 26, 51, 109, 116, 187, 268; NA SP 70/13 fo. 129r (CSP Foreign 1559-60, 1036).


50 Leslie, Historie, II, 419; and see above, ch. 6.

51 CCCC MS 105 pp. 217; CSP Foreign 1559-60, 441, 467n; Dickinson, Two Missions, 59, 71-81, 167, 177.

52 CSP Scotland, 724.1, 736, 749, 759, 765.1; Dickinson, Two Missions, 97-119, 135; Leslie, Historie, II, 436-7; CCCC MS 105 p. 305; CSP Foreign 1560-61, 3; NA SP 52/3 fos. 153r, 163r (CSP Scotland, 766.1, 769).

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54 CSP Scotland, 792.1, 797; Leslie, Historie, II, 438; Dickinson, Two Missions, 149, 157-9, 167; CCCC MS 105 p. 218; CSP Foreign 1560-61, 116, 166, 182, 388; NA SP 52/4 fo. 162f (CSP Foreign 1560-61, 315).

55 Robinson, Zurich Letters, I, 40.


57 Herries, Historical Memoirs, 38; Knox, I, 345; VI, 24; CSP Foreign 1558-59, 862.


59 CSP Foreign 1559-60, 348, 421; Knox, VI, 53; CCCC MS 105 p. 307; CSP Scotland, 559; Leslie, Historie, II, 443; Keith, History of the Affairs of Church and State, III, 2.

60 Chambers, Charters and Documents Relating to Peebles, 259.

61 Ninian Winzet, The buke of fourscoir-thre questions (RSTC 25859: Antwerp, 1563), sig. A5v; Knox, VI, 26; Dunbar, Reforming the Scottish Church, 35-6; Hay Fleming,
Register, 10-18; Foggie, Renaissance Religion, 37-8, 279; ALC, 422; Patrick, Statutes, 163; Donaldson, Scottish Reformation, 51; NA SP 52/4 fo. 39v (CSP Scotland, 826).

62 Wodrow Misc., 119.

63 Knox, I, 390-1, 465-73; VI, 78; Marwick, Extracts from the Records of Edinburgh, III, 63-5; Wodrow Misc., 73, 83; Pryde, Ayr Burgh Accounts, 30-1, 33; CSP Foreign 1559-60, 485; Kirk, Patterns of Reform, 14.

64 Wodrow Misc., 67; Marwick, Extracts from the Records of Edinburgh, III, 48; Knox, VI, 22, 34; NA SP 52/2 no. 11 (CSP Scotland, 616); Alford, Early Elizabethan Polity, 60.

65 Hay Fleming, Register, 5-6; Dawson, “The face of ane perfyt reformed kyrk”, 424; NA SP 52/4 fo. 39v (CSP Scotland, 826); Marwick, Extracts from the Records of Edinburgh, III, 65; R. Renwick (ed.), Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Stirling, AD 1519-1666 (Glasgow, 1887), 77; Pryde, Ayr Burgh Accounts, 31, 132.

66 Gunn, Book of Peebles Church, 167; Renwick, Extracts from the Records of Stirling, 63; Hay Fleming, Register, 33-6, 44.

67 CSP Foreign 1558-59, 823, 902, 930, 1331; CSP Foreign 1559-60, 809; CSP Foreign 1560-61, 124, 131; CSP Scotland, 731, 741.