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Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity

Cowie, Christopher; Greenberg, Alexander

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Authors

Alexander Greenberg



Contributors

Christos Kyriacou
Editor

Robin McKenna
Editor

Abstract

According to constitutivists about epistemic normativity, epistemic normativity is explained by the nature of belief. Specifically, it is explained by the fact that, as a matter of conceptual necessity, belief stands in a normative relation to truth. We ask whether there are persuasive arguments for the claim that belief stands in such a relation to truth. We examine and critique two arguments for this claim. The first is based on the transparency of belief. The second is based on Moore-paradoxical sentences. We develop a common objection to both. Both arguments are reliant on implausible claims about the relation between accepting a norm and being motivated by it. This point has sometimes been made in connection with the transparency of belief. But its development and application to Moore-paradoxical sentences are, we believe, novel.

Citation

Cowie, C., & Greenberg, A. (2018). Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity. In C. Kyriacou, & R. McKenna (Eds.), Metaepistemology : realism and anti-realism (173-196). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93369-6_8

Online Publication Date Sep 20, 2018
Publication Date Sep 20, 2018
Deposit Date Feb 18, 2018
Publicly Available Date Mar 29, 2024
Publisher Palgrave Macmillan
Pages 173-196
Series Title Palgrave innovations in Philosophy
Book Title Metaepistemology : realism and anti-realism.
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93369-6_8

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Accepted Book Chapter (171 Kb)
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Copyright Statement
Cowie, Christopher & Greenberg, Alexander (2018). Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity. In Metaepistemology: Realism and Anti-Realism. Kyriacou, Christos & McKenna, Robin Palgrave Macmillan. 173-196 reproduced with permission of Palgrave Macmillan. This extract is taken from the author's original manuscript and has not been edited. The definitive, published, version of record is available here: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93369-6_8




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