Hume on Belief and Vindicatory Explanations

Smith, Benedict

doi:10.1017/s0031819119000111

Hume on Belief and Vindicatory Explanations

Smith, Benedict

Authors

Dr Benedict Smith b.w.smith@durham.ac.uk
Associate Professor

Abstract

Hume's account of belief is understood to be inspired by allegedly incompatible motivations, one descriptive and expressing Hume's naturalism, the other normative and expressing Hume's epistemological aims. This understanding assumes a particular way in which these elements are distinct: an assumption that I dispute. I suggest that the explanatory-naturalistic aspects of Hume's account of belief are not incompatible with the normative-epistemological aspects. Rather, at least for some central cases of belief formation that Hume discusses at length, S's coming to believe that p can be explained in a way that vindicates S's belief that p.

Citation

Smith, B. (2019). Hume on Belief and Vindicatory Explanations. Philosophy, 94(2), 313-337. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819119000111

Journal Article Type	Article
Acceptance Date	Jan 11, 2019
Online Publication Date	Apr 25, 2019
Publication Date	Apr 30, 2019
Deposit Date	Feb 6, 2019
Publicly Available Date	Mar 1, 2019
Journal	Philosophy
Print ISSN	0031-8191
Electronic ISSN	1469-817X
Publisher	Cambridge University Press
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	94
Issue	2
Pages	313-337
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819119000111

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