I. Introduction

Can the Charter be invoked in disputes between private parties, thus creating a coherent constitutional basis for horizontality for fundamental rights, or does its limited scope of application preclude its use in horizontal disputes as a self-standing source of law? That was the constitutional question at the heart of the Grand Chamber’s recent ruling in Bauer.¹

There is little doubt that, for a long time, the EU horizontality doctrine was, as a 2006 editorial of the Common Market Law Review had put it, ‘a law of diminishing coherence’.² The insistence on the non-horizontality of directives from Marshall³ onwards led to the adoption of often unpredictable exceptions, exemplified in the Mangold judgment,⁴ which generated substantial legitimacy challenges⁵ and bids to ‘stop the European Court of Justice’.⁶ It was within this terse legal background that a nearly decade-long debate about the horizontal direct effect of the Charter emerged.⁷ Supporters of a cautious approach pointed to the problems of

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¹ ECJ 6 November 2018, Joined Cases C-569/16 and C-570/16, Stadt Wuppertal and Volker Willmeroth als Inhaber der TWI Technische Wartung und Instandsetzung Volker Willmeroth e. K. v Maria Elisabeth Bauer and Martina Broßonn, EU:C:2018:871.
³ ECJ 26 February 1986, Case C-271/91, Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority (Teaching), ECR 723.
⁴ ECJ 22 November 2005, Case C-144/04, Mangold v Helm, ECR I-9981; see also ECJ 19 January 2010, Case C-555/07, Kücküdeveci v Swedex GmbH, ECR I-365.
the Mangold ruling and the text of Article 51(1) of the Charter, which is addressed to Member States and Union institutions, arguing that the principle of horizontality should not be extended to its substantive provisions. Others advocated a more expansive approach, founded upon the coherent and effective application of fundamental rights to all legal disputes, against the state and private actors alike.

In Bauer et al, the Court’s Grand Chamber finally puts this debate to rest, in favour of the latter interpretation. Bauer is the latest of a set of rulings during the last year, including Egenberger and IR, which set the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter apart from prior rules on horizontality. But it is an especially significant part of that puzzle, because it brings the earlier case law together and clarifies its breadth within the field of EU fundamental rights jurisprudence where the abovementioned debate was most readily manifested: the social rights enshrined in the Charter’s Solidarity chapter (in this case, the right to paid annual leave protected in Article 31(2) thereof). It was indeed in this field that, not long ago, the Court had refrained from clarifying the reach of the horizontality doctrine and the status of different provisions of the Charter, first in Dominguez and, perhaps most starkly, in its heavily criticised judgment in Association de Médiation Sociale (hereafter ‘AMS’).

This comment has a threefold purpose. At a first stage, it analyses the key features of the Bauer ruling (part II). It then seeks to reconstruct what might now, safely in my view, be described

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8 The most significant challenge to the horizontal effect of the Charter was mounted by Advocate General Trstenjak in her Opinion in Dominguez, a case which concerned the very same right (paid annual leave): Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak, delivered on 8 September 2011, in Case C-282/10, Dominguez v Centre Informatique du Centre Ouest Atlantique and Préfet de la Région Centre, EU:C:2011:559 (hereafter ‘Dominguez Opinion’), paras 80–83; see also C Ladenburger, ‘FIDE Conference 2012 Institutional Report’ (2012) XXV FIDE Congress, Tallinn, 30 May–2 June 2012, 34–5.


10 ECJ 11 September 2018, Case C-68/17 IR v JQ, EU:C:2018:696; ECJ 17 April 2018, Case C-414/16, Egenberger v Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwicklung e.V, EU:C:2018:257, further discussed in a separate note in this issue. See also the ruling of the Court in Max Planck, which was rendered on the same day as the Bauer judgment, further confirming its bearing: ECJ 6 November 2018, Case C-684/16, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften e.V. v Tetsuji Shimizu, EU:C:2018:874.

as the current position on the horizontal effect of fundamental rights in the European Union and assesses the contribution the case makes in this regard (part III). Finally, the note argues that Bauer offers food for thought about the desirability and possible future directions of horizontality in respect of fundamental employment rights (part IV). How can the ruling be related to the Court’s broader analysis of horizontality? Is it convincing in its painstaking reaffirmation-but-containment of Marshall and AMS? Examining these questions brings the note to a mildly sombre ending: it is argued that, whilst Bauer solidifies some positive changes in respect of the constitutional recognition of the Charter, it would be too quick to assume that it amounts to the effective recognition of fundamental rights in the workplace – a feat which would require a more thorough revision of the relationship between fundamental rights and market freedoms in horizontal disputes within the Union’s public order.

II. Analysis of the Ruling

A. The legal context and questions before the Court

Bauer is not a single case: it stems from two, in all but one respect identical, sets of facts. The first case, C-569/16, concerned a dispute between Stadt Wuppertal and Mrs Maria Elisabeth Bauer. The second case, C-570/16, concerned a dispute between Mr Volker Willmeroth, in his capacity as owner of the TWI Technische Wartung und Instandsetzung Volker Willmeroth e.K. (a private company) and Mrs Martina Broßonn. The Stadt Wuppertal and Mr Willmeroth had been the last employers of the late husbands of Mrs Bauer and Mrs Broßonn, respectively. Both had refused to pay the claimants an allowance in lieu of annual leave not taken by their spouses before their death.

Under German law, paragraph 7(4) of the revised Bundesurlaubsgesetz (Federal law on leave) (BGBl. 2002 I, p 1529) (hereinafter referred to as ‘BUrlG’) provides for payment in lieu of leave in case of termination of the employment relationship, while paragraph 1922(1) of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil Code) (hereinafter referred to as ‘BGB’) provides that the estate of a deceased person passes in whole to their heirs. The relevant legal context at the EU level is, as mentioned above, Article 31(2) of the Charter, which provides that ‘every worker has the right to limitation of maximum working hours, to daily and weekly rest periods and to
an annual period of paid leave’. Secondary EU legislation occupying this field further clarifies the meaning of the right in question. Article 7 of Directive 2003/8812 provides that:

1. Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that every worker is entitled to paid annual leave of at least four weeks in accordance with the conditions for entitlement to, and granting of, such leave laid down by national legislation and/or practice.
2. The minimum period of paid annual leave may not be replaced by an allowance in lieu, except where the employment relationship is terminated.

Applying the finding of the Court of Justice in Bollacke13 that an annual leave entitlement cannot be altogether lost upon a person’s death, German courts had initially granted the claims of both Mrs Bauer and Mrs Broßonn. On appeal, however, the proceedings were stayed, as they raised questions about the applicability of this finding to the present context, particularly in case it was impossible to interpret Articles 7(4) BUrlG and Article 1922(1) BGB as comprising death of the employee within the concept of ‘termination’, thus making a payment in lieu of leave part of their estate. Joining the two cases, the Court of Justice reconstructed the national courts’ questions as follows:

(1) Does Article 7 of Directive [2003/88] or Article 31(2) of the [Charter] grant the heir of a worker who died while in an employment relationship a right to financial compensation for the worker’s minimum annual leave prior to his death, which is precluded by Paragraph 7(4) of the BUrlG, read in conjunction with Paragraph 1922(1) of the BGB?
(2) If the first question is answered in the affirmative: does this also apply where the employment relationship is between two private persons?14

In other words, the first question in the case was about the correct interpretation of the right to paid annual leave and the second question was procedural/constitutional, as it concerned the horizontal direct effect of a right further concretised in a directive. Thus, whilst for those of us with an Anglo-Saxon keyboard calling the cases ‘Bauer’ avoids the uncomfortable Eszett in Mrs Broßonn’s surname, it was in fact her case that made the judgment especially significant. For, even though the right to paid annual leave was engaged in both of the joined cases, it is

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14 Bauer, supra n 1, para 19.
trite EU law ‘that a directive may not of itself impose obligations on an individual and that a provision of a directive may not be relied upon as such against such a person.’\textsuperscript{15}

B. The Opinion and Judgment

The judgment was certainly influenced by the elaborate Opinion that preceded it. Maintaining a position he has consistently defended from \textit{Küçükdeveci} onwards,\textsuperscript{16} Advocate General Bot invited the Court to reconsider previous interpretations of fundamental rights based on general principles or ‘particularly important principles of EU social law’ and to confirm, once and for all, that the social rights enshrined in the Charter are equally fundamental to its other provisions.\textsuperscript{17} The Advocate General developed his argument in close conversation with earlier case law and, in a remarkable effort to reconcile \textit{Küçükdeveci} and \textit{AMS}, sought to clarify that \textit{Küçükdeveci} should not have been interpreted as meaning that only Charter provisions further expressed in directives enjoy horizontal direct effect. Rather, it was the constitutional character of the Charter that had led to the finding in \textit{Küçükdeveci}, which therefore did not depend on ‘further expression’ in a directive.\textsuperscript{18}

Advocate General Bot then took care to distinguish the present case from the \textit{AMS} ruling. Unlike Article 27, which refers to ‘national laws and practices’, the Advocate General argued that Article 31 was clearly mandatory and specific enough to be relied upon in itself – this finding not being dependent on whether a dispute was between private parties as opposed to between a private party and the state.\textsuperscript{19} His argument was built upon the holy grail of the precedent in this field: paragraph 39 of \textit{Defrenne II} and its finding that the need to observe rules of a ‘mandatory nature’ applies ‘not only to the action of public authorities, but also extends to all agreements which are intended to regulate paid labour collectively, as well as to contracts between individuals’.\textsuperscript{20} On this basis, the Advocate General asked the Court to reaffirm its position in \textit{Egenberger} by declaring that those provisions of the Charter which have a mandatory nature (i.e. are not principles or aspirations?) are horizontally applicable as such.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Marshall}, supra n 3, para 48.
\textsuperscript{17} Bauer Opinion, supra n 7, para 57, citing ECJ 29 November 2017, Case C-214/16, \textit{King}, EU:C:2017:914, para 32.
\textsuperscript{18} Bauer Opinion, supra n 7, paras 74-76.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid, paras 79-81.
\textsuperscript{20} ECJ 8 April 1986, Case 43/75, \textit{Defrenne v Sabena}, ECR 455, para 39.
thus removing any remaining doubt regarding the need for further implementation of these rights in secondary legislation.²¹

The Court agreed and, in contrast to its earlier case law in this field, its ruling was especially detailed and methodical – laudable developments in their own right. First, the Court unpacked the content of the right to paid annual leave carefully and explained that the proviso limiting payment in lieu of leave to cases of termination was intended to ensure the meaningfulness of that right both during (so that employers do not coerce their employees not to take leave) and after the end of the employment relationship.²² The reason for termination was immaterial: death marks the unfortunate but inevitable end of many employment relations.²³ Furthermore, the Court reasoned, annual leave has a measurable, pecuniary dimension, which does not dissipate upon the death of an employee, as it has been accumulated during his/her employment.²⁴

Having thus set out the meaning of the right to paid annual leave, the Court also followed the Advocate General’s suggestion to revise the overcomplicated distinctions between different rights in EU law, lingering in a long line of case law in this field and creating substantial and ‘unnecessary ambiguity’ therein.²⁵ It found that

the right to paid annual leave, as a principle of EU social law, is not only particularly important, but is also expressly laid down in Article 31(2) of the Charter, which Article 6(1) TEU recognises as having the same legal value as the Treaties.²⁶

It was thus the constitutional status of this provision, and not its designation as a ‘general’ or ‘particularly important’ principle of EU law, that led the Court to its answer to the first question. Leaving the Directive aside entirely, the Court found that Article 31(2) of the Charter in itself has the effect of limiting the Member States’ discretion to retroactively remove the enjoyment of the right, e.g. by prohibiting payment in lieu after a person’s death.²⁷ National law and other aspects of EU law, including the Directive, should be interpreted in accordance with that core obligation.

²¹ Bauer Opinion, supra n 7, para 76, citing Egenberger, supra n 10.
²² Bauer, supra n 1; paras 42-43.
²³ Ibid, para 46.
²⁴ Ibid, para 48.
²⁶ Bauer, supra n 1, para 51.
²⁷ Ibid, paras 61-63.
But there is a difference between saying that entitlements accrued in accordance with Article 31 do not dissipate upon a person’s death and saying that these entitlements can be invoked by the heirs of the person having accrued them in order to produce a remedy in a private dispute. While the former finding concerns the meaning of the right in general, the latter relates to the more technical aspects of the case and, more precisely, to the question about the direct effect of EU law. In this regard, the Court firstly affirmed the possibility of reliance on directives against the state. It thus dealt quickly with Mrs Bauer’s case, which concerned a public employer, before turning to the more complicated question raised by Mrs Broßonn’s circumstances. In analysing her case against Mr Willmeroth, the Court reaffirmed the non-horizontality of directives, even when these are clear, precise, and unconditional. Mrs Broßonn could not have relied upon the Directive in a dispute with her late husband’s employer. Whereas the Marshall rule remains valid in theory, though, the existence of the Charter limits its relevance in the fundamental rights context.

The Court quickly went on to mediate the above limitation, through an affirmation of the possibility of direct effect for the Charter in both vertical and horizontal disputes. To do so, it returned to the nature of Article 31(2) of the Charter and examined its potential for horizontality as a self-standing provision of EU primary law. In this respect, following the analysis of its Advocate General, the Court acknowledged the existence of a debate over the scope of application of the Charter and definitively (and, in my view, correctly) resolved it:

[A]lthough Article 51(1) of the Charter states that the provisions thereof are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing EU law, Article 51(1) does not, however, address the question whether those individuals may, where appropriate, be directly required to comply with certain provisions of the Charter and cannot, accordingly, be interpreted as meaning that it would systematically preclude such a possibility.

In these terms, Bauer et al unequivocally affirms the Charter’s horizontality, as a matter of constitutional principle. The Court then goes on to analyse the conditions under which specific provisions might be applied horizontally. On this point, too, the Court follows the Advocate General’s approach, finding that Article 31(2) is mandatory and specific enough (though the

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28 Ibid, paras 70-72.
29 Ibid, paras 77.
30 Bauer Opinion, supra n 7, paras 77-78.
31 Bauer, supra n 1, para 87.
Court does translate this into a, potentially, more stringent requirement of unconditionality, which could restrict its application to certain provisions.\(^{32}\) As the Court puts it:

The right to a period of paid annual leave, affirmed for every worker by Article 31(2) of the Charter, is thus, as regards its very existence, both mandatory and unconditional in nature, the unconditional nature not needing to be given concrete expression by the provisions of EU or national law, which are only required to specify the exact duration of annual leave and, where appropriate, certain conditions for the exercise of that right.\(^{33}\)

It follows that Charter provisions which are mandatory and unconditional are horizontal, with or without further expression in secondary legislation.

The question that, of course, remains is which provisions these are. The case law has now provided a range of examples: the Bauer judgment affirms last April’s ruling in Egenberger (and, more recently, in IR), meaning that Articles 31(2), 47, and 21, are in themselves sufficient to provide redress to individuals in private disputes.\(^{34}\) At the same time, though, Bauer emphatically distinguishes and reaffirms AMS on its facts.\(^{35}\) As I discuss further in the following sections, this raises concerns regarding the fate of Article 27 and, presumably, of all rights that refer to national laws and practices. Yet before turning to a critique of the judgment, it is worth briefly analysing its last substantive part, which considers the available remedies.\(^{36}\)

From an orthodox EU law perspective, the immediate implication of the case might appear to be not only that there is a right to paid annual leave in the Union against public and private employers, but that there is also a corresponding obligation on these employers to comply with it directly. This is likely true in practice, but only partly so in terms of the constitutional structure the Court proposes. The mandatory and unconditional nature of the right (i.e. the fact that it enjoys horizontal direct effect under EU law) means that:

if the [national] court is unable to interpret the national legislation at issue in a manner ensuring its compliance with Article 31(2) of the Charter, it will therefore be required, in a situation such as that in the particular legal context of Case C-570/16, to ensure,

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\(^{32}\) Ibid, paras 82-83. While ‘unconditionality’ is, of course, part of the classic formula for vertical direct effect as well, cases such as Reyners had relaxed its operation in practice substantially: see Case 2/74, Reyners v Belgium [1974] ECR 63. The use of unconditionality in Bauer seems, in turn, to support what appears to be the Court’s overall position stemming from this case law, namely that conditionality upon national laws and practices diminishes a particular provision’s potential of being used in a horizontal dispute (a good example of which remains Article 27 EUCFR as seen in the AMS ruling, supra n 11).

\(^{33}\) Ibid, para 85.

\(^{34}\) Ibid. See also IR v JQ, supra n 10 and the note on these rulings in this issue.

\(^{35}\) Bauer, supra n 1, para 84.

\(^{36}\) Ibid, paras 90-91.
within its jurisdiction, the judicial protection for individuals flowing from that provision and to guarantee the full effectiveness thereof by disapplying *if need be* that national legislation (see, by analogy, judgment of 17 April 2018, *Egenberger*, C-414/16, EU:C:2018:257, paragraph 76).³⁷

The ruling thus seems to confirm a trend traceable to *Dansk Industri*³⁸ but, as noted in the judgment, more explicitly assumed in *Egenberger*, which is no longer to harmonise the remedial stage of the process by stipulating the *direct* use of a fundamental right in a private relationship (note the absence of a reference to *Mangold* and *Küçükdeveci*). Rather, the Court appears to be prepared to allow national courts to guarantee the full effectiveness of the right through *any* appropriate means including, but perhaps not limited to, its disapplication.

### III. The significance of the Bauer ruling: fundamental social rights matter in vertical and in horizontal disputes

Based on the set of findings laid down above, it appears to me that the *Bauer* ruling makes three significant contributions to fundamental rights law in the European Union: it affirms the status of the Charter’s social rights; it settles the question of the Charter’s horizontality in principle and, indeed, by reference to its most controversial set of provisions (those found in Chapter IV); and, finally, it clarifies aspects of the operation of the doctrine of horizontal direct effect. This section analyses each of these contributions in turn.

First, and perhaps most importantly, the ruling confirms that the fundamental social rights enshrined in the Charter have a normative core that is applicable in all disputes that fall within the scope of EU law. As noted in the introduction, it was as part of its case law on the Solidarity chapter that the Court had limited any argument in favour an overarching constitutional analysis of the Charter by finding, in *AMS*, that certain provisions did not have a ‘rights-conferring’ nature,³⁹ thus excluding their meaningful effect.⁴⁰ The *Bauer* case to some extent revises this approach, by formally acknowledging the inclusion of social rights in a ‘written constitution’.⁴¹ While it should be noted carefully that *Bauer* does not overrule *AMS*, so that

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³⁷ Ibid, para 91, my emphasis.
³⁸ ECJ 19 April 2016, Case C-441/14, *Dansk Industri (DI) v Estate of Karsten Eigil Rasmussen*, EU:C:2016:278, paras 29-35.
³⁹ *AMS*, supra n 11, para 47.
⁴¹ Prigge Opinion, * supra* n 9, para 26.
the most contentious set of provisions found in the Charter (collective employment rights) may remain limited in their effects insofar as they are conditional upon national laws and practices—a critique to which I return in the following section—the ruling does clarify that all fundamental rights should be taken into account in the interpretation of national law before considering their ability to produce direct effect. It thus signals a marked and, in my view, welcome revision of one of the most problematic aspects of the AMS judgment: it confirms that the Charter’s provisions are indivisible in their constitutional status, even if they are not directly effective. Indeed, unlike its rejection of any form of horizontality in AMS, the Court in Bauer appears to embrace the idea that fundamental rights are capable of radiating across the legal system of the European Union, in vertical as well as in horizontal disputes. And, in this way, fundamental social rights do not become, as Advocate General Bot had so aptly put it, a ‘mere entreaty.’

A second, albeit related, point of note is that the judgment fits into a series of cases offering more detailed guidance regarding the horizontal direct effect of the Charter, including Egenberger and IR, thus presenting a glimmer of hope that the lack of clarity following cases like Mangold, Kücükdeveci, and AMS, is finally behind us. An especially positive dimension of the ruling was the very joining of the Bauer and Broßonn cases, which drew out in the clearest way the problems of non-horizontality, both for the protection of fundamental rights in the Union and for the coherence of EU law: in bringing together a case against a public employer and a case against a private employer in the same factual scenario, the Court offered an illustration of the substantive unfairness in which the lack of horizontal direct effect of directives could have resulted. This concern had already been echoed in the academic literature for many years, as well as in Advocate Generals’ Opinions as early as Faccini Dori. As the

42 I borrow the idea of a ‘radiating effect’ (or ‘Ausstrahlungswirkung’) from German constitutional theory: R Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (tr J Rivers, OUP 2002), p. 355; see also German Constitutional Court 15 January 1958, Lüth—BverfGE 7, 198 (Az: 1 BvR 400/51).
44 See further the note on Egenberger and IR in this issue.
famous dictum goes, like cases should be treated alike. In *Bauer*, the Court appears to recognise the problems its earlier case law was creating in this respect, at least in the fundamental rights context, where rights of a very similar character suffered a different fate depending on their source in EU legislation and, subsequently, their (subjectively determined) status as general principles of EU law in line with *Mangold/Küçükdeveci*.

In fact, *Bauer* is especially important because it forms part of a faction of the horizontal effect jurisprudence in which exceptions to the non-horizontality rule, such as the one set out in the *Mangold/Küçükdeveci* saga, had never operated. Arguably, in the light of this line of case law, the main question for the Court had never been whether provisions of the Charter that previously enjoyed (or almost certainly would have enjoyed) horizontal direct effect as general principles of EU law would also enjoy such effect under the Charter. Rather, as Advocate General Trstenjak had noted in her Opinion in *Dominguez*, the key question was whether provisions such as the right to paid annual leave, which did not previously enjoy general principle status and were therefore not readily comprised within the exception created by the *Mangold/Küçükdeveci* saga, should now also acquire horizontality, in virtue of their inclusion in the Charter alone.\(^46\) The Grand Chamber’s judgment in *Bauer* largely – though not without reservations – answers this question affirmatively.

Thus, while the scope of application of the Charter remains a difficult matter, *Bauer* leaves no doubt that, as a solid constitutional proclamation of rights, it is not subject to the application of any rules concerning directives, but to conditions similar to those applicable to other aspects of EU primary law. Even though the Charter ‘is not literally freestanding’ and presupposes ‘some lock onto EU law’ in order to apply, once a situation is deemed to fall within the scope of EU law, horizontality is not excluded in virtue of the text of Article 51(1) for any part of the Charter.\(^47\) Just as Advocate General Cruz-Villalón had put it in his noteworthy Opinion in *AMS* (which was not followed by the Court at the time), through its more recent rulings, the Court now seems to accept that ‘there is nothing in the wording of the article or […] in the preparatory works or the Explanations relating to the Charter, which suggests that there was any intention […] to address the very complex issue of the effectiveness of fundamental rights in relations

\(^{46}\) *Dominguez* Opinion, *supra* n 8, paras 128–135.

between individuals.\(^48\) In other words, the inclusion of a right within the Charter can be a sufficient reason for horizontal effect when a case falls within the scope of EU law, even for rights that previously might not have had general principle status: having found a place in the Charter means that these rights should now be considered to enjoy that status, even if the Court had not previously decided it.\(^49\)

A final point of significance in this case is what I interpret as a tentative clarification of the existing doctrine of horizontal direct effect. The omission of an explicit reference to direct effect in paragraph 91 of the ruling might be easy to overlook. However, read in the light of the cases and Opinions that preceded it, including perhaps the outright rejection of the Mangold doctrine by the Danish Supreme Court,\(^50\) the judgment appears to make a careful and accurate procedural adjustment to the horizontality case law. This appears to me to be that the direct effect of EU law refers to its invocability in a dispute before national courts and not to the remedies offered at national level – a stance that was pioneered by the reporting judge in her academic capacity.\(^51\) While Member States must ensure that a remedy is offered within the dispute in question including by disapplying national legislation, if that is required in the circumstances, the ruling does not stipulate that the right should be applied in a direct manner in the private dispute as a matter of EU law. Lenaerts and Corthaut have previously highlighted, for instance, that ‘the power of a rigorously applied duty of consistent interpretation should not be underestimated.’\(^52\)

\(^{48}\) AMS Opinion, \textit{supra} n 9, para 31.

\(^{49}\) This is consonant with a position previously advocated by the Court’s President, Judge Lenaerts, albeit in his academic capacity, arguing that all provisions of the Charter should be seen as having the status of general principles: K Lenaerts, ‘Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ 8:3 \textit{EuConst} (2012), p. 375, at p. 376; see also K Lenaerts and J Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘The Constitutional Allocation of Powers and General Principles of EU Law’ 47 \textit{CML Rev} (2010) p. 1629, at p. 1656 et seq.


As I have argued in more detail elsewhere,\footnote{See Frantziou, \textit{Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Rights}, supra n 7, chapters 6 and 8.} this approach should be welcomed in this field: not only is it constitutionally more refined than an assumption that direct effect equals the direct application of a right in a private dispute but, provided the relevant standard of protection has been clearly interpreted by the Court, as is the case in \textit{Bauer}, it does not raise concerns about effectiveness. In cases involving the state, there is often parity between the invocability of the right and the remedy offered. Yet, in horizontal disputes, different legal systems have historically incorporated fundamental rights in a variety of ways – for example, by imposing an obligation through an extensive reading-in of the relevant right, by requiring the state to step in to protect the victim of a violation and, in only a few instances, by directly placing a constitutional duty on a private actor.\footnote{Ibid, chapter 2.} Beyond an appeal to primacy which, as recently highlighted by the Danish response, never took seed in national courts, it is unclear what benefit accrues to individuals from fundamental rights derived from EU law being applied differently from other fundamental rights within the legal orders of the Member States, and indeed being applied directly, if their meaningful effect would not have otherwise been compromised.\footnote{Ibid, chapter 8.}

Echoing \textit{Egenberger}, \textit{Bauer} now suggests that, as long as the means used are outcome-neutral, i.e. do not place the aggrieved party at a disadvantage or leave them without redress simply due to the structures of national law, a space can be carved out for the constitutional complexity of horizontality to be accommodated within EU discourse.

Where, then, does \textit{Bauer} leave us in respect of the horizontal effect of fundamental rights in the EU? Taking account of the recent Grand Chamber judgments in this field, the position now appears to be the following. Firstly, the Charter is capable of producing indirect and direct horizontal effect in principle because, in line with Article 6(1) TEU, it has ‘the same legal value as the Treaties’. Its scope of application does not preclude such a finding. National courts should thus first strive to interpret national law in the light of any materially relevant provision of the Charter. Secondly, even if an interpretation of national law in conformity with the right is impossible and the right in question is mandatory and unconditional (its ‘unconditional nature not needing to be given concrete expression by the provisions of EU or national law’),\footnote{\textit{Bauer}, supra n 1, para 85.} so that the right is directly invokable in private disputes as such, the national courts’ ability to develop the legislation in a manner that is compatible with fundamental rights is not diminished.
but, in such cases, national courts must ensure that a remedy is offered within the dispute in question. Failing that, state liability in damages may be claimed.

If my analysis is correct, this is a clearer and more coherent endorsement of the horizontal effect of fundamental rights. At least from the perspective of constitutional design, but in my view also from the perspective of the effective protection of fundamental rights, which depends increasingly on compliance by private actors, Bauer should be (moderately) celebrated. At the same time, however, as the final section of this comment highlights, one should not necessarily assume that Bauer marks a drastic revision of horizontal effect altogether or that it provides sufficient protection in respect of all fundamental rights. Most importantly, in distinguishing the present case from AMS (rather than revising it altogether), the Court’s ruling in Bauer does not go quite as far as perhaps one might have hoped.

IV. A critical query: do all fundamental social rights matter equally?

While Bauer seemingly confines AMS to its well-deserved ‘isolated corner’, the Court’s continued appeal to the differences between rights such as information and consultation within the undertaking and rights such as paid annual leave is more problematic than it might initially appear. Of course, there is a technical reason for differentiating AMS from Bauer: unlike Article 31, Article 27 defers to national laws and practices. However, placing an acute emphasis on that distinction is problematic both in terms of the protection of collective employment rights and in terms of coherence with the Court’s case law beyond the Solidarity chapter. It thus largely undermines the – otherwise positive – bearing of the Bauer ruling on the status of social rights in the Union overall.

As Collins puts it, the deference to national laws and practices in respect of certain rights stipulates limitations to the core obligation and not only to the application of these rights to private disputes. In turn, if their conditionality on national laws and practices is the reason why certain provisions of the Charter are not invokable as such, then consistent interpretation, to which the Court appeals as the first step of its analysis, would actually matter very little in

their regard (because the obligation in the light of which national law should be interpreted would itself logically depend on what national law provides). Since further enshrinement in a directive is not enough to render such provisions horizontal, either, then an inequality in the level of protection between public and private contexts will be preserved for these rights, as a direct consequence of the Court’s insistence upon the validity of Marshall and AMS.

It should firstly be pointed out that, in theory at least, this limitation may prove to be a problem for a number of provisions across different parts of the Charter and not just those found in the Solidarity chapter. For example, Article 9 (the right to marry and found a family), Article 10(2) (the right to conscientious objection), Article 14(3) (aspects of the right to education), and Article 16 (the freedom to conduct a business) could all be rendered ineffective in horizontal disputes, if references to national laws and practices were taken to be the determining criterion for invocability. But it should not be overlooked that the restriction of horizontal effect for provisions that refer to national laws and practices in Bauer is likely to continue to operate very predominantly as a hurdle for the horizontal effect of the Solidarity chapter. Within the latter, Article 31 is exceptional in not deferring to national laws and practices, rather than in doing so. The only Solidarity provisions that do not include this statement, other than Article 31, are Articles 29 (access to a placement service), 37 (environmental protection), and 38 (consumer protection). Are these provisions – the latter two being clearly considered ‘principles’ within the Charter’s Explanations – any more mandatory or unconditional than, say, Articles 27 or 28, respectively enshrining the rights to be informed and consulted in the workplace and to collective bargaining and action, including strike action? If not, one might altogether question the rigour of the justification adduced for distinguishing Bauer from AMS.

More fundamentally, though, even if a reference to national laws and practices could be justified as indicative of a structural barrier to direct effect (after all, it does render a degree of conditionality fairly obvious), a consistency challenge to the Court’s position should still be levied. If we were to zoom out of the Bauer case in order to assess the significance of references to national laws and practices in the Court’s broader case law, we might come to question the

objectivity of a criterion based on references to national laws and practices in the first place. For example, does Bauer succeed in reconciling AMS, which substantially limited the core content of Article 27, with Alemo-Herron, which substantially extended the core content of Article 16? While both of these provisions refer to national laws and practices, it was only the one found in the Solidarity chapter that succumbed to the limitation. In turn, if the Court does not always take references to national laws and practices to be determinative of the absence of a core EU obligation, as the Alemo-Herron judgment suggests, this begs the question of what criteria could be driving this determination.

Inconsistencies such as these are difficult to iron out through case-by-case adjustments of the problematic rulings of times past, without a more thorough revision of the qualities of horizontality within EU constitutional law, as a space of contestation and, at times, of conflict between different types of fundamental rights and between fundamental rights and market freedoms. Seen in this light, Bauer could be taken to suggest that those aspects of the Solidarity chapter that have collective and political, rather than individual (or, as the Court put it, measurable or ‘pecuniary’) dimensions, might still not play quite as fundamental a role on the Union as the Charter’s other provisions. While the ruling stands neatly alongside Egenberger and IR in clarifying the relevance of Mangold and, with it, in ensuring the effective protection of (some) fundamental rights, its scope and meaningfulness become far more uncertain if placed in the context of a line of case law about workplace politics, where the corrosive effects of the Viking heritage continue to hold much of their ground.

V. Conclusion

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61 Ibid.

62 ECJ 11 December 2007, Case C-438/05, The International Transport Workers’ Federation and The Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, ECR I-10779; see also ECJ 18 December 2007, Case C-341/05, Laval Un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundets Avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet, ECR I-11767.

63 Bauer, supra n 1, para 48.


It is perhaps high time we stopped teaching the Mangold saga as the exception to the non-horizontality of directives and entirely reversed our analysis. As most recently affirmed in Bauer, the constitutional norm now appears to be that the Charter of Fundamental Rights is horizontally applicable, at least indirectly and, in many cases, directly as well. There is a limited exception to this basic premise, stemming from the Marshall rule, which is that direct horizontal effect must be rooted in primary law and not in a directive. In turn, any Charter provisions which are not concrete enough as such will not enjoy direct effect in horizontal relations simply because they are further expressed in a directive, although they could still enjoy indirect effect therein.

As I have highlighted above, in practice, this limitation can have a discernibly negative impact on the protection of some fundamental employment rights in the European Union. For rights that defer to national laws and practices in particular, it may continue to operate as a cause of unequal protection in like cases. Similarly, the rather generous references to AMS in the ruling and Opinion appear somewhat underwhelming in revisiting a tradition of horizontality that has, at times, been used not only to advance, but also to stall, the operation of fundamental rights in the workplace.

It is thus worth asking: should we stay contented with only a near-rejection of the non-horizontality of directives? Or, in turn, with only a near-endorsement of the relevance of fundamental social rights to intersubjective disputes? An effort to resist a continued fragmentation of the principle of horizontality and some overarching attempt further to define its contours could be significant further improvements in this field. These improvements can be built squarely upon the task undertaken in Bauer, which is to set out a clearer constitutional role for the Charter in the EU legal order, but they also require a neater hierarchisation of fundamental rights within that order, so that the horizontal conflicts often arising in this field might, eventually, be resolved. Nevertheless, Grand Chamber judgments like Bauer and Egenberger do suggest greater receptiveness on the part of the Court to review this problematic line of case law. It is to be hoped that they will not mark the Court’s final word on the horizontal effect of the Charter but, rather, the beginning of a deeper engagement with the merits and challenges of horizontality in the ever-changing, and ever-more private-centric, field of fundamental rights protection in the Union’s constitutional space.