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An Epistemological Problem for Evolutionary Psychology

Ratcliffe, M.

Authors

M. Ratcliffe



Abstract

This paper draws out an epistemological tension implicit in Cosmides and Tooby's conception of evolutionary psychology. Cosmides and Tooby think of the mind as a collection of functionally individuated, domain-specific modules. Although they do not explicitly deny the existence of domain-general processes, it will be shown that their methodology commits them to the assumption that only domain-specific cognitive processes are capable of producing useful outputs. The resultant view limits the scope of biologically possible cognitive accomplishments and these limitations, it will be argued, are such as to deny us epistemic capacities that evolutionary psychology presupposes in its pursuit of an objective, comprehensive account of human nature.

Citation

Ratcliffe, M. (2005). An Epistemological Problem for Evolutionary Psychology. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 19(1), 47-63. https://doi.org/10.1080/02698590500051126

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date 2005-03
Deposit Date Apr 3, 2007
Journal International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
Print ISSN 0269-8595
Electronic ISSN 1469-9281
Publisher Taylor and Francis Group
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 19
Issue 1
Pages 47-63
DOI https://doi.org/10.1080/02698590500051126


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