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Suffering and the Primacy of Virtue

James, Simon P.

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Abstract

Some people claim that some instances of suffering are intrinsically bad in an impersonal way. If it were true, that claim might seem to count against virtue ethics and for consequentialism. Drawing on the works of Jason Kawall, Christine Swanton and Nietzsche, I consider some reasons for thinking that it is, however, false. I argue, moreover, that even if it were true, a virtue ethicist could consistently acknowledge its truth.

Citation

James, S. P. (2019). Suffering and the Primacy of Virtue. Analysis, 79(4), 605-613. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anz049

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date May 28, 2019
Online Publication Date Sep 16, 2019
Publication Date Oct 30, 2019
Deposit Date Jun 19, 2019
Publicly Available Date Mar 29, 2024
Journal Analysis
Print ISSN 0003-2638
Electronic ISSN 1467-8284
Publisher Oxford University Press
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 79
Issue 4
Pages 605-613
DOI https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anz049

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Copyright Statement
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Analysis following peer review. The version of record James, Simon P. (2019) 'Suffering and the primacy of virtue.', Analysis., 79 (4). pp. 605-613 is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anz049





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