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Possible worlds and moral philosophy.

Smith, B. W. (2001) 'Possible worlds and moral philosophy.', Teorema., 20 (3). pp. 41-50.


This paper is, in part, a response to Steffen Borge's article in Teorema Vol. XIX/1 (2000), "A Call for a Possible World Argument in Ethics". I suggest that the relationship between possible worlds and ethical deliberation is not distinctive and auxiliary in nature. Rather, I argue that the contemplation of possible worlds is an essential part of ethical theorizing. The immediate character of ethics vis-a-vis the possible is evidenced by the account of moral deliberation proposed by a certain form of moral particularism. In particular, the work of John McDowell demonstrates the inextricably modal aspects of ethics in this regard.

Item Type:Article
Additional Information:
Keywords:Ethics, Modality, Particularism, Possible-World, McDowell.
Full text:Full text not available from this repository.
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Record Created:10 Apr 2007
Last Modified:08 Apr 2009 16:29

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