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Durham Research Online
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Particularism, perception and judgement.

Smith, B. (2006) 'Particularism, perception and judgement.', Acta Analytica., 21 (2). pp. 12-29.

Abstract

According to the most detailed articulation and defence of moral particularism, it is a metaphysical doctrine about the nature of reasons. This paper addresses aspects of particularist epistemology. In rejecting the existence and efficacy of principles in moral thinking and reasoning particularists typically appeal to a theory of moral knowledge which operates with a 'perceptual' metaphor. This is problematic. Holism about valence can give rise to a moral epistemology that is a metaethical variety of atomistic empiricism. To avoid what could be called the Myth of the Moral Given, particularism has made use of a judgement-centred account of moral epistemology. This paper critically examines that account with reference to a proposed analogy between our moral knowledge and our knowledge of similarities.

Item Type:Article
Keywords:Particularism, Epistemology, Perception, Presentism, Judgement, Similarities.
Full text:PDF (Copyright agreement prohibits open access to the full-text) - Accepted Version
Publisher-imposed embargo
(90Kb)
Status:Not peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:http://www.transactionpub.com/cgi-bin/transactionpublishers.storefront/461ba3360074fef6ea6dc0a80aa5073d/Product/View/0353&2D5150&2A1
Record Created:27 Mar 2008
Last Modified:12 Jul 2016 12:02

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