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Durham Research Online
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Particularism, perception and judgement.

Smith, B. (2006) 'Particularism, perception and judgement.', Acta analytica., 21 (2). pp. 12-29.

Abstract

According to the most detailed articulation and defence of moral particularism, it is a metaphysical doctrine about the nature of reasons. This paper addresses aspects of particularist epistemology. In rejecting the existence and efficacy of principles in moral thinking and reasoning particularists typically appeal to a theory of moral knowledge which operates with a 'perceptual' metaphor. This is problematic. Holism about valence can give rise to a moral epistemology that is a metaethical variety of atomistic empiricism. To avoid what could be called the Myth of the Moral Given, particularism has made use of a judgement-centred account of moral epistemology. This paper critically examines that account with reference to a proposed analogy between our moral knowledge and our knowledge of similarities.

Item Type:Article
Keywords:Particularism, Epistemology, Perception, Presentism, Judgement, Similarities.
Full text:PDF - Accepted Version (90Kb)
Status:Peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-006-1001-2
Publisher statement:The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-006-1001-2
Record Created:27 Mar 2008
Last Modified:08 Sep 2016 11:48

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