ABSTRACT

In this article it is argued that everyday processes and rituals entrenched political identities in post-reform political culture. The intensification of formal party allegiances—that is, deep and enduring loyalties towards factions within the established partisan structure—was not solely a result of ideology. Allegiances were also strengthened by the local activities of parties and by the infrastructure enhanced (and to an extent imported) by the Scottish Reform Act. These two factors reinforced each other, encouraging a vibrant, and at times violent, set of election rituals. From particular analysis of the constituency of Roxburghshire, it is clear that local party organisations were more autonomous, flexible and deeply rooted in broader society than might be assumed. Moreover, the rituals and processes of electioneering were very closely linked to formal parties and party allegiance. Indeed, the phenomenon of electoral violence, thus far assumed to be practically non-existent in Scotland, was closely related to election rituals and parties. This all suggests that formal partisan identities were more developed, and at an earlier stage, in Scotland than elsewhere in the U.K. These identities would go on to play a notable role in shaping the development of mid- and late Victorian Scottish society.

* The author would like to thank Gordon Pentland, Ewen Cameron, and the anonymous readers for their valuable comments on this article.
The Reform Acts of 1832 substantially rewrote the formal rules of politics throughout the United Kingdom. More informally, they also had a deep and enduring impact on the interconnected but distinct political cultures of Scotland, England, Ireland and Wales. This article focuses on one particular (and highly significant) aspect of Scottish political culture—the increasingly central role of party and how the distinctive features of Scotland’s politics fostered this centrality of party in the aftermath of 1832. The close link between identities and formal party-political allegiances which is continually evident in the later nineteenth and twentieth centuries was not solely the result of ideological factors. The interconnection of parties and people at a grassroots level was encouraged and embedded by the prevailing political culture. Through a detailed and focused examination of these interactions in Roxburghshire, the origins and character of this phenomenon can be revealed. A more nuanced picture of political identities in the post-reform period emerges, with implications for the analysis of mid- and late Victorian politics and society.

The effects of 1832 on the political cultures of England, Wales and Ireland have been explored in depth. Quantitative studies have strongly pointed towards the growth of more enduring forms of voter partisanship after 1832 in England and Wales. The Scottish Reform Act (unlike its English equivalent) did not legally require the systematic printing and distribution of pollbooks. As a result, quantitative analysis of voting patterns along the lines undertaken by Phillips and Wetherell for

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1 Although their role has come under increasing scrutiny, they were, nevertheless, ground-breaking pieces of legislation. See J. A. Phillips, *The Great Reform Bill in the Boroughs: English electoral behaviour, 1818–1841* (Oxford, 1992), 1.

2 Given the wealth of work in this area, especially on religion, ideological issues are discussed in this article only insofar as they directly impact on the working of then contemporary politics. For a broader discussion of some of the main issues at play at the time, see, e.g., W. H. Fraser, *Chartism in Scotland* (Pontypool, 2010); G. I. T. Machin, *Politics and the Churches in Great Britain, 1832–1868* (Oxford, 1977).


England is unfortunately not possible for Scotland generally. Nonetheless, fruitful work on the political culture of Scotland after reform has been undertaken, though this is less abundant than for other parts of the U.K. I. G. C. Hutchison’s authoritative monograph remains the standard work on Scottish politics at this time, though Hutchison acknowledged that his work was not intended to be comprehensive, focusing, instead, on how parties developed in relation to political issues and electoral fortunes. An examination of Roxburghshire’s post-reform constituency politics offers an opportunity to examine political culture from a different and a local perspective. This is especially important as the national political cultures of the United Kingdom retained strong local characteristics. In a Scottish context, localism was, if anything, strengthened by reform—the act of 1832 swept away the last vestiges of electoral homogeneity, perpetuated by the system of political management associated with Henry Dundas. Studies of local politics after 1832 exist but none specifically focus on political culture—rather, they concentrate on isolated themes, including ideological issues and local government. Moreover, the development of Scottish political parties in the first decades after 1832 remains relatively unexplored. This article challenges the existing

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5 The most valuable exception to this is the discussion of Edinburgh’s populace and the pollbooks for the general election of 1852, contained in Graeme Morton, *Unionist Nationalism: Governing urban Scotland, 1830–1860* (East Linton, 1999). All Scottish constituencies (except Glasgow and Edinburgh) were single-member seats, meaning that the analysis of first and second multiple-choice votes is mostly impossible in the few Scottish pollbooks which have survived.


contention that post-reform political life in rural Scotland was characterised, in contrast to that in the cities and towns, by consensus.\textsuperscript{12} Three particular issues are examined. Firstly, an exploration is made of the extent to which elite-dominated local parties were organisationally disposed towards close interaction and collusion with popular elements. Secondly, the methods by which formal party apparatus (intentionally or unintentionally) instilled partisan identities in the context of everyday social experience are examined. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is shown that many of the popular rituals associated with political culture were closely tied to formal party politics. Before this, however, the local context in which Roxburghshire politics was conducted will be explained and reasons offered as to why Roxburghshire constitutes a revealing case study.

A single member county seat, Roxburghshire’s boundaries and the number of its representatives were unchanged by the Scottish Reform Act. As in the rest of the country, however, the franchise was vastly extended. Seventy-one electors had voted in 1831 but the following year the electorate numbered 1,303. This corresponded closely to the average Scottish county constituency electorate of 1,104 and is one reason why Roxburghshire might constitute a useful case study.\textsuperscript{13} In addition, however, Roxburghshire also displayed elements of Scotland in microcosm. The county comprised traditional agricultural areas under the influence of local magnates; conventional market towns, such as Jedburgh; and thriving industrial centres representative of the new age, such as the rapidly expanding textile-manufacturing town of Hawick.\textsuperscript{14} Old and new, urban and rural, agricultural and industrial were all brought into direct political contact in the county. A newspaper asserted that in the county ‘party principles … divides families and friends, houses against houses,

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\textsuperscript{12} Fry, \textit{Patronage and Principle}, 34.
streets against streets, according to what side they take. Indeed, the seat changed hands at each and every election between 1832 and 1847.

The constituency was also partly shaped by the politics of influence and coercion which were prevalent in smaller counties. Yet it also displayed elements of the boisterous political independence which characterised electoral politics in larger constituencies, both county and burgh. Moreover, the county’s high rate of contestation generated a great deal of significant (and surviving) material, including the very detailed private papers of both local parties. Other public materials, including local and national newspaper coverage, and evidence from parliamentary inquiries into the county’s politics, also survive in abundance. The constituency is, therefore, as representative of Scotland’s political culture as any single constituency can be. It is one of the very few for which a holistic glimpse of political culture emerges, in which the public and private utterances and actions of political actors, ranging from the landed elite to the unenfranchised, are visible. This enables the use of a methodological approach which historians have successfully applied to the study of politics before 1833, even though such work mainly focused on changes in popular and national identities, rather than on formal partisan identities. Such an approach emphasises relations and interactions between the languages and actions of the groups which constitute a political culture.

The Montagu-Scott family, headed by the duke of Buccleuch, was the greatest single influence in Roxburghshire politics. The fifth duke, the extremely wealthy owner of extensive local estates,
was the *de facto* leader of the Conservative party, locally and nationally.\(^{22}\) Most of the local landed class, ranging from smaller gentry to Lord Polwarth and Lord Lothian, supported the party.\(^{23}\) The Conservative candidates in the period were Lord John Scott, Buccleuch’s brother, and Francis Scott, Lord Polwarth’s heir. Their chief rivals were the Elliot family, headed by the earl of Minto. The second earl was leader of the local Whig faction and served as first lord of the admiralty from 1835 to 1841.\(^{24}\) All Liberal candidates (with the exception of William Fraser Elliot) were Elliots of Minto.

With the exception of the uncontested election of 1847, the majority of the winning candidate in Roxburghshire was always marginal. The constituency was thus balanced on a partisan knife-edge for fifteen years, across five general elections. However, as will be shown, local parties were not the mere creatures of these elite factions. Instead, they played an increasingly central role in regulating the operation of political culture.


Table 1: Constituency Election Results, 1832–1847

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1832 (December)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. George Elliot (Lib.)</td>
<td>624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord John Scott (Con.)</td>
<td>532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir William Fraser Elliot (Lib.)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1835 (January)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord John Scott (Con.)</td>
<td>757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. George Elliot (Lib.)</td>
<td>681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1837 (July)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon. John Edmund Elliot (Lib.)</td>
<td>803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon. Francis Scott (Con.)</td>
<td>759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1841 (July)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon. Francis Scott (Prot.)</td>
<td>830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon. John Edmund Elliot (Lib.)</td>
<td>748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1847 (July, August)</td>
<td>Unopposed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The new electoral landscape both affected, and was affected by, the development of constituency parties. Throughout Scotland, from industrialised Greenock to pastoral Fifeshire, formal local party organisations were formed in the 1830s in order to operate effectively in the new system. As a finely-balanced single-member seat, there was no possibility of electoral compromise between the parties in Roxburghshire; instead, there was head-to-head competition. Despite their seeming domination by elites and limited social reach, the structure and activities of local parties meant that party activists on the ground possessed far more autonomy from their social and political superiors than might be assumed. In one typical case, a local Conservative agent (in cahoots with his district chairman) conspired to suppress a printed address issued by his own candidate; the agent asserted that ‘as we (that is our chairman and myself) disapprove of the present address I intend very much to use my discretion as to circulating it’, as he thought its content ‘entirely uncalled for’.

Moreover, between elections party agents were crucial in the matters of voter registration and the manufacture of fictitious votes. The party apparatus was in a key position to influence the character of local politics on an everyday level.

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The Roxburghshire Liberal party was distinguished from its Conservative opposition in many respects, including ideology and organisational approach. These differences serve to expose an underlying partisan-cultural approach to politics. Both parties were highly local in focus, with little to no interference from outside the county.\(^{28}\) This benefitted the Conservatives but disadvantaged the Liberals; their apparatus was far more chaotic and ad hoc in nature. This was a problem both locally and nationally for the Liberal party and partly explains its electoral decline in Scotland during the 1830s.\(^{29}\) In Roxburghshire retrenchment was largely because the Liberals were hesitant to employ local solicitors (writers to the signet, or Writers) as political agents.\(^{30}\) Some of this reluctance arose from ideology, as is evident from the protestations of one local Writer: ‘However conservative the majority of the bar may be, I can assure you that in their professional capacity they know no politics’.\(^{31}\) Despite this assertion, there was a lingering suspicion in Liberal circles that lawyers, who were at this time generally conservative in inclination, might be affected professionally by their personal opposition to liberalism.

In Roxburghshire the Liberal party, much like elsewhere, had fewer funds to draw upon than its Conservative opponents.\(^{32}\) At the start of the post-reform period it relied partly on subscriptions from local electors. These payments were described by Minto as ‘small sums indeed, but will help them to keep up an interest in the thing as well as keep them together’.\(^{33}\) It was recognised at a very high level that the principal importance of local subscriptions was not financial, but rather because they constituted an organisational means by which to encourage the interconnected goals of ideological unity, partisan adherence and popular party affiliation. The party’s financial and organisational strategies were similar. Immediately after reform, it replaced Writers with local committees of activists. By doing so, it was able to build a more popular and partisan base and (at

\(^{29}\) Hutchison, Political History, 9, 49.
\(^{30}\) The local Whig group had employed Writers before 1832 though the small pre-reform electorate suggests that this was required to much limited extent than after 1832.
\(^{31}\) HHH, Kelso Collection 11: Charles Baillie to John Smith, 14 Aug. 1837.
\(^{32}\) Salmon, Electoral Reform, 76.
\(^{33}\) Edinburgh, National Library of Scotland [NLS], MS 11749 (Minto MSS), fos 72–4: George Elliot to Lord Minto, 29 Dec. 1832, quoted in Hutchison, Political History, 50.
least initially) make use of the enthusiasm and unpaid labour of its adherents. But the committee structure gradually fell apart and afterwards organisational responsibility once again fell on leading Whig proprietors and a smaller number of Writers.\(^\text{34}\) After the mid-1830s this is evident in the character of surviving records. In contrast to the numerous immaculate and detailed reports prepared for local Conservatives by various Writers, Liberal records are much more improvised. Electoral calculations were sometimes written on scrap paper and they contain far less detail and analysis than those prepared for their opponents.\(^\text{35}\)

Local Conservative parties generally took their lead from local landed families, especially in counties such as Linlithgowshire, where the duke of Hamilton’s express approval was felt necessary for any party candidacy.\(^\text{36}\) The Roxburghshire Conservative party, in common with other Tory county organisations, was formally subordinated to the ‘great family’ of the locality. Though ideologically averse to popular participation in party activities, the party was, nevertheless, embedded in local political life and was not entirely isolated from the broader political environment. It was active in canvassing and campaigning, and even the Liberals grudgingly recognised that their opponents would ‘not fail for want of activity’ after Donald Horne was appointed as Conservative chief agent in 1833.\(^\text{37}\) However, an elite-centred focus on the Conservatives tends to obscure how much the control and direction of their party was actually concentrated in the hands of local agents and activists, particularly writers to the signet:

> The agents may appear to be expensive parts of the machinery, and they certainly are so, but I think it would be impossible to conduct an election in such a county as this, without

\(^\text{34}\) Hutchison, *Political History*, 51.
\(^\text{35}\) Hutchison, *Political History*, 49; see, e.g., the electoral papers in NLS, MS 11751 (Minto MSS).
\(^\text{36}\) See correspondence regarding George Dundas’s proposed candidacy for the county in 1852, contained in NRS, GD364/1/173 (Hope of Luffness MSS).
\(^\text{37}\) NLS, MS 11750 (Minto MSS), fo 47: George Elliot to Lord Minto, 1 Mar. 1833. Donald Horne of Langwell was later to be the chief Conservative agent for all of Scotland, reporting to Buccleuch as head of the party.
some agents. There are very few gentlemen in our county who will work on such occasions.\textsuperscript{38}

The local party was an active machine run (and to an extent directed) by professionals.\textsuperscript{39} Its autonomous activity was noted by Horne, when discussing with Buccleuch the purchase of properties to be rented out to supporters: ‘I am anxious to avoid correspondence with the local agents, as the expression of any intention to make such purchases even to them, might induce some of our own supporters to bring their properties into the market’.\textsuperscript{40} In employing local Writers, who often prioritised their own financial gain before party interests, Horne and Buccleuch were well aware of the limits to their own power. Local professionals, deeply embedded in their immediate society, were, however, the primary conduit through which ordinary people experienced direct contact with political parties. Though not as effective or broadly based as the Liberal activist-committees, the structures favoured by the Conservatives probably enhanced the party’s ability to engage with informal and popular political worlds.

The main activities undertaken by both party organisations between elections served to further embed partisan adherence in local political culture. The rapid growth of constituency parties after 1832 was in large part stimulated by the changes wrought by the reform acts, specifically in the matter of the creation and registration of voters.\textsuperscript{41} Indeed, the very foundation of formal party associations was primarily designed to ensure that these activities could be effectively managed.\textsuperscript{42} Though the unique nature of the reformed Scottish franchise and of registration provisions is well-studied, the link between these matters and party development has been entirely neglected.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{38} NRS, GD224/581/18 (Buccleuch MSS): Charles Ogilvie to duke of Buccleuch, 16 Dec. 1842.
\textsuperscript{39} For these themes in the subsequent period, see Kathryn Rix, \textit{Parties, Agents and Electoral Culture in England, 1880–1910} (Woodbridge, 2016).
\textsuperscript{40} NRS, GD224/581/15 (Buccleuch MSS): Donald Horne to duke of Buccleuch, 22 Dec. 1840.
\textsuperscript{41} Salmon, \textit{Electoral Reform}, 27–37.
\textsuperscript{43} For reform and registrations, see William Ferguson, ‘The reform act (Scotland) of 1832: intention and effect’, \textit{SHR} 45 (1966) 105–14.
so than the equivalent legislation in other parts of the U.K., the Scottish Reform Act contained many legal ambiguities with regard to franchise qualifications. This directly led to both parties registering substantial numbers of ostensibly legitimate, but widely denounced as ‘fictitious’, voters. These were created by, for example, sub-dividing estates into nominal ‘life-rent’ interests, by adding additional joint-tenants to existing leases and by purchasing properties for rental to partisans.\textsuperscript{44} Such tactics had become widespread by 1836, especially in the Borders region.\textsuperscript{45} Contemporary opinion had it that ‘the temptations to create votes of this description would be the strongest in those counties in which the constituency was the smallest, and the political parties most equally divided’.\textsuperscript{46} Though Roxburgshire did not have a small electorate, its politically almost evenly divided electorate encouraged the practice of large-scale vote-making.

In a political landscape where every vote counted, the Conservatives, already skilled at electoral management, enjoyed a considerable early advantage in manufacturing votes throughout Scotland.\textsuperscript{47} By 1833 Horne was ‘adding as many votes as he can by adding names to the leases ... [or] otherwise by purchasing small properties or houses’ in Roxburghshire.\textsuperscript{48} The local party quickly displayed talent in registering sympathetic voters. Indeed, Horne himself appeared on the electoral rolls of Midlothian, East Lothian, Roxburghshire, Selkirkshire and three other northern counties.\textsuperscript{49} In Roxburghshire, Whigs publicly accused local Tories of, for example, creating six fictitious votes on the Abbotsford estate of the recently deceased Sir Walter Scott;\textsuperscript{50} and Roxburghshire’s political culture was coloured by vote-making that was more extensive than that evident in many other constituencies.\textsuperscript{51} Yet, Roxburghshire also experienced less vote-making than many neighbouring

\textsuperscript{44} Ferguson, ‘Reform act’, 108–12.
\textsuperscript{45} Brash, ‘Introduction’, p. xliii.
\textsuperscript{46} Parliamentary Papers [PP], 1837–8, XIV, \textit{Reports from Committees: Fictitious Votes (Scotland)}, iii.
\textsuperscript{48} NLS, MS 11750 (Minto MSS), fos 82–5: George Elliot to Lord Minto, 26 Nov. 1833.
\textsuperscript{49} Brash, ‘Introduction’, p. xlvi.
\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Morning Post}, 8 Oct. 1834.
\textsuperscript{51} Vote-making was less common, but still practised, in Highland counties such as Ross-shire, where Sir John Gladstone unsuccessfully attempted to procure votes for his four sons, including the young
counties. In the smaller constituencies of Selkirkshire (with 288 non-resident voters out of an electorate of 552 by 1836) and Peeblesshire (with over 300 nominal life-renters out of an electorate of 700 by 1837), manufactured votes determined election outcomes.\textsuperscript{52} Party leaders recognised, however, that public opinion played a far more influential role in Roxburghshire: because it possessed a larger electorate, it could not be entirely controlled or managed. Locals, therefore, objected more effectively than elsewhere to extensive vote-making efforts, as they made ‘good subjects for popular attack’ which would be noted and condemned by the press and political opponents.\textsuperscript{53}

Despite press reports to the contrary, vote-making was a practice undertaken by both parties. By the mid-1830s the Liberals were almost as active in the registration courts as the Conservatives.\textsuperscript{54} Moreover, they had quietly adopted many of the same vote-making techniques for which they publicly lambasted their opponents.\textsuperscript{55} While the Conservatives were generally more notorious for registering sympathetic voters, the most infamous local incident of vote-creation was a Liberal effort, in which twenty-six fictitious votes were manufactured by the duke of Roxburghe. Donald Horne, himself an inveterate schemer, commented wryly that ‘a good deal of splitting property’ had occurred;\textsuperscript{56} and even the \textit{Times} took notice, stating that there had ‘seldom been a more barefaced transaction’ in the county.\textsuperscript{57}

The Scottish Reform Act has been described as more transformative than its English equivalent, especially (though unintentionally) in the matter of electoral registration.\textsuperscript{58} Scottish political parties nationally, and in Roxburghshire particularly, derived immense advantage from the practice, perhaps even more so than was the case in England. Given that it was often expensive and

\bibitem{Gladstone} William Gladstone. See NRS, GD46/4/158/16 (Seaforth MSS): J. A. S. Mackenzie to William Mackenzie, 5 Apr. 1834.
\bibitem{Baillie} NRS, GD224/581/15 (Buccleuch MSS): Charles Baillie to duke of Buccleuch, 18 Dec. 1840.
\bibitem{Evening} \textit{Evening Chronicle}, 25 Aug. 1835.
\bibitem{Hutchison} Hutchison, \textit{Political History}, 35.
\bibitem{Horne} NRS, GD40/9/364/8/1 (Lothian MSS): Donald Horne to Lord Lothian, 27 Aug. 1839.
\bibitem{Times} \textit{The Times}, 9 Oct. 1839.
\bibitem{Ferguson} Ferguson, ‘Reform act’, 109.
time-consuming to maintain names on the register, both parties in Roxburghshire assumed this responsibility on behalf of their respective voting blocs at the yearly revisions of the electoral roll. These annual revisions became the pivotal political occasion of the year.\textsuperscript{59} This had the effect of strongly linking partisan adherence to the business of attaining the vote, pulling many, if not most, voters into the party-political fold and increasing formal partisanship rapidly. In this way, a party-centred political culture was increasingly embedded. It encompassed most electors and, crucially, a potentially much-larger hinterland of \textit{would-be} electors.

While parties were an increasingly important component of political culture outside of election periods, during election campaigns they were especially prominent. This is illustrated by the hitherto underestimated role played by parties in several important features of post-reform political culture. They were actively engaged in the everyday practices of electioneering, the vibrant rituals which accompanied election periods and the often-violent conduct of elections.

Contested elections had often been sparked by rivalries and discord between elite, aristocratic factions.\textsuperscript{60} Even before 1832 competitive electoral politics in Roxburghshire (such as they were) had largely revolved around the Buccleuch-Minto axis. Given the on-going political prominence of both families, this might appear to suggest strong continuities in political culture before and after 1832. Nevertheless, the striking increase of the electorate in Scotland after 1832 (by 1,400\%) encouraged a greater intensity of political activity compared to the more gradual increase experienced in England, where the comparatively larger franchise before 1832 had grown by only 80\%.\textsuperscript{61} In Roxburghshire the electorate had increased from a mere 151 in 1830 to 1,321 in 1832, and to 2,277 in 1841.\textsuperscript{62} Elections did not occur in a state of isolation from the wider world; electors, parties and candidates

\textsuperscript{59} Fry, \textit{Patronage and Principle}, 35. Their importance was highlighted in the memoirs of the (Conservative) sheriff of Lanarkshire, who presided over the revisions in Glasgow and the surrounding county. See Archibald Alison, \textit{Some Account of My Life and Writings: An autobiography by the late Sir Archibald Alison}, ed. J. R. Alison, 2 vols (Edinburgh, 1883), ii. 85.

\textsuperscript{60} Phillips, \textit{Reform Bill}, 5.

\textsuperscript{61} Hutchison, \textit{Political History}, 1; Dyer, \textit{Property and Intelligence}, 18–21.

were influenced (at least indirectly) by broader public opinion.\textsuperscript{63} Moreover, candidates and parties often addressed and accommodated those sections of society outside of the enfranchised political nation.\textsuperscript{64} Even before 1832 the operatives of Hawick had long agitated for franchise extension; a great many petitions had originated locally; and elections in Roxburghshire were accompanied by spectacle and symbol.\textsuperscript{65} This is evident in the last (perhaps unusually animated) election held under the old franchise.\textsuperscript{66} In 1831 a ‘party, perhaps about two hundred, of the Jedburgh reformers, marched in procession with banners and bands of music throughout the town’ and ‘large parties of the populace ... paraded the streets throughout the day’.\textsuperscript{67} It is likely that parties had at least some role in promoting election-related spectacles such as this. After reform, it is clear that the organising and supporting role played by both parties increased significantly. In 1835, for instance, ‘a Conservative horse cavalcade took place … but it was very coolly received, and produced no sensation such as probably was anticipated’.\textsuperscript{68} This damper squib in predominantly Liberal Hawick demonstrates that election spectacles were not elaborate rituals in which non-electors would join unthinkingly in any public festivity. Rather, participation was frequently indicative of genuinely partisan identities. Party-political loyalties were not worn lightly—they were often highly public and notably spirited.

The greater presence of parties appears to have contributed to the increasing intensity and frequency of public political display. In 1841, for instance, after Hawick’s residents received word that the county would be contested, ‘not less than 5,000 human beings were on the streets in less than an hour ... [and] the streets were one moving mass of men, women, and children, who paraded

\textsuperscript{64} Vernon, \textit{Politics and the People}, 105.
\textsuperscript{66} For a detailed account of disturbances throughout Scotland in this election, see Pentland, \textit{Radicalism, Reform and National Identity}, 98–106.
\textsuperscript{67} Scotsman, 21 May 1831; Caledonian Mercury, 23 May 1831.
\textsuperscript{68} Scotsman, 17 Jan. 1835.
the town, preceded by a band of music’. There was deep and on-going popular participation in local constituency politics. Election rituals encouraged this and elections simultaneously reinforced the link between such public spectacles and partisan adherence to formal political parties. The cultural ephemera generated by party electioneering also served to promote partisan identities. To take one instance, the song composed in 1832 in support of Lord John Scott (‘John of Buccleuch’), which was sung to the tune of the Young Lochinvar, extolled Scott’s ‘gallant spirit so manly’, as opposed to his opponent, ‘a placeman in office, with pensions enough’. Despite the immensity of popular feeling in Hawick against the Tories, the song had some success: ‘the Hawick men ... Lord John has made friendly anthems popular over there, and many of them have already expressed their regret at having pledged themselves to G. Elliot’. Rather than disdaining such tactics, as might be expected of a Conservative aristocrat (and a traditionalist one at that), Lord John’s use of song was symbolic of a wider willingness by the formal parties to engage in robust popular politics. This was especially evident in urban environments, such as Hawick and further afield too, for example in the Falkirk burgh district. The starkly partisan and uncompromising tone of many political anthems, combined with the positive popular reception they received, highlights the deeply oppositional nature of local party politics. This forthright dimension to electioneering was a tactic employed by both parties, as is illustrated by the ribald musical response to ‘John of Buccleuch’, ‘Booby Lord John’. Also sung to the tune of the Young Lochinvar, it denigrated ‘this sprout of a lord’.

The spoken language deployed in public meetings was often rowdy and humorous. When Lord John Scott directly quoted from Peel’s Tamworth Manifesto, in order to attract those in favour of

69 Scotsman, 30 Jun. 1841.
70 NRS, GD157/3009 (Buccleuch MSS): Songsheet, ‘John of Buccleuch’.
73 A wealth of Scottish political songs and poems from the period attesting to this can be found in the database ‘The People’s Voice: Scottish political poetry, song and the franchise, 1832–1914’ [https://thepeoplevoice.glasgow.ac.uk; accessed 14 Jun. 2018].
moderate reform, he noted ‘the correction of approved abuses’; but Captain Elliot and others in the audience interjected, in an ironical tone, ‘Ah, proved abuses’.\(^75\) In other constituencies a similar atmosphere took hold. In Fife, for example, the Liberal candidate provoked hysterical laughter by making an extended analogy comparing the church of Scotland to a fighting-cock in the Tory interest.\(^76\) Throughout the U.K. publically delivered speeches allowed crowds who attended—composed of electors and non-electors alike—to heckle and display partisan sentiments.\(^77\) Public speeches and the broader language of politics, as recorded in printed anthems, poems and satirical handbills, are also revealing. They constitute evidence of an increasingly inclusive, dynamic and partisan local political culture, which candidates and party activists encouraged.\(^78\)

The more formal ritualistic aspects of electioneering illustrate the ways in which political culture was developing along lines similar to England, yet in nationally distinctive fashions too. Despite the large geographical size of Roxburghshire and its significantly increased electorate, in 1832 candidates were still expected to canvass new and old voters personally.\(^79\) Lord John Scott was thought to be a particularly effective canvasser, possessing ‘Popularity and pluck’.\(^80\) George Elliot also actively canvassed in an election characterised by ‘strenuous exertions’ on both sides.\(^81\) This was broadly similar to English practice, which placed much emphasis on personal canvassing.\(^82\) However, certain traditions common in pre-reform England were almost entirely absent from pre-reform Scotland—especially ‘treating’, the practice of providing drink, food and entertainment for electors. In England treating had fuelled an atmosphere of public festivity before 1832. There was much less expectation of this in pre-reform Scotland and, given the very small electorate in constituencies such as Roxburghshire, treating was perhaps not expedient. After 1832 it made its

\(^{75}\) *Caledonian Mercury*, 17 Jan. 1835.

\(^{76}\) *Fife Herald*, 3 Aug. 1837.


\(^{78}\) See, e.g., NRS, GD224/580/3/2/53 (Buccleuch MSS): Satirical handbill entitled ‘Hawick Stakes’.

\(^{79}\) NRS, GD40/9/345/3 (Lothian MSS): William Ogilvie to Lord Lothian, 5 Jul. 1832.

\(^{80}\) NRS, GD224/33/3 (Buccleuch MSS): James Hogg to Duke of Buccleuch, 21 Jul. 1832; NRS, GD224/580/3/2/10 (Buccleuch MSS): William Ogilvie to Duke of Buccleuch, 17 Jun. 1832.

\(^{81}\) NRS, GD157/2999/3 (Polwarth MSS): Charles Ogilvie to Lord John Scott, 29 Jun. 1832,

\(^{82}\) O’Gorman, ‘Campaign rituals’, 83.
appearance in many places north of the border though Conservative agents were initially unsure if it was legally permissible under the terms of the Scottish Reform Act.\textsuperscript{83} Nevertheless, party agents soon became the principle conduit through which treating was undertaken—and this ultimately reinforced the connection between party elites and popular politics. Lack of experience in treating did, however, cause financial miscalculation: as a ‘great part of it [party funds] was expended to no purpose. I believe much good has not been [achieved] ... from any of our tavern bills, excepting those where his Lordship [John Scott] presided’.\textsuperscript{84} Agents thus learned only after the 1832 contest that treating was at its most effective when combined with a personal canvass. In England treating was (to a large extent) rooted in tradition; but its rapid integration into the everyday practice of Scottish electioneering owed much to party competition. More generally, Scottish political figures, especially those with little or no previous connection to English politics, were almost entirely unprepared for the often exorbitant cost of electioneering in the post-reform era. Even Donald Horne, a seasoned and practical political operator, commented that ‘its amount surprised me, and the charges will strike us Scotch practitioners as exorbitant; but the observation applies to every account we receive from the South’.\textsuperscript{85}

The political culture of electors and non-electors in Roxburghshire was shaped not just by Liberals and Conservatives and by their innovative election practices.\textsuperscript{86} Chartists had a significant and established presence in the county by the later 1830s. They held ‘regular meetings once a month ... it is understood they are in regular communication with the Chartists in Scotland and the north of England ... they have a regular chairman and secretary’.\textsuperscript{87} Throughout the U.K., and in Roxburghshire too, chartists were also actively involved in the election process, often through the

\textsuperscript{83} NRS, GD224/1126/220 (Buccleuch MSS): Sam Wood to J. Gibson, 29 Nov. 1832; O’Gorman, ‘Campaign rituals’, 84.
\textsuperscript{84} NRS, GD224/1126/220 (Buccleuch MSS): Patrick Wilson to J. Gibson, 27 Nov. 1832.
\textsuperscript{85} NRS, GD224/1126/221 (Buccleuch MSS): Donald Horne to J. Gibson, 8 Mar. 1833.
\textsuperscript{86} Malcolm Chase, ‘“Labour’s candidates”: chartist challenges at the parliamentary polls, 1839–1860’, Labour History Review 74 (April 2009) 64.
\textsuperscript{87} NRS, GD40/9/327/21/2 (Lothian MSS): Procurator Fiscal, Kelso, to General Elliot, 1 Aug. 1839.
mass raising of hands for chartist candidates at public nomination meetings. While they seldom had a direct effect on polling beyond this initial husting, their powerfully symbolic intervention at these meetings influenced proceedings indirectly. In Roxburghshire, James Fraser, former editor of chartist paper the True Scotsman, was proposed by supporters from Hawick at a nomination meeting held in Jedburgh. Most chartist nominees in Scotland, as in the U.K. more generally, garnered a clear majority of hands raised at election hustings, outnumbering those favouring more conventional candidates. This symbolic gesture in favour of chartist aims was, for many, a direct repudiation of formal party politics on the Liberal-Whig-Conservative spectrum. In Roxburghshire, while the Liberal John Elliot secured a ‘great crowd’ of hands, Fraser subsequently obtained ‘a considerable number of those who had previously held up their hands for Mr. Elliot, though not to the same extent as before’. This signals the close relationship between local Liberals and chartists. Indeed, Elliot had spoken in parliament in favour of the secret ballot and had warmly toasted local non-electors at a public dinner, adding that ‘every man, woman, and child has an influence which they may legally use, and that legal influence I will solicit’. Yet the hustings also revealed that those present were more firmly wedded to formal partisan politics than might be expected. Fraser supported a much broader enfranchisement than Elliot but this did not trump the crowd’s willingness to support a pro-reforming candidate within the established partisan structure.

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88 Although no property qualification was required for nomination as an election candidate, a deposit of £180 was required in Scotland. This was yet another way in which the different reform acts promoted a distinctly Scottish political culture. By linking nomination to capital, rather than to property, the connection between property and the franchise which the chartists opposed was weakened north of the border, at least symbolically. See Chase, ‘Labour’s candidates’, 66.
91 Chase, ‘Labour’s candidates’, 67; Fraser, Chartism in Scotland, 109.
92 Scotsman, 10 Jul. 1841.
If chartists influenced political culture, so too did crowds. Elections were often accompanied by political violence in which crowds were often involved. Indeed, it has been suggested that violence, coercion and other ‘ugly practices’ offset the traditional forces of aristocratic influence in political culture.\textsuperscript{94} Violent behaviour involved diverse elements in society, engulfing both voters and non-voters. Roxburghshire was particularly prone to outbursts of political violence, far more so than many larger constituencies, such as Glasgow, where the closely fought contest of 1837 concluded with the ‘greatest order’.\textsuperscript{95} Nevertheless, after 1832 an overwhelming enmity existed, both among new electors and among those still excluded, towards those Tories who had attempted to prevent the expansion of the franchise. This hostility was especially pronounced in Scotland and predated reform, given the particularly reactionary character of the Scottish Tory party in the decades before 1832: although the election of 1831 was not typical, H. F. Scott, the Tory candidate in Roxburghshire, only narrowly avoided being lynched during his canvass.\textsuperscript{96}

Outbursts of violence were generally spontaneous and often reflective of public confusion about politics.\textsuperscript{97} In Roxburghshire, however, there is from 1832 strong and abundant evidence of aristocratic collusion in violent episodes, which were sometimes even orchestrated by the social elite. The widespread popular hostility towards Conservatives in 1832 was often manifested in physical form: ‘Lord John I am told got into a violent scrape last night with his opponents ... pelted out of the Hawick Bishopry, and cut in the face’. Conservatives did not submit meekly to such behaviour and Lord John promptly responded by ‘striking people in the Crowd, with his stick’.\textsuperscript{98} Those involved in such episodes were not just Whig or Liberal adherents:

\begin{quote}
Lord John came to Jedburgh on Tuesday with about two thousand men on horseback ...
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
every man having a large stick made for fight, besides which they had collected their
\end{quote}
hordes from the Tory estates. And all of this to witness the chairing. They however could not make a riot and consoled themselves by getting happy at Mrs Laings Inn.99

This incident illustrates many traits of electoral rowdiness: both sides could instigate violence, suggesting a vibrant and highly partisan political atmosphere. Violence, or attempts to instigate violence, could be directly organised by political elites implying close links between them and their partisan supporters. Violence could occur after elections had been won or lost: it was, therefore, not always perpetrated with a view to influencing the outcome of a contest. Indeed, that a potentially violent occasion ended, instead, as a drunken gathering in a Hawick inn demonstrates the link between political and recreational activity. Still, the knock-on effects of events such as this kept political matters in the public mind between elections. The trial of those who had pelted Lord John with stones at the Hawick Bishopry attracted a crowd of ‘not less than 600 or 700 persons’. It collapsed in chaos and was not resumed because ‘public feeling was so strong upon the subject’.100

In many U.K. constituencies the episodic violence evident during the election of 1832 was thought to be a one-off expression of public feeling arising from the unprecedented nature of that election. The continued rioting in Hawick in 1835 ‘assumed a more serious aspect’ in the minds of some contemporaries.101 The town’s inhabitants were held by some to have a particular ‘jealousy of the power of their rulers’, which was displayed in a ‘blunt open sincerity of behaviour’.102 Nevertheless, Lord Lothian’s attempt to deploy the military to suppress disorder in Hawick elicited more public condemnation than the town’s rioting.103 As an ‘independent’ county, the physical nature of electioneering, while widely disapproved of, was considered less objectionable than the imposition of order by outside military force.

99 NLS, MS 11749 (Minto MSS), fos 72–4: George Elliot to Lord Minto, 29 Jul. 1832.
100 Caledonian Mercury, 18 Feb. 1833.
101 The Standard, 7 Feb. 1838.
102 Robert Chambers and William Chambers, Gazetteer of Scotland, 2 vols (Glasgow, 1838), ii. 533.
103 Caledonian Mercury, 24 Jan. 1835.
During the 1837 election campaign Roxburghshire, despite its generally rural and prosperous complexion, experienced the most tumultuous and violent election in Scotland. On the first day of polling in Hawick, Tory voters were roughly treated, so much so that local party activists ‘could not get them particularly the infirm turnout to run the gauntlet’. The local sheriff provided no protection, leaving Tories ‘at the mercy of the mob, whenever they choose to attack us, except insofar as we may be able to protect ourselves’. Sir James Graham reported that ‘the mob seized eleven of Mr. Scott’s voters, stripped them of their clothes, threw them into the river, and compelled three to run for shelter through the town in open day without a rag to cover them, in the presence of women and an assembled multitude’. Tory voters were also ‘cooped’ (besieged) in the Tower Inn. The surrounding mob ‘broke 276 panes of glass in the hotel, and the weight of the stones and missiles which were flung into the house exceeded one hundred weight’. These events provoked extensive discussion in the national press and may have had an impact on the election result. Horne reported that ‘we have about 30 votes to poll, but I do not expect to get above twenty tomorrow’. Those who were prevented from voting, combined with others who stayed away from Hawick out of fear, may well have swung the election in favour of the Liberal candidate, who won with a majority of only forty-four. Such incidents are clear evidence of the ways in which electors and non-electors alike could have a real and perhaps decisive effect on electoral outcomes.

Yet, that these events were excused by some is telling. When questioned in the subsequent parliamentary investigation, ‘Mr. Baillie Wilson objected to the poll being adjourned, and asked the Sherriff if he had never heard of people being stripped of their clothes and ducked in English elections. (Laughter.).’ While many objected to violence, it was, to a degree, regarded as a

104 NRS, GD224/582/7/2 (Buccleuch MSS): Donald Horne to duke of Buccleuch, 3 Aug. 1837.
105 Sir James Graham to Sir Robert Peel, 1837, in Charles Parker (ed.), Sir Robert Peel: From his private papers; with a chapter on his life and character, 2 vols. (London, 1899), ii. 349.
106 Norman Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel (London, 1953), 139; Morning Post, 8 Feb. 1838.
107 NRS, GD224/582/7/2 (Buccleuch MSS): Donald Horne to duke of Buccleuch, 3 Aug. 1837.
108 See Table 1.
109 The Standard, 10 Feb. 1838.
customary part of English political culture. Indeed, Minto’s son, Lord Melgund, could boast at a local dinner that ‘no attempt was ever made to break the peace, notwithstanding the few torn clothes and duckings that are said to have taken place. If you only saw an English election, you would be convinced of this (loud cheers)’.

Jokes at England’s expense, both at Westminster and in the constituency, suggests a popular perception that Scotland experienced less electoral violence than England. Scottish violence was considered unusual and perhaps, therefore, inconsequential.

These protestations should, however, be taken with a pinch of salt; they were primarily intended to downplay the Liberal role in events. Before the election of 1837 it was privately advised that ‘a little wholesale agitation would do a vast deal to assist’ J. E. Elliot, the Liberal candidate, and during the siege of the Tower Inn, Minto facilitated safe passage through the mob for those who promised not to vote: ‘Lord Minto offered to escort him safely through the rioters, who, bowing to his authority over them, made way.’

This, for many observers, confirmed extensive and intimate collusion between local Whig elites and the crowd, many (if not most) of whom were non-electors. It was, therefore, unsurprising that John Elliot would subsequently claim that the ‘irregularities of Hawick were not greater than at most elections. Whatever did occur has been greatly exaggerated’.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to suggest that anti-Tory crowds were entirely the creature of local Whig notables. In 1837, when Francis Scott was followed and pelted with mud, George Elliot ‘took issue with this as delicately as I could but it only created a laugh and I fear they will not mind their manners if he [the bailie] calls again’. The relationship between local Liberal elites and their often boisterous constituents was defined more by influence than by control. Elsewhere, as Scottish radicals drifted away from increasingly moderate Whigs after 1835, their relations became more...

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110 Caledonian Mercury, 26 Oct. 1837.
111 NLS, MS 11789 (Minto MSS), fos 163–4: Rev. G. Elliot to Lord Minto, 11 Feb. 1837; Morning Post, 29 Aug. 1837.
112 Kelso Chronicle, 27 Oct. 1837.
113 NLS, MS 11751 (Minto MSS), fos 9–16: George Elliot to Minto, 11 Feb. 1837.
strained. In Roxburghshire, however, it would appear that local Whigs enjoyed an unusually close and sustained relationship with their more radical constituents. Although the Scottish Reform Act had excluded non-electors from national parliamentary politics, at a local level radicals were often very active in civic affairs and not, therefore, complete outsiders to the political process.115

The town of Hawick was particularly prominent in violent election-time incidents. Its people allegedly possessed ‘elements of character ... [which] carry them, as they have sometimes done in seasons of political excitement, into excess’.116 As a consequence, Sir James Graham even proposed a bill to replace Hawick as the principal polling place for Roxburghshire elections.117 As an increasingly industrialised weaving town in which many were dependent on one export-oriented industry, Hawick suffered disproportionately from the commercial depression of 1836–7.118 It was perhaps particularly prone to outbursts of unrest at this time but the events of 1837 were merely the most notable example of a more general pattern of election disorder. The Conservatives thought that most of the town’s major manufacturers were Liberal and one of the bailies who had refused to intervene in the unsettling events of 1837 was certainly the owner of a local manufactory.119 Subsequently it was alleged that some of his workers had been among the leaders of the mob and that in their workplace they had openly discussed violent action.120 Hawick amply illustrates the degree to which county seats in many parts of the U.K. experienced urbanisation.121 The distinction between urban and rural seats could be somewhat arbitrary and misleading, as borough and county constituencies were often, like Roxburghshire, of mixed character.

114 Hutchison, Political History, 35.
115 Richardson, ‘Independence and Deference’, 47; Fry, Patronage and Principle, 38.
117 Scotsman, 30 May 1838.
118 Devine, Scottish Nation, 159.
119 NRS, GD224/491/11 (Buccleuch MSS): William Ogilvie to duke of Buccleuch, 25 Nov. 1845.
120 Morning Advertiser, 8 Feb. 1838.
Scottish elections have been described as sober and solemn events, when placed in comparison to those in England.\textsuperscript{122} However, English election riots became notorious precisely because they were unusual.\textsuperscript{123} This applies to Roxburghshire too. Perceptions that mass violence scarred the county’s electoral culture were exacerbated by the rarity of disorder in the wider Scottish context—though it should be noted that elections were not entirely peaceful, even in the more quiescent period after 1847. In 1861 election riots in Aberdeenshire resulted in a death and riots occurred in Dumfries in 1884 and even as late as January 1910.\textsuperscript{124} Still, rioting when it happened was conspicuous and sensational; more common were events such as the pelting of Lord John, intimidation, cooping and threats made against individuals. Incidents of this sort did not usually attract press coverage.\textsuperscript{125} Although both types of violence speak to intense and spirited feeling among the wider community and to entrenched partisan sentiments, it is noticeable that violence was not used in an attempt to overthrow the political system.

The political culture of Roxburghshire and more generally that in Scotland was, however, affected by the declining fortunes of the Conservative party. The party had already been damaged by the perception that it had a role in bringing about the disruption of the church of Scotland in 1843. Though it was unlikely ever to wholeheartedly embrace non-intrusion, there were significant elements of the native Scottish party which had made strenuous efforts to promote some form of accommodation. Peel and the national leadership, however, were less flexible as polarisation intensified from 1839 onwards; after that point, moderate middle-class Conservatives, who had in

\textsuperscript{122} Hanham, ‘Introduction’, p. xxi.
\textsuperscript{124} For an incident in Dingwall, where a crowd of fifty broke into a house and kidnapped a voter in 1841, see NRS, AD56/309/1 (Lord Advocates MSS): James Elphinstone to (?), 22 Feb. 1861; Buchan Observer and East Aberdeenshire Advertiser, 24 Oct. 1884; Stonehaven Journal, 27 Jan. 1910.
\textsuperscript{125} London, British Library, Add. MS 40485 (Peel MSS), fo 225: Capt. Horatio Ross to Sir Robert Peel, 19 Jul. 1841.
Scotland also been disproportionately non-intrusionist, drifted away from the party. Competitive politics in Roxburghshire was finally ended by the later acrimonious split in conservatism over Peel’s conversion to free trade. These divisions wrecked the party’s constituency machinery, which until then was still largely intact and electorally viable. While Buccleuch eventually sided with Peel, the county’s M.P., Francis Scott, and a large proportion of the local party remained loyal to protectionism. Despite Buccleuch’s assertion that ‘bygones will be bygones as far as I am concerned’, Francis Scott declined to stand again in 1847 and no suitable Conservative candidate could be found, even although the party held a lead in the registrations. Buccleuch, the de facto Scottish Conservative leader and one of the richest and largest landowners in Britain, could not control the representation of the county in which he was the largest proprietor. The confluence of national and local factors had combined to decide the fortune of a political party and the constituency’s elections would thereafter remain uncontested and quiescent until 1868.

The Reform Act restructured the electoral process. Scottish elections have been traditionally characterised as less dynamic and lively than those in England. It has often been assumed that constituencies dominated by the landed interest expressed less partisan sentiment than more ‘independent’ seats. The experience of Roxburghshire suggests that neither of these assumptions is accurate. As an increasing number of voters participated in the political process, voter allegiance intensified. Although after 1832 voters were less beholden to aristocratic influence, they were increasingly ensnared by that of party. Local party organisation, registration efforts and vote-making had a marked effect on elections and popular partisan adherence. Local political culture was manifested in vibrant, colourful and sometimes violent political activities. It encompassed all those who wished to participate in politics, whether or not they qualified for the vote. The political culture of Roxburghshire also sheds light on how Scottish electoral culture both increasingly resembled, yet

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128 Phillips, Reform Bill, 11.
129 Salmon, Electoral Reform, 131.
still differed from, that elsewhere in the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{130} As in England, party allegiances were becoming increasingly strong.\textsuperscript{131} From a much lower starting point than in England, this happened very quickly in Scotland; and the vibrant political culture which stimulated this development may have resulted in ultimately stronger partisanship in Scotland than elsewhere in the U.K.. Politics in Roxburghshire between 1832 and 1847, it may be concluded, was animated, partisan and participatory.


\textsuperscript{131} See Phillips and Wetherell, ‘The great reform bill’; ‘The great reform act’.