Skip to main content

Research Repository

Advanced Search

Spencerism and the Causal Theory of Reference

Hinzen, W.

Spencerism and the Causal Theory of Reference Thumbnail


Authors

W. Hinzen



Abstract

Spencer’s heritage, while almost a forgotten chapter in the history of biology, lives on in psychology and the philosophy of mind. I particularly discuss externalist views of meaning, on which meaning crucially depends on a notion of reference, and ask whether reference should be thought of as cause or effect. Is the meaning of a word explained by what it refers to, or should we say that what we use a word to refer to is explained by what concept it expresses? I argue for the latter view, which I call ‘Darwinian’, and against the former, ‘Spencerian’ one, assuming conceptual structures in humans to be an instance of adaptive structures, and adaptive relations to an environment to be the effect rather than the cause of evolutionary novelties. I conclude with the deficiency – both empirically and methodologically – of a functionalist study of human concepts and the languages they are embedded in, as it would be undertaken in a paradigm that identifies meaning with reference or that gives reference an explanatory role to play for what concepts we have.

Citation

Hinzen, W. (2006). Spencerism and the Causal Theory of Reference. Biology and Philosophy, 21(1), 71-94. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-005-0205-y

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date 2006-01
Deposit Date Jul 7, 2008
Publicly Available Date Jul 7, 2008
Journal Biology and Philosophy
Print ISSN 0169-3867
Electronic ISSN 1572-8404
Publisher Springer
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 21
Issue 1
Pages 71-94
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-005-0205-y
Keywords Concepts, Dretske, Fodor, Internalism, Teleosemantics.

Files

Accepted Journal Article (119 Kb)
PDF

Copyright Statement
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com.





You might also like



Downloadable Citations