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The problem of mental causation and the nature of properties.

Gibb, S. C. (2004) 'The problem of mental causation and the nature of properties.', Australasian journal of philosophy., 82 (3). 464 - 476.

Abstract

It is argued that if the properties of causation are tropes rather than universals, then a psychophysical reductionism can be advanced which does not face the problem of multiple realizability. However, the 'trope solution' rests upon the assumption that one can combine a trope monism with a type dualism. I argue that such a combination cannot be allowed. Given a plausible interpretation of types within a trope ontology, trope monism in fact entails type monism. Consequently, if one identifies mental tropes with physical tropes, one must also identify mental and physical types and in doing so face a modified version of the multiple realizability argument

Item Type:Article
Keywords:Mental causation, Metaphysics, Monism, Property, Trope.
Full text:Full text not available from this repository.
Publisher Web site:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713659879
Record Created:11 Apr 2007
Last Modified:09 Jun 2014 15:13

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