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The Problem of Mental Causation and the Nature of Properties

Gibb, S.C.

Authors



Abstract

It is argued that if the properties of causation are tropes rather than universals, then a psychophysical reductionism can be advanced which does not face the problem of multiple realizability. However, the 'trope solution' rests upon the assumption that one can combine a trope monism with a type dualism. I argue that such a combination cannot be allowed. Given a plausible interpretation of types within a trope ontology, trope monism in fact entails type monism. Consequently, if one identifies mental tropes with physical tropes, one must also identify mental and physical types and in doing so face a modified version of the multiple realizability argument

Citation

Gibb, S. (2004). The Problem of Mental Causation and the Nature of Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82(3), 464 - 476. https://doi.org/10.1080/713659879

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date 2004-09
Deposit Date Apr 11, 2007
Journal Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Print ISSN 0004-8402
Electronic ISSN 1471-6828
Publisher Taylor and Francis Group
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 82
Issue 3
Pages 464 - 476
DOI https://doi.org/10.1080/713659879
Keywords Mental causation, Metaphysics, Monism, Property, Trope.
Publisher URL http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a713659879~db=all~order=page


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