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The Endgame

Banerjee, A.N.; Markovich, S; Secciay, G

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Authors

S Markovich

G Secciay



Abstract

On December 1st, 2009 President Obama announced that the U.S. troops would have started leaving Afghanistan on July 2011. Rather than simply waiting \the U.S. troops out," the Taliban forces responded with a spike in attacks followed by a decline as the withdrawal date approached. These, at rst, counter-intuitive phenomena, are addressed by studying a two-player, zero-sum game where the duration of the strategic interaction is either known or unknown (i.e., the game can stop at any time with positive probability). We nd that, conditional on the players' relative position, players' equilibrium strategies are non-stationary in a known duration game but they are stationary in the unknown duration case. Hence, introducing uncertainty, no matter how small, changes players' optimal behavior qualitatively and discontinuously: qualitatively because their behavior becomes stationary; discontinuously because the equilibrium is stationary only as far as the continuation probability is bounded away from 1.

Citation

Banerjee, A., Markovich, S., & Secciay, G. (2019). The Endgame. Games and Economic Behavior, 118, 176-192. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.08.010

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Aug 24, 2019
Online Publication Date Sep 2, 2019
Publication Date Nov 1, 2019
Deposit Date Sep 3, 2019
Publicly Available Date Mar 29, 2024
Journal Games and Economic Behavior
Print ISSN 0899-8256
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 118
Pages 176-192
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.08.010
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1293959

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