The Non-existence of Ontological Categories: A defence of Lowe

Miller, J.T.M.

doi:10.1515/mp-2016-0012

The Non-existence of Ontological Categories: A defence of Lowe

Miller, J.T.M.

Authors

Dr James Miller james.miller@durham.ac.uk
Assistant Professor

Abstract

This paper addresses the ontological status of the ontological categories as defended within E.J. Lowe’s four-category ontology (kinds, objects, properties/relations, and modes). I consider the arguments in Griffith (2015. “Do Ontological Categories Exist?” Metaphysica 16 (1):25–35) against Lowe’s claim that ontological categories do not exist, and argue that Griffith’s objections to Lowe do not work once we fully take advantage of ontological resources available within Lowe’s four-category ontology. I then argue that the claim that ontological categories do not exist has no undesirable consequences for Lowe’s brand of realism.

Citation

Miller, J. (2016). The Non-existence of Ontological Categories: A defence of Lowe. Metaphysica, 17(2), 163-176. https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2016-0012

Journal Article Type	Article
Online Publication Date	Sep 8, 2016
Publication Date	2016-09
Deposit Date	Jul 29, 2020
Publicly Available Date	Jul 29, 2020
Journal	Metaphysica
Print ISSN	1437-2053
Electronic ISSN	1874-6373
Publisher	De Gruyter
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	17
Issue	2
Pages	163-176
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2016-0012