A new argument for moral error theory

Cowie, Christopher

doi:10.1111/nous.12357

A new argument for moral error theory

Cowie, Christopher

Authors

Dr Christopher Cowie christopher.d.cowie@durham.ac.uk
Associate Professor

Abstract

Traditional arguments for moral error theory are based on identifying a problem with the metaphysics of moral properties. I provide a new argument that is based on the inconsistency of first‐order moral judgments. I illustrate this using impossibility results in population axiology.

Citation

Cowie, C. (2022). A new argument for moral error theory. Noûs, 56(2), 276-294. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12357

Journal Article Type	Article
Online Publication Date	Oct 20, 2020
Publication Date	2022-06
Deposit Date	Oct 21, 2020
Publicly Available Date	Oct 20, 2022
Journal	Noûs
Print ISSN	0029-4624
Electronic ISSN	1468-0068
Publisher	Wiley
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	56
Issue	2
Pages	276-294
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12357

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Copyright Statement
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Cowie, Christopher (2022). A new argument for moral error theory. Noûs 56(2): 276-294, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12357. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.