Teams Do Inflict Costly Third-Party Punishment as Individuals Do: Experimental Evidence

Kamei, Kenju

doi:10.3390/g12010022

Teams Do Inflict Costly Third-Party Punishment as Individuals Do: Experimental Evidence

Kamei, Kenju

Authors

Kenju Kamei

Abstract

Initiated by the seminal work of Fehr and Fischbacher (Evolution and Human Behavior (2004)), a large body of research has shown that people often take punitive actions towards norm violators even when they are not directly involved in transactions. This paper shows in an experimental setting that this behavioral finding extends to a situation where a pair of individuals jointly decides how strong a third-party punishment to impose. It also shows that this punishment behavior is robust to the size of social distance within pairs. These results lend useful insight since decisions in our everyday lives and also in courts are often made by teams.

Citation

Kamei, K. (2021). Teams Do Inflict Costly Third-Party Punishment as Individuals Do: Experimental Evidence. Games, 12(1), Article 22. https://doi.org/10.3390/g12010022

Journal Article Type	Article
Acceptance Date	Feb 26, 2021
Online Publication Date	Mar 3, 2021
Publication Date	2021
Deposit Date	Nov 10, 2021
Publicly Available Date	Nov 10, 2021
Journal	Games
Publisher	MDPI
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	12
Issue	1
Article Number	22
DOI	https://doi.org/10.3390/g12010022
Public URL	https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1222396

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This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).