Wade, J. B. and Pollock, T. and Fischer, H. M. and Harald, M. (2002) 'The role of power and politics in the repricing of executive options.', Academy of management journal., 45 (6). pp. 1172-1182.
We explore how CEO power affects the repricing of executive options. The spread between an option's exercise, or strike, price, and the market value of a stock impacts the likelihood of repricing. This effect is enhanced when the CEO of the firm in question is also the chairman of its board. Firm and CEO visibility, more board members appointed after a CEO's hiring than before it, a staggered board, and relatively high percentages of CEO and institutional ownership reduce the impact of the spread on the likelihood of repricing.
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|Publisher Web site:||https://doi.org/10.2307/3069432|
|Record Created:||27 Aug 2008|
|Last Modified:||30 Nov 2017 16:14|
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