Germen militiae: War and German Identity in the Later Middle Ages

by

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You know, there are things that people of your generation and mine ought never to forget. We've been through the war and we know perfectly well what the Germans are like … and how national character basically doesn't change.

Students of the history of political ideas are wont to regard national stereotypes with some disdain. Medievalists, despite – indeed, no doubt partly on account of – their current infatuation with all aspects of the medieval 'nation', are in this respect no different. The fact that stereotyped utterances about various European realms, regions, settlements, and their populations are common in medieval writings has not, of course, gone unnoticed. On the whole, however, their occurrence has not been found especially illuminating. Instead, it is their intellectual vacuity and dull predictability that tend to be stressed – when they are scrutinized at all. The instinctive distaste of most scholars for prejudice masquerading as eternal truth often shows through, and there are specialists in the field who roundly insist that cataloguing mere 'topoi of differentiation' is no part of the proper business of the historian of identities. Where collective stereotypes have attracted interest, it has been as potential evidence for the consolidation of the communities which applied them or became their subjects. The early growth of the nation, some have thought, can in a rough-and-ready way be traced by charting their proliferation. A major context for this has often been found in the growth of secular government during the later Middle Ages and in the emergence of a new sort and scale of warfare. A natural concomitant, it is argued, was the elaboration and diffusion in the warring kingdoms of an unreflective, easy-to-use armoury of clichés of self-congratulation and of vilification for neighbours and enemies. No account of the cultural impact of the Hundred Years War is now complete without a glance at the language of mutual insult which produced images of the proud, stiff-necked French and of drunken, loutish (and tailed) Englishmen abroad. War made nations, and thus it was soon nations, decked out in a new, cheap and gaudy, rhetorical finery, that were making war. Stereotypes had a central place in the parchment call-to-arms, clustering thickest around those peoples
which, in an age of organized violence, went to war most often, most ruthlessly, and to most devastating effect.

Not only common sense but also the relationship between war and stereotype familiar from the more recent past seems to support this view: the conspicuously aggressive become nature's aggressors. But whatever stimulates the proliferation of stereotypes in the first place, there is another aspect to their existence that calls for explanation: their habit of lingering, even in the utterances of the educated, long after the circumstances which may once have nourished them appear to have passed. The fact that in the closing decades of the twentieth century, after nearly fifty years of peace and stability, the Germans could still on occasion figure in the political rhetoric of the well-briefed as Europe's prime warmongers and overlords-in-waiting alerts us to a lesson which medievalists in particular might take to heart: that there is more to national stereotypes than meets the eye. Far from being mere substitutes for thought, stereotypes can overlie and encode complex webs of ideas, assumptions, and controversies. If that observation holds good for modern national labels, it is unquestionably still more applicable to medieval ones, which were deployed within a society where literate political discourse relied to a peculiar degree upon inherited literary models and rhetorical techniques. An examination of medieval stereotypes soon reveals that, like their modern counterparts, they were contentious and contested, serving above all as devices with which to argue. Yet the meanings which they bore could be multiple and ambiguous, their functioning within discourses of identity and power less self-evident than is often supposed – as this paper endeavours to show, by examining some of the contexts and conjunctions within which one well-known stereotype was deployed.

I

The history of the association between the Germans and war can be, and on occasion has been, made to appear both long and continuous. John of Salisbury, writing soon after the middle of the twelfth century, posed what was to become a celebrated rhetorical question when he demanded to know who set up the Germans – 'this brutish and unruly people' – as judges over the nations of the earth. Such has been the modern resonance of his words that some years ago a former president of the Monumenta Germaniae Historica felt the need to insist, before an audience of American academics, that the turbulent history of the medieval Reich may have explanations more complex than the German character traits identified by John. Read in their twelfth-century context, however, his remarks seem understandable
enough. So too does the proud boast of Gottfried of Viterbo, a member of Barbarossa's chancery, and John's contemporary, that 'German swords' could 'move earth and sea'. Both reflections originate, after all, in the heyday of imperial power under the Hohenstaufen, in a time of military assertiveness by the Empire's German rulers. By as early as the eleventh century, the Germans had already won a reputation both for physical courage and, in the view of their Italian neighbours and victims, for ruthless violence. The associations suggested in these instances – between war, the shaping of political identities, and their encapsulation in group stereotypes – thus appear to be familiar ones: broadly, those which have been traced in other European realms during the later Middle Ages.

As everyone knows, however, the German case is special, for the days of imperial glory were numbered. The history of German military triumph was in fact markedly discontinuous, and did not lead, before the nineteenth century, to those processes of political, institutional, and ideological consolidation around a nascent 'national' monarchy so often detected in other parts of late medieval Europe. It therefore comes as something of a surprise, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, still to encounter utterances which seem more properly to belong in the age of Barbarossa – such as Heinrich Bebel's assurance, proffered to King Maximilian in 1501, that 'few peoples in the world have not, at one time or another, felt the sharpness of German swords or have at least trembled at the terror of our name'. But the militant patriotism characteristic of educated Germans on the eve of the Reformation is well enough known, and it has generally been ascribed its own, particular and immediate, causes. Alongside a strengthening anti-papal current, which itself nourished a keener interest in the triumphs and tragedies of Germany's imperial past, an important new element has been identified in the writings of Tacitus on the ancient Germans, rediscovered during the second half of the fifteenth century. There, German humanists thought they found a contrast marked out which spoke directly to their most urgent anxieties and grievances: between the plain warrior virtues of their own putative forebears and the decadent vices of the Latin south. On one view, modern stereotypes associating the Germans with a certain kind of harsh, military primitivism have their origin in perceptions forged in the time of Erasmus and Luther.

'Everything should be tried before iron. That is the view of the doctors, and emperors too have learned it by experience.' These words, put into the mouth of Charles IV, were written in 1351 in reply to the poet Petrarch, who had called on Charles to come into Italy and restore the ancient majesty of the Roman Empire. They appear not only to characterize well Charles's own approach to rulership (during a thirty-two-year reign as king and emperor
he did not involve himself in a single major war), but also to encapsulate aspects of late medieval imperial government more generally. The two centuries that lay between the end of the Hohenstaufen dynasty and the consolidation of the Habsburgs on the imperial throne offer scant support for a vision of German military grandeur. It was not merely the fact that the Empire's dwindling resources compelled a more limited, and pacific, style of rule than in times past. The whole standing of German arms appears diminished: by a series of military debâcles against the Bohemian Hussites, for example; or by the standing reproach represented by the advance into Europe of the Ottoman Turks.

Far from withering away, however, images of German military valour, warrior kingship, and restless, untameable bellicosity proliferated in writings of this period as never before, as they came to be woven in new, fundamental ways into the fabric of German constitutional and political debate. Not only that: assertions of Teutonic military supremacy appear to cluster especially in the troubled century between Frederick II's death in 1250 and the imperial coronation, in 1355, of the Luxemburger Charles IV – a century which one recent historian of the German monarchy has labelled the age of 'small kings', rulers distinguished by their modest means and narrow horizons. 'Just as there is a time of peace and a time of war', reflected the publicist Alexander of Roes, writing in 1281, 'so also there are men destined for peace and men destined for war'. First among the latter, Alexander insisted, were his own German fellow-countrymen. Half a century later another German, Conrad of Megenberg, explained how his people owed their name itself to their innate military capabilities: they were a germen milicie – a 'race of warriors'. Nor was it only learned and semi-learned treatise-writers who continued to harp on the theme of German bellicosity. Similar ideas are found not only among the chroniclers but also in the language of the imperial chancery. The very gravity of the crises facing the Empire seemed in the eyes of some to call for a reawakening of the stern warrior aptitudes of its German bearers – a perception which underlies Alexander of Roes' demand that the prince-electors raise to the imperial throne 'a German knight … just like Charlemagne'. The persistence, and amplification, of such ideas in an age which seemed to contemporaries, no less than modern scholars, so marked by crisis, instability, and contraction in German political life requires an explanation. The interest of such an explanation lies in its potential to illuminate not only the historical development of ideas linking the German people with war, but also the relationship between medieval identities, stereotyping, and political power more generally.
Any approach to the network of motifs associating the Germans with war must, however, begin by recognizing something too often overlooked in the current pursuit of the medieval 'nation': that the mix of ideas, assumptions, and sentiments which made up political identities in the Middle Ages varied between different peoples; and that, consequently, the stereotypes into which such identities were condensed also differed, in their resonances, connections, and implications. The medieval Empire was not like other European kingdoms, and the relationship which the German people was during the late Middle Ages held to have with imperial power was likewise distinctive. The professed ideals of the Christian Roman Empire had traditionally been militant: since the fifth century, prayers for the emperor had hoped for his success in suppressing 'all barbarian [meaning pagan] peoples'. In the late Middle Ages the liturgies for both the German (Aachen) and Roman coronations for the Empire's ruler continued to emphasize his duty to extend by successful war the frontiers of the Christian community. The habitual formulations of the imperial chancery, faithful to the teachings of Latin theology and canon law, went on portraying the German monarch as a wielder of the gladius saecularis – a universal coercive power which, it was argued, complemented the 'spiritual sword' entrusted to the priesthood.

The tradition which made the German people alone rightful custodians of the Christian Roman Empire was of less ancient origin. But by the second half of the thirteenth century it too had put down substantial roots in European constitutional thought. The conflicts of principle between the papacy and the Hohenstaufen, which came to a head in the first half of the century, had stimulated a closer scrutiny of the Empire's history and of the entitlements of its bearers. Innocent III's decretal Venerabilem, issued in 1202, became a foundation for future discussions, with its clear ruling that the papacy had, in the time of Charlemagne, transferred to the Germans the right to nominate candidates for the imperial throne. Admittedly, not everyone agreed either that the pope had been the author of the Empire's translation or that it was under Charlemagne that imperial power had passed to the Germans. Nevertheless, Venerabilem did focus attention on one crucial question: why specifically the Germans? Innocent himself had not directly answered it, but others soon did – such as the German canonist Johannes Teutonicus, who insisted that all acknowledge 'that the Teutons by their virtues have won the Empire'.

The debate took on a new urgency after 1250, however. The Hohenstaufen dynasty's hold on the imperial crown had been broken; within a few years the German prince-electors had placed on the throne an English and a Castilian prince; and the king of Bohemia too was
more than once a candidate for the Empire. Most strikingly, the whole association of the German people with the imperial title was in these years brought into question. Venerabilem itself raised the possibility that what the papacy had given it might take away. Within a generation of Frederick II's death proposals were being advanced for a fundamental reorganization of the Empire and rumours circulated to the effect that the pope was planning to break up its territories. But the notion also surfaced that the imperial office itself might be translated afresh, to some more fitting bearer. A suitable candidate appeared ready at hand, in the form of the French people, whose princes were able during the later thirteenth century to bask in the reflected glory of that paragon of Christian warrior-kingship, Louis IX. The strengthening French Carolingian tradition added its own note: had not Charlemagne himself been rex Francorum? Speculation was heightened by repeated diplomatic manoeuvres, in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, to place a French prince on the imperial throne. It drew nourishment from popular prophecies which awaited the coming of a new Charles, from the French royal line. French prestige, moreover, had a counterpart in the scorn now being expressed in some quarters among the Germans' western neighbours for the universalist posturings of a people and of rulers in whose own German kingdom, as the Spanish canonist Vincentius put it, 'every hut usurps lordship for itself'.

When the Empire's translation was discussed, questions about the relative suitability of different peoples – and thus, about 'national character' – were never far from the surface. The very idea of translatio imperii – finding an appropriate custodian for an office understood principally in terms of protection and coercion – ensured a place for the language of ethnic stereotype at the heart of learned political speculation. Such language became a natural recourse for the group of mainly German theorists and pamphleteers who in the two centuries after 1250 set out to show the rightness of their own people's continuing tie with the Empire. To establish the claims of the Germans to the Christian Roman heritage, they adopted two interwoven strategies: unfolding the long and illustrious history of warfare waged by 'German' monarchs on behalf of the Church; and grounding the Empire's history and fate in an interpretation of German identity.

Their characteristic viewpoint, which compressed German into Frankish history, was capable of endowing the Empire's bearers with an impressive military pedigree – one which, unparalleled in the world, stretched unbroken from Charles Martel to the emperors of the central Middle Ages, as the fourteenth-century publicist Lupold of Bebenburg explained. The kings and emperors of the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries were shown leading triumphant armies over the Alps, to free the church of Rome from the Lombards. Late
medieval writers were able to cast over the raiding, plundering, and tribute-taking of the Carolingians and Ottonians the self-same legitimizing mantle that Frankish and Saxon churchmen had once applied, of warfare and protection in the name of the Church. Alexander of Roes noted with satisfaction that Charlemagne had brought the Saxons into the Christian fold 'rather by the material than by the spiritual sword'. Lupold of Bebenburg recounted how Henry I had taught the Northmen and the Danes, by force of arms, to bear the yoke of Christ, and how Otto II, his grandson, had so triumphed over the Slavs that they willingly became both Christians and tributaries. To recount German history was to unfold a story of sacred violence. Under the Hohenstaufen, the imperial mission of warfare for the Faith had crystallized in the belief that it was the emperor's duty to lead the crusade against the heathen. This idea too proved long-lived. Dietrich of Niem, writing early in the fifteenth century, blamed the defeat of the multi-national crusading army at Nicopolis in 1396 on French usurpation of the place in the van that by tradition belonged to the Germans 'in all wars against the Saracens'.

It was not without reason, the argument went, that the Germans had for so long been the Church's strong arm. Dietrich's remark highlights a recurrent principle in German writings on the Empire: that the Germans, alone among Europe's peoples, possessed the qualities which imperial rule demanded. These were, necessarily, qualities which were associated with the ancient Romans, whose direct political heirs the Germans claimed to be. For medieval people, the Romans were above all great soldiers and conquerors. German writers were understandably at pains to trace links between their forebears and a Roman past: through Caesar's conquests and foundations, and his settlement of Romans in Germany; through the Roman ancestry traced by some German dynasties; and through the aid which, in a popular and much-repeated tradition, the ancient Germans had given Caesar in wresting supreme power from the senate. By assimilating the Germans to the Franks – whose Trojan origins were a long-established tradition – it became possible to claim a direct blood tie between Romans and Germans, and thus to portray the latter more credibly as the heirs to Roman characteristics. Alexander of Roes maintained that the Roman blood of the Germans was evident from their seriousness (which distinguished them from the frivolous French), and from their devotion to war and conflict. The moral was clear: barbarian peoples, Alexander observed, flee before the eagles of the Romans and the Germans, whereas they have no fear of the lily of France.
What really concerned German writers was the supreme fitness for armed struggle that their people's links with Rome affirmed. Here, it seemed, lay their fundamental title to the Empire. Conrad of Megenberg, in a dialogue between a personified Ecclesia and the pope, has the Church explain how, if the Germans were to lose the Empire, both she and the papacy would be defenceless against tyrants.\(^{58}\) Alexander of Roes expressed succinctly what appears to have been a widely held view when he described the entire German people as showing the qualities of a warrior nobility: collectively they constituted the militia of Latin Christendom, hence their indispensability to its defence.\(^{59}\) His perception did not lack a certain objective basis: nobles and their values really did permeate to a striking degree the political life and culture of later medieval Germany. The hold exercised by local aristocratic families over German episcopal churches, and the consequent bellicosity of many of their incumbents, were proverbial.\(^{60}\) In many German towns, ruling elites assimilated themselves to the martial culture and lifestyle of the landed nobility.\(^{61}\) Seen from this perspective, the infusion of aristocratic priorities and standards of judgement into the imperial idea too becomes readily comprehensible.

'Verliuset Diutschiu zunge ir reht, daz wirt sie an eren swachen': should the Germans ('the German tongue') lose their imperial title, it will undermine their honour. The words are from a verse composed soon after the middle of the thirteenth century by a singer known as 'Meißner'.\(^{62}\) If the Germans were, as Alexander claimed, Christendom's militia, that fact was attested by the singular honour that they had won, namely the Empire, which served as their collective patent of nobility. It was not only learned publicists who thought this way. Timothy Reuter has shown how profoundly imperial politics in twelfth-century Germany was founded upon notions of honour and status.\(^{63}\) In the following period, as the association between the Empire and the German people became more explicit, the same modes of thought came to infuse German identity itself. What marked the Germans out in their own estimation was something more personal than just success in war: it was the qualities of the soldier, a special relationship with the heroic. The Germans were exemplars of strenuitas, animositas, audacia.\(^{64}\) And to a talent for fighting was joined a taste for it – 'joy in battle', in one chronicler's phrase.\(^{65}\) In vernacular form, their qualities gained an epic ring: a successful or admired ruler, like Rudolf of Habsburg or Henry VII, was for the poets a helt ('hero'), or a degen ('mighty warrior').\(^{66}\) The chronicler Mathias of Neuenburg has Rudolf boast, after his victory at Besançon in 1289, that with just four German knights and forty footsoldiers he could overcome any multitude.\(^{67}\) Privileged status, it was clear, required constant
justification: honour had to be vindicated, and blemishes made good. The German princes – according to Venerabilem, the real beneficiaries of the Empire's translation – had a special responsibility for performing, in company with the ruler, those feats of arms upon which their people's standing depended.

At a time when imperial power was weak, and the German title to the Empire in some doubt, a heavy burden of obligation was thus naturally laid at the princes' door. German commentators addressed the problem of imperial renovatio in a language of honour, loyalty, and valour, and of their antitheses: cowardice, treachery, and shame. In an address, in German verse, to the princes met at Passau in 1348, the poet Lupold Hornburg portrayed the Empire, in the guise of a beautiful woman, as denuded of her dignity. Her rulers had set aside the heroism of their forebears, and now had time only for lies, deception, and the toadying of the court. The Reich was in the hands of 'cowards', soft men who, Lupold lamented, 'do not thirst after honour'. Consequently, Germany herself 'stands in small regard'. The remedy was plain: emperors and princes should rediscover the hard, martial habits of yore. Lupold's diagnosis must appear somewhat surprising, in an age when some observers were identifying the Germans' immoderate taste for sturmen and striten as a major cause of the Empire's enfeeblement. Yet it reflects a mode of thought whose naturalness for many literate Germans is attested by references in similar vein in the chronicles. The Strasbourg chronicler Gottfried of Ensmingen records how 'the good name of the knighthood of the German realm' was tarnished by the flight of a German nobleman in battle. Crucially, the opposing force had included French-speakers. All was ultimately well, however, when in 1289 King Rudolf led his German forces in a triumphant campaign into the French-speaking south-west, 'in order to recover the honour and the good name of all of Germany'. It was war that had provided the German militia with their imperial charter, and through war alone, waged in the Empire's name, could they reaffirm it in time of need.

IV

If medieval Germans habitually sought warlike qualities in their rulers, elements in the political life of the later Middle Ages conspired to ensure that such qualities came particularly to the fore. The elective imperial crown, firmly established in the second half of the thirteenth century, had its theoretical justification in the principle of idoneity – that the most suitable candidate should be chosen. The needs of contemporary rulership no less than customary expectation ensured that the ruler's military capacities got prominent mention in the formal
declarations of his personal qualities which the election procedure involved. In 1273 the electors made known that the new king, Rudolf of Habsburg, was 'vigorous in body, and blessed with success in warfare against the wicked'.\footnote{74 Such judgements were not confined to official pronouncements. The Swabian continuator of the Kaiserchronik observed that the princes chose the count of Habsburg because, although not of Hohenstaufen blood ('von Stoufen niht geborn'), he was – note once more the heroic strain – a man outstanding in valour: 'an manhait uzerkorn'.75}

The problems which German monarchs faced in establishing and maintaining themselves on the throne seemed to call for the qualities of a warrior hero. If the Empire's rulers could not raise great armies against their neighbours, they were often forced to assemble smaller ones against their own subjects and rivals. The century after 1250 was marked by split elections, by periodic spats with Roman and Avignon popes, and by challenges from powerful imperial vassals.\footnote{76 The crises of royal power and legitimacy that resulted were frequently resolved by armed force. The grinding military commitment that awaited a new king of uncertain title is illuminated by Count William of Holland, elected with papal backing against the Staufer in 1248, who in the period to 1251 alone conducted thirteen separate sieges.77 Merely reaching Charlemagne's minster at Aachen for coronation necessitated a six-month siege of the town, before William's army, reinforced by papal crusaders, could force an entry. The fates of the rulers themselves reflect the tenor of the time, with around half of the kings and emperors of the period meeting deaths linked to violence – on the battlefield, on campaign, or under the assassin's blade.78 Pitched battle several times settled a seemingly intractable constitutional question.79}

The task of governing the Empire's German territories was understood as an essentially military one, a view actually encouraged by the meagreness of the monarch's resources and the scale of the challenges facing him. The disordered state of the German lands is a recurrent lament of the chroniclers and, if their sentiments are at all representative of their fellow-countrymen, it is clear that establishing peace by suppressing local disorder and violent crime was the most urgent demand set before a ruler.\footnote{80 A hint of what was hoped for and required is provided by the Austrian chronicler Jansen Enikel, writing in the vernacular for an urban, burgher audience, in his account of Caesar's exemplary rulership: 'The lord Julius / Thus made good peace / In all the German lands, / Because wherever his power was recognized, / There he was greatly feared'.81 Enikel ends with the characteristic reflection that Caesar's warlike deeds won him 'great honour'.}

10
The use of conspicuous military display to articulate and validate political authority was a well-established – in the eyes of some a distinctive – part of German political life, and the limited resources and urgent duties of rulership in the two centuries after 1250 helped to ensure its perpetuation. Shows of armed force gained greater ideological significance, however, and a far more explicit association with notions of Germanness, when the ruler attempted to exercise power south of the Alps. There, German arms not only enforced but actually embodied imperial authority: a concession granted by Rudolf of Habsburg's vicar in Tuscany relieved the Sienese of any obligation of fealty to the Empire until they should be visited either by the monarch himself or by a force of at least five hundred German knights.

But for well-informed Germans the expeditions that their ruler led over the Alps in person had a special significance. In the century after Frederick II's death these became both less numerous and, when they did occur, distinctly more modest in scale, duration, and achievements than in times past. Yet literate Germans of the fourteenth century show a telling determination to paint the short-lived and ill-starred ventures of Henry VII (1308-1313) and Ludwig the Bavarian (1314-1347) in the south in colours of militant triumph. What the chroniclers had in mind remains visible in a coloured drawing in the Codex Balduini Trevirensis, made in the circle of Baldwin of Luxemburg, archbishop of Trier (1307-1354). Henry VII, Baldwin's brother, is seen heading south over a stylised alpine ridge under a forest of lances and imperial banners, amid a dense press of helmeted and mailshirted men, the electors among them. Crossing the Alps in military array was no mere act of rule, but part of the necessary and accustomed spectacle of Empire: chroniclers understood this, and took care to see what tradition taught them they must. What is more, the journey south had by the fourteenth century come to manifest, like few other tasks of government, the special relationship of the German people with imperial majesty. During preparations for an aborted Italian expedition under Rudolf of Habsburg the bishop of Basel wrote to the king from Rome, urging him to assemble 'a band of warriors such as mighty Germania can nurture'. He took pains to impress on Rudolf the need for a truly magnificent show of force, 'thereby gaining infinite glory for Germany and renown that will endure for many generations'.

Triumphant show needed to be followed by triumphant deeds. Here too, writers were moved to adopt a language of extravagant military success inherited from a more glorious German imperial past. The inconclusive street-fighting in which Henry VII became embroiled when he reached Rome in 1312 was transformed by the chroniclers into a sanguinary vindication of German animositas: men waded up to their knees in blood and the
Tiber itself flowed red.89 Otto of Freising's celebrated quip, that Barbarossa's army paid the Romans for the imperial crown not in Arabian gold but Teutonic iron, is paralleled by similarly grim epigrams fathered on Henry VII.90 These – indeed the whole language of German military action in the south – illuminate a point of the greatest importance: that images of German bellicosity only gained their full meaning when placed within larger networks of ethnic stereotypes.

The rhetoric of German triumph relied upon a parallel rhetoric, of subjection, humiliation, and expropriation.91 Whether in the writings of publicists and pamphleteers, the narratives of Latin and vernacular chroniclers, or the verses of poets and singers, we find the self-same amalgam of tendentious, counterposed, and mutually-supporting stereotypes. Just as the Germans were natural conquerors and rulers, so Italians were by nature subjects. For Alexander of Roes they were the populus to Germany's militia.92 The German people, says the Königsaal chronicler 'was accustomed always to be victorious, and was therefore very ready manfully to assail and put to flight the soft and feminine spirit of the Gauls' – meaning here Italians.93 Not only the people, but their lands too were soft and feminine, rich and ripe for exploitation, and thus naturally subject and tributary – hence the repeated reference in German sources of various kinds to the Empire's Italian territories as its 'garden', its 'pleasure garden', or its 'orchard'.94

To find stereotypes deployed in this way can occasion little surprise. Is this not precisely the language of domination and control, over a constructed, subordinate 'other', that we have learned to expect self-styled 'imperial' peoples in any age to speak?95 Support for such a reading of the German evidence seems to come from a viewpoint which has in recent times found favour among medievalists. In a number of influential studies, the period between roughly the twelfth and fourteenth centuries has been ascribed a special significance, as a time when European powers and elites began to assert harsher and more exclusive kinds of dominance, supported by a new vocabulary of belonging and exclusion.96 Cultural developments took a fundamental place within a larger pattern of strengthening hegemonies. If boundaries of various sorts came in this period to be more assiduously policed, that was partly because they had been rendered more visible, and capable of more articulate delineation, by a new battery of terms and concepts, derived in part from the revived study of Antiquity.97 Political relationships were naturally among those affected: literary models of 'binary difference', often drawing upon classical distinctions between civilization and barbarism, were applied to lend dominion and expropriation the stamp of the inevitable, the natural, the God-given.98 There may have been only one Roman Empire in western Europe,
but there were plenty of would-be empire-builders, and an inherited and rejuvenated repertoire of stereotypes, the argument goes, furnished some formidable construction materials.99

V

The language of German imperialism, with its stress on military triumph over a naturally servile 'other', seems to suit such a picture precisely. Yet it is necessary only to recall the state of imperial rulership, both north and south of the Alps, in the decades after 1250 for it to become clear that the relationship between power and stereotyping must necessarily have been somewhat different in the German case. When German writers invoked images of heroic warriorship and its antitheses their characteristic object was not to legitimize recent conquest or sustain novel claims to rule, but to affirm what they regarded as a time-honoured political order – 'the pre-eminence of the Roman Empire', as Alexander of Roes put it – and to defend and celebrate the special status of its status-conscious German custodians.100 Such intentions are far removed from the confident, aggressively intolerant, 'state-building' climate in which some historians locate the proliferation of stereotypes. The vocabulary of identity and 'otherness', in German mouths of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, was an avowedly conservative one, uttered in a mood of crisis, against times which, especially for the Empire’s better-informed and more widely travelled champions, seemed filled with dangerous novelties. Most alarming of these was the challenge posed by that upstart rival militia whose shadow loomed beyond the western frontier: the kingdom of France, its people, and its 'most Christian' kings.101

German writers were accustomed to describe their Romance-speaking neighbours, whether south of the Alps or west of the Meuse, in strikingly similar ways. Even much of the terminology was common: Italians or French, all were Walhen in the vernacular and, on occasion at least, Gallici in Latin.102 The character traits supposedly distinctive to the two peoples were also to some degree common, serving to locate both in the self-same subjection to the Germans. The French, no less than the Italians, emerge from German writings as an effeminate people, calling for tutelage and a firm hand.103 It was an imputation that suited perfectly the objectives of German treatise-writers, keen to banish the spectre of an impending translatio imperii in Francos. Conrad of Megenberg's Ecclesia thus urged the pope not to charge the Empire's shield with the lilies of France, 'which are soft and womanish'.104
It thus comes as no surprise to encounter the French, in German writings, repeatedly failing the key test of fitness for imperial rule: trial by battle. Like the Italians, they are dismissed as hopelessly ineffective soldiers. The claim was no mere utilitarian confection of the publicists, who here invoked more deep-rooted German attitudes; but it was an idea that imperialist treatise-writers were particularly assiduous in exploiting. In his Noticia seculi of 1288, written soon after the troubled end of Charles of Anjou's reign, Alexander of Roes had a moral to point. Their recent military setbacks, he explained, were but a foretaste of the chastisement that awaited the French, should they continue to claim a role for which they were manifestly not fitted: nature had allocated them pacific functions within the Christian commonwealth, as scholars and clerks; yet 'they strive, like Teutons and warriors, to be cruel and bellicose men and plunderers'. The French presumption which Dietrich of Niem thought had betrayed the Christian cause at Nicopolis was, from a German point of view, no isolated lapse, but one further instance of a familiar habit, of usurping positions of command which rightly belonged to their eastern neighbour. To the faint-heartedness characteristic of Walhen generally, the French – who affected a fashionable chivalric swagger and stretched out their hand for the imperial crown itself – added evil and dangerous traits of their own: self-deluding vanity and the grave sin of pride. In Alexander's view, not only were the French less manly, and thus less warlike, than the Germans; they were also their juniors – a kindred but later offshoot of the Frankish family. The position which he ascribed them as Christendom's natural clerks (clerus) similarly de-sexed and disarmed them, and placed them under the protection of the Empire's German militia. His reflections on the subject of German and French 'national character' illustrate powerfully how ethnic stereotypes, far from being mere thoughtless tags of abuse or self-flattery, could take a central place within deliberate and ambitious arguments. Alexander knew well how to set stereotypes to work for him – not only to laud his fellow-Germans but also, no less importantly, to display their Italian subjects in fitting attitudes of subjection and to name and shame their most menacing rivals. Listing and classifying within hierarchical schemes was a habit congenial to educated medieval minds. It was no mere intellectual game, however: when Alexander shuffled stereotypes to support his view of the right order in human affairs, he did so in response to other contemporary schemes of stereotyping, which were arguing for a quite different order. It is the outstanding qualities of the French, he admits, that prompt some to see them as candidates for the Empire. The Germans, by contrast, are condemned by their critics as rude and uncultivated: how, such persons ask, can they govern the whole of Christendom, when even their own dress and manners are so
disorderly? Alexander believed he could rebut such frivolous objections. Yet the terms in which he was led to defend his fellow-countrymen, and the concessions which he felt compelled to make to their critics, prompt as many questions as they answer.

VI

The Germans too, Alexander conceded, had their faults: not only the coarseness of which their French rivals indicted them, but also cruelty, rapacity, and an innate love of quarrels. It is hard to see how Alexander's medieval readers could wholly have escaped the reflection, obvious to modern ones, that a people marked by such vices was perhaps not so incontestably fitted for the guardianship of Christendom after all. The light which his words casts upon the more troubling dimensions of German bellicosity encourages closer scrutiny of some of the celebrations of German valour found in other writings. It is easy to understand why, for example, the Königsaal chronicler gave prominence to Henry VII's martial entry into Rome; but what is to be made of his picture of the emperor's German forces cutting a swathe through the city's Italian defenders 'like ravening wolves among defenceless sheep'? In fact, although German writers mostly deployed references to their people's bellicosity in what they intended as positive ways, the actual characteristics which they invoked were by no means self-evidently flattering, but rather, at best, troublingly ambiguous.

Under the year 1336 the chronicler John of Winterthur notes that the king of Hungary had broken off a military campaign because, on one report, he dreaded the advent of the Germans (especially the Swabians, adds John), 'and fled as if before a whirlwind or a raging tempest (tempestatem furiosam)'. On this if on little else the Germans and their southern and western neighbours were of one mind: the Teutons were a furious people. But was resembling a raging tempest a reputation to cherish, or one to live down? Does German furor belong in the category of 'positive' or of 'negative' stereotypes – or does it in fact permit any such absolute view? Its use by German writers was certainly in most cases clearly laudatory. Viewed from the south, however, the picture was very different. Petrarch summed up what he judged to be the essence of Italian superiority over the northern neighbour in a stark antithesis: vertù contra furore. If furor Teutonicus was a familiar rhetorical cliché, it was nevertheless one with potentially complex significance: in German writings a proud boast, affirming ancient titles to power; in Italian ones a bitter, shaming reproach hurled at the wild men beyond the mountains. Yet the picture is in fact more complex still: the furious ways of the Teutons, it soon becomes clear, gave northerners too
occasional cause to reflect. A purely functional interpretation of the theme of German fury will not therefore suffice, since its meaning, and thus its purpose, varied sharply in line with different authorial standpoints, traditions, and objectives. What is needed instead is an approach capable of illuminating something of the range of images and associations which the motif invoked. For this, it is necessary to follow furor Teutonicus back to its origins.

The phrase was a coinage of the Roman poet Lucan, recounting the incursions which Germanic tribes – the Cimbri and the Teutones – had made into the Empire at the end of the second century BC. It entered medieval writings during the Investiture Contest, by which time Lucan's ancient Teutones had become contemporary Teutons, and it gained acceptance on both sides of the Alps in the course of imperial campaigns in Italy in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The idea of behaviour inspired by innate 'fury' calls for some scrutiny, since it had deep roots in medieval literate culture, and tended naturally to invoke a range of further, kindred motifs. A furious people might indeed, in the medieval view, gain a name for martial prowess and conquest: for Oderic Vitalis, writing in the twelfth century, furor distinguished the Normans. It was nonetheless a rather different quality from fortitude: a man fleeing a battlefield in blind panic could be termed a furibundus. At its heart lay surrender to some overmastering passion. For Roman writers like Lucan, furor was a defining feature of the 'other' beyond the frontier: Romans may have been outstanding warriors, but in Antique thought barbarians alone were furious ones. Classical conceptions of barbarism struck early and lasting roots in medieval Europe’s scholarly tradition, gaining a fresh prominence in the intellectual currents of the central Middle Ages. Albertus Magnus, who wrote in Germany during the troubled thirteenth century, observed that the barbarian, unlike the civilized man, 'is moved … by unreasoning fury, lust, and self-delusion'. Fury, to the educated medieval mind, inescapably called forth a cluster of alarming cognate qualities, associated with the Antique image of the barbarian: manners untutored by reason; backward and disorderly political arrangements; and a cruel, ill-disciplined, and predatory style of war.

It is necessary only to recall Alexander’s damning claim, that the French aspired to equal the Germans in cruelty and plundering, for it to become evident that Teutonic martial virtues were, for educated Germans scarcely less than for hostile outsiders, inseparable from some plainly barbarian shortcomings. Others confirmed Alexander’s view that Germans made harsh soldiers. To cruelty, moreover, was joined, in German portrayals of their compatriots at war, a rashness in battle and a characteristically heedless rush for booty that on occasion proved militarily counterproductive. For Italian commentators, many characteristic evils of the northern way of fighting – cruelty, greed, injustice – were
condensed into the deeds of German mercenary bands in the south in the fourteenth century. For some Germans too, the condottieri had a part (though a far smaller one than for Italians) in shaping a dark vision of their people in arms: Conrad of Megenberg reflected that Germans who joined professional companies fought unjust wars, since it was their arms that kept in power the tyrants of Lombardy. For Isidore of Seville, it might here be noted, what drove men to wage unjust wars was furor.

VII

It was not only on the battlefield that barbarian motifs crowded in upon the Germans. In the accounts of some of their southern and western neighbours, the unreasoning fury of the Teutons was portrayed as robbing them of their very humanity, hence the range of 'bestial' qualities with which Italian and French writers were inclined to surround them: an alleged aversion to washing, disgusting table manners, want of dress sense, habitual drunkenness; and the German language itself, compared on occasion with the roaring of lions or with a terrible thunder, but also with the barking of dogs, the howling of wolves, and the croaking of frogs. If in German eyes the Empire's Italian 'garden' represented nature tamed and harnessed, Italian viewpoints portrayed Germany as nature run wild, raging, unbounded, and uncultivated. Petrarch wrote of the clouds from the north shedding an 'iron rain' of criminal soldiery on his native land.

The fully developed picture of the German barbarian was unfolded in French and Italian writings, and it is to these that it is necessary to turn to observe most clearly the interconnection of the image's various component themes. German views were naturally more muted. Yet the unflattering perspectives which Romance-speakers laid out were no calumnies of their own recent fabrication, but elements drawn and re-fashioned from a literate culture in which all educated Europeans had a share. For Germans too they were inescapable – particularly for those Germans who went in search of a literary pedigree for the claims of Teutonic arms. Consequently, some of the same motifs for the German lands and their inhabitants – motifs stressing the raw, the outsized, and the immoderate – are encountered in German writings also. Sometimes they were given what appears to be a positive colouring. More than one German writer spoke warmly of the immense stature and sturdy physique of his fellow-countrymen. The view that Teutons were robusti was one which enjoyed general agreement, and which in the later Middle Ages was reinforced by an origin myth tracing their descent from a giant. But neither could Germans choose to
overlook those troublesome barbarian failings – dull-wittedness, gluttony, drunkenness, inurbanitas, as well as a taste for blood – with which their neighbours charged them. Some Germans had experienced French and Italian scorn at first hand. The humanists were not the first generation of educated northerners whose self-consciousness was moulded by travel: Alexander of Roes, Conrad of Megenberg, and Dietrich of Niem are among those who spent lengthy periods at the papal Curia at Rome and Avignon. Each of them recounts in some detail, from evident personal acquaintance, the faults which in their time others were laying at their people's door.\textsuperscript{138}

Just as important, however, was the influence exerted by literary tradition. The chronicles of the early Middle Ages, and the regional historical memories which they nourished, kept before the eyes of thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Germans an image, if not quite of the vices, then at least of the elemental, untutored ferocity of their forebears. The vernacular Schöppenchronik, begun in official circles in fourteenth-century Magdeburg, depicts the ancient Franks warning their king against an alliance with the Saxons, who were 'a wild, untamed people'.\textsuperscript{139} The etymologies of tribal names preserved comparable ideas in easily-memorable form. Lupold of Bebenburg was just one of those to repeat the well-worn commonplace that the Franks were so-called because they were 'fierce'.\textsuperscript{140} By land and sea alike the Saxons were 'intractable and rock-hard', according to the Franciscan encyclopedist Bartholomaeus Anglicus, who taught at Magdeburg in the thirteenth century.\textsuperscript{141}

The literary inheritance of Latin Antiquity, however, shaped in particularly deep and compelling ways the late medieval image of the German. The belief sometimes encountered, that the rediscovery of Tacitus first introduced literate Germans to classical thought about their character and ancestry, is far from the truth – though it did, unquestionably, enrich their view of Germanic prehistory.\textsuperscript{142} Although the Germania and the Annales had fallen into obscurity in medieval Europe, other Antique works reflecting Roman views of the barbarian continued to be read.\textsuperscript{143} The chronicler John of Viktring, for example, was able to draw on writings by Josephus, Vegetius, and Isidore for his observations on the inhospitable German climate and the ferocity, huge size, and physical strength of the natives.\textsuperscript{144} Isidore alone (who had emphasized the rapacity of the gentes Germaniae as well as their fortitude) bequeathed to later centuries an eloquent and widely-invoked conspectus of barbarian qualities.\textsuperscript{145} However much German writers sought to concentrate on the seemingly more laudable elements in their people's inherited image, its alarming resonances in ancient thought could never be wholly suppressed.\textsuperscript{146}
If the ethnic *topoi* handed down to literate Germans of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were there to be used, they had also somehow to be coped with. The vocabulary of ideas and concepts which they yielded facilitated, and supplied a structure for, those arguments, claims, and controversies which in the decades after Frederick II's death helped to constitute a deepened sense of Germanness. Yet while Germans had considerable scope to manipulate their inherited stock of autostereotypes, they could not simply abolish it, nor could they easily add to it or ignore its individual elements. The authority of the past set its own agenda, and German writers were in some measure the servants, as well as the architects, of the ideas upon which their people's identity rested. One way of coping was to confront directly some of the more disturbing components of the classical tradition, and apply them to the analysis of contemporary German society. Given the intimate links between warfare and government in German thinking, the more blameworthy elements in the German style of war which some writers conceded could scarcely have failed to have political repercussions. Was it any coincidence, some asked, that German public life appeared so bloody and chaotic? The rapacity identified by Alexander of Roes was just one German failing that could not easily be confined to the battlefield. Lupold of Bebenburg is among those who pilloried the German princes as thieves and *raptores*, whose short-sighted selfishness was endangering German possession of the Empire itself. The problem was not merely the ambition or self-interest of the leaders of German society but, as stereotype seemed to show, their reckless impulsiveness, which drove the Germans not only to plunder others, but also themselves. Alexander of Roes, as so often, sums up the view of literate Germans of his age in his plaintive wish that his fellow-countrymen might learn foresight.

It was Conrad of Megenberg, however, who took the further step of relating the lessons of Antique ethnology directly to the problems of governing fourteenth-century Germany. One powerful source of conflicts, he admitted, was the elective crown. But matters were not helped by 'the fury (furor) and impatience of the German people, through which quarrels are sown among them daily'. Conrad offered an analysis of the German temperament which borrowed ideas from Aristotle, and reflected theories about the northern barbarian widely held in the learned world of the ancient Mediterranean. The Germans, he explained, live far from the sun, and the speed and quantity of their blood, from which they have their boldness, account also for their rashness. The evil proclivities to which birth and environment gave rise were, Conrad believed, aggravated by social attitudes commonly
encountered among Germans. His fellow-countrymen, he lamented, dismissed learned knights as 'book-eaters' and, training up their own young in physical arms alone, sent them off to war unarmed with the prudence that overcomes mere brute strength. Here was another lesson with relevance beyond the battlefield, in an age in which reason, honed by book learning, was coming to seem an essential foundation not only for military success but for the exercise of all public power and authority.

Applying the language of ethnic stereotype so explicitly to the ills of contemporary German society was a high-risk strategy, however – one which was always prone to highlight the seeming incongruity of a people so infused with barbarian traits sporting the mantle of imperial Rome. Qualities which, in the formulations of ancient writers, were synonymous with a fundamental incapacity for orderly political life sat uncomfortably beside German claims to universal power. At a time when good government was widely held to be founded on reason, unreasoning wildness inevitably looked to some less like a charter for rule than a disqualification. Exactly those qualities which some Germans perceived in their own political life – fragmentation, discontinuity, violence, cruelty, irregularity – were ones which elsewhere in Europe were being cited as arguments for the fundamental unfitness of certain peoples to manage their own affairs, and thus for their rightful subjection to other, more advanced, powers. Indeed, Germans themselves invoked on occasion a very similar repertoire of negative attributes in order to portray as backward – and thus, in some instances at least, to claim authority over – the peoples beyond their own eastern and north-eastern frontiers: Bohemians, Poles, Hungarians, Scandinavians, and Baltic pagans.

The treatise-writers of the later Middle Ages – the most articulate and self-conscious scrutineers of the German character – were therefore on the whole loathe to ponder too deeply the constitutional implications of those failings which tradition laid at their people's door. Instead, they tended to concentrate on deliberately minimizing the significance of the more troubling aspects of the ancient image of the German, or on re-casting as strengths their people's alleged shortcomings, and arguing that the truly harmful political vices were those of their over-civilized neighbours and rivals. The arguments of the publicists adopted a series of polarities, which aimed to make the best of their people's inherited barbarian image – pitting the battlefield against the court, the open-hearted soldier against the deceitful flatterer, and hard deeds against vain words. The German is indeed a glutton, agrees Conrad of Megenberg's Ecclesia, 'but in war he hurries as if in courtly service'. Dietrich of Niem was another writer who conceded charges of German coarseness and hard drinking, only to contrast approvingly the honest simplicity of past emperors with the worldly vanities of the
By equating courtliness with corruption, servility, and cowardice, German writers were able to present the boorishness which both literary tradition and contemporary critics found in their own people as at worst a venial shortcoming, if not actual evidence of underlying virtue.

The view which contrasted wholesome Germanic severity with the soft and degenerate ways of the south and west was therefore no invention of the humanists, but one which gained wide currency among literate Germans in course of the crises and debates of the later Middle Ages. Indeed, Germans of the Lutherzeit were to forge their own arguments in substantial part out of the rich chronicle and publicist literature that flowed from German pens between the mid-thirteenth and mid-fifteenth centuries. At the heart of this lay a view of the German warrior, of his plain, homely merits, and of the high rewards which these had earned his people. Yet the closing centuries of the Middle Ages had taught the Empire's German supporters some troubling lessons, which their writings could not wholly obscure: that in a treacherous world virtue does not invariably have its reward, and that the guileless Teutonic hero could not in fact be counted on always to conquer. Mathias of Neuenburg recounts a cautionary tale from the battle of Crécy, where – in a striking parallel to Dietrich of Niem's account of Nicopolis – the defeated French had first seized the van, in arrogant disregard of their German and Bohemian allies, only to flee the field, abandoning the Germans, who stood firm, to be slaughtered. It was left to the victorious Edward III – who as a warrior-king could speak with authority in the matter – to lament the fallen Germans, and to reflect how much better he would have rewarded them than had the treacherous French. Here was without question a morality story for patriotic Germans; but was its message on the whole a reassuring or a disheartening one? As Conrad of Megenberg – writing not long after the events of 1346 – had pointed out, unless joined with cunning, German prowess offered scant hope of triumph. Barbarian warrior virtues, no less than turbulent barbarian vices, were coming to seem increasingly anachronistic in a world in which arms-bearing had long ago ceased to be equated with ruling – a world in which, indeed, the universal soldier would soon take up his place not among the masters, but the servants.

New Romans or irredeemable barbarians, lords of the world or hired butchers? If there was one thing that the late medieval image of the Germans at war evidently did not do it was provide the kind of easy answers to naïve questions which, it is often maintained, account for
the appeal of national stereotypes to dull minds throughout the ages. Medieval clichés about
the warmongering Teutons, all too predictable and readily explicable in some modern eyes,
turn out to be anything but. Instead, we seem to be faced with a stereotype that will not obey
the rules, and that turns on its head much conventional wisdom. Its German subjects
themselves appear as deeply paradoxical figures: a martial race whose laurels from the
battlefields of late medieval Europe were few and far between; consummate warlords who
proved notoriously incapable of constructing the kind of institutionalized war machine whose
assembly in other regions of late medieval Europe is still applauded by some historians as a
key measure of national achievement. All the signs are that the theme of German belligerence
was reaching its largest medieval public, attracting unprecedentedly close scrutiny, and
winning the most wholehearted affirmation from informed commentators, at just the time
when Germany's political institutions appeared fatally shrunk and debilitated, their
ideological foundations held up to question as never before. The paradoxes do not end there,
however. It seems hard to regard either as a mere piece of casual abuse or as a cunningly-
wrought weapon of dominion a stereotype which evidently commanded such substantial
cross-cultural consensus: whether among the German people's most patriotic champions or its
sharpest Italian detractors, among devout believers in the universal mission of the late
medieval Reich or natural sceptics, the view of the Germans as unrivalled exemplars of a kind
of unadorned military ferocity found wide agreement. The sort of approach which sees
'national' stereotypes as purpose-made vehicles for the delivery of some single, reassuringly
straightforward, judgement on a people will not work in this case: if the inherent bellicosity
of the Germans was a premise enjoying general assent, different writers derived from it
sharply varying, indeed fundamentally opposed, conclusions.

German identity in the Middle Ages was at all times complex. The stresses and strains
to which German political society was subject in the decades after Frederick II's death
rendered its complexities more acute and more evident, and exposed them to new, more
systematic and widespread, kinds of consideration. Some of the starkest tensions and
contradictions within late medieval notions of Germanness were illuminated by the
association with war – illuminated but, crucially, not resolved. Where, commentators were
compelled to ask themselves, did 'Germanness' in its essence lie? And where, we are bound to
add, lay that 'other' which much current thinking on the subject of identity invites us to
discern behind every account of collective selfhood? Nowhere settled or straightforward, is
evidently the answer to both questions.
A sense of being German was, in a twofold fashion, defined to an unusual degree from the outside. First, it was rendered especially visible through journeys – specifically, through journeys over the Alps, and, most characteristically, through the movement of forces of armed men. It was over the Alps that, at some time in the remote past, were believed to have come those migrant bands of soldiers – Trojans, Macedonians, Armenians – who were in legend the ancestors of the various German descent groups. Roman armies too had come north; and German warbands, it was popularly supposed, had gone south to Caesar's aid. Images of German soldiers crossing the Alps at the behest of 'caesar' remained in the late Middle Ages a powerful – for some fourteenth-century writers, an indispensable – encapsulation of the imperial identity of the Germans. To grasp why that was so, it must be noted that the very idea of Germanness – of a political identity common to all the Germanic language groups within the medieval Empire – had first taken shape after the Saxon emperors began, in the tenth century, to lead armies into Italy. The long heritage of armed journeying ensured that in a second sense too German identity was historically defined from without: through the constructions of 'the German' proposed at various times by those neighbouring peoples – particularly Romance-speakers – with whom the northerners had down the centuries come into contact. The earliest, tenth- and eleventh-century, references to 'the Germans' as a single people, and to their lands, are thus to be found not in German but in north Italian and Burgundian writings.

Much of the substance of German identity, therefore, lay elsewhere: outside 'Germany', south of the Alps, embedded within an imperial inheritance attainable only through (actual or imagined) travel. And where was its corresponding 'other' to be found? Not, alas, safely confined among those neighbouring races within whose supposedly unwarlike characteristics some late medieval Germans were at such pains to locate it, but in places disturbingly close to home: irremovably rooted within the images of a turbulent, barbarian, selfhood from whose shadow late medieval Germans could not hope (and, indeed, never wholeheartedly wanted) to escape. 'Barbarian Germany', it might be said, existed in a perpetual, troubling, though in certain ways fruitful, dialogue with a parallel and interpenetrating 'imperial Germany' – with the fund of memories, traditions, and titles upon which were founded the historic claims of the Germans to uniqueness. It was above all in reflections about war that the two currents met and merged.

The mood of crisis, defensiveness, and perceived decline which often underlies late medieval writings touching on questions of German identity, far from straining traditional links between the Germans and notions of martial prowess, supplied some urgent impulses
for their multiplication and reinforcement.\textsuperscript{168} It did so in a number of different ways, however: the stereotype of the bellicose Teutons proved capable of satisfying simultaneously various diverse – indeed, to some extent contradictory – explanatory needs. The view which ascribed to the Germans a special relationship with warfare endured, and gathered adherents, in the decades after 1250, not because it had one, particular and inescapable, message to convey, but because it did not. On the contrary, it was its unsettled (and unsettling), ambivalent, and debatable character that explains much of its attractiveness, at a time when doubts and questions, more than firm certainties, supplied the core of German identity. There are insights here, into the development of political communities, and into the functioning of those arguments and discourses from which they are constituted, with applicability beyond the German case – and beyond the late Middle Ages. Collective stereotypes, and the ramified identities which they focused and energised, amounted to more than mere shadows cast on society by the institutions of the nascent 'modern state'. The interactions which they attest, between cultural tradition, vital political discourse, and the power of government, were – and are – richer, more complex, less predictable, and less linear than has often been supposed. Not only confident assertiveness, aggression, and growth, but also a shared sense of diminution, and sentiments of nostalgia and disappointment, can be powerful stimuli to certain kinds of collective identity. Empires in their heyday may wage wars; but it is part of the melancholy lot of fading imperial powers to commemorate and to interpret, to ritualize and to mythologize war, and to draw from bygone conflicts lessons – whether comforting, disturbing, or both – with which to face an unappealing present and uncertain future.
**Germin militiae: notes**

1. I am grateful to the participants in seminars and conferences at the universities of Durham, Huddersfield, Leeds, Sheffield, and York, who heard and commented upon papers on which this essay is based.


Europe (Basingstoke, 1998). But stereotypes have attracted some interest from historians concerned with medieval 'colonization' movements: see nn. 98, 158 below.


6 As examples, see Michael Prestwich, English Politics in the Thirteenth Century (Basingstoke, 1990), 80-1; Clanchy, England and its Rulers, 249, 257.


9 Allmand, Hundred Years War, 140. See also Iris Black, 'An Accidental Tourist in the Hundred Years War: Images of the Foreign World in Eustache Deschamps', in Simon Forde,

10 Thus F.J.C. Hearnshaw, Germany the Aggressor throughout the Ages (London, 1940). Hearnshaw offered a synthetic view of German history, from Arminius to Hitler, with chapters organized around the theme of war: 'Early Tribal Wars', 'Early Medieval Wars', 'Later Medieval Wars', and so on.

11 The survival of the theme of German belligerence is charted in Manfred Koch-Hillebrecht, Das Deutschenbild: Gegenwart, Geschichte, Psychologie (Munich, 1977), 138-45. For a further celebrated British example from the Thatcher years, see Dominic Lawson, 'Saying the Unsayable about the Germans', The Spectator, 14 July 1990.

12 For an unusually full and polemical exposition of the viewpoint: Hearnshaw, Germany the Aggressor; for a more sophisticated discussion of the place of war in German history and culture, see Norbert Elias, The Germans: Power Struggles and the Development of Habitus in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Eng. trans. by Eric Dunning and Stephen Mennell (Cambridge, 1996).


14 Horst Fuhrmann, "'Quis constituit Teutonicos iudices nationum?" The Trouble with Henry', Speculum, lxi (1994). But for an example of John's continuing role in polemics


20 Ludwig Krapf, Germanenmythos und Reichsideologie: Frühhumanistische Rezeptionsweisen der taciteischen 'Germania' (Tübingen, 1979); Frank L. Borchardt, German Antiquity in Renaissance Myth (Baltimore, 1971), 177-81, 303-5.

21 A view strongly argued by Klaus von See, Deutsche Germanen-Ideologie vom Humanismus bis zur Gegenwart (Frankfurt am Main, 1970), 14-17.

22 Printed in Konrad Burdach, Vom Mittelalter zur Reformation: Forschung zur Geschichte der deutschen Bildung, 11 vols. (Berlin, 1893-1937), vii, 15, no. 2, in a ms. written by Cola di Rienzo.


28 A letter in the name of Rudolf of Habsburg (1273-1291) thus threatens Philip III of France with the potentia which Germania nurtures if he does not desist from molesting imperial churches: Acta Imperii Angliae et Franciae ab a. 1267 ad a. 1313: Dokumente vornehmlich zur Geschichte der auswärtigen Beziehungen Deutschlands, ed. Fritz Kern (Tübingen, 1911), 34, no. 53. For similar formulations from the chancery of Frederick III (1440-1493), see Claudius Sieber-Lehmann, Spätmittelalterlicher Nationalismus: Die Burgunderkriege am Oberrhein und in der Eidgenossenschaft (Göttingen, 1995), 191.
29 Alexander of Roes, Noticia seculi, cap. 18, ed. Grundmann and Heimpel, 165.


31 For the Aachen ordo, see MGH Leges, ii, ed. Georg Heinrich Pertz (Hannover, 1837), 386; for the Rome ordo, see Die Ordines für die Weihe und Krönung des Kaisers und der Kaiserin, ed. Reinhard Elze (MGH Fontes Iuris Germanici Antiqui in usum scholarum [N.S.], ix, Hannover, 1960).


33 For Venerabilem, see Friedrich Kempf, Papsttum und Kaisertum bei Innocenz III.: Die geistigen und rechtlichen Grundlagen seiner Thronstreitpolitik (Rome, 1954), 48-55; Robert Folz, Le Souvenir et la légende de Charlemagne dans l'empire germanique médiévale (Paris, 1950), 272-5. For the idea of translatio imperii, the standard work is Werner Goez, Translatio Imperii: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Geschichtsdenkens und der politischen Theorien im Mittelalter und in der frühen Neuzeit (Tübingen, 1958), esp. ch. 7.


36 For a general account of the period, see J. Kempf, Geschichte des deutschen Reiches während des großen Interregnums (Würzburg, 1893).

37 The evidence was examined by Arnold Busson, Die Idee des deutschen Erbreiches und die ersten Habsburger (Vienna, 1878); C. Rodenberg, 'Zur Geschichte der Idee eines deutschen Erbreiches im 13. Jahrhundert',Mittheilungen des Instituts für österreichischen Geschichtsforschung [henceforth MiÖG], xvi (1895).

38 Goez, Translatio Imperii, esp. chs. 8-11.


40 The currency of such speculation is noted by Alexander of Roes, writing at the Curia under the French pope Martin IV: Memoriale, cap. 14, ed. Grundmann and Heimpel, 104. For

41 Gaston Zeller, 'Les Rois de France candidats à l'Empire', Revue historique, clxxiii (1934); Kämpf, Pierre Dubois, 45-53.

42 In the later thirteenth century such prophecies seem to have been current especially in Italian Angevin circles. See Franz Kampers, Die deutsche Kaiseridee in Prophetie und Sage (Munich, 1896), 93-4; Folz, Le souvenir, 298-300; Dietrich Kurze, 'Nationale Regungen in der spätmittelalterlichen Prophetie', Historisches Zeitschrift, cci (1966), 6-7. The prophecy is mentioned by Alexander of Roes, Memoriale, cap. 30, ed. Grundmann and Heimpel, 136-7.

43 Post, Medieval Legal Thought, 489.

44 There are introductions to their thought in Friedrich Heer, 'Zur Kontinuität des Reichsgedankens im Spätmittelalter', MiÖG, lviii (1950); Borchartd, German Antiquity, ch. 5.

45 Lupold of Bebenburg, Libellus de zelo Catholicae Fidei ueterum Principum Germanorum, cap. ii, in De iurisdictione, autoritate, et praeminentia imperiali, ac potestate ecclesiastica, ed. Simon Schardius (Basileae, 1566), 420. For Lupold's writings, see essay by Katharina Colberg in Ruh et al. (eds.), Verfasserlexikon, v, 1071-8.

47 Thus Robinson, 'Church and Papacy', 293, 296. The roots of late medieval publicist writings in a Carolingian-Otonian tradition of political theology are emphasized by Heer, 'Kontinuität des Reichsgedankens', 336.

48 Alexander of Roes, Memoriale, cap. 27, ed. Grundmann and Heimpel, 130.

49 Lupold of Bebenburg, Libellus de zelo, cap. ii, in De iurisdictione, ed. Schardius, 419-20.

50 For a number of important studies of Hohenstaufen thought on emperorship, including the emperor's crusading responsibilities, see Günther Wolf (ed.), Friedrich Barbarossa (Darmstadt, 1975); Josef Fleckenstein (ed.), Probleme um Friedrich II. (Sigmaringen, 1974). For the imperial duty to combat the heathen, see Frederick II's Golden Bull of Rimini of 1226: Historia Diplomatica Friderici Secundi, ed. J.-L.-A. Huillard-Bréholles, 6 vols. in 12 (Paris, 1852-61), ii.1, 549. Rudolf of Habsburg observed, in a letter to the cardinals, that the Empire's weakness benefited the heathen: MGH Legum Sectio IV: Constitutiones et Acta Publica Imperatorum et Regum, iii, ed. Jakob Schwalm (Hannover, Leipzig, 1904-6), 25, no. 22.

51 Hermann Heimpel, Dietrich von Niem (c.1340-1418) (Münster, 1932), 156.


54 The story of how the Germanic tribes, having been subdued by Caesar after fierce fighting, aided him in the south was first recounted around the beginning of the twelfth century in the *Annolied*. It was popularized in the *Kaiserchronik* later in the same century, and repeated and elaborated by a number of late-medieval writers. See Thomas, 'Julius Caesar', esp. 253-7. For its origin, see *Das Anno-lied*, ed. Martin Opitz (Heidelberg, 1946, reproducing orig. edn, 1639); for a late-medieval elaboration of the *Annolied* story, Jansen Enikel, *Weltchronik*, in *Jansen Enikels Werke*, ed. Philipp Strauch (*MGH Deutsche Chroniken*, iii.1, Hannover, 1891), 403-7.


Ibid., cap. 33, 142. It is not, however, only in publicist writings that the idea is encountered that the Germans have the Empire on account of their military qualities. See the letter of the German princes announcing the election of Sigismund of Luxemburg, in Deutsche Reichstagsakten, vii, ed. Siegfried Kerler (Munich, 1878), 116, no. 68 (21 July 1411): it is as a result of their 'hard severity' in service of Christendom in times past that the German princes have gained the right to appoint a Roman king and future emperor.

Conrad of Megenberg, Planctus, cap. 48, ed. Scholz, 59; cf. ibid., cap. 8, 29; and see the very similar views of Alexander of Roes in his Pavo, an allegorical Latin poem: Schriften, ed. Grundmann and Heimpel, 191, vv. 263-72.


64 As examples, see Die Königsaaler Geschichts-Quellen mit den Zusätzen und der Fortsetzung des Domherrn Franz von Prag, ed. Johann Loserth (Fontes rerum Austriacarum: Oesterreichische Geschichtsquellen, i Abtheilung, 8, Vienna, 1875), 348 (animositas, audacia); Conrad Kyeser aus Eichstätt, Bellifortis: Umschrift und Übersetzung, ed. G. Quarg, 2 vols (Düsseldorf, 1967), ii, 2 ('Theutunia vero gloriatur strenui robusti et forti milicia').

65 Ellenhardi chronicon, - 1299, ed. Philipp Jaffé (MGH Scriptores, xvii, Hannover, 1861), 131 (letitia belli); and see also the comment by the chronicler John of Winterthur that, during military activities in 1336, the retreat of the king of Bohemia to a fortified place deprived his German adversaries of their 'ardent desire', namely facultas bellandi: Die Chronik Johannis von Winterthur, ed. Friedrich Baethgen (MGH Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum [N.S.], iii, Berlin, 1924), 130.

66 For examples, see 'Der Unversagte', in Politische Lyrik, ed. Müller, 86, no. xxviii (Rudolf as 'ein helt an tugenden unverzaget'); Lupold Hornburg, 'Dyse rede ist von des
Ryches clage', in ibid., 198, no. lvii (Henry VII as 'der gotes degen'). For the use of these words in German heroic literature, see Der Nibelunge Nôt, mit den Abweichungen von der Nibelunge Liet den Lesarten sämtlicher Handschriften und einem Wörterbuch, ed. Karl Bartsch, 2 vols. in 3 (Leipzig, 1870-1880), ii.2, 51-3 (degen), 146-7 (helt).

67 Die Chronik des Mathias von Neuenburg, ed. Adolf Hofmeister (MGH Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum [N.S.], iv, Berlin, 1924), 42. The Königsaal chronicle remarks in context of Henry VII's Italian campaign that ten Germans often assail, wound, and slaughter a thousand or more in battle: Königsaaler Geschichts-Quellen, ed. Loserth, 348.

68 Lupold Hornburg, in Politische Lyrik, ed. Müller, 198 ('Tuchs lant in kleiner wirde stat').

69 Lupold's view of what was called for is eloquently attested by his picture of Caesar's government: 'Julius, des riches spizzen, / Konde wol die finde smizzen / Hertlich zue manigen ziten. / In sturmen vnd in striten / Betwang der helt ir vil mit maht. / Der keyser keyserlich durch facht / Do seinen wider werten frefel'. Ibid., 193.

70 The words are Lupold's: n. 69 above; and see below, **-**.

71 Ellenhardi chronicon, ed. Jaffé, 128. A Salzburg annalist reflects that he cannot say whether Rudolf of Habsburg's victory over Otakar of Bohemia in 1278 redounded more to the glory or the ignominy of 'our illustrious Germany', when it is noted how few princes were
present in Rudolf's army: Annales S. Rudberti Salisburgenses a. 1-1286, ed. Wilhelm
Wattenbach (MGH Scriptores, ix, Hannover, 1851), 803.

72 Ellenhardi chronicon, ed. Jaffé, 128.

73 On the emergence of an elective crown: Ernst Schubert, 'Königswahl und Königtum
im spätmittelalterlichen Reich', Zeitschrift für historische Forschung, iv (1977); Heinrich
Mitteis, Die deutsche Königswahl: Ihre Rechtsgrundlagen bis zur Goldenen Bulle, 2nd edn
(Brünn, 1944, repr. Darmstadt, 1987).

74 MGH Constitutiones, iii, ed. Schwalm, 18, no. 14. Cf. similar formulation in MGH
Constitutiones, iv.1, ed. Jakob Schwalm (Hannover, Leipzig, 1906), 7, no. 8 (announcing to
the Empire's subjects the election of Rudolf's son Albert, 1298).

75 Kaiserchronik: Schwäbische Fortsetzung, ed. Edward Schröder (MGH Deutsche
Chroniken, i, Hannover, 1892), 413.

76 For an introduction to the history of German royal government in the period, see
Heinz Thomas, Deutsche Geschichte des Spätmittelalters, 1250-1500 (Stuttgart, 1983), chs.
1-6.

77 Michael Toch, 'The medieval German city under siege', in Ivy A. Corfis and Michael
Wolfe (eds.), The Medieval City under Siege (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1995), 39.
Killed in pitched battle: Adolf of Nassau (1292-1298); killed or died on campaign:
William of Holland (1248-56); Henry VII (1308-1313); assassinated: Albert I (1298-1308).
The death of a major pretender to the throne, Otakar II of Bohemia, in battle against the
reigning king, Rudolf of Habsburg (1278), might also be noted. John of Winterthur, writing
shortly before the middle of the fourteenth century, believed that all German kings and
emperors since Rudolf's time had met violent deaths: Die Chronik Johanns von Winterthur,
ed. Baethgen, 68; and according to the Königsaal chronicler, Henry VII reflected that
Germans had been responsible for the killing both of Bohemian kings and of recent rulers of
the Empire (with Adolf and Albert explicitly named): Königsaaler Geschichts-Quellen, ed.
Loserth, 266-7.

Examples: 1278 (Rudolf's victory over the rebellious vassal Otakar); 1298 (Albert I's
claim to throne vindicated against King Adolf); 1322 (Ludwig the Bavarian's claim to throne
vindicated against rival candidate, Frederick of Habsburg). See Thomas, Deutsche
Geschichte, 61, 105-6, 158-9.

A single example, from many which might be cited: Die Chronik Johanns von

Jansen Enikel, Weltchronik, ed. Strauch, 404.

For a celebrated example of the association of the Germans with military display, see
(Oxford, 1955-1979), ii, 593, no. 277; for some spectacular shows of arms in late medieval
Germany, see Otto Volk, 'Von Grenzen ungestört – auf dem Weg nach Aachen: Die
Krönungsfahrten der deutschen Könige im späten Mittelalter', in Wolfgang Haubrichs et al. (eds.), Grenzen Erkennen – Begrenzungen Überwinden: Festschrift für Reinhard Schneider zur Vollendung seines 65. Lebensjahres (Sigmaringen, 1999), 269, 274; J. Jeffery Tyler, Lord of the Sacred City: the Episcopus Exclusus in Late Medieval and Early Modern Germany (Leiden, 1999), 129, 140. The relationship between military display and monarchical weakness found a striking constitutional expression during the later Middle Ages in the form of the Königslager – the solemn military camp that any king-elect of disputed title was from the thirteenth century onward required to maintain for a fixed period outside the gates of Frankfurt am Main, as a visual display of his legitimacy and support. For this see: Hans Weirich, 'Über das Königslager: Ein Beitrag zur Verfassungsgeschichte des spätmittelalterlichen Deutschen Reiches', Deutsches Archiv für Geschichte des Mittelalters, iii (1939); Volk, 'Von Grenzen ungestört', 271-2.

83 MGH Constitutiones, iii, ed. Schwalm, 568, no. 606; and see Fritz Kern, 'Die Reichsgewalt des deutschen Königs nach dem Interregnum: Zeitgenössische Theorien', Historische Zeitschrift, cvi (1911), 52-3.


85 See William M. Bowsky, Henry VII in Italy: the Conflict of Empire and City-State, 1310-1313 (Lincoln, Neb., 1960), where this and other illustrations from the codex are reproduced between 50 and 51.
86 The chronicler John of Viktring thus recounted how Ludwig the Bavarian, on his expedition of 1327, 'entered Italy, to the wonder of many, attended by a noble and outstanding retinue of knights of German stock': *Iohannis abbatis Victoriensis Liber certarum historiarum*, ed. Fedor Schneider (*MGH Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum*, xxxvi, Hannover, Leipzig, 1909), 92. His words gain in significance when it is noted that Ludwig in fact brought only modest forces with him from Germany: Pauler, *Die deutschen Könige*, 144-64; H.S. Offler, 'Empire and Papacy: the Last Struggle', *Trans. Royal Hist. Soc.*, 5th ser., vi (1956), 367-7, where Offler numbers the force with which Ludwig crossed the Alps at 'a few hundred'.


88 For this language under the Hohenstaufen, see Franz Guntram Schultheiß, *Geschichte des deutschen Nationalgefühles: Eine historisch-psychologische Darstellung* (Munich, Leipzig, 1893), 220-22.

89 *Die Chronik Johannis von Winterthur*, ed. Baethgen, 62, 68. A similarly lurid picture is painted by the Dominican chronicler Henry of Herford, in his account of the fighting in Milan: *Liber de Rebus Memorabilioribus sive Chronicon Henrici de Hervordia*, ed. Augustus Potthast (Göttingen, 1859), 228. For events in Rome, see Bowsky, *Henry VII*, 159-70. The one full-scale battle which took place during Henry's time in Rome, on 26 May 1312, was in fact a defeat for the Luxemburger.

91 Its character is well illustrated by the account of Henry VII's capture of Brescia found in the Königsaal chronicle: Königsaaler Geschichts-Quellen, ed. Loserth, 342-3. For Henry before Brescia, see Bowsky, Henry VII, 115-27.


93 Königsaaler Geschichts-Quellen, ed. Loserth, 348; and the contrast between German severity and Italian softness is then further developed ibid., 348-9. See also Conrad of Megenberg, Planctus, cap. 8, ed. Scholz, 28.

94 See MGH Constitutiones, iii, ed. Schwalm, 90, 260, nos 100, 266; and, for further examples, Ernst Schubert, König und Reich: Studien zur spätmittelalterlichen deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte (Göttingen, 1979), 223-4. A treatise by Dietrich of Niem, urging the return of the Empire's rulers to Italy, has the title Viridarium Imperatorum et Regum Romanorum (ed. Alphons Lhotsky and Karl Pivec in MGH Staatsschriften des späten Mittelalters, v.1, Stuttgart, 1956).

95 For an influential view of the process at work, see Edward W. Said, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient (Harmondsworth, 1991), esp. 1-28. For 'the other', see


race in medieval Ireland', in ibid. The term 'binary difference' is from Gilman, *Difference and Pathology*, 24.

99 An argument particularly strongly made in Gillingham, 'English imperialism', 392.

100 Thus note the title of Alexander's first and longest work: *Memoriale … de Prerogativa Imperii Romani* (ed. Grundmann and Heimpel, 91).


104 Conrad of Megenberg, Planctus, cap. 31, ed. Scholz, 48.

105 More than one chronicler saw fit to record, for example, that the king of France, who in 1289 was preparing for war against the Empire, drew back through fear of German potencia: Liber certarum historiarum, ed. Schneider, 260, 301; Die Chronik des Mathias von Neuenburg, ed. Hofmeister, 39-40. For fifteenth-century German views on French lack of strenuitas, see Sieber-Lehmann, Spätmittelalterlicher Nationalismus, 291-3.

106 Alexander of Roes, Noticia seculi, cap. 15, ed. Grundmann and Heimpel, 161. The same recent events receive allegorical treatment in Pavo, 191, vv. 263-72.

107 For pride and vainglory in medieval thought, see Morton W. Bloomfield, The Seven Deadly Sins: an Introduction to the History of a Religious Concept, with Special Reference to Medieval English Literature (Michigan, 1952), 75, 105; for the chivalric reputation of the French among German writers, see Thomas, 'Nationale Elemente', 375-6.

108 Alexander of Roes, Memoriale, cap. 18, ed. Grundmann and Heimpel, 114. The French were called 'Francigene, quasi a Francis geniti'.


110 For the list-making habit and its roots: Meyvaert, "Rainaldus", 749.

112 Alexander of Roes, Memoriale, cap. 14, ed. Grundmann and Heimpel, 104.

113 Alexander of Roes, Noticia seculi, cap. 13, 14, ed. Grundmann and Heimpel, 160-1. Even the Germans' alleged amor dominandi, in Alexander's view a morally neutral characteristic (ibid., 159-60), gains a different complexion when it is recalled that Augustine had identified libido dominandi with the harshness and injustice of Pharaoh: see Frederick H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1975), 16.

114 Königsaaler Geschichts-Quellen, ed. Loserth, 347. For a similarly disturbing view of German warfare, see Henry of Herford's account of the massacre perpetrated by Henry VII's troops, 'raging in the Teutonic fashion' (more quasi Theutonico furentes), in Milan, 'sparing neither sex nor age': Liber de Rebus Memoriabilioribus, ed. Potthast, 228. Alexander of Roes, it might be noted, had insisted that the Germans were custodians of the Christian sheepfold, not its violators: Memoriale, cap. 36, ed. Grundmann and Heimpel, 146 (figuratively equating St Peter's pastoral staff with the Empire, by which the 'ravening wolf' is driven off).


116 See generally E. Dümmler, 'Über den furor Teutonicus', Sitzungsberichte der königliche Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (phil.-hist. Klasse), ix (1897); Paul Kirn, Aus der Frühzeit des Nationalgefühls: Studien zur deutschen und

117 Studies of the social functioning of stereotypes are apt to treat them as amenable to unproblematical classification as either 'positive' or 'negative': thus Rupert Brown, Prejudice: its Social Psychology (Oxford, 1995), ch. 4. The view is also common in the writing of medievalists on the subject: thus, on the allegedly 'black and white' quality of medieval stereotypes, Guenée, States and Rulers, 65.

118 For the Königsaal chronicler, it was the furor Teutonicus of Henry VII's troops, synonymous with boldness in battle, that overcame the Romans, Henry's own furor that brought the Brescians to their knees: Königsaler Geschichts-Quellen, ed. Loserth, 343, 347. For further examples of the use, in broadly positive ways, of furor Teutonicus and cognate phrases in late medieval German writings, see: Ellenhardi chronicon, ed. Jaffë, 130, 131; Annales Colmarienses maiores a. 1277-1472, ed. Jaffë (MGH Scriptores, xvii), 213; Sieber-Lehmann, Spätmittelalterlicher Nationalismus, 191.

119 Peter Amelung, Das Bild des Deutschen in der Literatur der italienischen Renaissance (1400-1559) (Munich, 1964), 41. It might be noted that in Ambrogio Lorenzetti's fresco cycle of 1338-9 in the Palazzo Pubblico in Siena, illustrating the character and effects of good and evil government, the allegorical figure of furor is placed in company with tyranny, division, and war. See Quentin Skinner, 'Ambrogio Lorenzetti: the Artist as Political Philosopher', Proceedings of the British Academy, lxxii (1986), 33.

120 See below, **-**.
121 Functionalist approaches, which view stereotypes as tools fashioned to justify particular forms of social behaviour or to cope with perceived threats to society, remain popular among medievalists: thus, for example, Moore, *Persecuting Society*, 98; Richards, *Sex, Dissidence and Damnation*, 19; and, for ethnic stereotypes, Menache, 'Symbols and national stereotypes', 191. Theoretical treatments have adopted the same standpoint: Gilman, *Difference and Pathology*, 16-21; and, for an influential older study, Gordon W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Boston, Mass., 1954), 191.

122 For this and what follows, see Dümmler, 'Über den furor Teutonicus'.


124 Conrad Kyeser describes Sigismund of Luxemburg as a *perfugus atque furibundus* for abandoning the field at Nicopolis: Conrad Kyeser, *Bellifortis*, ed. Quarg, 53. Thomas Aquinas insisted that courage was a quality different from rashness as well as timidity, and that its essence was firmness of mind: Philippe Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, Eng. trans. by Michael Jones (Oxford, 1984), 251.

125 See Jones, 'The Image of the Barbarian', 377.

126 See nn. 97 and 98 above, as well as Meyvaert, "Rainaldus", esp. 746-7.

128  Jansen Enikel, recounting the campaigns of the young Frederick II, observes that any Italian (Walich) who fell into the hands of the king's German troops 'was bound to suffer', while Gottfried of Ensmingen states that King Rudolf's French-speaking adversaries were reluctant to surrender, knowing that the German custom was not to take prisoners: Jansen Enikel, Weltchronik, ed. Strauch, 554; Ellenhardi chronicon, ed. Jaffê, 185-6.

129  For rashness in battle as a German characteristic (accidental slaughter of a friendly native in Prussia by German crusaders), see Peter of Dusburg's Cronica terre Prussie, in Scriptores rerum Prussicarum: Die Geschichtsquellen der Preußischen Vorzeit, I, ed. Theodor Hirsch et al. (Leipzig, 1861, repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1965), 91. For booty (resulting in Conradin's defeat at Tagliacozzo, 1268), see Ottokars österreichische Reimchronik, ed. Joseph Seemüller (MGH Deutsche Chroniken, v.1, Hannover, 1890), 41, vv. 3060-74. The chronicler insisted that for an army to break up in pursuit of plunder was, alas, typically German: 'wand leider solhes sinnes / sint die Tiutschen meisteil alle'. For the view that the Germans lacked foresight, see below, **.

130  Amelung, Das Bild des Deutschen, esp. 23-4.

Jahrhundert (Göttingen, 1977), 314. For the activities of the German companies in Italy, see Stephan Selzer, Deutsche Söldner im Italien des Trecento (Tübingen, 2001).

132 Russell, Just War, 27.

133 For Italian views of the Germans, see Amelung, Das Bild des Deutschen; Thompson, Feudal Germany, i, ch. 11; for French views, see Karl Ludwig Zimmermann, 'Die Beurteilung der Deutschen in der französischen Literatur des Mittelalters mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der chansons de geste', Romanische Forschungen, xxix (1911); Max Remppis, Die Vorstellungen von Deutschland im altfranzösischen Heldenepos (Halle a.S., 1911). For further specific examples, see Walther, 'Scherz und Ernst', 274, 281, nos 73, 74, 77, 134; Black, 'An Accidental Tourist', 182-5; Philippe de Commynes, Mémoires, ed. Joseph Calmette, 3 vols. (Paris, 1924-1925), i, 139-40 (describing the domestic habits of the Count Palatine's retinue while at the Burgundian court in Brussels).


135 Quoted in Amelung, Das Bild des Deutschen, 42.


Something of the tone of what they must have picked up is captured by the chronicler Mathias of Neuenburg, who had spent time at Avignon himself, and who reports a sermon in which the future Pope Clement VI glossed Ludwig the Bavarian's name (Baurus) as meaning 'unable to wipe his beard clean': Die Chronik des Mathias von Neuenburg, ed. Hofmeister, 188-9. See also the fear of Alexander of Roes that his arguments will provoke derisio Gallicorum: Noticia seculi, cap. 18, ed. Grundmann and Heimpel, 165.

Die Magdeburger Schöppenchronik (Die Chroniken der deutschen Städte vom 14. bis ins 16. Jahrhundert, vii, Leipzig, 1869), 15. The earliest Saxon settlers (whom the chronicler, following Widukind, claims came from Alexander the Great's army) were, in the view of the native Slavs who named them, 'crazy for strife': ibid., 9.

Lupold of Bebenburg, De iure regni et imperii, cap. i, in De iurisdictione, ed. Schardius, 333. For further instances of this view (which originated with Fredegar), see Meyvaert, "Rainaldus", 747; Borchardt, German Antiquity, 67; Alexander von Roes: Schriften, ed. Grundmann and Heimpel, 113 n. 1.
Anton E. Schönbach, 'Des Bartholomaeus Anglicus Beschreibung Deutschlands gegen 1240', MiöG, xxvii (1906), 69; and see also ibid., 79, for the view of the Thuringian people as being, in keeping with the name of its homeland, *dura* and severe against its enemies.

See n. 20 above. Among the works which treat the rediscovery of Tacitus as marking a new epoch in German self-consciousness are von See, *Germanen-Ideologie*, 9; Simon Schama, *Landscape and Memory* (London, 1996), ch. 2.

For surveys of Roman writings on the ancient Germans, see A.N. Sherwin-White, *Racial Prejudice in Imperial Rome* (Cambridge, 1970); *Altes Germanien – Auszüge aus den antiken Quellen über die Germanen und ihre Beziehungen zum Römischen Reich: Quellen der alten Geschichte bis zum Jahre 238 n. Chr.*, ed. Hans-Werner Goetz and Karl-Wilhelm Welwei, one vol. in 2 parts (Ausgewählte Quellen zur deutschen Geschichte des Mittelalters, i (a), Darmstadt, 1995).


It is significant that Bartholomaeus Anglicus, whose account of German regional geography depended partly on Isidore, singled out for praise those communities, like the Rhinelanders and the inhabitants of Holland, who in his view were 'less inclined to plunder.
and robberies than are other Germanic peoples': Schönbach, 'Bartholomaeus Anglicus', 74, 75.

147 The urgency of contemporary debates is indicated by the frequency with which the violent and disordered state of the German lands found reference in public documents in the later Middle Ages. For some examples from the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, see Deutsche Reichstagsakten, ii, ed. Julius Weiszäcker (Munich, 1874), 150, no. 63; ibid., iii, ed. Julius Weiszäcker (1877), 272, no. 212; ibid., v, ed. Julius Weiszäcker (Gotha, 1885), 682, no. 470.

148 Lupold of Bebenburg, 'Ritmaticum querulosum et lamentosum dictamen de modernis cursibus et defectibus regni ac imperii Romanorum', in Politische Lyrik, ed. Müller, 176. Cf. the remarks of 'Meißner' (ibid., 68, no. xiv 2), who describes the Reich as 'orphaned' through the greed of the 'German tongue' (i.e. the German people, embodied in its princes).

149 Alexander of Roes, Memoriale, cap. 10, ed. Grundmann and Heimpel, 100 (echoing Deut. 32: 29): 'Utinam Germani … saperent et intelligerent ac novissima providerent!' For more on the medieval view that the Germans lacked foresight, see Sieber-Lehmann, Spätmittelalterlicher Nationalismus, 192.

150 Conrad of Megenberg, Ökonomik, lib. 2.i, cap. 6, ed. Krüger, 14.

151 For the classical background, see: Clarence J. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore: Nature and Culture in Western Thought from Ancient Times to the End of the Eighteenth

152 Conrad of Megenberg, Ökonomik, lib. 2.iv, cap. 12, ed. Krüger, 201-2.

153 Ibid., lib. 2.iv, cap. 3, 170-1; and see also Krüger, 'Das Rittertum', 303.

154 Murray, Reason and Society, esp. ch. 5.

155 A perception which clearly underlay the remarks of the canonist Vincentius: n. 43 above.

156 For the association of fury with unreason, Jones, 'The Image of the Barbarian', 377; for irrationality as the essence of barbarism, Murray, Reason and Society, 256.

157 See n. 98 above.

158 See Paul Görlich, Zur Frage des Nationalbewußtseins in ostdeutschen Quellen des 12. bis 14. Jahrhunderts (Marburg (Lahn), 1964), 146-7 (Bohemians), 200-1 (Poles); Bartlett, Making of Europe, ch. 4; Johann Andritsch, 'Das Ungarnbild in der österreichischen Historiographie im Mittelalter', in Walter Höflechner et al. (eds.), Domus Austriae: Hermann Wieslecker zum 70. Geburtstag (Graz, 1983), 24-9. Some characteristic German views of the Bohemians are illustrated in Königsaaler Geschichts-Quellen, ed. Loserth, 50-1, 266-7. The Danes are charged with a propensity for murdering their kings by the thirteenth-century singer known as 'Meister Rumelant': in Politische Lyrik, ed. Müller, 84, no. x 3.
Alexander of Roes was thus at pains to dismiss as mere juvenility the chivalric attainments of the French: Memoriale, cap. 18, ed. Grundmann and Heimpel, 114.

Alexander's French contemporary, William of Nangis, by contrast, argued that chivalry was one of the three elements symbolically represented by the French lily, along with learning, and with Faith, which chivalry and learning alike supported: Herbert Grundmann, 'Sacerdotium – Regnum – Studium: Zur Wertung der Wissenschaft im 13. Jahrhundert', Archiv für Kulturgeschichte, xxxiv (1951), 14-15. For German views of French chivalry more respectful than Alexander's, however, see Thomas, 'Nationale Elemente', 375.

Conrad of Megenberg, Planctus, cap. 18, ed. Scholz, 37-8. For the antithesis between warlike valour and courtly corruption in German sources, see n. 68 above.


German humanism's debt to the late Middle Ages is recognized by Borchardt, German Antiquity, esp. ch. 5.

Die Chronik des Mathias von Neuenburg, ed. Hofmeister, 205-7. Around the end of the fourteenth century, the tale was incorporated by the Strasbourg chronicler Jakob Twinger into his vernacular universal chronicle, a work which reached a large public in Germany at the end of the Middle Ages: Chronik des Jacob Twinger von Königshofen (Die Chroniken der deutschen Städte vom 14. bis ins 16. Jahrhundert, viii, Leipzig, 1870), 474-5.
For the emergence of the infantryman as the emblematic soldier in the visual arts at the end of the fifteenth century, see J.R. Hale, *Artists and Warfare in the Renaissance* (London, New Haven, 1990). The genre first became established in German and Swiss art.

For a further characteristic example, in addition to those cited above, see *Die Chronik Johannes von Winterthur*, ed. Baethgen, 13: Conradin raised a powerful army in Germany, in order to enter Italy.


There are some stimulating reflections on the role of imperial decline in German political culture in Elias, *The Germans*, 320-1, 359-60.