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US public diplomacy and Iran

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The presidency of George W. Bush has seen a prolonged debate between ‘new nationalist’ and ‘neo-conservative’ understandings of how the United States should exercise global leadership. ‘New nationalism’ has appeared as the president’s own default position on American leadership. It derives from a tradition that weaves its way back to the Frontier and to the nationalism of President Andrew Jackson (1). More immediately, it derives from the rather narrowly defined nationalism which was such a prominent feature of Republican Party thinking in the 1990s. Bush, particularly early on, presented himself as an ‘Americanist’ or ‘new nationalist’: prepared to exercise international leadership, but only in a manner congruent with strictly defined American interests. Absent those interests, the world would have to resolve its own problems. The days of Clinton and ‘foreign policy as social work’ were over (2). In 1999, Bush declared that, unless the leader of the United States ‘sets his own priorities, his priorities will be set by others’ (3). Against this ‘new nationalist’ version of international leadership – the version embraced by leading members of the Bush foreign policy team – has stood neo-conservatism and militarised democracy-promotion. The tradition of democracy-promoting global leadership associated with President Woodrow Wilson stands opposed to that deriving from Jackson and President Theodore Roosevelt. Sometimes understood as a form of interests-based realism, neo-conservatism is more sensibly construed as a coming together of democratising idealism with a commitment to military primacy, all strongly rooted in the soil of American exceptionalism. Neo-conservatism, in the famous phrase, is ‘Wilsonianism in boots’. As in the Jeffersonian tradition, neo-conservatives see ‘interests’ and ‘ideals’ as interpenetrative, the one reinforcing the other (4).

The shock of 9/11 immeasurably strengthened the hand of those within the administration, and particularly within the US Department of Defence, who favoured a neo-conservative construction of American global leadership. Charles Krauthammer wrote on 21 September 2001 that this was no time for ‘agonized relativism’ (5). Yet, at least as originally conceived, the War on Terror still reflected ‘new nationalist’ conceptions of global leadership: more forward defence than democracy-promotion, more Theodore Roosevelt than Woodrow Wilson. The neo-conservative position was that 9/11 had opened the way for transformative action, conceived in moral as much as in strategic terms. At least in relation to the Middle East, the neo-conservative agenda rapidly gained ground. ‘Forward defence’ in Afghanistan gave way to an approach which embodied more strongly the theme of democracy promotion/imposition. The shift to a
democracy-promoting rhetoric, seen at its most spectacular in Bush’s second inaugural address of January 2005, was also unquestionably connected to the failure to unearth weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. However, the notion of leadership defended by the administration after 9/11 always combined the ‘new nationalist’ (with ‘American interests’ defined more expansively than before 9/11) and the ‘neo-conservative’ versions of global leadership. Speaking at West Point military academy in June 2002, Bush not only claimed a virtually absolute right to ‘pre-empt’ threats from other countries by taking military action against them; he also promised to ‘extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent’ (6). By November 2003, speaking in London, Bush was defending a Wilsonian form of world leadership: a concept rooted in the interdependence of ideals and interests, drawing also from the post-Cold War doctrine, dear to the Clinton administration, that international democracy guarantees international peace. According to Bush: ‘In democratic and successful societies, men and women do not swear allegiance to malcontents and murderers; they turn their hearts and labours to building better lives’ (7). The administration’s mind-set was also still fundamentally shaped by the American victory in the Cold War. The events of 1989 had, it felt, been a vindication of American ideals: market democracy was bound to prevail, provided always that Washington did not lose its nerve, as it had come close to doing at various points in the Cold War. The 2002 National Security Strategy opened thus: ‘The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom – and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise’ (8).

Before looking in a little more detail at policy towards Iran, I will just touch briefly upon a few dimensions of foreign policy conceptualisation and/or operationalisation of special importance in this connection: the doctrines of pre-emption, ‘regime change’ and ‘rogue states’, the impact of bureaucratic politics, and the Bush administration’s rediscovery of multilateralism and public diplomacy.

Firstly, pre-emption and ‘rogue states’. The pre-emption doctrine enunciated at West Point and in the 2002 National Security Strategy was exceedingly stark and presidentialist. To some degree, it was little more than a statement of the obvious. If the US president wishes to order a military assault on a real or imagined external threat, and orders the US military into battle, he clearly can do so. Congressional war powers have long been withering away. As Anthony Lewis wrote in the New York Review of Books, the doctrine effectively put one more nail not only in the coffin of legislative war prerogatives, but finally ‘overthrew the commitment that the United
States, along with all other UN members have made ‘to eschew attacks across international frontiers except in response to armed aggression’ (9). The doctrine was interpreted in some quarters as an attempt to expand the scope of the (western hemispheric) Monroe Doctrine; the doctrine that had underpinned ‘pre-emptive’ attacks on the Dominican Republic (1965), Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989-90). It clearly conflated ‘pre-emption’ (involving immediate threat) with ‘prevention’ (action taken to ward off remoter threats). The pre-emption doctrine was also a statement of intent and warning, just as the Iraq invasion, when it came, embodied a warning to Iraq’s neighbours.

‘Pre-emption’ slotted neatly into two other concepts of relevance for the developing tale of US-Iranian relations: the concepts of ‘regime change’ and of ‘rogue states’. ‘Regime change’, of course, can be effected by encouraging disaffection within the target state, by fomenting hostility from that state’s neighbours, or even (as happened at the close of the Cold War) by waiting for the geopolitical apple to drop in Washington’s lap. From the neo-conservative perspective at least, effective ‘regime change’ was unattainable without a military threat that was made credible by at least a limited application. Speaking from the fringes of the administration, Richard Perle anticipated a world transformed by militarised regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq: ‘having destroyed the Taliban, having destroyed Saddam’s regime, the message to others is, “You’re next”. Two words. Very efficient diplomacy’ (10). ‘Rogue states’ thinking – evident in the description of Iraq, Iran and North Korea as the ‘axis of evil’ in the 2002 State of the Union address – has a long history, certainly extending back to the human rights policies of the Carter administration. In post-Cold War conditions, the doctrine was developed in the Clinton administration to indicate a determination to isolate and marginalise countries – typically the international ‘bad boys’ like Iran, Cuba and North Korea – which stood stubbornly apart from the 1990s move towards international marketised democracy. The ‘rogue states’ doctrine had, by the later 1990s, fallen into a degree of disrepair. Commentators argued that, by apparently ruling out constructive engagement with the ‘bad boys’, it unduly constrained policy options. The lumping together of conservative theocracies with communist holdovers made little objective sense, and might actually encourage opportunistic calculation – even a degree of collusion – among those ‘rogues’ who wished to harm and embarrass the US (11). During the later Clinton years, the term ‘rogue’ or ‘backlash’ state was dropped in favour of the phrase, ‘states of concern’. With 9/11 and the ‘axis of evil’ and other collective verbal depictions of the ‘bad boys’, the concept of ‘rogues’ made a strong comeback, even if some degree of operating flexibility was retained in the cases of Libya and North Korea (12).
Bureaucratic politics affects all administrations, though some – notably that of the elder Bush – manage to escape its worst effects. The State Department is a natural, one might almost say ontological, antagonist of the Department of Defence, just as the National Security Council staff tends ‘naturally’ to vie with Foggy Bottom. It is important to avoid stereotypes. During the George W. Bush years, for example, State has contained many ‘hawks’. As Richard Holbrooke indicated in his Balkans memoir, the Pentagon, at least in the 1990s, was somewhat less martial in inclination than the State Department itself (13). However, the impact of bureaucratic politics – a mixture of competing ideology, personality and place – on the public diplomacy of the younger Bush can scarcely be denied. The Powell/Rumsfeld antagonism, for example, was a staple of journalistic understanding of the administration’s internal dynamic well before 9/11 (14). What seems to distinguish this administration from others is the centrality of the State Department/Pentagon (rather than State/NSC) rivalry, and also the extraordinary, unprecedented role played by the Vice Presidential office. As the sum of public statement on foreign policy, US public diplomacy can hardly fail to reflect the complex bureaucratic tensions. The observer of these matters can never be sure that there is no integrative master plan behind apparent inconsistencies. Conflicting signals, after all, can be issued with the deliberate intention of unnerving and wrong-footing allies. Vice President Cheney’s statements on Iran may indeed be the 21st century equivalent of the Nixon ‘mad bomber’ strategy in Vietnam. Common sense and the lessons of history would, however, seem to suggest that inconsistencies actually are what they appear to be. The associated discomfort may be illustrated in the efforts of Secretary of State Colin Powell in September 2004 (following the Iranian agreement to suspend its nuclear programme) to distance himself from John Bolton’s public espousal of isolation of Iran, and possibly even regime change. ‘We have no intention of regime change’, declared Powell. ‘That is our policy: no regime change. It is up to the Iranian people to decide what they are going to do with respect to their future and how they are going to be led’ (15).

By the end of the first Bush term, it was widely acknowledged (at least by virtually everyone outside the Pentagon and the Vice Presidential office) that US public diplomacy, defined in terms of ‘selling’ the policy to world opinion, was in desperate need of improvement. Richard Holbrooke commented that Al Qaeda’s public diplomacy seemed slicker than America’s: ‘How can a man in a cave out-communicate the world’s leading communication society?’ (16). The second Bush term began with a clear determination not only to improve public diplomacy, but also to exhibit a determination to exhaust multilateral options before moving to unilateral ones.
The new Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Karen Hughes, defended effective public diplomacy as ‘waging peace’, while Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice developed the notion of ‘transformational’ co-operative diplomacy. Regarding Iran, the administration backed the EU-3 (Britain, France and Germany). Here is Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns, speaking in March 2006: ‘We seek to work within a broad coalition of countries to deny Iran a nuclear weapons capability; to stop its sponsorship of terrorism in the region and around the world; to coalesce with Arab governments, our European allies and friends from across the world to blunt Tehran’s regional ambitions; and finally to extend support to the Iranian people, especially the millions of young Iranians who suffer due to the regime’s repression and economic misrule and crave opportunities to connect with the wider world’ (17).

Let us turn briefly to the recent history of US policy towards Iran, before looking a little more closely at US public diplomacy in this area over the past year or so. The policy of the early 1990s was essentially one of isolation and marginalisation of Iran, in line with ‘rogue state’ ideas and the ‘dual’ containment (Iraq and Iran) strategy for the Middle East. The election of Khatemi in 1997 provoked a rethink and significant move towards engagement. Various speeches by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright between 1998 and 2000 acknowledged past US mistakes in Iran and put forward the idea of a confidence-building ‘road map’ towards normalisation of relations. Albright’s view was that progress was being made, but that full normalisation was impossible in light of the nuclear programme and Iranian involvement in international terror (notably the Khobar Towers Saudi Arabian bombing of June 1996) (18). In March 2000, Albright announced the lifting of import restrictions on a range of Iranian products.

The initial Bush stance on Iran tended to lean towards isolation, via sanctions and diplomatic activity, rather than engagement. Offers of talks with Tehran were declined in 2002 and 2003 following the discovery of Iranian evasion of International Atomic Energy Agency requirements. Tenuous links were also broken off after the May 2003 Riyadh bombing. The short-lived Paris Agreement of 2004 led to some thawing of relations, though the 2005 election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad represented a defeat for proponents of engagement both in Tehran and Washington. The night before the election, George W. Bush predicted that the ‘tide of freedom’ sweeping the region would ‘come eventually to Iran’. By 2005-6, a host of specialist advisers and academics were promoting the cause of engagement. Ray Takeyh, for example, in *Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic* argued that US policy had long been hindered...
by a tendency to see Iran as a theocratic monolith. ‘Regime change’ doctrines and threats of military action were increasingly empty after the failures in Iraq, and also exposed and weakened the cause of reform within Iran. Clearly Iran had been emboldened by the America’s Iraqi problems and by the possibility of pro-Iranian regimes in both Baghdad and Kabul (19). However, positive engagement between Washington and Tehran might be a product of a degree of coalescence between US and Iranian strategic interests (20). Clinton era veterans, along with Henry Kissinger, weighed in behind the option of direct talks over nuclear issues. Apparently following this kind of logic, Secretary Rice in May 2006 offered to open talks with Tehran if it agreed to suspend its nuclear-enrichment activity. She compared the offer to US involvement in multi-party talks on the North Korean nuclear programme. The offer also envisaged an end to ‘isolation’, with the possibility of aid for non-weaponised nuclear development and an opening for Iranian membership of the World Trade Organisation.

Dealing more closely with recent US public diplomacy towards Iran, it is possible to discern clear ‘engagement’, ‘isolation’ and ‘confrontation’ tracks. Regarding engagement, there was the May 2006 offer, along with various speeches – notably the president’s Merchant Marine Academy address of 19 June 2006 – which offered positive comments on Iran as a ‘great nation’. Generally, the sine qua non has been the halting of the enrichment programme. Reviewing Iran’s relationship with the IAEA in April 2006, only a month before Rice’s offer, Robert Joseph (Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security) declared: ‘Iran has clearly demonstrated that it is not willing to cooperate and that it is determined, despite calls for compromise and negotiation, determined to move forward in complete defiance of the international community’ (21). Only a fortnight before Rice’s offer, the US permanent representative to the IAEA in Geneva denounced ‘18 years of deceit’, the ‘unexplained links to A Q Khan’ and the ‘unexplained ties to Iran’s military and its missile programme’ (22). The failure of the offer led directly to the sanctions votes in the UN Security Council in early 2007. Rice noted in September 2006: ‘If they’re not prepared to negotiate, then you have to use sanctions’ (23). Nicholas Burns in March 2007 looked to ‘multiple points of pressure’, arguing that an ‘active and focused diplomatic strategy’ would win the day (24). As well as the UN sanctions of 2007, the US was also still implementing various Congressionally mandated sanctions, some dating from the Carter era, but the most significant being those contained in the Iran Libya Sanctions Act, due for reauthorisation (with Libya excluded) in 2006. Administration spokesman in 2006, following the second administration reorientation of policy towards allies, were anxious that the reauthorisation should not include any legislated penalties on countries
which did not follow the sanctions path. (The Helms-Burton legislation on Cuba in the Clinton period had controversially included ‘extraterritorial’ penalties for countries breaking that trade embargo).

It is clear from all administration statements in 2006 that an Iran with nuclear weapons was simply unacceptable to Washington. According to Robert Joseph: ‘A nuclear-armed Iran is something we simply cannot tolerate.’ It ‘would represent, I think, a direct threat not only to us and not only to the countries in the region, but to the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime’ (25). John Bolton (then US representative to the UN) told the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee in March 2006: ‘Forgive my moment of facetiousness when dealing with a matter literally of life and death, but if the pursuit of nuclear weapons by a state with a leader who calls for another to be “wiped off the map” is not considered a threat to international peace and security, I daresay one must ask - what is?’ (26). Though it is foolish for any side to concede negotiating positions in advance, there seems to be no suggestion in the Bush administration’s public diplomacy of any willingness to tolerate an Iran under the current regime with nuclear weapons. Nuclear development invariably comes first in any list of Iranian misbehaviour, swiftly followed by sponsorship of terror (notably Hizbollah in Lebanon), support for radical militias in Iraq and repression at home (27).

Washington’s current determination not to tolerate a nuclear Iran raises some obvious thoughts. For one thing, of course, even given the most robust of calculations about the speed and status of Iran’s programme, the current Republican administration will not have directly to deal with the problem. Nevertheless, if diplomacy, ‘multiple pressure points’ and isolation all fail, what will America do? This thought leads us once more back to regime change. Though usually conceived in terms of military action, regime change, as indicated above, can be rather less dramatic. Initially there was a hope for a spillover from Iraqi democratisation As late as September 2006, Secretary Rice was still arguing in these terms: ‘ in the long run, the best thing that we have going for us is that when Iraq is stable and when Iraq is capable of giving a different kind of model in the Middle East, that’s one that’s not theocratic, one that is able to bring all people, Shia and Sunnis and Kurds together, that’s going to be a direct threat to the Iranians because it says that it is Iraq’s model, not Iran’s model that is the future for the Middle East’ (28). The current implausibility of the ‘Iraq model’ - and also the post-2003 implausibility of any ground attack on Iran - seems to have inclined the administration to lean to a doctrine of ‘soft’ regime change. Public diplomacy towards Iran, at least in the technical sense of ‘selling’ and ‘outreach’
to ordinary citizens, now consists of the kind of ‘Voice of America’ activity that once characterised US policy towards Eastern Europe. Nicholas Burns looked forward in March 2007 to direct funding by the US of a ‘variety of civil programs’. In 2006, the administration received some $66 million dollars in supplemental funding for domestic ‘outreach’ in Iran. ($75 million had been requested, though it seems likely that the 66 million figure has been augmented through reprogramming). Voice of America now has a Farsi service, while the US funds Radio Farda. Rice has put particular emphasis on encouraging the development of Western music in Iran, while various exchanges (including the official visit of an American wrestling team) have been facilitated. According to Burns, for fiscal year 2008, Bush requested $75 million in economic support funds for civil society and human rights projects in Iran (29).

For Burns, ‘dialogue’ and the encouragement of Iranian civil society is primarily designed to ‘stimulate a change in the behaviour of the Iranian Government’ (30). However, in light of many comments from leading administration foreign policy players, it may also be seen as aimed at a kind of ‘soft’ regime change. What of ‘hard’ regime change? Bush and many others have noted that all options are on the table. Vice President Cheney told Fox News in January 2007 that he feared ‘a nuclear-armed Iran, astride the world’s supply of oil, able to affect adversely the global economy, prepared to use terrorist organizations and/or their nuclear weapons to threaten their neighbors and others around the world’. His implication was that Washington must do what is necessary to prevent such a nightmare (31). In June 2007, administration press spokesman Sean McCormack spoke of US pressure operating on two tracks – ‘the Security Council track’ and ‘then also working bilaterally with states on how we might pressure Iran outside of the Security Council’. Also: ‘There are existing options in the absence of doing nothing that are out there. Nobody wants to see those come about’ (32). Around the same time, Mohamed ElBareidi (IAEA head) warned of ‘new crazies’ in Cheney’s office ‘who say let’s go and bomb Iran’ (33). The deployment of two US aircraft carriers to the Persian Gulf in May also raised tensions and widespread discussion of American support for an Israeli bombing assault. The case for bombing was set out recently in the pages of Commentary by Norman Podhoretz. The ‘plain and brutal truth’, according to Podhoretz, ‘is that if Iran is to be prevented from developing a nuclear arsenal, there is no alternative to the actual use of military force – any more than there was an alternative to force if Hitler was to be stopped in 1938’ (34). Two articles in The New Yorker by Seymour Hersh reported a ‘redirection’ or ‘strategic shift’, coordinated from Cheney’s office, bringing the US into increasingly open confrontation with Iran. According to Hersh: ‘a special planning group has ben established in the offices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, charged with
creating a contingency bombing plan for Iran that can be implemented, upon orders from thePresident, within twenty-four hours’. The ‘redirection’ is traced by Hersh not simply to Cheney, but also to the Saudis. Hersh notes some shifts even in US public diplomacy, with Rice, for example, portraying ‘Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah’ on ‘the other side of the divide’ between ‘reformers’ (generally the Sunni states) and ‘extremists’ (35).

Let me proceed with a few observations on the picture painted by Hersh, followed by some concluding comments on US public diplomacy towards Iran. The Bush administration is deep into its second term blues. Presidential second terms are usually fairly miserable times, as the political clock winds down (36). Bush’s, despite the 2004 post-election talk of spending vast amounts of political capital, has been more miserable than most. A weakened administration, even one faced – against all the predictions of 2004 – by a Democratic Congress can take controversial military action. To some extent a presidency in the period following the second term mid-term elections is free of the threat of democratic retribution. Yet controversial military action in Iran would be unlikely to help any Republican candidate in 2008. If Bush’s public popularity is low, Cheney’s is almost non-existent. Pew Research Center data still indicate widespread public support for the Baker-Hamilton strategy of talking to Syria and Iran. Public support for a bombing campaign could conceivably be manufactured but sustained approval could certainly not be guaranteed (37). The mood of the Congressional leadership is clear, especially after the Pelosi-Lantos trip to Syria. (Lantos has co-sponsored legislation to establish a peaceful ‘nuclear fuel bank’, to which Iran would have access). The issue of Iran has not yet deeply affected the 2008 campaign. Most candidates, Democrat and Republican, accept the case for not ruling out any option in advance. The memory of President Lyndon Johnson ruling out the nuclear option in Vietnam is still quite potent. Barack Obama gave an interview on Iran to The New Yorker in January 2007, in which he described Tehran as being ‘driven more by ideology and fantasy’ than by rational calculation. He noted also that Iranians were still ‘justifiably still angry’ at America’s role in the 1953 coup (38). Hillary Clinton has cast doubt on the credibility of a military option: ‘We have all learned lessons from the conflict in Iraq, and we have to apply those lessons to any allegations that are raised about Iran’ (39). Clinton has also undertaken not to allow the establishment of permanent US bases in Iraq. On the Republican side, John McCain has declared that the only thing worse than bombing Iran would be to let Iran get the bomb (40). Rudy Giuliani in the June 5 Republican candidates debate made it clear that ‘not taking options off the table’ included keeping open the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons against Iran.
Lastly, a few comments about US public diplomacy towards Iran. Clearly there are inconsistencies, reflecting the various bureaucratic and ideological divisions discussed earlier. One or two specific points may be made. Administration statements still reflect ‘rogue state’ thinking, with its inherent problem of constricting American freedom of action and also encouraging unlikely and uncoordinated collusion. In 2006, Nicholas Burns listed Cuba, Syria and Venezuela as countries that ‘want to see Iran succeed’ in its nuclear weapons effort (41). An important effect of inconsistency is also the problem identified by Joe Biden (chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) in 2007: ‘is the Administration’s goal in Iran regime change or behaviour change? No one likes this regime, but let’s keep our eye on the first prize: preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons. How can we tell Iran not to go nuclear, but then in the next breath tell the regime our goal is to take it down?’ He added: ‘is the pressure we are applying aimed at improving our position and weakening Iran’s in any future negotiations or is it designed to prepare the battlefield for war?’ (42). There is also the question of ‘linkage’: the precise connection between the various demands being made on Tehran, from human rights improvements, to nuclear issues to matters concerning the treatment of Al Qaeda suspects in Iran, to Iranian behaviour in Iraq. The Bush public diplomacy – and in the absence of direct talks between Washington and Tehran, there is precious little other diplomacy – does indicate that nuclear issues are America’s paramount concern, but is less than reassuring about the clarity of gradations and connections between the demands being made on Tehran. There is also the question – like ‘linkage’ this will remind us once again of the Nixon era – of external and internal regime behaviour. Condemnation of human rights abuses within Iran inevitably draw the riposte that America’s own human rights record in the War on Terror has been far from beyond reproach. How exactly do the human rights abuses within Iran compare with the situation in pre-invasion Iraq, or in the Balkans in the 1990s? US public diplomacy has moved in the direction of accepting that Iran is a complex society, rather than a narrowly directed monolith. Further progress, however, may have to await changes of leadership personnel in both Washington and Tehran. Let me end, nevertheless, on a note of hope, albeit a slightly parochial one. Hard-liners can come to terms with each other – witness current developments in Northern Ireland.

Endnotes


17. ‘United States Policy Toward Iran’, Opening statement before the House International Relations Committee, 8 March 2006 ([www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2006/62779.htm](http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2006/62779.htm))


22. David I. Sheeby, ‘Iran can Choose Confrontation or Cooperation’, Documents and Texts from the Washington File, 10 May 2006 ([http://london.usembasy.gov/iran73.html](http://london.usembassy.gov/iran73.html)).


24. Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 29 March 2007 (available on the Committee website).

25. As note 21.

27. See for example, Burns’ remarks at notes 17 and 24.

28. As note 23.

29. As note 24.

30. ibid..


33. BBC radio interview (‘Today’), 1 June 2007.


35. As note 31. Also Seymour Hersh, ‘The Iran Plans’, *The New Yorker*, 17 April 2006.


37. Information available on Pew Research Center website.


39. As note 31.


40. As note 17.

41. ‘If there is anything worse than a poorly-planned intentional war, it is an unplanned, unintentional war’, Joseph R. Biden, 29 March 2007 (available on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee website).