James, S. P. (2007) 'Merleau-Ponty, metaphysical realism and the natural world.', International journal of philosophical studies., 15 (4). pp. 501-519.
Environmental thinkers often suppose that the natural world (or some parts of it, at least) exists in its own right, independent of human concerns. The arguments developed in this paper suggest that it is possible to do justice to this thought without endorsing some form of metaphysical realism. Thus the early sections look to Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception to develop an anti-realist account of the independent reality of the natural world, one, it is argued, that has certain advantages over the accounts proffered by 'environmental realists'. The concluding sections draw upon certain of Merleau-Ponty's later works to defend a rather bolder claim: that the conceptions of realism endorsed by environmental thinkers are not just ill equipped but, in fact, unable to acknowledge what may be provisionally referred to as the more-than-human dimension of reality.
|Keywords:||Merleau-Ponty, Environmental philosophy, Metaphysical realism, Environmental realism, Flesh ontology.|
|Full text:||Full text not available from this repository.|
|Publisher Web site:||http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672550701654917|
|Record Created:||10 Sep 2007|
|Last Modified:||26 Nov 2009 15:27|
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