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Geographies of Space and Power

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INTRODUCTION

Politics is about power. By extension, political geography is about the relationships between power and space and place. Yet until recently, surprisingly few political geographers paid much attention to what power means, or how it should be understood. Indeed, some even questioned whether political geographers should be concerned with the nature of power at all. In a commentary for political scientists written before the Second World War, Richard Hartshorne defined the proper scope of political geography. ‘Is the political geographer’, he wondered, ‘concerned with the ability of a certain political territory to provide the requirements for political power, in peace or war?’ He concluded that ‘the geographer’s emphasis is always on the area itself, with power, actual or potential, as one of its characteristics, and not on the question of power itself’ (Hartshorne, 1935: 952, emphasis added). This strange attempt to exclude from the scope of political geography one of the core concepts of political analysis contributed to the isolation of political geography not only from the study of power, but also from the study of politics more generally.

Until recently, if political geographers have discussed power, they have for the most part treated it as transparent or self-evident – something that might be explained but that did not need to be defined or theorized. Peter Taylor (2003) has pointed out that for much of the twentieth century, mainstream political geography was weakly developed, because of a lack of attention to questions of power. In 1964, for example, the editor of a collection of readings surveying the field of political geography had to turn for his chapter on ‘Approaches to the Study of Political Power’ to the work of Franz Neumann, a political theorist (and member of the Frankfurt School of critical social theory), instead of including a discussion of the subject by a geographer (Jackson, 1964; Neumann, 1950). Saul Cohen remarked that ‘much of what is termed “political geography” lacks political substance. It is, in fact, cultural geography organized according to political units’ (1963: v). However, the founders of political geography did not shy away from questions of power, and it is to their writings that we turn first.

ASSERTING POWER: EARLY POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

Ideas about power were at the heart of the early development of political geography by Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904), Halford Mackinder (1861–1947), and Isaiah Bowman (1878–1950), often regarded as the ‘founding fathers’ of German, British, and American political geography, respectively, (Taylor, 1993: 50). In different ways, all three understood political power to be closely related to the occupation and control of territory and geographic space. Ratzel’s Politische Geographie (Ratzel, 1897) was effectively an extended treatise on what he understood to be the intimate ties between people, earth and state. According to Ratzel the state should be seen as an organism whose potential life and growth is closely related to the qualities of the earth it occupies. Ratzel’s ideas formed the basis for the development of German geopolitics (Geopolitik) under the direction of Karl Haushofer between the First and Second World Wars. Although Haushofer’s political links to the Hitler government during the Third Reich are the subject of debate (Bassin, 1987; Heske, 1987),
he put forward a highly nationalistic vision of the relations between geography and international politics that helped to legitimate the Nazi regime.

Whatever their formal political affiliations, the promoters of the nationalistic perspectives associated with Geopolitik adopted an uncompromisingly 'realist' approach to the study of international relations. As a theory of international relations, realism holds that individual states represent the highest level of political authority and that therefore international politics is made up only of interactions between sovereign states that are the principal agents in international relations. States are assumed to act rationally to further their own interests (and particularly their security) in a world in which other states' true intentions can never be known, but may be hostile. In the realist view of the world, the ability of a state to promote its own interests depends on its power relative to other states, which is related in turn to the resources under its control.

Realism also characterized Halford Mackinder's political geography. Mackinder (1904) argued that control over territory was a crucial determinant of political power. With the growth of more efficient land-based transport, he suggested, continental states (and particularly those occupying the Eurasian heartland of human history) would catch up with and surpass maritime powers, such as Britain. Some have taken his arguments as predicting the rise in power of the Soviet Union, others have suggested that his emphasis on the strategic importance of rail travel has turned out to be misplaced. What is important for the present argument is that, like Ratzel, Mackinder stressed the close relationship between the occupation of territory and political strength. He was also concerned with the relationship between power and the spatial organization of the world – its division into what he called the 'pivot area' of continental Eurasia, the 'inner crescent' around its fringes and the 'outer crescent' consisting of the Americas and the lands of the southern hemisphere. This way of thinking about the global spatial arrangement of political power, with its immanent possibility of confrontation between 'sea-powers' and 'land-powers', was later taken up and adapted by Nicholas Spykman in his discussion of 'heartland and rimland' (Spykman, 1944).

In a later work, written just after the end of the First World War, Mackinder predicted (correctly as it turned out) the re-emergence of international tensions that were to lead in due course to the Second (Mackinder, 1942: 1). He went on:

The great wars of history – we have had a world war about every hundred years for the last four centuries – are the outcome, direct or indirect, of the unequal growth of nations, and that unequal growth is not wholly due to the greater genius and energy of some nations as compared with others; in large measure it is the result of the uneven distribution of fertility and strategical opportunity upon the face of the globe. (Mackinder, 1942: 2)

Mackinder called his book Democratic Ideals and Reality and it was intended as a warning to those idealists who sought to prevent further wars through the establishment of a democratic international order embodied in a League of Nations. For Mackinder, idealism had to be tempered with realism since geographical realities ('uneven distribution') would inevitably threaten democratic ideals unless deliberate steps were taken to counter them. Indeed, many 'realist' political leaders were strongly committed in practice to the promotion of their particular national interests, by force if necessary. As Noam Chomsky points out, for example, the idealism of US President Woodrow Wilson, a champion of the League of Nations after the end of the First World War, went hand-in-glove with a hard-nosed and frequently undemocratic and violent promotion of American interests overseas (Chomsky, 2003: 46–8).

Mackinder's arguments anticipated the principal division in twentieth-century international relations theory between realism and idealism. Idealism acknowledges the possibility of an international order based on universal principles and the rule of law, whereas the realist view of the world is characterized by inter-state anarchy. Idealism provided a guiding framework for the work of Isaiah Bowman, the third of political geography's 'founding fathers'. Bowman was a strong supporter of the League of Nations, formed after the First World War, and espoused international cooperation. He argued that armed conflict is neither inevitable nor a desirable mechanism for settling disputes, given that the application of science to warfare had 'made it possible to conduct war to the point of self-destruction' (Bowman, 1928: 4–5). Although his idealism sounded high-minded, Bowman was hardly disinterested. Rather, he was an active proponent of American influence overseas. For example, writing about the Philippines he averred that:

There can be little question that the Philippines should not be left to themselves either to frame a foreign policy independent of American interests and possibly inimical to them, or to become the prey of an unscrupulous power. [... The duty of the United States is clear. It was through us that the Islands were freed from Spanish influence; it is to us that the thought of the world turns for a safe and fair solution of the Philippine problem, no matter if we be charged with the crimes of
imperialism and selfish business purpose. (Bowman, 1928: 722–3)

The affinities with early twenty-first-century American foreign policy in Iraq are clear: American power is still exercised (unsurprisingly) in pursuit of American interests, but is dressed up as benevolent paternalism. Bowman’s understanding of the relation between space and power, then, saw the development of national territories as inextricably interlinked. The need to project American power over great distances conjured a global vision of world politics, but one in which national exceptionalism retained its force (see also Smith, 2003).

Power and its relationship with territory was central to the early development of political geography as a distinctive sub-discipline, focused as it was on questions of rivalry between states. Peter Taylor has called this the ‘power-political heritage of geopolitics’ (Taylor, 1993: 52–64). However, while control of territory was taken to be an important source of power, the nature of power remained unexamined and largely taken for granted. Power was typically understood by these early political geographers to mean the ability of one state to influence, or to impose its will upon, another, but even this simple definition was rarely made explicit.

**LEGITIMATING POWER: POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY IN THE MID-TwentIETH CENTURY**

In the 1940s, many Anglophone political geographers were shocked by what they saw as the alliance between German Geopolitik and National Socialism and the corruption of geographical science for ultra-nationalist political purposes. So political geography retreated from an explicit engagement with questions of state power vis-à-vis other states, largely abandoning the field to the neighbouring discipline of international relations. Partly as a result, political geography fell into the doldrums in the 1950s and 1960s (Taylor, 1994: 448–9), producing limited amounts of research of even more limited interest. The state remained the primary focus of political-geographic study, but the main concern became the functional integration of the territories of individual states (Hartshorne, 1950). Hartshorne argued that ‘the fundamental purpose of any state […] is to bring all the varied territorial parts, the diverse regions of the state-area, into a single organized unit’ (1950: 104) and the objective of political geography was to analyse the barriers to this integration and how they may be overcome. Hartshorne eschewed any explicit discussion of the nature of political power or its relationship with space and territory. Nevertheless, he implies that state power is not only at the heart of his analysis, but is effectively endorsed as legitimate and necessary. State power is the mechanism through which territory is brought under unified political control:

In all cases, [the state] attempts to establish complete and exclusive control over internal political relations – in simplest terms, the creation and maintenance of law and order. Local political institutions must conform with the concepts and institutions of the central, overall, political organization. […] Most importantly, because we live in a world in which the continued existence of every state-unit is subject to the threat of destruction by other states, every state must strive to secure the supreme loyalty of the people in all its regions, in competition with any local or provincial loyalties, and in definite opposition to any outside state-unit. (Hartshorne, 1950: 104–5, emphasis added)

This kind of legitimation of potentially quite unjust and anti-democratic actions on the part of state authorities justifies Peter Taylor’s suggestion that mainstream political geography was a deeply conservative discourse (Taylor, 2003: 48). Be that as it may, Hartshorne’s account implied that power is related to the state’s ability to extend its authority across all of its territory, and this is one of the main ways in which the relationship between power and space has been understood in social theory (Allen, 2003).

One exception to the general neglect of the issue of the nature of power in the writings of mid-twentieth-century political geographers is found in the work of Stephen B. Jones, Professor of Geography at Yale University. Writing in 1954, Jones was unusual in setting out an explicit, if brief, definition of power:

Power is here defined as ‘that which permits participation in the making of decisions’ […] This is perhaps not truly a definition; it tells not what power is, but what makes it possible. It has the virtues of including constructive uses and of saying that power is not solely material or possessed only by those who have a lot of it. Power, like radiant energy, can move in many directions at once. (Jones, 1954: 422)

Jones links together two different understandings of power: power as a stock of resources and power as an aspect of political practice (or, as Jones puts it, ‘national strategy’):

An estimate of national power has two aspects which are related, in a figurative way, like the two rays of a triangulation […] One ray or beam is the conventional inventory of the elements of factor
of power. It gives the power resources of a nation, using 'resource' in a broad sense. The other ray is here called 'national strategy' (Jones, 1954: 421).

For John Allen (2003), the idea that power can flow is another of the principal ways that social theorists have linked power and space.

The concept of 'national power' can be traced to the work of the leading realist international relations scholar Hans Morgenthau. In his classic work Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau argued that a variety of elements contribute to the power of one nation relative to others, including 'geography', natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, the quality of a nation's diplomacy, and quality of government (Morgenthau, 1949: 80–108). Jones adopted Morgenthau's approach, proposing the idea of a 'power inventory' (1954: 424), an enumeration of the resources of a state. The notion that a state's power is strongly influenced by, or is even the same thing as, its stock of resources, has been the most common understanding of power in most political-geographic writing, reflecting both the realist underpinnings of mainstream political geography as well as its lack of theoretical sophistication.

In Geography and Politics in a World Divided, Saul Cohen (1963) identifies 'the power analysis approach' as only one of four possible approaches to the study of political geography. As Cohen acknowledges, the term 'power analysis' in this context comes from Hartshorne (1954), although Hartshorne did not elaborate its methods in any detail. Like Jones, power analysis for Cohen entails the construction of a comparative 'power inventory' for different states or other political areas. He suggests that the inventory should include:

1. The physical environment (landforms, climate, soils, vegetation, waterbodies, etc.);
2. Movement (the directional flow of the transportation and communication of goods, men, [sic] and ideas);
3. Raw materials, semi-finished and finished goods (employed and potential, in both time and space terms);
4. Population (in its various characteristics, particularly qualitative and ideological);
5. The body politic (its various administrative forms, ideals, and goals in their areal expression, such as county, state, national, and international bloc frameworks.) (Cohen, 1963: 8)

In addition, Cohen suggests that 'space' should be a sixth distinctive category: 'in this sense the location, shape, and boundaries of political entities are analyzed, as well as the impact of space upon the internal character and external relations of such political entities' (1963: 9). Although Cohen is careful to note the limitations of the approach, he suggests that data from these various categories can be tabulated and converted into an index that would provide insights into power differences between states or other political entities. A similar method is advocated in Harm de Blij's US college text Systematic Political Geography (de Blij, 1973: 55–79), and Richard Muir's Modern Political Geography (Muir, 1981).

To those familiar with recent geographical writings informed by social and political theory and continental philosophy, these inventory-based approaches are painfully unsophisticated. However, their basic assumptions were not very different from those underlying many more recent discussions of space and power, even if those assumptions were not made explicit. At least five of these assumptions are worth highlighting. First, power can be quantified so that the different levels of power of different states can be enumerated in a table and compared. Second, power can be possessed and held in reserve awaiting deployment. Thus 'potential raw materials', such as mineral reserves, add to the power of the state, even though they may never be exploited. Third, power is equated with resources (physical, material, human and organizational). Fourth, different resources can be related to each other as equivalents (by converting them to a common index scale), suggesting that there is a general 'essence' of power. Fifth, space affects power in various ways, so that the spatial characteristics of a state can increase or reduce its political power.

The concern with quantification evident in Cohen's version of political geography was shared by wider changes in geography in the 1950s and 1960s. The reframing of geography as 'spatial science' or 'spatial analysis' was not uncontested, but, for a period at least, quantitative methods, formal spatial models and a broadly positivist epistemology became dominant in Anglo-American geography. For political geography these developments had two main consequences. First, the locational models associated with spatial science were underpinned by the theories of neo-classical economics. Grounded in methodological individualism and the assumption that market competition leads to equilibrium conditions and Pareto optimality, the neo-classical approach leaves little room for considerations of political power. Actions of governments and other political actors are reduced to 'distortions' or, in more sophisticated accounts, efforts to correct for market failure. Moreover, one of the paradoxes of spatial analysis was its attenuated understanding of space. As Kevin Cox has argued, notions of territory and place, which are intimately linked to power, had no place
in the conceptual framework of spatial analysis (Cox, 1995).

Second, the new orthodoxy’s emphasis on quantitative methods produced a narrow vision of political geography which limited it to the study of quantifiable political phenomena such as election results. While the methodology of electoral geography has undoubtedly gained much from the development of statistical techniques, the difficulty of applying quantitative approaches to other kinds of political processes resulted in the sidelong of political geography throughout the 1960s.

From its nineteenth-century beginnings, then, political geography was concerned with power, but for much of the twentieth century little attention was paid to the nature of that power. Power appeared as a largely unexamined concept in most political-geographic writing. Insofar as it was theorized at all, it was typically equated with state power understood loosely as national strength. During the heyday of spatial analysis, questions of power were neglected or taken for granted. Since the 1970s, though, there has been a transformation in the theories and practices of political geography – and questions of power and its relationship with space have been at their heart.

**QUESTIONING POWER: CRITICAL POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY**

As the dominance of spatial-analytic and quantitative geography was challenged by a variety of anti-positivist alternatives, the 1980s and 1990s saw a major revival of political geography. Research expanded, new textbooks appeared, new courses were developed, and a specialist journal, *Political Geography Quarterly* (now simply *Political Geography*), was launched. Political geographers started to engage with social and political theory and developed a diverse and still growing range of perspectives and approaches to the subject. These developments paralleled similar changes in other areas of human geography, but the parlous state of political geography in the preceding decades meant that its resurgence was more striking. A central feature of this resurgence has been the adoption of a variety of critical approaches drawn from Marxism and post-Marxism, world-systems theory, feminism, post-structuralism, post-colonialism, and political ecology. Each of these has brought into political geography a particular view of power and, in some cases, a distinctive approach to thinking about the relationship between power and space. Yet when it comes to grasping the underlying nature of power there are some striking similarities with earlier ideas: that power can be possessed, for example, or that it derives from resources, or that it can flow across space.

**The world-systems approach**

One of the most influential works of this period was Peter Taylor’s *Political Geography: World-Economy, Nation-State and Locality*, first published in 1985 and now in its fifth edition (Taylor, 1985; Flint and Taylor, 2006). Taylor’s book was one of the first by a political geographer to consider the nature of power in any detail, with a substantial section of the opening chapter devoted to a discussion of ‘power and politics in the world-economy’ (Taylor, 1993: 23–48). Taylor argues that politics is often equated with activities surrounding states, but that these do not constitute the sum of political activities (1993: 24). He continues: ‘If we equate politics with [the] use of power then we soon appreciate that political processes do not begin and end with states; all social institutions have their politics’ (Taylor, 1993: 24).

Taylor then proposes a simple model of power involving two protagonists (‘A and B’) in a conflict, whose power ranking can be inferred from the conflict’s outcome. (A similar model is used by Ronan Paddison (1983: 3).) ‘When we inquire why A was able to defeat B’, suggests Taylor, ‘we would expect to find that in some sense A possessed more resources than B’ (1993: 25). Here power is seen as a product of the possession of resources. However, because politics cannot usually be reduced to a series of simple one-on-one conflicts, Taylor then proposes a development of the model in which the protagonists seek to widen the scope of the dispute in order to change the balance of power. He suggests that this might involve an appeal to an external authority. Although Taylor does not discuss the distinction, as we shall see later this mention of authority invokes a somewhat different meaning of power than the notions of coercion and domination underlying his initial A versus B model.

Taylor then goes on to explain that there is evidence to suggest that the hierarchy of power is not an adequate predictor of the outcome of political conflicts and that ‘the nature of power is much subtler than we have so far supposed’ (1993: 33). Part of the problem is that ‘“power” is one of those concepts which cannot be directly measured’ (1993: 33) and attempts to find proxy measures along the lines of the power inventory or index are unsatisfactory. What ‘we need’, says Taylor, is ‘a completely fresh approach to studying state power’ (1993: 34). He goes on:

This can be achieved through the world-systems approach by employing the concepts of overt and covert power relations. Whereas the former is what we normally understand by power as reflected in conflict, we shall argue that covert power, the ability to forward particular interests without resort
to coercion or threat, is much more pervasive and important (Taylor, 1993: 34).

Overt power may be 'actual' or 'latent', says Taylor. Actual overt power involves the use of force or coercion to decide the outcome of a conflict, the most obvious example being warfare. Latent overt power involves the threat of force. Taylor illustrates the point with reference to research identifying '215 incidents between 1945 and 1976, when armed forces were used politically to further US interests but without appreciable violence' (1993: 35).

There are also two types of covert power, 'non-decision-making' and 'structural position' (Taylor, 1993: 36–8). Non-decision-making refers to the idea that some issues and conflicts never become the object of a formal political decision, so that the status quo is preserved despite the existence of interests that might challenge it. Some political actors are able to exert more influence than others over the political agenda and thereby ensure that conflicts that might challenge them are avoided entirely. Although non-decision-making can be important in particular circumstances, Taylor argues that 'the most important form of power relation is structural' (1993: 37). In this case, certain political actors have more power because of their structural position in the world-system. Because the world-economy is structured unfairly in ways that result in the economic exploitation of peripheral and semi-peripheral countries by core countries, countries in the core do not have to engage in the overt use of force, or even the manipulative agenda-setting involved in 'non-decision-making', in order to see their interests prevail. According to world-systems theorists like Taylor, the system is already structured in such a way as to favour the interests of some countries over others. Core countries are therefore said to enjoy power over others as a result of their structural position.

For Taylor, the three-tier spatial structure of the world-economy described by world-systems theory helps to explain why some states adopt liberal political regimes and others are more authoritarian. States in the core benefit substantially from covert power. 'Generally speaking', says Taylor, 'there is a tendency for core states to be relatively liberal in their characteristics since their power is based primarily on their economic prowess' (1993: 38). In other words, core states can afford to allow their citizens civil and political rights. Semi-peripheral states, by contrast, tend to be authoritarian 'strong states' because, while they are economically dynamic, they have to use state power in attempts to 'restructure the [world-]system in their favour', although this strategy is usually unsuccessful (1993: 38). Finally, peripheral states have been subject to colonialism throughout most of their history and remain highly economically dependent. Despite substantial shows of state power (and especially its military trappings) and frequent resort to internal repression, these states are essentially weak (1993: 39).

Taylor's discussion of power represented a major advance in the literature of political geography. It moved the debate beyond simplistic 'power inventory' approaches and emphasized that there are different forms of power (overt and covert, military and economic, and so on). It also laid stress on the relationship between spatial organization and the operation of different forms of power (1993: 40–8). Although Taylor acknowledges the importance of differences in resource endowment among conflicting actors, he does not reduce power to resources, but recognizes other sources of power such as 'structural position' and 'non-decision-making'. He also cites examples of conflicts whose outcomes seem to run counter to what might have been expected from initial assessments of power differentials, such as the defeat of the United States in Vietnam (1993: 39–40). Although Taylor does not express it in these terms, such counter-intuitive examples suggest that power cannot be understood as something that actors possess; rather it is an effect of their practices (Allen, 2003: 2). Moreover, state governments and armed forces are not the only actors involved in determining the outcomes of international conflicts. As Taylor points out, 'internal' political processes, such as popular dissent, are also influential (1993: 39). We also need to recognize that states are not the only international actors: multinational corporations, intergovernmental bodies (such as the World Trade Organization, the IMF, the World Bank and the United Nations), NGOs, transnational political movements, world religions, and transnational criminal networks are all important. Recognizing that such diverse entities exercise power internationally may not accord with the realist principles that have historically underpinned most political geography, but it is surely essential if we are to make any sense of the contemporary world (Strange, 1996; Kaldor, 1999).

**Marxist political economy and the state**

Another major current in critical political geography has been derived from historical materialism and Marxist political economy. In the 1970s and 1980s several geographers, including Ron Johnston, Michael Dear, Gordon Clark, and John Short, drew on Marxist concepts in their writings on the geography of state power (Dear and Clark, 1978; Clark and Dear, 1981, 1984; Johnston, 1982, 1989; Short, 1982). Short, for example, emphasized
the role of uneven capitalist development in driving processes of inter-state rivalry. His account of the functions of the state under capitalism stressed the contributions of Marxist state theorists such as Ralph Miliband (1973) and Nicolas Poulantzas (1973, 1978) as well as those of Jurgen Habermas (1976) and James O’Connor (1973), who are not Marxists in a strict sense, but whose work forms part of a broader historical materialist tradition. Johnston argued that the weakness of much previous political geography stemmed from its failure to develop a ‘sensible treatment of the central element in its work – the state’ (Johnston, 1982: ix). He used similar sources to those cited by Short to explain the existence of the state and many of its basic activities, and also drew on Clark and Dear (1981). Clark and Dear elaborated their 1981 arguments in their book State Apparatus: Structures and Languages of Legitimacy (1984). Here they argued that the state must be understood in relation to the capitalist mode of production, but its workings cannot be reduced to an immanent ‘logic of capital’. Rather the state is institutionally separate from the economic sphere and able to operate with considerable autonomy (1984: 33–35). Clark and Dear argue that this provides for a ‘state-centred’ rather than a ‘society-centred’ theory of the state.

None of these authors develops an explicit theory of power in any detail, although Clark and Dear do consider the specific question of the legal powers of the local state (1984: 138–44). Questions of power are, though, central to Marxism, which sees power inequalities as endemic in the capitalist mode of production. For one strand of Marxist political analysis, the key question is how processes of capital accumulation are related to the forms and functions of the state. This question has no simple answer, as Clark and Dear explain, but broadly speaking there are two kinds of approaches to it. First, there are those that suggest that political power derives directly from the social relations of capital accumulation, and that the state exercises power in a fairly straightforward way to favour capital accumulation and the class interests that benefit most from it. The second set of approaches emphasizes that the state is both a medium for and an outcome of social struggles, including struggles between classes, and that its institutional capacities and actions have complex dynamics of their own. This approach sees capitalism as simultaneously a political and an economic system – a complex, differentiated totality in which political power cannot be reduced to economic power or vice versa.

A rather different approach is taken by David Harvey, unarguably the leading geographical interpreter of Marx. For Harvey, the workings of the capitalist mode of production not only lead to uneven economic development, but also produce tendencies towards a more general territorial coherence at the scale of the urban region (Harvey, 1985a). Capitalist production (in fact any production) operates under spatial constraints. Because production requires the bringing together of labour, materials and technology in particular places, there is a limit, at least in the short term, to the spatial flexibility of capitalism. Therefore, Harvey says, there are processes at work that define regional spaces within which production and consumption, supply and demand (for commodities and labour power), production and realization, class struggle and accumulation, culture and life-style, hang together as some kind of structured coherence within a totality of productive forces and social relations (1985a: 146).

Moreover, the resulting ‘territorial coherence becomes even more marked when formally represented by the state’ (1985a: 146). The tendency to structured coherence opens up a space within which, for a time at least, a ‘relatively autonomous’ urban politics can arise (Harvey, 1985b: 125–64). This relative autonomy (from the logic of capital accumulation) allows the formation of ‘regional class alliances’ that bring together otherwise opposed political interests. Thus for Harvey, the power of the local state is not immediately determined by the logic of capital accumulation, but arises from the necessarily territorial character of the conditions that make accumulation possible.

Within political geography, Harvey’s arguments have been taken up by a number of writers on the local state (e.g. Duncan et al., 1988; Painter, 1997). In recent years, however, the geographical literature on urban and regional governance has tended to draw more heavily on the ‘strategic-relational’ state theory developed in the work of the political theorist Bob Jessop. Jessop offers the following summary of the approach:

[The state] can be defined as an ensemble of socially embedded, socially regularized, and strategically selective institutions, organizations, social forces, and activities organized around (or at least actively involved in) making collectively binding decisions for an imagined political community. A relational approach implies that the exercise of state power (or, better, state powers in the plural) involves a form-determined condensation of the changing balance of forces. In other words, state power reflects the prevailing balance of forces as this is institutionally mediated through the state apparatus with its structurally-inscribed strategic selectivity. This refers to the ways in which the state qua social ensemble has a specific, differential impact on the ability of various political forces to pursue particular interests and strategies in specific spatiotemporal contexts through their access to and/or control over given state capacities – capacities that
always depend for their effectiveness on links to forces and powers that exist and operate beyond the state's formal boundaries. (Jessop, 2003: 145)

Thus the strategic-relational approach rejects the idea that power is 'possessed' or 'exercised' by the state:

It follows that to talk of state managers, let alone of the state itself, exercising power is at best to perpetrate a convenient fiction that masks a far more complex set of social relations that extend far beyond the state apparatus and its distinctive capacities. Thus we should always seek to trace the circulation of power through wider and more complex sets of social relations both within and beyond the state. (Jessop, 2003: 45)

Jessop's approach has been influential in political geography partly because of its emphasis on the importance of spatial (and especially scalar) relations and their transformation over time. For example, he suggests that 'the national scale has lost the taken-for-granted primacy it held in post-war Atlantic Fordist regimes' (Jessop, 2002: 179) but that no other scale has emerged as the primary focus of organization. Instead there are now 'continuing struggles over which spatial scale should become primary and how scales should be articulated' (Jessop, 2002: 179). This 'rescaling of the state' is reflected in the rise of international trading blocs, cross-border regions, and cities (Jessop, 2002: 177–87). These arguments have been widely applied in political geography and urban and regional studies and have also been subject to critical debate (e.g. Jones, 1997, 2001; Jones and MacLeod, 1999; MacLeod, 1999; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999; MacLeod and Jones, 2001; Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Cox, 2002a; Peck, 2002; Brenner et al., 2003; Brenner, 2004). For the most part, though, these applications and debates have focused on the more complex geographies of power arising from scalar restructuring and have not explicitly addressed the nature of power or how power itself should be theorized (Allen, 2003: 34–6).

Jessop's work and associated research in geography have been strongly influenced by regulation theory, which is a particular variant of Marxist political economy. The validity of regulation theory is disputed by Marxist scholars and political geographers. Kevin Cox grounds his approach to political geography in an analysis of the political economy of capitalism (Cox, 2002b) but is explicit in his rejection of regulationist approaches (Cox, 2002a). Although the exercise of power is central to Cox's concerns, he offers only a brief discussion of power as such, but does emphasize that 'power comes in different forms' (Cox, 2002b: 7).

He briefly identifies the power of money and the power of norms as important influences before turning to the relations between power and territory. Cox argues that 'territorial strategies are always exercises in power' and suggests that territoriality is quintessentially associated with state power. Even territorial strategies undertaken by private actors (such as private schools or gated communities) in the end depend on the state for their legality (Cox, 2002b: 8). The state's territorial sovereignty means that it can adopt a number of strategies for the regulation of space – for Cox, space and power come together in the shape of territory (Cox, 2002b: 367). We will return to the issue of territory later, after considering two further strands in critical political geography: feminism and critical geopolitics.

**Feminist political geography**

Most of our attention so far has been focused on power related to the state – either power relations between states or the power exercised by states over their territories. This is in accordance with the state-centrism that has characterized political geography for much of its history. World-systems theory has provided one kind of challenge to state-centrism, with its emphasis on the principal role of the capitalist world-economy. A rather different challenge arises from the growing influence of feminist approaches to political geography. Feminist writers have argued strongly that our definition of politics (and hence of political geography) should not be limited to formal political institutions such as the state, but should extend to include all sorts of social relations in which power is exercised. Feminism is centrally concerned with the nature and effects of gender relations and their potential transformation. One implication of a focus on gendered power relations is that interpersonal interactions come to be seen as just as much part of 'politics' as the actions of governments and conflicts between states. The feminist slogan 'the personal is political' captures this argument concisely. At the same time, feminism does not address only interpersonal power relations, but is concerned with the gendering of all kinds of social processes and institutions operating at a wide variety of geographical scales. Among many other topics, feminist geographers have examined the politics of nationalism, militarism, electoral representation, local governance, privatization, welfare reform, social movements, indigenous rights, citizenship and migration (Staeheli et al., 2004). Much of this work has contributed to a productive blurring of sub-disciplinary boundaries, so that political geographers are now taking seriously topics that were previously seen as the domain of urban, social, cultural or economic...
geography, despite their evidently political character.

Notwithstanding these developments, and the fact that more than two decades have passed since feminism began to influence geography, an explicitly feminist political geography is by no means firmly established, as Jennifer Hyndman notes: 'Geographers who find themselves at the crossroads of feminism and political geography have lamented the paucity of scholarship that links the two [and] despite on-going work to advance a thoroughly feminist geography, the intersections between these two sub-disciplines are relative[ly] few' (Hyndman, 2004: 307–8).

Despite these limitations, it is already clear that feminist work in political geography has considerable implications for our understanding of the relations between power and space. For example, two of the major debates in political geography from the 1990s have been about the politics of scale and the geographies of citizenship, and feminist theory has played a major role in each. In the case of scale, feminism draws attention to a range of other spatial scales, besides the conventional global/national/local triad. In particular, feminists emphasize the scales of the body and the household as important sites of gendered and generational power relations. Sally Marston, for example, identifies the household as a neglected arena in debates on scale, arguing that an account of gendered practices at the household scale is essential to understanding the sphere of consumption and social reproduction (Marston, 2000). Second, feminism has had considerable influence on studies of the geographies of citizenship (see, e.g. Staeheli and Cope, 1994; Kofman, 1995; McEwan, 2000; Secor, 2003; Staeheli and Clarke, 2003). Work in this area has drawn on feminist political theory to suggest that dominant definitions of citizenship are strongly gendered. One consequence of this is that in the West the public sphere and the public spaces within which citizenship is enacted have been encoded as rational, masculine and political while the private realm and the private space of the home has been encoded as emotional, feminine and outside politics. Feminist political geographers have contested these binary divisions and assumed equivalences and have sought to disrupt the rigid separation of the public and the private that they assume.

While feminist geographers in no sense deny the importance of the state or of inter-state relations in shaping political geographies (Hyndman, 2004; Staeheli et al., 2004), their work has opened up political geography to a wider range of understandings of power and a more plural sense of spatiality than that of state territoriality alone, while also unsettling conventional accounts of the geographies of the state (Desbiens et al., 2004).

Critical geopolitics

The close connections between knowledge, space and power that are the focus of much work in feminist political geography also lie at the heart of the study of 'critical geopolitics'. Critical geopolitics emerged during the 1990s as a way of rethinking the concept of geopolitics to move it beyond traditional realist theories and the polarized East–West political confrontation of the Cold War (Ó Tuathail and Dalby, 1991, 1998b; Dodds and Sidaway, 1994; Ó Tuathail, 1996, 2000; Sparke, 2000). Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby, two of the pioneers of the approach, have identified five arguments associated with critical geopolitics. First, geopolitics does not refer only to realist power-politics, but is 'a broader cultural phenomenon' encompassing the 'cultural mythologies of the state'. Second, critical geopolitics does not take for granted the boundaries of states and the separation between the state's inside and outside. States do not exist as distinct actors prior to the development of relations between them; rather states are 'perpetually constituted by their performances in relation to an outside against which they define themselves'. Third, geopolitics is not limited to practices of statecraft conducted by political leaders, but involves 'a plural ensemble of representational practices that are diffused throughout societies'. These can be divided into 'formal geopolitics', involving theories and strategies developed in think-tanks, strategic institutes and academia, the 'practical geopolitics' conducted by state institutions, and 'popular geopolitics', which refers to everyday cultural constructions in the mass media, films and so on. Fourth, the study of geopolitics 'can never be politically neutral'. Critical geopolitics insists on the 'situated, contextual and embodied nature of all forms of geopolitical reasoning'. Finally, critical geopolitics seeks to understand geopolitical practices in their broader socio-technical context. Geopolitics is understood as part of a wider process of government and control and is therefore concerned with 'the historical expansion of states, techniques of governmentality and histories of technology and territoriality' (Ó Tuathail and Dalby, 1998a: 2–7).

These arguments provide the basis for a radically different conception of power and of power's relationship to space from the one that dominated traditional studies of geopolitics. Three differences stand out in particular. First, power does not inhere (only) in material resources, but is also exercised culturally, and in particular through practices of representation. Critical geopolitics draws attention to the power of discourse and particularly of narrative to shape understandings of political events and of relations between places, and thus to influence those events and relations. Studies have focused
on all three categories of geopolitics described by Ó Tuathail and Dalby, covering the formal texts of strategists and academics, the practical discourses of political leaders and diplomats and the everyday narratives of the mass news and entertainment media. Joanne Sharp, for example, has written of the crisis in American culture and national identity generated by the loss of its geopolitical Other, the Soviet Union. She argues that the resulting sense of disarray was evident in the narratives of many popular films in the 1990s. But movies do not simply express a feeling of chaos and disorder, they also respond to it, and they do so in particular, argues Sharp, though a discourse of re-masculinization, thereby contributing to the construction of new forms of national identity (Sharp, 1998).

The second difference is that critical geopolitics adopts a more dispersed and plural view of power than traditional geopolitics. Power is not located exclusively in the state, but is diffused through society. This view owes a lot to the work of Michel Foucault, and many writers on critical geopolitics have indeed been much influenced by Foucault’s ideas. Foucault urges us to ‘keep it clearly in mind that unless we are looking at it from a great height and from a very great distance, power is not something that is divided between those who have it and hold it exclusively, and those who do not have it and are subject to it’ (Foucault, 2004c: 29).

He continues:

Power must, I think, be analyzed as something that circulates, or rather as something that functions only when it is part of a chain. It is never localized here or there, it is never in the hands of some, and it is never appropriated in the way that wealth or a commodity can be appropriated. Power functions. Power is exercised through networks, and individuals do not simply circulate in those networks; they are in a position to both submit to and exercise this power. They are never the inert or consenting targets of power; they are always its relays. In other words, power passes through individuals. It is not applied to them. (Foucault, 2004c: 29)

This ‘capillary’ view of power is a radically different conception of what power entails from the ‘power inventory’ approach of traditional geopolitics. It has been taken up very widely in geography, though it has been far more influential in social, cultural, and historical geography than in political geography. This neglect stems in part from the legacy of earlier ‘power politics’ approaches and the popularity of Marxism. It may also reflect an assumption that political geography is predominantly concerned with state power and that therefore Foucault’s ideas about the dispersal of power through populations are not directly relevant. This assumption seems mistaken on two counts. First, political geography has in recent years begun to move away from its state-centric view of the world, and second, Foucault’s approaches do address questions of statehood, sovereignty and government. How and to what extent Foucault addressed these questions has only become fully apparent with the recent publication of his lecture courses (Foucault, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c), although his concept of ‘governmentality’, drawing attention to the constitution of objects of governance and to the practices and technologies of government, has been widely applied in political geography since the 1990s (for example, Murdoch and Ward, 1997; MacKinnon, 2000; Moon and Brown, 2000; Painter, 2002; Raco, 2003).

The third difference is that critical geopolitics seeks to disrupt the spatial orderings of conventional geopolitics. Conventional geopolitics took the territorial sovereignty of the state for granted, and assumed that it was possible in theory and in practice to draw a clear distinction between domestic and foreign policy. Critical geopolitics contests these assumptions. In his commentary on the bombing of the US Federal government office in Oklahoma in 1995, Matthew Sparke notes that ‘the spatial dualisms of “outside” and “inside” are a blindingly sharp force of division in modern Western thought, ultimately governing even moral considerations of good and bad’ (Sparke, 1998: 198). Sparke points out that the bombing, which was perpetrated by an American citizen and avowed patriot, Timothy McVeigh, overturned the easy associations of ‘inside equals good’ and ‘outside equals bad’. Moreover McVeigh was a former soldier who had fought in Iraq against the bad outside. This kind of interpenetration of spaces formerly thought to be clearly distinct is a recurrent theme in critical geopolitical writing. It has also become a leitmotiv of geographical theory more generally and central to recent attempts to spatialize theories of power. It is to these spatializations of power that we now turn.

**SPATIALIZING POWER**

Until now, the dominant spatial concept in political geography to date has been ‘territory’ (Cox, 2002b). This accords with dominant understandings of the spatiality of the nation-state, which has been the prime focus of political geography. In recent years it has become clear to many political geographers that this fixation with the state and its territoriality has been profoundly limiting, and critiques of state-centrism have begun to emerge (Taylor, 1996). This is not to deny the importance of either the state or territory, but it is to insist that neither can be assumed to be natural, universal or pre-given, and that both must be placed in question
and seen not as the timeless foundations of politics but rather as two of politics’ outcomes.

John Agnew (1994, 1999) has coined the term ‘territorial trap’ to challenge the “state-centred account of the spatiality of power” (Agnew, 2003: 51). The territorial trap is underpinned by three assumptions. These are that ‘modern state sovereignty requires clearly bounded territorial spaces’, that ‘there is a fundamental opposition between domestic and foreign affairs in the modern world’, and that ‘the territorial state acts as the geographical container of modern society’ (Agnew, 2003: 53). Agnew argues that this state-centric view of the world is sustained by particular understandings of power. There is a tendency to understand state power in terms of coercion (‘power over’) exercised within discrete blocks of space. This view, Agnew suggests, both neglects infrastructural power (Mann, 1984), through which states make collective provision for their populations, but also ‘completely ignores the extent to which power is inherent in all human agency’ (Agnew, 2003: 55) and thus that power can also be ‘power to’ and ‘power from below’. The territorial trap also takes a limited view of the exercise of power between states, with coercion being the dominant understanding of power in the international as well as the domestic arena. Drawing on the Gramscian concept of hegemony, Agnew argues that this view is mistaken because ‘power can involve gaining assent, defining expectations, and co-opting others as much as or more than simply coercing them’ (2003: 57). Finally, Agnew argues that the territorial understanding of power is challenged by the state’s own powers in relation to property rights. State-centred accounts, he says, are ‘silent as to the role that states have played in the growth of certain basic social practices of capitalism – defining and protecting private property rights – that have inexorably led beyond state boundaries in pursuit of wealth’ (2003: 59). Agnew is at pains to point out that none of this means that the state is necessarily withering away. However, neither the state nor its territorial spatiality can be simply taken for granted in the context of processes such as the growth of international migration and the liberalization of financial markets, which are generating ‘new spatialities of power’ (Agnew, 2003: 61–5).

Agnew’s work is both important and relatively unusual in geography in drawing attention to the variety of forms that power can take and the different spatialities with which they are associated. Surprisingly few political geographers have tried to set out a systematic account of different types of power. Ronan Paddison’s The Fragmented State (1983), which is subtitled ‘the political geography of power’, discusses the distribution of power spatially and among hierarchical divisions within the state, but does not dwell on the nature of power itself at any length. Peter Slowe’s Geography and Political Power (1990) is organized around five sources of power (‘might’, ‘right’, ‘nationhood’, ‘legality’ and ‘legitimacy’). This seems promising as it explicitly recognizes that power comes in many forms, but Slowe provides little discussion of the conceptual distinctions between these different types.

In fact it was not until John Allen’s Lost Geographies of Power (2003) that a sustained attempt was made to examine both the diversity of modes of power and their relationship to space and place. In Lost Geographies, Allen provides a multi-dimensional account of power that recognizes that different kinds of power have different geographies. He suggests that despite widespread acceptance of the close connection between space and power, existing scholarship has ‘lost the sense in which geography makes a difference to the exercise of power’ (Allen, 2003: 1). Allen’s account includes critiques of most of the assumptions about power that underlie virtually all the scholarship I have discussed in this chapter. Whether it is the view that power is a matter of resources that we can hold, the Foucauldian concept of power as dispersed and all around us, or the suggestion that power flows through networks, Allen argues that all the widely used understandings of power fall to capture fully how space and place make a difference to power’s role in our lives.

Allen starts by insisting that power is not a thing or a substance, it does not travel or flow and it cannot be stored or saved up or possessed. Instead, power ‘is a relational effect of social interaction’ (2003: 2) and arises only as it is practised or exercised: it does not exist prior to and separate from its use. Noting that many recent studies have emphasized the importance of space to the exercise of power, Allen sets out three ‘spatial vocabularies of power’ (2003: 6–9, 13–91). These vocabularies represent the three main ways in which the relationship between power and space has been understood in contemporary social theory – and Allen’s analysis challenges each of them. First, power may be said to radiate out from a centre. Such a view of power treats it as a something that can be held or possessed and is located in a central institution, such as the apparatus of the state. From this perspective, power can be ‘decentralized’ or ‘delegated’ through the action of the central body; it also spreads out across space. As may be seen from the previous sections in this chapter, this vocabulary of power is the one that has dominated political geography throughout the twentieth century, and is, in fact, the main everyday, common-sense view of power in the West.

Secondly, and, Allen argues, less intuitively, power can be seen as a medium, that is, as the means to achieve outcomes. In this view, power is generated through networks of social interaction involving the mobilization of collective resources.
The spatial vocabulary of power involved here is that of flows of power (or more accurately resources) over, or through, social networks that are stretched across space. Such a conception of power is evident, to take a particularly prominent example, in the work of Manuel Castells and his idea of the networked society (Castells, 1996). The difficulty with this conception, argues Allen, is that the spatial distanciation involved in networked social relations seems to make remarkably little difference to the exercise of power. Networks are viewed as unproblematically transmitting power from here to there, without really affecting its nature (2003: 61–3).

The third vocabulary of power understands it as immanent; that is, power is not something external to human subjects that affects them by imposing from outside, but 'is implicated in all that we are and all that we inhabit' (2003: 65). In this case the key question is not 'Who has the power?', but 'How does power work?' The 'how' of power is exactly how Foucault describes his central concern (Foucault, 2004c: 24), and for Allen the writings of Foucault and associated writers such as Gilles Deleuze provide the clearest expression of the idea of power as immanent, in which there is no enduring capacity to power that may or may not be realized, only the routine deployment of techniques — spatial, organizational, classificatory, representational, ethical or otherwise, depending upon the forms of power involved — that seek to mould the conduct of specific groups or individuals and, above all, limit their possible range of actions. (Allen, 2003: 67)

As we saw above, this view of power is increasingly influential within political geography. For Allen, though, the idea that power is immanently everywhere, leads us to lose sight of the spatiality of power. This may seem a surprising claim, given the widespread perception that geography and space are at the very heart of Foucault’s project (e.g. Philo, 1992). However, Allen argues that, if power is immanent, it is essentially immediated, 'it works on and through everyone and every individual, but without spatial reference' (Allen, 2003: 89). It seems that if power is immanently everywhere, it is nowhere in particular.

In order to recover the geographies of power that he claims we have lost through the spread of the these three spatial vocabularies (centred power, networked power and immanent power), Allen emphasizes the diverse range of modalities that power can take, each of which relates rather differently to space and place (or to 'proximity and reach' as he puts it). He discusses at least eight different modalities of power: authority, domination, inducement, coercion, manipulation, seduction, negotiation and persuasion, each of which involves a different kind of social relation. Power as authority, for example, works through relations of recognition. Authority is obeyed insofar as it is recognized as legitimate, and laughter in the face of authority, Allen suggests, is the quickest way to destabilize it. Because of its dependence on recognition, authority is most effective in close proximity, particularly in face-to-face encounters. Anyone who has worked in a large organization will know that the authority of a manager is much more effective when manager and employee are in the same room. When the manager is absent, his or her authority dissipates and employees frequently take advantage of this to subvert managerial power. A different example is that of seduction. Seduction, Allen says, is a ‘gentle form of power’, which works by operating suggestively on our existing preferences and desires. A particularly clear example of seductive power is the advertising industry. Nothing in an advertisement coerces us into purchasing a product, rather advertisements draw us in by stimulating our curiosity. Unlike authority, seduction works well at a distance. We do not need to be physically in the presence of a copywriter or a salesperson for advertising to have its effect:

The fact that seduction works on curiosity, seeking to take advantage of attitudes and values that are already present, leaving open the possibility of rejection or indifference, is what gives it its considerable reach, yet at the same time curbs its intensity. These are not accidental features of the way in which seduction works; they are qualities that distinguish seduction from other modes of power and mark it out as a distinctive way of exercising power. (Allen, 2003: 103, emphasis added)

The second sentence in this quotation is italicized because it captures Allen’s key argument about the geographies of power. Each of the different modalities of power is bound up with a different relationship to space and it is these geographies that help to make the different forms of power what they are. For Allen, then, geography is constitutive of power, but in a different way in each case. Coercion, involving the use of physical force, requires co-presence, or technological systems capable of overcoming distance. Manipulation involves a geography of concealment, because it relies on misrepresentation, and so on.

One of the striking things about Allen’s discussion of different kinds of power is that it reveals the limited nature of the conceptions of power underlying most work in political geography, and the lack of explicit attention paid to the variety of power. As we have seen, individual political geographers have typically discussed at most one or two forms of power, insofar as they have discussed the nature of power at all. Most commonly in political geography power has been defined as domination or coercion (these are
often considered to be the same thing). Less often power has been considered in terms of negotiation, manipulation or inducement, though again without clear distinctions being made between these. On the other hand, while explicit discussions of power in political geography have not covered the full range of modalities of power identified by Allen, in practice much political-geographic research has shown how these various forms of power operate geographically.

Specific practices can involve more than one modality of power. Allen stresses that there is no rigid separation between different forms, and these can co-exist in place. For example, the ongoing US-led war in Iraq involved power in numerous guises – not just coercion, but also manipulation, inducement, persuasion, domination and so on. One of the great strengths of Allen’s approach is that it allows subtle distinctions to be made between the ways in which power is exercised, without ignoring ‘stronger’ forms of power such as domination and coercion.

POWER, SPACE AND POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

What are the implications for political geography of thinking power in a fully spatialized way, and giving full weight to its multiple modalities? World events at the beginning of the twenty-first century have undoubtedly prompted renewed interest in the exercise of political power. The conflicts in Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan, the so-called ‘war on terror’, flows of migrants and refugees, lack of progress on slowing climate change, national liberation struggles, the emergence of new forms of territorial governance, such as those associated with the growth of the European Union, and the relentless push by economically dominant states – especially the US – to open new markets for investment, production and consumption (called ‘free’ trade by its proponents, though the freedoms involved are rarely equally distributed); all these developments focus attention on practices of power, and they all, of course, have distinctive geographies. The challenge for political geography, then, is not only to write those geographies, but also to consider how space and place are implicated in the ‘hows’ and ‘whys’ of power in ways that do not just reproduce familiar assumptions about power being a resource that is held or transmitted – or the newer assumption that power is immanently everywhere.

One approach that has begun to inform recent work in political geography adopts a topological understanding of space. Topology allows us to understand spatial relations not in terms of fixed distances over a flat surface, but in terms of simultaneous or real-time connections in which the distant is drawn near and the near is made distant (Allen, 2003: 191–3). In a topological view of the world, then, Washington is much closer to Baghdad than it is to Tripoli, even though Tripoli appears nearer to Washington on a conventional map. Technologies of war, surveillance and communication have all functioned to render Baghdad close at hand. Political leaders from the occupying countries pop up unannounced in Baghdad with unnerving regularity. Officials thousands of kilometres away in the Pentagon can direct bombing raids or covert operations as if they were battlefield commanders. And the ‘green zone’ in Baghdad, housing the political and military administrations of the United States, operates as a kind of Washington-on-Tigris. At the same time, such topological ‘bendings’ of conventional spaces do not eliminate geography and nor do they guarantee the effective exercise of power in all its modes. Notwithstanding the technological capacity of the US, it has not (so far) been able to impose its will even on the whole of Baghdad, let alone Iraq. In Allen’s terms, it lacks authority – and it may be argued it has also failed at persuasion and inducement.

There is an emerging divide within political geography between perspectives that emphasise ‘hard’ forms of state territorial power and those that focus on power as a more diffuse cultural phenomenon. What I have been able to show in this chapter, I hope, is that, given a nuanced account of power and its relations to space, this divide is more apparent than real. Territory is not a source of power, but one of power’s many possible effects. The production of territory may involve all the different modalities of power, which in turn owe their effectiveness in different ways to their spatialities, many of which may be non-territorial or topological in form. From this perspective, topology is not a departure from territory; on the contrary, territory is just another topological twist.

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