In December 1992, 18,000 paramilitary police equipped with armoured cars and bulldozers besieged militants from the Gama'a Islamiyya (Islamic Group) in the North Giza neighbourhood of Munira Gharbiyya (see map), also known as Imbaba, part of the Greater Cairo agglomeration (Denis 1994; Singerman 1999). The ‘Siege of Imbaba’ came early in a protracted confrontation between militants and the Egyptian state which continued until the latter half of the 1990s and culminated in the Islamists’ defeat (Gerges, 2000). Lasting several weeks, it was characterized by indiscriminate mass arrests, hostage-taking by the security forces to secure the surrender of suspected militants and the ‘widespread’ use of torture (Sherry, 1995: 13). A report from an Egyptian human rights group in early 1993 claimed the citizens of Munira had initially welcomed the police intervention ‘hoping to be rid of the oppression practiced on them by the Islamic Group in Imbaba. But after two months... the slogan most popular was: “The hell of the Muslim groups is better than the police’s heaven”’ (Sherry, 1995: 12).

Munira, and other Cairo neighbourhoods where the Islamists had also established themselves, were ‘informal’. They had been built without official authorization—a symptom of the city’s rapid growth since the 1950s—and were hence outside the umbrella of state planning and infrastructure. Seemingly beyond the reach of President Husni Mubarak’s government, the Islamists mounted an urban guerrilla campaign against it and sought to create a ‘state-within-the-state’. Indeed, the Mubarak government’s intervention had apparently been provoked by the militants’ (somewhat premature) proclamation of an ‘Islamic Republic of Imbaba’ to western journalists.

In its wake, both state officials and Egyptian public ‘discovered’ that much of the Egyptian capital was outside the framework of state planning. Media reportage and more official texts labelled such informal neighbourhoods manatiq ‘ashwa’iyya—‘random’ or ‘haphazard’ areas, collectively ‘ashwa’iyayat’—and pathologized them as squalid havens for criminals and terrorists, a direct threat to Egypt’s physical, moral, and political health. In this implicitly securitizing discourse, such disorder demanded state intervention, not just to expel the Islamists but also to rebuild the physical environment and reform its inhabitants. The longer-term fear engendered by the discovery of the unruly city, urban Islamists and their plebeian supporters contributed to Cairo’s 1990s building boom, as Egypt’s elite retreated to ‘gated communities’ on the city’s desert periphery (Denis, 2006).

The ‘Siege of Imbaba’ and the case of informal Cairo speak to broader discussions of state-society relations in Egypt and urban insecurity in the developing world. The ‘ashwa’iyayat discourse is ironically echoed in the claims of western observers that informal Cairo represented an ‘oppositional space’ outside the purview of a state which controlled only the ‘main axes’ of the country (Ismail, 2000: 379; Roussillon, 1998: 390). The discourse itself would appear to be a species of the ‘imaginative geographies’ of alterity and menace that now commonly frame discussions of urban insurgency and counterinsurgency (Graham, 2006). More concretely, the ‘Islamic Republic of Imbaba’ seems to confirm the linkage between urbanization and threats to state stability or human security suggested by Brennan-Galvin (2002) and Lawson et al. (2008). The events of December 1992 further exemplify the claim that global cities like Cairo have become backdrops in the theatre of international terrorism (Savitch & Ardashev, 2001).
Lastly, the gated communities boom on the Cairo periphery is suggestive of the process, observed in Latin America and South Africa, where social inequality and violence produce urban polarization—enclaves of affluence amidst mass squalor (Caldeira 2000; Lemanski, 2004).

Yet closer scrutiny of the Cairo case suggests that, on the whole, the city is not a highly violent and conflictual environment outside the control of the state. After expelling the Islamists and making essentially token efforts to demolish and upgrade a few informal Cairo neighbourhoods, the Mubarak government effectively returned to the long-term patterns of indifference and neglect that had allowed informal Cairo to flourish since the 1960s. Such de facto policies of inaction are puzzling given the apparent threat posed by Islamist militants and the authoritarian top-down character of the Egyptian state’s rule. To a limited extent, its inaction can be explained in terms of resource constraints and risk avoidance. But since the 1970s, Cairo’s rulers have had access to substantial urban-development assistance offered by international donors who were well aware of the city’s dangers and challenges.

This article will argue that apparent state inaction actually reflects numerous linkages between informal urbanization and the Egyptian state. To a significant degree, the ‘ashwa’yyat are a consequence of an authoritarian political order from which the majority of Egyptians are excluded. Moreover, while the ‘ashwa’yyat discourse—and some scholarly accounts—depict informal neighbourhoods as confronting the state, in practice Egyptian governments have tolerated and sometimes even tacitly encouraged them. Informal urbanization ironically helps to reproduce a political order based on elite privilege by insulating Egypt’s rulers from bottom-up demands for housing and services. Thoroughly embedded in the clientelistic stratagems used by Egyptian governments to bolster their rule, informal communities have allowed these governments to achieve a surprising degree of state-society integration despite a political order predicated on exclusion. Hence the city’s seemingly oppositional spaces might be more usefully seen as an oblique reflections of the state and political order.

**Urban Insecurities – ‘Cairo As Bomb’**

Portrayals of Cairo as a rebellious mega-city are part of a well-established ‘Cairo as bomb’ trope in which the city is represented as perennially on the verge of conflagration (Singerman & Amar, 2006). It encompasses specific incidents of civil disorder including the January 1977 riots against the government reduction of consumer subsidies, the February 1986 police-conscript uprising, and (historically) the January 1952 ‘Black Saturday’ attacks on British interests. More generally, Cairo is a mega city, its population increasing from 2.5 to at least 11 million between the 1950s and 1990s (Bayat & Denis, 2000: 189 [Table 2.5]). These high rates of growth and the burdens placed on urban infrastructure have struck some contemporary observers as potentially explosive and disastrous (AID, 1978; Joint Housing Team, 1976). Of course, fears of urban disorder are hardly new. The nineteenth century European elite bemoaned the turmoil caused by native street peddlers (Kuppinger 1995). Their Egyptian successors have periodically asserted that Cairo has been over-run by uncivilized migrants from the countryside, particularly from Upper Egypt (Miller, 2006; Waterbury 1978).
Nationalist protests on the streets of Cairo were an established, if often largely theatrical, part of the political landscape in the latter decades of Egypt’s British-dominated constitutional monarchy (Tripp, 1998). The ‘Black Saturday’ attacks helped set the stage for the Free Officer’s seizure of power some months later. Popular protests figured significantly in the consolidation of power by Nasser, Egypt’s first president 1954 and subsequent challenges to his authority in the late 1960s (Waterbury, 1982). Perhaps not surprisingly, Egyptian governments have hence regarded their capital as a ‘container of political menace’ vulnerable to ‘mass violence’ which could potentially bring ‘the nation to a halt’ (Waterbury, 1982: 327).

But such fears also likely reflect the authoritarian character of the nominally republican dispensation of power established by Nasser and perpetuated by his successors Sadat and Mubarak. It included the construction of a bureaucratic Leviathan state apparently capable of the unilateral top-down control of the Egyptian economy and society and a disinterest in democratic bargaining (Owen, 2000; Kassem, 2004; Vatikiotis, 1968). While dependent on the state security forces for its reproduction, the political order’s long-term durability is also the result of continuing state penetration of the economy, extensive networks of devolved patronage, strategic manipulation, and subtle forms of symbolic violence. State officials have periodically stigmatized segments of Egyptian society as a threat to the national community, while always attempting to portray themselves as the guardians of its modernist development aspirations (Dorman, 2007; Long, 2004; Singerman, 1999).

Apparent liberalization by Sadat amounted to little more than the construction of a *facade* democracy. Despite the return to multi-party politics in the national legislature, real power remains in the hands of the patrimonial presidency and what might be understood as the Egyptian ‘deep state’—the military, security services, and bureaucratic elites (Springborg, 1989). They rule atop a broader coalition of dependent interests with preferential access to state distribution and state-created spoils, leaving ordinary Egyptians excluded from both meaningful political participation and preferential access to state largesse (Singerman, 1995; Waterbury, 1989).

This authoritarian dispensation is manifest at the level of city governance. The Cairo metropolitan area is not governed as a municipality, but rather fragmented into three administratively autonomous governorates—Cairo, Giza, and Qalyubiyya (see map)—which are effectively part of the national bureaucracy (Sullivan, 1983). Each is headed by a presidentially appointed governor, jobs historically given to ex-soldiers or policemen (Ino, 1989). Despite a complicated system of local councils ostensibly providing for popular representation and accountability, the governors rule top-down with few bottom-up constraints (Ghannam, 2001). Egypt’s rulers have been willing to tolerate token pluralism at the national level, but governorate officials and the ruling National Democratic party have generally blocked an opposition presence in these councils (Harders, 1998; Herzallah & Hamzawy, 2008).

The Egyptian state’s explicitly coercive capacities are also manifest at the local level in a variety of ways. For example, the capital is guarded by a ‘bewildering array of security forces [that keep] public order’ employing perhaps as many as 100,000 policemen (Rodenbeck, 1998: 277). These include the Amn...
Markazi (Central Security Forces) charged with riot control and often enlisted to support the demolition of informal areas and the Shurtat al-Marafiq (Utilities Police), deployed by the governorates to enforce building demolition orders and clear informal markets (Ismail, 2006; Springborg, 1989). Moreover, Cairo’s districting is organized around some 40 police stations. In some cases fortified, they are the most visible state institution in many neighbourhoods—for the most part located in potentially suspect areas (Ismail, 2000). But there is also room for co-option within this system of power: governorate officials and the police maintain de facto control of particular neighbourhoods through alliances with notable families (Ghannam, 2001).

The Emergence of Informal Cairo

Ironically given this elaborate architecture of top-down control, Cairo’s rulers have only exercised minimal guidance over the city’s expansion since the 1950s. Whether measured in terms of population or dwelling units, informal areas housed well over half of the city’s approximately 11 million inhabitants by 1996 (Sims 2000). Since the 1970s, informal development has probably accounted for at least 80 percent of Cairo’s growth (Mayo et al. 1982).

The bulk of such development has taken place on privately held agricultural land on the city periphery (see map). Informal Cairo does include settlements encroaching on public land, but they represent a relatively small percentage of the informal housing sector (Sims, 2000). The underlying causes of informal urbanization have been the city’s high rate of population growth—mainly through the natural increase of existing Cairenes—combined with the absence of new formal subdivisions within which housing could be built legally to absorb it. These factors helped drive steady land-price inflation beginning in the mid-1960s (Wheaton, 1979). An extensive rent-control system originally intended to curb housing price inflation only exacerbated it (McCall, 1988). Priced out of formal land and housing markets, increasing numbers of Cairenes bought farmland—the cost of which was stagnating or falling—upon which to build.

Such homesteading, however, contravened a host of laws, decrees, and other regulations prohibiting the conversion of farmland. As a consequence, the resulting sub-divisions lacked state planning and were, by virtue of their illegality initially denied access to public services such as water and sewerage (Mayo et al., 1982). In addition to the long-standing fears of disorderly urbanism, Egyptian state agencies nominally opposed such developments as encroaching on the country’s relative scarce arable areas and threatening food security. But although strictly speaking illegal, this urbanization is usually described—at least by western observers—as ‘informal’, referring to ‘activities which are not officially noticed through registration and taxation procedures’ (Hopkins, 1991a: 1). In part, this labelling reflects the fact that Egyptian state agencies—despite the predilection of authoritarian regimes for urban planning by demolition (Hardoy & Satterthwaite, 1989)—have had little success in curbing such urbanization.

Some observers see informality as a stepchild of the processes of liberalization and economic austerity experienced (however unevenly) by states like Egypt starting in the 1970s (Yacobi & Schecter, 2006). But such claims are only partially applicable to the Cairo case. There, the process and logic of informal
urbanization predate economic opening. Development of the Munira area, for example, was well underway by the mid 1960s (El-Sioufi, 1982). But the availability of remittance capital from Egyptians employed in the Gulf and Libya did accelerate its pace from the mid 1970s through the mid 1980s (Sims, 2003). In Egyptian terms, informal urbanization is best understood as an organic movement of mostly native Cairenes, usually young families, with sufficient capital to build, buy or rent in search of affordable neighbourhoods.

Such a position should not, however, be read as romanticizing informal urbanization. In the absence of formal planning, the process often results in sprawling neighbourhoods with extremely high population densities. The absence of state-provided infrastructure soon leads to serious environmental degradation (Oldham et al., 1987). The lack of land reserves for roads or other amenities means that such communities are sometimes characterized by narrow sunless canyon-like streets without intersections (El-Sioufi, 1982). Finally, informal urbanization may have become part of the broader problem of land/housing price inflation. As such communities mature, they become unaffordable for many young families, who will then likely homestead in settlements encroaching on public land and which suffer from more profound service deficits as well as greater tenure insecurity (El Kadi, 1992).

The ‘Islamic Republic of Imbaba’

In general terms, informality ‘expresses a certain resistance to state control’, seemingly manifest in the close association between informal Cairo and Islamist militants since the late 1970s (Hopkins, 1991b: 108). While not explicitly raising the issue of informality, Kepel’s (1985) examination of the social background of Cairo militants arrested in the wake of Sadat’s 1981 assassination noted that they were concentrated in urbanizing settlements on the city periphery. The relationship became even more apparent towards the end of the 1980s when militants in Upper Egypt relocated to Cairo both in order to escape the pressure of state security forces in the south and confront the Mubarak government on its home ground (Hafez & Wiktorowicz, 2004; Mubarak, 1995).

An initial confrontation came in 1988 when militants clashed with security forces in the North Cairo informal area of ‘Ayn Shams (Umar, 1988). By 1992, there were incidents of violence throughout the year in informal neighbourhoods throughout Cairo. Militants not only battled with police but also attacked stores alleged to sell alcohol and sexually illicit videos and were accused of fomenting sectarian tensions with attacks on Coptic Christians (Denis, 1996). But the climax of Islamist infiltration was in Munira Gharbiyya. The Gama’a Islamiyya had entrenched itself, using the neighbourhood as a base from which to attack the Egyptian state from without. Their urban-guerrilla activities included the assassination of public officials and the secular politician Farag Fuda (Abd al-Ati, 1992; Abdalla 1993).

From within, the militants sought also to create a ‘counter-society’, a microcosm of their proposed socio-political order (Sivan, 1987). The Gama’a Islamiyya’s ‘social work committees’ provided welfare services; its ‘night watch’ secured the streets; and its ‘reconciliation committee’ mediated disputes (Mubarak, 1995: 246, 260-263). There was a heavy emphasis on the remoralization of Egyptian society (Abd al-Ati, 1992;
Abdo, 2000; Mubarak 1995). Militants sought to ban the sale of alcohol and videos, and require women to wear the hijab (head scarf). The Gama'a Islamiyya’s imposition of social control—identical to its tactics in Upper Egypt—was also said to have found favour with the predominantly Upper Egyptian inhabitants of Munira whose ‘ideas, customs and traditions’ were much the same as those of their brethren in the south (Mubarak, 1995: 243).

The Mubarak government finally acted against the militants after their ill-advised declaration to a Reuters correspondent in late 1992 that they had established the ‘Islamic Republic of Imbaba’ in Munira Gharbiyya (Abdo, 2000; Singerman, 1999). This claim was perhaps the final straw for the Mubarak government in what had been a difficult period for Cairo. Its lethargic response to the October 1992 earthquake—which killed 561 and did $1.2 billion in damage in Cairo and elsewhere—provoked furious criticism in the press and some street protests (Brauch 2003; El-Kadi, 1993). Its seeming inability to provide shelter to the affected was in stark contrast to the effective relief given by Islamic organizations, under the direction of the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Awadi, 2005). Indeed, the resulting popular support may have encouraged militants in Munira to escalate their confrontation with the Mubarak government (Singerman, 1999).

So the ‘Siege of Imbaba’ came at the end of a chain of events suggesting that the Mubarak government was losing control of its capital, and more broadly that its long-term survival was threatened by the inability to address the country’s chronic socio-economic problems represented by informal Cairo. The suppression the Islamists in Munira was followed by a series of security-force sweeps against suspected militants elsewhere in the metropolitan area. In the longer term, it sought to re-establish at least the appearance of control over its capital. This effort took the form of a series of announcements through the spring of 1993 that the Egyptian state would deal decisively with informal Cairo through the comprehensive demolition and upgrading of its settlements (Kuppinger, 2001).

On the one hand, Mubarak and his officials declared that approximately sixteen Cairo neighbourhoods were beyond rehabilitation and would hence be demolished (Ibrahim, 1993; Mu'awwad, 1993). While the clearance list included communities apparently damaged in the earthquake, it did not include any of those where the government had clashed with the Islamists. On the other, they announced much larger-scale plans to upgrade informal communities (Arandel & El Batran, 1997). Roughly eighty neighbourhoods were to be comprehensively serviced, both with basic infrastructure—water, wastewater, and electricity connections—as well as ‘street-widening, lighting and paving […] mainly as a security measure meant to ensure easier control’ (El Batran & Arandel, 1998: 230).

Such announcements were made in the context of an unfolding media discourse of social danger—yet another manifestation of the ‘Cairo as bomb’ trope—in which informal areas were labelled ‘ashwa’iyat and stigmatized. Munira Gharbiyya, according to an Egyptian academic writing in English, had become a ‘Hobbesian world of violence and vice’ (Ibrahim, 1995: 75). While use of the term manatiq ‘ashwa’iyya in Egyptian media Arabic predates the Siege, nonetheless its usage shifted increasingly from a descriptive label for unplanned urbanization to a pejorative objectification of social disorder.
Crude themes within the *ashwa'iyyat* discourse included the links between the spatial disorder and degraded conditions within informal areas and their consequent social disorder; claims that they were a refuge for criminals and uncivilized rural migrants (often Upper Egyptian); and the assertion that, by virtue of their poverty and marginality, they were breeding grounds for radicalism and terrorism (Dorman, 2007). More sophisticated tropes, however, focused on the apparent absence of the Egyptian state. In one account, the Gama'a Islamiyya were able to exploit ‘the political, social, and security vacuum’, caused by the government’s failure both to assert its presence and develop the area (Mubarak, 1995: 245). Reportage during the siege stressed the need for the state to assert its presence and to deny the Islamists refuge (Al’Ghamri, 1992; Muntasar, 1992). Three years later, a leftist writer asserted that the area still remained self-sufficient and detached, hence continuing to defy state authority on an everyday level (Sulayman, 1997).

Crucially, the *ashwa'iyyat* discourse appeared to ‘securitize’ the issues of informality and urban planning, justifying unilateral state intervention (Buzan et al., 1998). Informal neighbourhoods and their inhabitants were depicted as an ‘uncivilized, almost savage, Other, in need of rehabilitation, education and moral guidance’ (Singerman, 1999: 11). They posed an existential threat, not only to Egypt’s immediate health and security, but also its aspirations for development (Kuppinger, 2001; Singerman, 1999). In this context, some commentators proclaimed that ‘clearance is the solution’, urging that state agencies be given the power to undertake large-scale demolitions (Shakir, 1993; Muhammad, 1993). On the other hand, explaining the rise of the Islamists in terms of the degradation and backwardness of the informal urban environment also allowed them and government officials to suggest that the state could re-order such communities by providing public services. Urban development might rehabilitate the *ashwa'iyyat*.

Western students of informality, schooled in such classic texts as Janice Perlman’s (1976) *Myth of Marginality*, will have little difficulty critiquing the *ashwa'iyyat* discourse. Indeed, its tropes are decidedly unoriginal, reproducing long-standing fears of urban disorder found in the West and elsewhere. A careful reading of the broader academic literature on informal Cairo—albeit mostly by western scholars or Egyptians in western universities—suggests that these neighbourhoods are neither pathological nor disorderly (Dorman, 2007). Whatever their problems of service deprivation and community cohesion, they are integrated into the broader Cairo metropolitan area on a number of levels.

Yet ironically even this scholarly literature sometimes mirrors the *ashwa'iyyat* discourse in the claim that informal urbanism reflects the absence of the Egyptian state. Asef Bayat, for example, has argued that the informal sector in Egypt (and elsewhere) is populated by those who desire ‘to run their own affairs, without involving the authorities or other modern formal institutions’ (1997: 59). Even more strikingly, Salwa Ismail has argued that informal areas in Cairo constitute ‘spheres of dissidence’ in which Islamist militants are able to establish themselves by virtue of the areas ‘autonomy, informality and self-regulation’ (2000: 364, 389). She viewed the militants as exploiting the illegality and invisibility ‘inscribed in the characteristics of the space itself’, for example, the absence of police stations (1996: 125). While certain social institutions within informal Cairo doubtless do have a degree of autonomy, Bayat and Ismail’s
claims beg the question of how such autonomy and opposition are possible given the apparently all encompassing character of the post-1952 political dispensation.

Confronting the ‘ashwa’iyat?

But perhaps the most effective critique of the ‘ashwa’iyat discourse emerges from an examination of the Egyptian state’s de facto policy of inaction vis-à-vis informal Cairo. Upon closer scrutiny, most of the areas slated for demolition had not been cleared by the end of the 1990s. Official claims to the contrary notwithstanding, there was also little evidence that informal Cairo had been systematically upgraded.

With respect to the sixteen neighbourhoods slated for demolition in 1993, Cairo fieldwork in the late 1990s uncovered clear evidence of merely three clearances, one of which was only partial (Dorman, 2007). In the meantime, eight of the areas had been re-designated for upgrading. This research further indicated that several of the original sixteen areas had been previously slated for demolition. Their inclusion on the 1993 list was not necessarily a sign of state resolve to tackle the pathologies of the novel ‘ashwa’iyat phenomenon, but rather merely the latest a series of attempts by Cairo officials to displace areas long deemed undesirable. Where clearances did take place—sometimes in areas not on the demolitions list—the removals often had little to do with informality. Most commonly, informal areas were displaced to make way for public-sector projects—for example major road works (Raymond, 2000; Sims, 2002).

On the infrastructure front, the Mubarak government did build new police stations and undertook the show-piece re-building of Munira Gharbiyya. However, there is less evidence of a more general renovation programme for informal Cairo. The $563 million Fund for the Upgrading of Scattered Settlements, announced in early 1993 as the primary funding instrument, was quite limited in per capita terms. Much of its money may have been spent on projects of primary benefit to upper-income groups in Cairo’s more formal areas (Sims, 2003).

The ambiguity of Egyptian upgrading efforts is evident in the Munira re-building case. Its show-piece upgrading, including a visit from Britain’s Prince Charles, was described in the semi-official press as a ‘model’ for how the state should deal with the ‘ashwa’iyat (Al-Dib, 1995). Some $90 million paid for sewerage, water connections, street lighting, paving, and improved sanitation as well as secondary services such as schools, a youth centre and clinics (Tadros, 1996). Yet interviews with an Egyptian official in Giza and a well-informed western source indicated that the Munira project was the only such effort undertaken in urban Giza. Much of the basic infrastructure work, however, had been installed by national agencies and not the local authorities. Yet even the provision of water and wastewater service would probably have not been possible without the substantial investments provided by a long-running US Agency for International Development (AID) sewerage project still underway at the time (Dorman, 2007). Closer to home, the Munira upgrading faced accusations from Egyptian commentators that—apart from paving and wastewater—state concern was ‘superficial’ and the upgrading ‘nominal’ (Al-Sawi, 1996: 129). Even the semi-official press noted its rather limited scope: nearby settlements still lacked basic utilities (Tadros,
Such evidence suggests that following the suppression of the Islamists, the Mubarak government returned to what might be called ‘neglectful rule’, long-established patterns of inaction that had allowed informal Cairo to flourish for decades. In the main, little was done to curb its continuing growth. One nominal effort, the announcement in 1996 that informal developers would be prosecuted in Egyptian military courts, had been abandoned by 2004 because it was actually encouraging such urbanization (El Hefnawi, 2005). De facto toleration of informal communities was also accompanied by the state’s inability or unwillingness to undertake major infrastructure projects without international funding. While officials did rebuff bottom-up demands for servicing, the long-term trend has been for areas to receive local connections eventually—usually the result of a clientelistic micropolitics whereby informal communities cultivate ties to state officials and the latter use services (or at least the promise thereof) as means of cultivating support (Fahmy, 2004; Kassem 1999; Sims, 2002; Tekçe et al., 1994).

Neglect & Complicity

Observers of Cairene politics therefore face an interesting puzzle: an apparently pervasive and unilateral state that nonetheless fails to take control of its capital, even after the emergence of virulently oppositional elements and despite a discourse apparently giving it ample justification for heavy-handed action. One possible explanation for the Mubarak government’s neglectful rule of its capital can be found at the levels of state capacity and structural constraint. Egypt’s historic underdevelopment—a legacy of an essentially mono-crop agrarian economy integrated internationally through cotton exports—has limited the domestic resources for modernization and state building (Barnett, 1992). Specifically, Egyptian governments since 1952 have lacked the means to plan and service the rapidly growing mega-city (Serageldin, 1990). Most importantly, they have been unable to construct sufficient housing to resettle the millions who would be affected by the large-scale clearance of informal Cairo and no government is likely to risk large-scale displacements without having alternative shelter available (Kuppinger, 2001; Sims, 2002). In this view, ‘neglectful rule’ merely represents the path of least resistance for Egypt’s rulers, given the historic constraints they faced.

An interesting implication of the structural constraints argument is that the Egyptian state, post-1952, is less a bureaucratic ‘leviathan’ and more of a ‘gate-keeper’ (Cooper, 2002). The claim here is that it maintains a modicum of top-down control not through the systematic penetration of society, but rather by focusing on strategic nodes of communication and relying on the large-scale use of intermediary groups to rule the urban and rural masses indirectly (Roussillon 1998). It is a tempting argument to make because it echoes the work of scholars who have looked at the Egyptian state in the rural sector, and similarly noted its incapacities vis-à-vis politically sensitive issues such as land reform and support to small farmers (Adams, 1986; Waterbury 1983). The ‘gate-keeper state’ argument further resonates with efforts to transcend conventional accounts of contemporary Egyptian politics—with their near uniform focus on national-government decision-making—in favour of a more bottom-up approach (Fandy, 1998).
But whatever the merits of these arguments about limited state capacity, they do not entirely fit the empirical case here. The Cairo metropolitan area is just too small to view the Egyptian state as merely a ‘gate-keeper’. Not only are there police stations situated throughout the city (especially after 1992), one can usually find some degree of state presence in even the most seemingly forgotten informal neighbourhoods. With respect to the resource constraints claim, structural underdevelopment has doubtlessly constrained the state. But since the 1970s Cairo’s rulers have not faced the city alone. Rather, they have had access to substantial levels of western aid and technical assistance for use in upgrading informal areas, planning the city’s future growth, and renewing basic infrastructure. For example, following the January 1977 riots the US Agency for International Development (AID) began a large-scale housing and informal areas upgrading project in Helwan—a southern Cairo industrial suburb (see map)—where the rioting had started and which had been a flash-point for civil unrest since the late 1960s (Dorman, 2007). Around the same time, AID justified its decision to upgrade the Cairo wastewater network and end widespread sewage flooding—what would eventually become a $900 million infrastructure programme—in terms of the need to reverse the urban poor’s declining standard of living which it linked to the 1977 riots (Dorman, 2007).

But such urban-development projects were not purely about buying social peace through the provision of infrastructure. They were also intended to foster an administratively competent Egyptian state better able to intervene in its capital (Dorman, 2007). Although their implementation has been highly uneven, with Egyptian state agencies generally resisting donor efforts to prepare them for more activist urban governance, these initiatives are nonetheless analytically significant. They strongly suggest that the indisputable constraints faced by Cairo’s rulers are not purely a historical (or structural) lack of resources, but also reflect more contemporary and political constraints on state capacity.

Informality & the Egyptian State

Indeed, the puzzle of non-intervention in informal Cairo can only be explained fully with the realization that the image, implicit in much of the ‘ashwa’iyat discourse, of the Egyptian state facing disorderly and insurgent subalterns is misleading. As Elyachar has insightfully observed: ‘the state cannot always be so neatly located outside informality’ (2003: 576). Not only are there numerous linkages, but informal Cairo is best understood as a consequence of certain state policies (declared and undeclared), and its top-down dispensation since 1952. The existence and durability of the ‘ashwa’iyat reflects not the absence of the Egyptian state, but the very peculiar qualities of its presence.

Not only does informal urbanization predate the economic opening of the 1970s, it was ironically an indirect consequence of the Nasser government’s state-led industrialization efforts of the late 1950s and early 1960s, a project as much about the exigencies of the military autocracy as Egypt’s developmental needs. In order to make resources available for industrialization, his government sought to channel capital, both public and private, out of the housing sector (Harik, 1997). In particular, it failed to create new Cairo sub-divisions—in the way that the city’s northern districts and Heliopolis neighbourhood had been developed in previous decades—to accommodate the city’s steadily increasing population (Abu
Lughod, 1971). While it did build a few new neighbourhoods, such as Medinat Nasr and Mohandisin in Giza, these areas were largely for the professional classes and elites (Harik, 1997). Located close by the Egyptian military’s major barracks and installations, Medinat Nasr was specifically intended for the officer corps (El Kadi, 1990). Public housing construction was similarly small-scale. Although nominally designated for low-income Cairenes, it has often functioned as a source of patronage (Abdel-Fadil, 1980; Hasan 1985; Sims 2000).

At the same time, the Nasser government located many of its new public-sector factories on the city’s agrarian periphery—the need to protect farmland notwithstanding—rather than in existing industrial centres. Such locations were intended to shield their future workers from the blandishments of the then still influential Egyptian communist movement (El Kadi, 1990). However this spatial dispersal strategy also facilitated subsequent informal urbanization of the surrounding area by installing utilities upon which such settlements could ‘piggy back’. Moreover, it also increased local housing needs which the new communities served by offering shelter to the factory employees (Dames & Moore, 1981; El Kadi, 1990; Sims, 2003).

Hence two of the essential conditions of possibility for informal urbanization—the absence of new subdivisions at the root of land-price inflation and the economic development of the city periphery—can be shown to have their origins in state policies shaped by the exigencies of authoritarianism. Such settlements are linked to the authoritarian and clientelistic character of state governance in two more general ways. First, the complexities and venalities of securing official permission for land development has led many ordinary Egyptians to opt for informality (DeSoto, 1997). Second, there is some suggestion that individual officials have sometimes used their official position to facilitate informal urbanization—for example, ‘selling’ public land to informal homesteaders—whether simply in return for pay-offs or because they were active participants in the informal development process (El Kadi, 1988; Elyachar, 2003; Sims 2000). But while it may collapse the view that the *ashwa‘iyat* are a marginal zone apart from the state, this evidence that the Egyptian state has been thoroughly implicated in their genesis does not by itself explain the subsequent absence of state intervention. Nor does it link non-interventionism specifically to the authoritarian dispensation.

Most immediately, the *de facto* reluctance to demolish informal neighbourhoods on a large scale in the absence of alternative shelter can be explained as an authoritarian survival strategy of risk avoidance. Autocracies predicated on popular demobilization will generally refrain from actions likely to catalyze bottom-up contention (Dorman, 2007). In this view, the Mubarak government was unlikely to demolish Munira Gharbiyya at the height of its campaign against the Islamists for fear of creating new grievances for the militants to exploit. But the absence of shelter alternatives is not a simple consequence of resource limitations, but rather starkly illustrates the constraints which Egypt’s elite-dominated and exclusionary dispensation of power puts on urban management.

By the late 1970s, the western aid agencies attempting to assist the Egyptian government in re-planning Cairo had grasped the linkage between informal Cairo and the metropolitan area’s broader expansion
discussed above (Dames & Moore, 1981). They advised the Sadat and Mubarak governments to re-orientate its north-south growth away from vulnerable farmland towards a more northeast-southwest axis (PADCO et al., 1982). With respect housing, they suggested the development of planned and serviced sites on the city’s desert periphery which would be sold to would-be informal homesteaders to construct affordable ‘semi-formal’ settlements without the problems of planning, services and farmland consumption (GOPP/OTUI/IAURIF, 1983; Tayler & Green, nd).

But the Mubarak government baulked at these recommendations for a number of reasons. Not only did such so-called ‘state-sanctioned slum building’ offend its modernist principles, many of the proposed desert sites were already planned by the housing ministry and the politically powerful Egyptian military for upper-income development. These agencies effectively blocked the adoption and implementation of donor recommendations (Dorman, 2007). A decade later, these desert sites are the very places where the luxurious gated communities have been located. So in the Cairo case, gated communities were not merely a response to unruly plebeian urbanization, they also obstructed attempts to manage it—occupying the land needed to include non-elite Cairenes in the city’s rationally planned growth. This example further illustrates the exclusionary character of the political order in which access to formal housing is often a preserve of the wealthy and well-connected, and shows specifically how the order constrains the provision of alternative shelter and hence the displacement of informal communities.

But such links go beyond Egyptian governments tolerating what they are unable to rollback. There is also evidence of their tacit acceptance, and sometimes encouragement, of informal urbanization. With respect to agricultural periphery settlements, one account quoted a long-time and highly influential agriculture minister in the Mubarak government saying that the state had aligned itself with the interests of such homesteaders in the 1980s (Musaylihi, 1988). More specific cases of official acceptance generally involve settlements—such as Manshiet Nasser and ʿIzbat al-Haggana (see map)—which encroach on state land. Although described in the ʿashwaʾiyat literature as violations of the law, public land-use regulations actually allow considerable scope for such occupations (Sims, 2002). Manshiet Nasser, for example, was originally settled by a nearby squatter community which was being displaced to make way for a hospital. Community leaders negotiated through local parliamentarians, eventually receiving ‘tacit permission’ to establish the new neighbourhood (Tekçe et al., 1994: 24). On the city’s eastern periphery, ʿIzbat al-Haggana originated as an encampment for the families of the Camel Corps soldiers prior to 1952 and later received a degree of official sanction. It housed the construction workers building Medinat Nasr and serving nearby military facilities (Sims, 1984; Soliman, 2004).

Such acceptance has an obvious logic, yet again indicative of the exclusionary character of the political order. The self-help strategies of informal Cairo ironically serve to insulate a political order in which the elite have preferential access to state largesse. The settlement of Manshiet Nasser relieved state officials of the likely risks of forcible clearance and the necessity of paying for resettlement. Not only do state officials probably understand that many Cairenes have little option but to homestead informally—a point sometimes echoed in the semi-official press—such settlements are an easy means of housing lower-
income communities at little cost to the state (Al-Mussawar, 1983; Soliman, 1987). Indeed, some western
observers have suggested that in Cairo the notion of informality functions largely as a pretext for
rationing scarce infrastructure (Mayo et al., 1982; Tekçe et al., 1994). It is thus more generally a means by
which the city’s rulers sidestep the human costs of its inevitable expansion and shield themselves from the
demands the city’s growth engenders. Such views appear to be confirmed in the semi-public comments of
an Egyptian official summarized by Elyachar:

Informal housing, he explained, was housing for which the state provided no services—water, electricity,
roads, or lighting. People who build in such conditions enjoyed cheaper prices in exchange for doing
without these services. Those who lived in informal settlements had to provide for themselves, until they
were established enough that the state had to recognize them, such as had happened in Manshiet Nasser.
Those living in informal housing had the right to build, he explained, but not to demand anything from the
state (2003: 593).

This position, not coincidentally, opens the door to the kind of clientelism in search of public services
upon which the micro-politics of many Cairo neighbourhoods revolves. It thus links them to the country-
wide networks of devolved patronage which have long under-pinned the political order. Hence
informality, again ironically, allows Egypt’s rulers to achieve a considerable degree of state-society
integration by other means—despite a political order grounded in elite privilege.

Conclusion: Explaining the ‘Ashwa’iyat Discourse

At least in Cairo, rapid urbanization has not produced a highly violent and conflictual environment
outside the control of the state. Instead, neighbourhoods are closely connected to the state both in origins
and reproduction. In the long term, the ‘Siege of Imbaba’ has done little to alter the underlying state
orientation of indifference, toleration and tacit approval—as well as the clientelistic politics of service
provision—which actually characterizes state-society relations on a day-to-day basis. State interventions
are constrained not only by limited state capacity, but also a logic of exclusion and privilege—intrinsic to
Egypt’s post-1952 political order—in which informal settlements are regarded as the path of least
resistance for the low-income and state agencies develop the formal city almost exclusively for the elite.
So these neighbourhoods should not be understood as a disorderly oppositional zone. Rather they are a
reflection, however oblique, of the political order they seem to confront.

But such an interpretation of state-society relations in informal Cairo leaves one remaining question: if the
two are so closely tied together in origin and ongoing relations of complicity, what purpose was served by
the highly pejorative ‘ashwa’iyat discourse? Indeed, it is unclear whether the issue of informality was
genuinely ‘securitized’. Although the ‘ashwa’iyat were indisputably portrayed as an existential threat and
there is little evidence to suggest that the discourse was rejected by any significant section of the Egyptian
public, nonetheless the relative absence of securitizing policies or practices makes the application of
Buzan et al.’s securitization concept problematic.

The answer to this last puzzle is probably that the ‘ashwa’iyat discourse needs to be thought of in terms of
the Egyptian state’s broader repertoire of ‘symbolic violence’, and that the discourse has had a number of
functions—some of which are only indirectly related to the areas it purports to describe. For example, it
may reflect a degree of authoritarian unease at informal urbanization as an organic bottom-up movement from within Egyptian society not subject to formal state control (Ghannam, 2001). In the context of confronting the Islamist militants in the early 1990s, it should also be read as an attempt to depoliticize the Islamist political challenge—with its elements of subaltern agency, grass-roots organization, and protest of the status quo—as mere criminality, a product of informal Cairo’s socio-spatial disorder (Singerman, 1999). It contributes to the long-term political goal—intrinsic to the post-1952 order—of ‘denying communities the legal right and space and organizational resources to participate in Egyptian political life’ (Singerman, 1999: 27).

Finally, the *'ashwa'iyat* discourse provided the Mubarak government with a means of deflecting the increased public concern with Cairo’s overall well-being that followed the earthquake and clashes with militants. It served to ‘spatialize a series of social and political problems’, in effect transferring them ‘into these [informal] areas, symbolically absolving the rest of the city’ (Kuppinger 2001: 197, 199). In so doing, the discourse provided the Mubarak government in the early 1990s with a means of deflecting the increased public concern with Cairo’s overall well-being that followed the earthquake and clashes with militants. In short it was a means of scapegoating and obscuring the state’s broader failures of urban governance.
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—— 2000b. ‘Map 4: Generalized Classification of Residential Built-up Areas’, Institute for Liberty and Democracy, Formalization of Urban Real Estate in Egypt project.


Map caption

Informal development in the Cairo metropolitan area

Source: Séjourne, 2000a,b

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