Ingthorsson, R. D. (2009) 'Can things endure in tenseless time ?', Sats–Nordic journal of philosophy., 10 (1). pp. 79-99.
It has been argued that the tenseless view of time is incompatible with endurantism. This has been disputed, perhaps most famously by Hugh Mellor and Peter Simons. They argue that things can endure in tenseless time, and indeed must endure if tenseless time is to contain change. In this paper I will point out some difficulties with Mellor’s and Simons’ claims that in tenseless time a particular can be ‘wholly present’ at various times, and therefore endure, as well as have incompatible properties at those different times, and thereby change. In effect I argue that they do not resolve the charge that the tenseless view of time is incomatible with endurantism because the tenseless view does not allow anything to change temporal location and thereby come to be ‘wholly present’ at various times.
|Keywords:||Mellor, Simons, Tenseless Time, Temporal Parity, Persistence.|
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|Publisher Web site:||http://cjas.dk/index.php/sats/article/view/2549|
|Record Created:||07 Oct 2009 11:20|
|Last Modified:||25 Nov 2011 09:42|
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