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Truthmakers without truth.

Ingthorsson, R. D. (2006) 'Truthmakers without truth.', Metaphysica., 7 (2). pp. 53-71.

Abstract

It is often taken for granted that truth is mind-independent, i.e. that, necessarily, if the world is objectively speaking in a certain way, then it is true that it is that way, independently of anyone thinking that it is that way. I argue that proponents of correspondence-truth, in particular immanent realists, should not take the mind-independence of truth for granted. The assumption that the mind-independent features of the world, i.e. ‘facts’, determine the truth of propositions, does not entail that truth is independent of minds. This follows only on the further assumption that there exist propositions about every feature of reality independent of minds, which is something the immanent realist can and should deny.

Item Type:Article
Keywords:Truth, Truth-maker principle, Armstrong, Immanent realism.
Full text:PDF - Accepted Version (83Kb)
Status:Peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:http://www.metaphysica.de/issues-2006.htm
Record Created:07 Oct 2009 11:50
Last Modified:25 Nov 2011 09:53

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