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The Logical vs. the Ontological Understanding of Conditions

Ingthorsson, R.D.

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Authors

R.D. Ingthorsson



Abstract

According to the truth-functional analysis of conditions, to be ‘necessary for ’ and ‘sufficient for ’ are converse relations. From this, it follows that to be ‘necessary and sufficient for ’ is a symmetric relation, that is, that if P is a necessary and sufficient condition for Q, then Q is a necessary and sufficient condition for P. This view is contrary to common sense. In this paper, I point out that it is also contrary to a widely accepted ontological view of conditions, according to which if P is a necessary and sufficient condition for Q, then Q is in no sense a condition for P; it is a mere consequence of P.

Citation

Ingthorsson, R. (2008). The Logical vs. the Ontological Understanding of Conditions. Metaphysica, 9(2), 129-137. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-008-0027-x

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date Oct 1, 2008
Deposit Date Oct 7, 2009
Publicly Available Date Oct 7, 2009
Journal Metaphysica
Print ISSN 1437-2053
Electronic ISSN 1874-6373
Publisher De Gruyter
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 9
Issue 2
Pages 129-137
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-008-0027-x
Keywords Necessary and sufficient conditions, Conditionality, Ontology, Wertheimer, Causality, Truth-functional analysis.
Publisher URL http://dro.dur.ac.uk/6086

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Copyright Statement
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com



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