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The logical vs. the ontological understanding of conditions.

Ingthorsson, R. D. (2008) 'The logical vs. the ontological understanding of conditions.', Metaphysica., 9 (2). pp. 129-137.

Abstract

According to the truth-functional analysis of conditions, to be ‘necessary for ’ and ‘sufficient for ’ are converse relations. From this, it follows that to be ‘necessary and sufficient for ’ is a symmetric relation, that is, that if P is a necessary and sufficient condition for Q, then Q is a necessary and sufficient condition for P. This view is contrary to common sense. In this paper, I point out that it is also contrary to a widely accepted ontological view of conditions, according to which if P is a necessary and sufficient condition for Q, then Q is in no sense a condition for P; it is a mere consequence of P.

Item Type:Article
Keywords:Necessary and sufficient conditions, Conditionality, Ontology, Wertheimer, Causality, Truth-functional analysis.
Full text:PDF - Accepted Version (55Kb)
Status:Peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12133-008-0027-x
Publisher statement:The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
Record Created:07 Oct 2009 11:50
Last Modified:25 Nov 2011 09:54

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