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Durham Research Online
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Causal closure principles and emergentism.

Lowe, E. J. (2000) 'Causal closure principles and emergentism.', Philosophy., 75 (4). pp. 571-585.

Abstract

Causal closure arguments against interactionist dualism are currently popular amongst physicalists. Such an argument appeals to some principles of the causal closure of the physical, together with certain other premises, to conclude that at least some mental events are identical with physical events. However, it is crucial to the success of any such argument that the physical causal closure principle to which it appeals is neither too strong nor too weak by certain standards. In this paper, it is argued that various forms of naturalistic dualism, of an emergentist character, are consistent with the strongest physical causal closure principles that can plausibly be advocated.

Item Type:Article
Keywords:Overdetermination.
Full text:PDF - Published Version (121Kb)
Status:Peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S003181910000067X
Publisher statement:© The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2000
Record Created:04 Jul 2008
Last Modified:19 Apr 2011 09:42

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