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Causal closure principles and emergentism

Lowe, E. J.

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Authors

E. J. Lowe



Abstract

Causal closure arguments against interactionist dualism are currently popular amongst physicalists. Such an argument appeals to some principles of the causal closure of the physical, together with certain other premises, to conclude that at least some mental events are identical with physical events. However, it is crucial to the success of any such argument that the physical causal closure principle to which it appeals is neither too strong nor too weak by certain standards. In this paper, it is argued that various forms of naturalistic dualism, of an emergentist character, are consistent with the strongest physical causal closure principles that can plausibly be advocated.

Citation

Lowe, E. J. (2000). Causal closure principles and emergentism. Philosophy, 75(4), 571-585. https://doi.org/10.1017/s003181910000067x

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date 2000-10
Deposit Date Jul 4, 2008
Publicly Available Date Jul 4, 2008
Journal Philosophy
Print ISSN 0031-8191
Electronic ISSN 1469-817X
Publisher Cambridge University Press
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 75
Issue 4
Pages 571-585
DOI https://doi.org/10.1017/s003181910000067x
Keywords Overdetermination.

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Copyright Statement
© The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2000







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