Cozzi, G. (2001) 'Inventing or spying ? implications for growth.', Journal of economic growth., 6 (1). pp. 55-77.
An engineer graduates if shederives the obvious implications of her instructor's hints. Butthe patent system rewards only the first to present nonobviousadvancements—ideas similarly skilled engineers are notexpected to invent. If a fraction of the newly invented hintsspill over before the technological advances they entail arecompleted and granted legal protection, the R&D workerswill find it convenient to spend some time searching for eachother's hints instead of creating their own. A simple modificationof the basic Schumpeterian model shows that the larger the skilledpopulation, the larger the relative incentive to spy.
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|Publisher Web site:||http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1009898011453|
|Record Created:||05 Mar 2010 10:50|
|Last Modified:||05 Mar 2010 10:55|
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