Globalized fear? Towards an emotional geopolitics

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**Abstract**

This paper questions the recent recasting of fear within critical geopolitics. It identifies a widespread metanarrative, ‘globalized fear’, analysis of which lacks grounding and is remote, disembodied and curiously unemotional. A hierarchical scaling of emotions, politics and place overlooks agency, resistance and action. Drawing on feminist scholarship, I call for an emotional geopolitics of fear which connects political processes and everyday emotional topographies in a less hierarchical, more enabling relationship. I employ conscientization as a tool to inform the reconceptualisation of global fears within critical geopolitics, and to move forward epistemological practice and our relationship as scholars with social change.

Keywords: fear, geopolitics, emotion, feminism, conscientization

**I. Introduction**

If the plethora of book titles in the early years of the twenty first century is anything to go by, fear is back in fashion (e.g. Bauman 2006; Bourke 2005; Furedi, 2005, 2006; Robin 2004; Schneier 2003). That this level of analytical interest in fear exists at this particular time, and largely within the spaces of Anglo-American world, is not coincidental, but relates to a series of contemporary events. Most obviously, terrorist attacks in the west this century¹ and the war on/of terror² have sparked new interest in the politics and patterns of fear. Other global (or at least deterritorialized) issues, including some that are seen as related to terrorism, have also figured highly in the public imagination and on policy agendas. These include immigration and the threats it is perceived to pose to nation states; the possibility of deadly diseases which can travel rapidly across the world; global financial crises; and environmental destruction and, potentially, catastrophe (see Beck 2002; Hartmann et al 2005; Hujsmans 2006; Ingram 2008). The context which these ‘new’ threats have entered is generally
regarded as a longer-standing ‘risk culture’ in western societies; the thesis runs that ‘paranoid’ or ‘neurotic’ citizens have become disproportionately anxious in everyday life, encouraged by government actions, scientists’ claims and commercial interests (Beck 1992, 1999; Furedi 2006; Isin 2004). While it is not usually analysed in detail (although Beck 1999, 2002 is an exception), it is the increasingly global nature of these issues which is held to be ratcheting up both risk and fear and the government and individual actions and practices that are held to be resulting.

This paper takes issue with this understanding of fear. I argue that a powerful metanarrative, which I call ‘globalized fear’, is present in academic work and the wider public sphere. These literatures have generated important insights, particularly the more critical and detailed accounts of the new geopolitics of fear which include contributions from political geographers (e.g. Katz 2007; Megoran 2005; Sparke 2007). However, the model of fear that provides the basis for these discussions is not always reflective of the ways that fear is felt, patterned and practiced in everyday life. To engage in this critique may inevitably seem to set up the global/geopolitical and the local/everyday in a binary relationship, which is also the case in most of the literature reviewed here. In contrast, the aim of the paper is to critique the ways in which fear is constituted within the new geopolitics of fear literature, to dismantle the artificial scaling it suggests, and to point to a more insightful and empowering framework for understanding fear in the twenty-first century that is far more attentive to what is happening on ‘the ground’ in the places and lives that people inhabit. To this end, the paper draws throughout on recent feminist understandings of scale, global/local processes and geopolitics, and suggests how these might be combined with accounts of emotion. This provides one way of redressing the scaling-up of analysis of fear that has gradually taken place in recent decades - not reversing it, but finding new ways to refocus on different interconnected sites simultaneously.

First, some of the issues and themes in these new literatures on globalized fear are examined more closely. Next, in a critique of this literature, I suggest that the ‘globalized fear’ metanarrative tends to constitute fear as omnipresent and connected, yet at the same time analyses it remotely, lacking grounding, embodiment or emotion. I then begin to outline what a call for an ‘emotional geopolitics’ might entail. I examine three areas of existing literature: critical research on fear of crime, feminist
accounts of globalization and geopolitics, and emotional/affective geographies, each of which is largely ignored in the new geopolitics of fear literature. All offer relevant insights, and help underpin a more enabling framework for understanding fear against the backdrop of the war on/of terror. I go on to develop one agenda for an emotional geopolitics of fear that uses conscientization as a conceptual, epistemological and political tool. I conclude with some reflections on the separateness of various trajectories of knowledge production around the geopolitics of fear to date.

The literatures reviewed here use ‘fear’ in different ways; they variously analyse it as experiential, discursive, and/or political. What they have in common – and this underlies geographers’ longstanding and recently diversifying interest in fear – is that they view fear as a social and spatial rather than purely psychological phenomenon. Fear is defined throughout the paper as an emotional reaction to a perceived threat that always has social meaning, and which may have a range of positive and negative effects on social and spatial relations.

II. Globalized fear?

Few political spheres generate more fear and awe than the international. This is not only the case with key events such as wars or terrorist attacks, but also applies to the very nature of global politics. Consider how conventional realist approaches to foreign policy, which revolve around nation states seeking to maximise security, are in many ways political attempts to master and manipulate the awe-inspiring fear of the international and the conflicts it engenders.

(Bleiker and Leet 2006, 714)

Feminist interventions question the disembodied masculinism of the [global] and interrogate the limits of local/global binaries, calling attention to the silenced, marginalized and excluded. In so doing, they observe that the local is often essentialized (Roberts 2004)…the discourses of globalization hypermasculinized (Nagar et al. 2002), and many forms of knowledge and social relations effaced.
By ‘globalized fear’ I mean the powerful metanarrative that is currently popular in analyses of the relation of fear, terror and security. There are two senses in which these metanarratives of fear can be considered to be ‘global’. The first is the idea, more often implicit than worked through, that emotions are being produced and circulate on a global scale: this has become prominent within much recent political analysis of security and terror, including work in human geography. The second sense in which these explanations and processes are ‘global’ ones is that they tend to be prioritized and discussed as though they apply to everyone all of the time. In this section, I want to examine these two propositions in more detail.

1. A scaled history of the analysis of fear
Like the process of globalization itself, the metanarrative of globalized fear is not new, but gathered pace as the century turned. The last thirty years have seen a steady widening of the scale at which analysis of fear has taken place. The following brief historical caricature attempts to capture this scaling, though not all of the intricacies of academic analysis of fear. In the 1960s and 1970s, accounts of fear tended to be individualized and pathologized in social science (see Smith 1989 for a critique). By the 1980s, much empirical emphasis was on the neighbourhood as a unit of analysis (e.g. Taub 1984). At the same time, feminist and other structuralist critiques became significant in diverting attention from individuals and environments towards the underlying social and political structures which breed fear, as well as mapping in rich detail the texture of fear in everyday lives (Crawford et al 1990; Pain 1991; Stanko 1990; Valentine 1989). Critiques of moral panic and the governance of fear at the national scale were also increasingly evident (Hall et al 1978; May 1988). Through the 1990s, such analyses of fear as discursive - as a political and cultural tool used by powerful groups within nation states to meet certain ends - gained further ground, becoming more prominent than empirical descriptions of the patterning of fear (Garland 1996; Lee 2007). In the early years of the twenty-first century, the idea that governments are increasingly manufacturing, drawing upon and reproducing fear (at least, certain sorts of fears) has become the predominant focus of attention, though there are different emphases and perspectives in the literature. The suggestion that science and commerce have joined with public policy in encouraging a ‘culture of
fear’, a risk-averse condition which stimulates negative reactions by individuals (Furedi 2001, 2006; Glassner 1999), has been eagerly taken up. Some go so far as to state that ‘public policy and private life have become fear-bound; fear has become the emotion through which public life is administered’ (Bourke 2004, x). Isin (2004) argues that Anglophone neoliberal state societies are now governed through neurosis, responding to and instilling fear in ‘neurotic citizens’. For Isin, the ‘culture of fear’ actually argument underplays ‘the fact that people not only conduct their lives with affects and emotions but also in the absence of capacities for evaluating full and transparent information’ (Isin 2004, 220). Such political use of fear is certainly not new, as Bourke’s (2004) history shows (and nor is the outright dismissal of people’s critical capacities). However, many would agree that ‘there is something new about the specific architecture of fear that is now being crafted and…the specific ‘we’ it attempts to craft with it’ (Weber 2006, 684, my emphasis).

2. Globalized fear in the social sciences
Since 2001, a burgeoning literature has developed around globalized fear. In academic and public discourses, fear has become primarily focused on issues of international reach, such as immigration, disease and terrorism, rather than the concerns of previous decades with local everyday lives, bodies and places (Pain and Smith 2008b). In accounts of the new geopolitics of fear (e.g. Bleiker and Leet 2006; Gregory and Pred 2007; Robin 2004; Sparke 2007), fear is drawn into geopolitical governance and conflict. It is the transnational dimensions of fear that are of interest here: in this model, fear is produced and imagined rapidly and connectedly from one site in the world to another, directed and channelled by political agendas. The transmission between spaces and scales is often attributed to the mass media (Debrix 2008), with certain culturally proximate events, such as terrorist attacks on the west, receiving disproportionate ongoing attention because of their political and socio-cultural utility (Mythen and Walklate 2006). Indeed, the discourse of fear is so ubiquitous that it is often linked to these before there has been time to ascertain their actual emotional impacts (Altheide 2003), and the media rarely specify exactly what it is that we actually fear (Poynting et al 2004). Increasingly, this applies to issues ranging from panics about immigration flows to diseases such as SARS and avian flu, though the core theme has been the war on/of terror that has followed al-Qaeda bombings of western targets this century. Such risks, whether imagined, potential, or
happening now, enter a ‘world risk society’ (Beck 1999) in which the ‘unpredictable, uncontrollable and ultimately incommunicable’ consequences of risks increasingly circulate at a global scale (Beck 2002, 40). According to Beck, it is not that life has become more dangerous. It is that risk is now de-bounded, in spatial, temporal and social terms, so that ‘the hidden central issue in world risk society is how to feign control over the uncontrollable – in politics, law, science, technology, economy and everyday life’ (Beck 2002: 41, original emphasis).

While the brief history of analysis of fear (above) reflects the dual trends of the scaling-up of analytical interest and the de-concretization of risk and fear, we might reflect that both fear discourses and its global-mobile nature have been with us in the west for rather longer. Our colonial history provides a pre-condition as well as a parallel to these uses of emotion around a supposition of unbounded risk; present day geopolitical events and relations both raise the stakes and provide further credibility for widespread fear (see Ahmed 2004; Tolia-Kelly 2007, 2008).

For many scholars, the manipulation of fear is central to the ‘feigning of control’ that Beck speaks of, and especially prominent in analyses of the war on/of terror. Fear is, of course, germane to the definition of terrorism, as it involves the use of fear as a weapon which is as intended to be effective as bombs. For example, from al-Qaeda statements following the Madrid bombings in March 2004, ‘if you don't stop your injustices, more and more blood will flow and these attacks will seem very small compared to what can occur in what you call terrorism’; and after the London bombings in July 2005, ‘Britain is now burning with fear, terror and panic in its northern, southern, eastern and western quarters’. The media have validated this suggestion that western fears of terrorism are widespread (Altheide 2003). Such reports (or, more properly, unsubstantiated statements about fear) are, paradoxically, tied up with the nation-building that follows terrorist attacks, so that in 2005, Londoners were congratulated on their resilience and collective stiff upper lip, reminiscent of the ‘Blitz spirit’ of World War Two (Closs Stephens 2007), in comparison with supposed mass hysteria in the USA following the New York bombings of 2001 (see also Smith 2002 on nation-building in the representation of terrorist attacks).
Recent suggestions from critical commentators that governments use these fears in order to justify domestic and foreign political actions are persuasive, at the same time as constituting, themselves, new constructed fear metanarratives entering the fray. Here fear and risk are woven together in particular ways, and fear has gained considerable currency as a way in which (geo)politics gets done:

Before 9/11, Americans were supposed to be in Eden, idling in a warm bath of social autism…Our fear of terrorism, orchestrated and manipulated by the powerful, is being used to reorganise the structure of power in American society, giving more to those who already have much and taking away from those who have little.

(Robin 2004, pp 1-2 and 25)

3. Globalized fear and human geography

The notion of the globalization of fear has, not unexpectedly, stimulated renewed interest in fear within human geography, and from new quarters of the discipline. These ideas about fear fit well with political geographers’ interest in international relations and critical geopolitics, as well as with related popular assertions about risk, lifestyle and the quality of life in the west in the twenty-first century (Beck 1999; Furedi 2006; Gill 2007). Since 2001, many political geographers have taken up positions in opposition to the war on/of terror (Bialasiewicz et al. 2007; Cowen and Gilbert 2008; Graham 2001, 2004; Harvey et al 2001; Katz 2007; Mitchell 2002; Olund 2007; Smith 2002; Sparke 2005, 2007). Shortly following the New York attacks, Davis’ (2001, 390) prophesy was that ‘fear has a brilliant future’, if Americans’ anxieties about personal safety and prosperity were to lead them to trust a ‘revamped National Security State’. Political and social geographers have since demonstrated that the war on/of terror has led, exactly, to repressive and unjust international and domestic policies (see the collections by Gregory and Pred 2007; and Pain and Smith 2008a).

This work has focused especially upon the construction of imaginary and binary geographies that underpin the new geopolitics of fear. Here, government and right wing narratives locate (white) western populations ‘inside’ the map of the nation state or Homeland, and the terrorist threats ‘outside’ – imaginary geographies which
reproduce discourses about dangerous spaces and others, and are laid onto existing racial hatreds (Flint 2004; Sparke 2005). Alongside wider political science, geographical work on the war on/of terror spells out the oppressive consequences that tend to reinforce existing inequalities, for example Robin’s (2004) careful analysis of shifting US domestic policy as having material consequences for Muslim Americans locally. Fear is viewed as driving political actions, as well as being used and affected by them: ‘responses’ to terrorism such as the Iraq invasion by the US and its allies are driven by powerful emotions and the overwhelming desire to exert control in response to them (Bleiker and Leet 2006).

In human geography, Megoran (2005) and Oslender (2007) show how geopolitical strategies in recent years spread terror and fear within local populations in Uzbekistan and Colombia respectively. For Bialasiewicz et al (2007), popular geopolitical representations also feature in the reproduction of imaginative geographies of US security strategies, echoing Sharp’s (2000) earlier assertion that everyday practices and representations are crucial in forming notions of geopolitics and imagining enemy threats through fear. Katz (2007) builds on this notion of a discursive construction of fear with the suggestion that fear in New York city following the 2001 attacks became materialized via urban architectures, police presence and security measures; ‘banal terrorism’ became installed as routine in our collective subconscious, and fear became normal and accepted. Elsewhere, geographers have begun to engage with the ways in which bodies might be affected by and implicated in the politics of the war on/of terror (e.g. Lim 2007; Thrift 2007b), a developing literature I return to later.

III. A critique

Together, this body of work on the new geopolitics of fear is important in its analysis of geopolitical relations and the identification of unjust international and domestic policies. It is also important to point out its layering: it is multi-disciplinary, there is diversity in its approaches to theory and empirical evidence, and so it does not present a unified or harmonious canon of work. The critique below does not reflect doubt about the value of these lines of enquiry. Nor is it made simply to point out what is lacking and might be added on. Instead, my aim is to highlight some of the unintended consequences of theories that take fear for granted, and the political imperative for at least considering the perspectives of those who are supposedly
fearful, who do not currently constitute either collaborators or audience for much of this work. I also question why these (geopolitical) geographies of fear often seem so divorced from other (everyday) geographies of fear. I take issue with the frequently uncritical conceptualization and deployment of fear, the common assumptions about scale, and the lack of historicity that characterises some of this work. The second sense in which these explanations and emphases are ‘global’ is also problematic: fear tends to be prioritized and discussed as though it applies to everyone all of the time, with little regard to social or spatial difference. There are assumptions that fear is, in the first place, in all of these accounts of globalized fear; as well as assumptions about the ways that emotions originate, travel and affect. Ironically, geographers have sometimes joined in the universalization of fear, applying it with a broad brush across a flat earth. Within this literature, there are five important weaknesses.

1. Fear? Whose fear?
The vast majority of the work cited so far examines and makes proposals about (globalized) fear with little or no reference to the feelings, perceptions, views, subjectivities or bodies of those who are supposed to be fearful. The concurrent lack of reference to empirical social research across much of this literature, which is well into its fifth year now, is notable. Hopkins (2007b) makes a similar point about the absence of the voices of marginalized groups in geographers’ responses to the 2001 New York attacks. I attend to both gaps in a follow up paper which reviews empirical evidence about globalized fear, which suggests that fear of terrorism is not widespread among western populations: terrorist events lead to heightened fear which drops off quickly as time passes, and fear effects are much sharper for certain (marginalised) groups (Pain 2008a). Yet research identifying the localised ‘playing out’ of globalized fear (a conceptualisation which is also problematized further below) is often ignored altogether, or placed as subordinate or tangential to the arguments; critical or nuanced understandings of the local/global relationships of emotion are not explored in much of the literature (for example, neither Bauman 2006 or Furedi 2006, 2007 dwell on empirical evidence about global fears). The sense is that the arguments occupy loftier territory; the issues are of such urgent importance, they rise or fall regardless of what might be going on on the ground. Very little attention is paid to whose fear it is that we are talking about: who names fear, who claims it, and who actually feels it? How is it experienced, and what do people do
with it? How is it shaped and differentiated by varied lives, communities and places? While the influential work of geographers such as Graham (2004) and Sparke (2007) is more nuanced, engagement with available analyses of grounded geopolitical fear is also lacking. Many political scientists tend to assume the effects of fear discourses in creating fearful masses (see Pain and Smith 2008b).

A powerful critique by Crawford (2000) of the emotion-blank nature of theories of international politics, that predated the onset of the war on/of terror and the escalation of the issues dealt with here (see also Ling 2000; and more recently Bleiker and Hutchison 2008), might also be applied to recent scholarship in political geography. Crawford notes that ‘theories of international politics and security depend on assumptions about emotions that are rarely articulated and which may not be correct’ (Crawford 2000, 116), and ‘ironically the emotions that security scholars do accept as relevant – fear and hate – seem self-evidently important and are unproblematized. This taken-for-granted status, especially of fear, has particularly pernicious effects’ (118). I go on to identify some of these effects.

2. Globe talk: a scaled hierarchy of fear
The notion of the movement of fear in the bulk of the literature cited so far is a firmly hierarchical one: fear moves from international political events and processes down into people’s minds, bodies and everyday lives. Global, the state, ‘big’ political forms and transnational processes are at the top, active and in control. Ordinary people’s emotions are affected, sponge-like and passive, at the bottom. Furedi’s work (2001, 2006), again, is an archetypal example of this (see Pain 2006, 2008b). Even carefully crafted and historically situated studies of fear such as Robin’s (2004) and Bourke’s (2005) do not pause to consider the consequences of people not being afraid (or of other emotions). The paradoxical lack of interest in feeling itself within analysis of the new geopolitics of fear is likely only to reinforce a fixation with the global as the key scale for analysis. We have seen elsewhere how local/global binaries do epistemological work to exclude the agency of women (Roberts 2004) and young people (Hörschelmann and Schäfer 2005). Marston et al (2005) critique the scalism inherent in the ‘globe talk’ of political and economic geography: in constructing the global as bigger, better, more important and more worthy of analysis, and through demoting what happens at other scales, this globe talk ‘plays into the hands of’
neoliberal commentators’ (Marston et al 2005, 427). The construction of fear as
globalized and simultaneously passive produces disempowering identities for its
supposed subjects, and therefore may even reproduce the conceptualization of fear of
the political forces accused of seeking to order or manipulate emotions.

There are exceptions within the new geopolitics of fear literature. For example, in
Megoran’s (2005) analysis of fear in Uzbekistan he deftly illustrates how a range of
government policies and actions are intended to garner popular support through
creating fear of neighbouring regimes, via popular culture as well as more direct
political channels. He identifies how people’s response to fear discourses is
embodied, blurring the distinction between the political and the personal. Poynting et
al (2004) craft a detailed tapestry of local fears, relating moral panics about the Arab
Other in Australia to events at the national and global scale, but making clear that the
experience as well as the discursive construction of fear is always layered and multi-
faceted. Sparke (2007, 338) points to the pressing need to ground our understandings
of hopes and fears in particular spatial contexts ‘in all their physical, social, economic
cultural and political complexity’. He suggests that it is not enough to outline the
geographies of dispossession which are reinforced by the ways the war on/of terror
has unfolded; ‘we need to learn to learn from the dispossessed about their hope-filled
struggles to create geographies of repossession too’ (Sparke 2007, 347; and see Pain
and Smith 2008b). In their collection on political violence and fear, Gregory and Pred
(2007, 6) set out an agenda including the examination of ‘how political violence
compresses the sometimes forbiddingly abstract spaces of geopolitics and geo-
economics into the intimacies of everyday life and the innermost recesses of the
human body’. However, any notion that the intimate and the everyday simply absorb
global political violences and fears would be problematic. The task goes well beyond
simply expanding the spaces and scales under consideration when charting the ways
that politics has its effects. Indeed, and as the later discussion of feminist political
geography will explore, there is a strong case for rupturing the very idea of these
spaces and scales, because they tend to fix commanding notions about emotions,
power, human agency and being (Pain and Smith 2008b; Pratt and Rosner 2006).

3. Fear as a social and political construction
Most commentators, whether writing about global fears or the more mundane aspects of the ‘culture of fear’, discuss fear as a discourse rather than a material emotion or affect. Furedi (2001, 2006) is an exemplar, reading an increasingly ‘fearful’ society off its media prominence, opinion polls and its reproduction through scientific and government statements. His work epitomizes the cultural construction of fear; Furedi (2001) pares down fear for children’s safety to the point where there is no actual risk, no harm, no social unevenness and no geography to children’s experiences of danger and fear, reproducing a certain classed and adultist interpretation of childhood (see Pain 2006). So assumptions about the effect of terrorism on our fears are certainly not alone in ignoring the ground. Again, in failing to question the uptake of globalized fear or identify the range of responses and resistances to it, many critical scholars are, inadvertently, in danger of reifying and reproducing the very fear discourses that they take issue with (for example Bauman 2006; Isin 2004). Rather than dismiss the discursive power of fear, we should understand it primarily as an emotion which relates in various ways to risk in different contexts, at the same time as it may be deployed and experienced as a signifier, discourse or political tool. Such an understanding means moving between scales, and keeping a critical eye on their construction.

4. Exposing privilege: whose fears matter?

Fourthly, there is the unspoken privilege of the fears that these accounts mostly describe. We know from other contexts that fear is always named, known, privileged and spatialized in certain ways by the powerful, and that it tends to affect the poorest and most marginalized people the most (see the later discussion of fear of crime). Yet the preoccupation in the globalized fear literatures is the fears of people in the west, when the harm and devastation wrought by the war on/of terror is far greater outside the west. Critical geographers have done more to make this paradox visible than other scholars (see Abu Zhara 2008; Graham 2004; Hewitt 2001; Megoran 2005; Oslender 2007; Wright 2008). Within the west, too, we would be wise to attend to Beck’s (2002) reminder that risks may be global and unbounded, but also sharply differentiated in terms of their unequal social and geographical impacts. The poor are routinely written out of fear. Yet it is the quietest fears, with little political capital but more immediate materiality, which have the sharpest impacts (Shirlow and Pain 2003).
Global discourses of ‘global’ fear are also centrally about whiteness. They themselves are ordered by power geometries (see Tolia-Kelly 2007, 2008; after Massey 1993). As Ling (2000, 242) pointed out in an earlier critique, the set of narratives underlying discussions of globalization ‘recalls earlier relations between a colonial self and its native Other’. As they are presently construed, the subjects of rapidly moving global fear are white people living in the west, faced with fears about others harming them and their way of life from near or afar. Thus a pressing but unspoken dimension of the ‘culture of fear’ (Furedi 2006; Glassner 1999) is its whiteness. In contrast, Poynting et al (2004) ask what preconditions have allowed the emergence of a ‘culture of fear’ in western societies and its deployment to further certain political agendas: their answer is its close relation with and contingency upon anxiety about racial and ethnic dimensions in particular western nations. Theories of globalized fear, then, should also be contested on these grounds; they often do little to challenge the assumption that fear is the prerogative of the privileged. Research with minority ethnic groups in the west suggests otherwise (e.g. Hopkins 2007b). Class is another unspoken divider which affects the impact and distribution of global fears. And while a gendered critique of the war on/of terror is gaining ground (Hunt and Rygeil 2006), especially focusing on its consequences for Muslim women, it is anomalous that very little work as yet identifies how the global fears under discussion here might in fact be highly gendered (see Ling 2000).

5. Making room for agency, resistance and action

Finally, there is little room for agency in accounts of globalized fear. Isn’t fear reacted to, thought about, reformulated, resisted and reshaped into other emotions and actions? Don’t feelings have transformative power of their own? Few of those writing about global fear have considered that emotions stimulate action and affect the practices, progress and shape of politics at different scales (see, in contrast, Askins 2008; Bleiker and Hutchison 2008; Crawford 2000; Goodwin et al 2001; Hörschelmann 2008; Wright 2008). While hope may be mentioned as a smaller but promising cousin of fear, it is largely done with all of the limitations that I have described as applying to analyses of fear (with important exceptions including Wright 2008).
The top down dialectic of discourse/experience, refracted through global/local and geopolitical/everyday, is too simple and has been contested for many years in the literatures I go on to explore. Alongside critiques of the war on/of terror and its oppressive policies, then, we might want to ask how people engage with global fear discourses, how everyday experiences of fear feed into these discourses, and how fear relates, interacts and circulates across these imagined scales of the abstract.

IV. Framing an emotional geopolitics of fear
I have argued so far that understandings of the new geopolitics of fear primarily view fear as discursively produced and circulated for political ends. There is a tendency among some left scholars to use and reinforce this construction of fear, alongside their critique of its deployment by governments. I now go on to suggest an alternative – an emotional geopolitics of fear - and in so doing, further destabilise some of the dominant discourses and taken for granted assumptions within geopolitical analysis and its scaling of the politics of fear.

Likewise, feminist critiques of political geography in general, and globalization in particular, have taken issue not just with geographers’ mainstream accounts, but also with critical geographers’ critiques of them. In an elegant and powerful piece, Nagar et al (2002, 260) suggest that geographers’ accounts of globalization provide a ‘rich and important literature [but] tend to deal with (1) economic processes in the formal sector, (2) only certain places and scales, and (3) only certain actors’ (see also Hörschelmann and Schäfer 2005). Nagar et al go on to suggest remedies to these exclusions using existing feminist literature. In parallel, I suggest, many accounts of the new geopolitics of fear, including those of critical geographers, are guilty of similar exclusions. Feminist and critical work elsewhere in the discipline underpins the critique of globalized fear drawn above, and already provides some suggestions as to how these exclusions might be addressed.

I make three suggestions in calling for an emotional geopolitics of fear. The first is that we rework our understanding of geopolitics to take greater account of emotions, and that we should seek to understand and incorporate emotions in nuanced and grounded ways (Crawford 2000). The geopolitics of fear are embedded in cultural, economic, social and spatial micro-geopolitics, as evidenced by other studies of wider
exclusion. The bodies of work discussed below provide a starting point for this reconceptualization. Secondly, a more emotional geopolitics means taking up epistemological challenges that feminist researchers have laid down for decades, and thirdly, the refocusing of attention on resistance, agency and action. In Section V, I expand on this conceptual, empirical and political agenda. First, in supporting this call, I draw upon three existing bodies of literature that comprise a frame for analysing the global/geopolitical and the local/everyday. These are critical research on fear of crime, feminist accounts of globalization and critical geopolitics, and recent work on emotional/affective geographies. Their connections to globalized fear are reviewed below. Little of this work has explored global fears, and little of it, in turn, has been drawn on or acknowledged by the bulk of the literature I have discussed so far.

1. Critical work on the fear of crime
The critical literature exploring the effects of fear of crime in everyday life developed in the 1980s and 1990s. Much is located in feminist social science including human geography, but it also includes ethnographic studies in sociology and criminology. It is characterised by the use of qualitative methodologies as well as carefully crafted local surveys, and tends to focus on the sharp divisions of well-being and marginality that fear reinforces, particularly around poverty, race, gender and place. As Megoran (2005) has observed, its insights have been overlooked in the new geopolitics of fear. Sociologists and social geographers are just beginning to reflect on overlaps and consequences of crime fear and terror fear (e.g. Altheide 2003; Koskela 2009; Mythen and Walklate 2006; Pain and Smith 2008a), and political scientists might follow suit.

Here, fear is viewed as an emotion with embodied sensations and material implications. Fear inhabits people, and they, rather than ethereal, mobile or free-floating discourses, are the subject of empirical and analytical attention. Fear is also seen as situated and contextual, affected by local places and events as well as wider spatial settings (Loader et al 1998; Smith 1987, 1989). As Simonsen (2007, 175) writes more recently, ‘moods…are attunements – contextual significances of the world, associated with practices, lifemode and social situation’. Critical work on the fear of crime has explored the role of personal biographies, dispositions and previous experiences in explaining present day fears within communities, but also their
intersections with wider social, economic and political structures including class, gender, age, ability and ethnicity (Crawford et al 2000; Pain 2000; Stanko 1990; Walklate 1989). Although local lives and topographies are the main focus, feminist work in particular ‘jumps scales’ (see Cahill 2004, 2007), binding everyday experiences to wider networks of power and privilege.

Fear is not viewed as a static or negative state in these accounts, but as continuously challenged, resisted and reshaped. Importantly, people do not absorb messages about how to feel uncritically or without reference to context, knowledge or experience. People also worry, feel angry, are bold, and hope, and all of these emotions are viewed as having the potential to be transformative (Koskela 1997). Finally, fear is not a quantity or quality we can fully know, and cannot be assumed. One of the key points has been that those who are often the most fearful, for example certain groups of young people, are more likely to be victims of crime than offenders, and to be fearful as well as feared (Brown 2005; Muncie 2004). There are strong parallels here with demonized groups in the current geopolitical climate, as the research of scholars such as Dunn et al (2007), Hopkins (2007b), Noble (2005) and Pederson et al (2006) bears out. These studies share the emphasis in the critical fear of crime literature on sensitive, contextualized research to challenge assumptions and stereotypes about fear, the fearful and the feared: exactly what is missing in most recent accounts of geopolitical fear. For Mythen and Walklate (2006), questions that arise from fear of crime for the war on/of terror include whom we are seeking safety and protection from, how this varies following lines of gender, race, age, place, class and so on, and what shape ‘cultures of fear’ take on the ground. Elsewhere, drawing parallels with research on parents’ fears for children, I raise the political dangers of oversimplifying the likely consequences of the war on/of terror for fear, calling for critical distance from assumptions of widespread fearfulness (Pain 2008b).

2. Feminist accounts of globalization and geopolitics

Scale is at the heart of problems with existing accounts of global fear. Feminist scholarship on globalization and geopolitics, though it has had little to say about emotion to date, offers some exciting possibilities for rethinking scale. It is not enough to consider how global processes play out at local scales, the angle taken in ‘globe talk’ where it diverges from asserting only the global (Marston et al 2005).
Neither is it satisfactory to classify emotions as either locally- or globally-produced (for example personal/community experiences of fear, versus state suggestion/imposition). We might think instead about emotions being experienced as simultaneously both local and global. For example, Hopkins’ (2007a) work weaves both sites into his discussion of the fears of young Muslim men in Scotland; while Hörschelmann and Schäfer (2005) describe young people as living and performing the global through the local, engaging with and negotiating globalization in different ways. Further, recent feminist critiques of globalization point to the need to unlearn and relearn scale (Roberts 2004). As Pratt and Rosner (2006) insist with their collection of feminist work on the intertwining of global and intimate relations, the disruption of grand narratives of global relations and the upending of hierarchies of space and scale are vital. Disturbing the scales of local and global altogether is necessary if everyday practices and actions are not simply taken to ‘confirm the force and inevitability of certain modes of global capitalist expansion’ (Pratt and Rosner 2006, 16). In other words, we might disturb and dispense with scales and binaries such as local/global altogether, as these have disturbing political implications yet remain surprisingly resistant in the face of such critiques (Marston et al 2005). This imperative suggests de-scaling accounts of globalized fear which, as I outlined in the first half of the paper, prioritise and reify the global, the geopolitical, and the actions of large political structures. De-scaling globalized fear might allow the shape, movement and transformative power of emotions to emerge and their effects to be better appreciated.

Some key ideas in feminist critical geopolitics also inform the examination of globalized fear. Critical geopolitics as a subdiscipline incorporates work on the everyday and private realms, though it more often focuses on the mundane everyday than everyday politics (Dowler and Sharp 2001). Here too, hierarchies of global/local are dismantled to reimagine a more rounded and democratized understanding of geopolitics. Dowler and Sharp (2001) propose three interventions for a feminist geopolitics that are relevant to the current discussion. First, they identify the need to embody geopolitics, focusing on how particular bodies are used and represented, in evaluating discourses and in highlighting everyday experience (see also Hyndman 2003). In parallel with this critique of geopolitics, much analysis of fear has been dominated by rationalist, disembodied notions of fear - for example dismissing fear
that seems ‘too much’ or overblown (Furedi 2001) denies the emotional and embodied aspects of the relationships between adults and children.

Secondly, Dowler and Sharp suggest we need to locate geopolitical analysis more clearly, to counter previous western discourses. The charge that ‘critics stand at an ironic distance…without having to disclose their own location…yet it is a western form of reasoning, dominated by white, male academics’ (Dowler and Sharp 2001, 167) also applies to recent literatures on the geopolitics of fear (though, to be fair, critics of the war on/of terror find little reason for irony). Globalized fear is largely about us fearing them, and is negatively correlated with risk and harm; but its strategies for gaining analytical purchase on fear rarely include deferring to the fearful or feared. More positive - and carrying the political possibility of challenging the nature as well as manipulation of fear – is a rebuilding of understanding from the perspectives of those most affected.

Thirdly, Dowler and Sharp suggest we need to ground geopolitics and consider how international representations and processes work out in everyday life. Various examples of feminist work make these connections and insist on a ‘microscale’ geopolitics of the everyday, including May’s (1988) classic study of the cold war and US identity, Secor (2001) on Islamist politics in Istanbul, and Kallus (2004) on how the residential environment in Israel becomes a site of geopolitical struggle over national territory. A rich example is Katz’s (2004) ‘countertopography’ of US and Sudanese childhoods in the context of global restructuring, in which she draws out the ways that processes affecting what appear to be very different places are intertwined. Her argument is that places and scales speak to and affect each other in both directions. Such arguments apply as well to fear, as there are contiguous rather than linear relationships between global processes and local topographies of emotion.

Recent work that specifically focuses on the war on/of terror puts these tenets into theory and practice. Hunt and Rygiel (2006) challenge the overwhelmingly gendered literature and representations of war on/of terror, arguing that certain types of people are presented as active agents involved in the doing and shaping of these particular global events, and others are ‘acted upon’, passive recipients of the war on/of terror. They call for attention to intersectionality, rather than the reproduction of
homogenous subjects such as ‘woman’. Feminist analyses ‘disrupt and make visible the masculinized, militarized, racialized, sexualized, and classed dynamics through which the war operates’ (Hunt and Rygiel 2006, 3), as well as providing political grounds from which to contest the oppression that men and women around the world may experience because of the war on/of terror. In particular, they want to shift attention away from the dominant focus of western discussions on Islamic terrorists and their victims. Hannah (2005) also exposes the effect of powerful American discourses - masculinity and the frontier myth - on shaping US foreign policy since 2001. Cowen and Gilbert (2008) highlight the centrality of heteronormative discourses about home and family to government strategies that produce and reproduce fear in the war on/of terror, while Puar (2007), in a study of social identities in the face of growing securitization, identifies ‘homonationalism’ in the sexualization and racialization of threatening potential terrorist bodies. So we might add to Dowler and Sharp’s (2001) agenda for a more embodied, located and grounded geopolitics, a more emotional one.

3. Emotional and affective geographies
The third body of literature that can help to frame an emotional geopolitics is recent work on emotional/affective geographies. The burgeoning area of emotional geographies has remained curiously separate from discussions in political geography. More widely throughout the social sciences, it is argued that emotions need to have a far more prominent position in analysis of the socio-spatial world (Anderson and Smith 2001; Davidson et al 2005; Turner and Stets 2005). The suggestion is not to focus in on emotions, risking their depoliticization or trivialization, but to demonstrate that they, and their spatialities, are fundamental to the layout of society. Here, I address two overlapping pathways that geographical analysis has taken.

First, a body of work broadly titled emotional geographies has, over the last few years, investigated the importance of emotions to social processes and landscapes, to subjective experiences of space and place, and to the policy arenas which affect them (Anderson and Smith 2001; Davidson and Milligan 2004; Pain and Smith 2008; Parr et al 2005). The relations between individuals are informed by emotions, which are themselves always part of constellations of wider individual and collective landscapes (Conradson and McKay 2007). In particular, social geographers have emphasised that
the subjectivity of emotions is inherently tied to social inequalities (see Panelli et al 2004; Thien 2005b) and to power geometries (Tolia-Kelly 2007, 2008), and that people’s conscious evaluation of emotions may lead to collective action (Pain et al 2008). Such work is closely influenced by feminist theory and practice, and often being explicit about the positionalities, emotions and relations of writers and subject/participants. These premises begin to address critiques of the use of globalized fear. For (geo)political geographies, we might see emotions not just as blank canvasses, waiting to be affected by wider events and relations, but as situated, historicized and relational – already formed and always changing - and affecting politics, as much as they are affected by politics, at a range of scales. So fear, as feminist analyses have long reminded us, is an emotional response tied to existing lives, their topographies, histories and daily insecurities. It was not dropped onto western countries following the handful of terrorist attacks since 2001. It was already there, embedded in and focused on complex places and identities; it was present simultaneously in entwined local and international histories of risk and threat (Pain and Smith 2008b). Approached in this way, emotionality can help us get away from individualized understandings of global fear, as well as accounts which focus primarily on the discursive. One of the values of emotional geographies is its implicit focus on agency, and the challenge it might pose to hierarchical notions of politics (following Crawford 2000; Ling 2000).

Secondly, affective geographies have offered the promise of ‘a different kind of intelligence about the world’ that centres on the biological constitution of being as a performative force, non-verbal communication and the openness of events (Thrift 2004, 60). This work, closely connected to non-representational geographies, centres on stimuli and interactions that accompany pre-cognitive affects upon bodies, and have the power to move events, people and places (e.g. Conradson and Latham 2007; Tolia-Kelly 2007, 2008; Woodward and Lea 2009). This emphasis on movement offers an engagement with fear which is potentially highly relevant to the discussion here, given that a key question in unpicking the hierarchical scaling of the geopolitical and everyday (see Section III) is how else emotions might move (see Pain and Smith 2008b). These relations of affect may be channelled for political purposes (Woodward and Lea 2009); for example, Thrift (2007a) has outlined how the state may use affective contagion to control emotions and establish political and moral authorities,
using bodies as unconscious or semi-conscious receivers and transmitters of knowledge and feeling. Scholars working with affect have begun to apply these insights to issues around the war on/of terror. As Ahmed (2004) describes, love, hate and fear towards certain bodies are invoked by the war on/of terror, concretizing a feeling of the collective and its others. Lim’s (2007) analysis of fear and terror explores ‘the ways that fear becomes captured by or inserted into narratives of terror…[and]…put into service to recruit people and bodies to political causes, interests and actions’.

However, wider critiques of geographies of affect also have relevance to this particular application. While they may seem scales apart in the focus of their analysis, some writing on affective geographies reflects, rather than challenges, the hierarchical relationships that are so problematic within the literature on the new geopolitics of fear. Affective contagion can also seem to move between bodies across a flat earth; the weight of the record of fear as a sharply uneven and socially differentiating phenomenon, and its role in social injustice, are not always made evident or prominent (Tolia-Kelly 2006, 2007). Affect may also seem to relegate emotion to immediacy, immanence and the virtual, whereas ‘affective registers have to be understood within the context of power geometries that shape our social world’ (Tolia-Kelly 2006, 213). The focus on immediate corporeal sensations also carries the danger of negating the role of past experience (Ahmed 2004; Tolia-Kelly 2006). The ways in which cognitive thought, consciousness and planned action continually change and move fear are, understandably, not the focus of attention. In emphasising the pre-cognitive, and sometimes in lacking empirical example, affect moves beyond the limits of social constructivism but can feel as detached, disembodied and impersonal as the geopolitics literature reviewed earlier (see Bondi’s (2005) parallel argument about non-representational theory). For Thien (2005a), too, affect flits over the crucial sphere of everyday life and emotional subjectivities, paradoxically serving to further distance emotion from scholarship and the public arena: it begs questions about authority and who is speaking for whom (Bondi 2005; Thien 2005a; Tolia-Kelly 2006).

In recent responses to these criticisms, geographers have argued that affect can contribute far more to social geographies that attempt to be moral and engaged than
has been evident to date (see Woodward and Lea 2009). Lim (2007) suggests that thinking of fear as an affect allows for a focus on what bodies do in the moment of encounter, but need not preclude the ways in which bodily memory plays out. Further, the role of affect in how social movements come about it outlined by Woodward and Lea (2009). Meanwhile, Thrift (2007b) writes of the possibilities of deploying affect as a practical strategy, as well as in understanding its misuse by the media in the war on/of terror. His suggestion for working on hope and stimulating compassion as a practicable affective measure in answer to suicide bombings is one many critical geographers might identify with. However, it is an agenda which is (perhaps deliberately) vague, with neither the mechanics nor the personnel specified. His account of the ‘necessity of working on the affective episteme of Western populations so that they make connections with the world they currently may lack…Western populations exhibit pity when what is really needed is compassion’ (Thrift 2007b, 286, original emphasis) is a more sympathetic account of Western emotions than the label ‘fearful’. However, it makes assumptions about its subjects - we know very little about what ‘western populations’ are actually feeling in relation to the war on/of terror (but see Hopkins 2007a and Horschelmann 2008 who identify different and complex emotional responses) and, as I have argued, speculation is not without danger. It also fails to address questions about the audience for geographers’ critiques of the war on/of terror and their ultimate impact. We are left to wonder how do those feeling fear and other emotions already analyse and act upon these feelings?

The tendency to distinguish between emotion and affect is challenged by Simonsen (2007). In a refreshing account of a geography of practice, she emphasises the contextual, relational and multi-scalar nature of emotions; ‘emotions are neither “actions” nor “passions” (understood as forces beyond our control that simply happen to us) – they are both at once’ (177). She seeks to link social practices from bodily to transnational scales, by understanding how they ‘meet up with moving and fixed materialities and form configurations that are continuously under transformation and negotiation’ in particular places (179). Her account builds on both emotional and affective geographies, providing a more promising conceptualisation that might counter ‘globalized fear’. In the next section, I outline another.

V. Towards an agenda for an emotional geopolitics of fear
The particular conceptual, epistemological and political agenda for an emotional geopolitics of fear that I forward here uses the concept of conscientization (conscientização), which was first used by the Brazilian radical educator Paulo Freire (1972) to describe the development of critical consciousness from within. He originally applied it to students for whom education was crucial in challenging their marginalised status, with the goal of revolutionary liberation. The term has since been taken up more widely, and beyond critical pedagogy, for example into participatory action research in geography (see Kindon et al 2007). Importantly in the context of the arguments here, conscientization may describe a theory, a method or a process of social change (as, in radical pedagogy, these are not separated).

My call for an emotional geopolitics of fear combines all three of these strands. The first concerns the nature of analysis; the need to reconceptualize the relationship between emotions and global issues in a way that challenges the hierarchical, procedural scaling of emotions that characterises much work on the war on/of terror. As the earlier critique of the position of human agency in the new geopolitics of fear literature suggested, there is an urgent need to interrogate how power and resistance among individuals and communities, alongside power and domination by the state, might apply to the effects of emotions. As well as thinking about how people and social relations are pushed and pulled by emotions (as the new geopolitics of fear and affect literatures describe, in different ways), how do they knowingly deploy them, publicly, privately, individually and collectively? An emotional geopolitics of fear that explores and engages the conscientization of fear (after Freire 1972) might ask how do self-conscious and self-critical experiences of fear inform ground-up processes of change; how do emotional conditions, within and without, politicise subjects and mobilise self- and collective action at conscious level? Navigating a path between the current possibilities and limitations of both emotional and affective geographies (after Simonsen 2007), conscientization has important implications for epistemology and action (see below), but this deployment of it need not exclude the affective. I recognise that constructing a too-rational fearful subject precludes potentially significant understandings of the ways that emotions also figure pre-cognitively (Lim 2007; Woodward and Lea 2009), as well as the ways in which marginalised people are sometimes positioned within power geometries so as to preclude conscious action (after Tolia-Kelly 2007).
Secondly, conscientization underpins the epistemological standpoints that an emotional geopolitics of fear might draw on and deploy. Throughout the paper, I have commented on the lack of reference to the (supposedly) fearful which is notable in wider literatures on the geopolitics of fear, and geographers’ writings on the war on/of terror and affect. I have also pointed to feminist theory and practice in several existing areas which highlights the imperative for thinking, feeling and questioning our own positionalities in writing and research (e.g. Haraway 1991; Moss 2002). While critical geographers rapidly condemned of the war on/of terror, and have called for more humanitarian and cosmopolitan responses, analysis in this field is still dominated by western, white, male academics, often still engaging in remote and disembodied ways rather than exposing our own involvement in the relations we write about. Can we focus, as well, upon people’s own conscious navigation of fear, with a political strategy defined dialogically with those who feel fear? Can we engage an epistemological shift to emotion with, rather than emotion of or compassion for? I am not suggesting that there is no place for analyses that are purely conceptual or speculative, nor am I keen to see the sort of emotional and personalized accounts that ultimately inflate the self. But the issues of injustice at the present time also demand a place for engaged research which attends more carefully to emotions, and rethinks and recasts our own relationships with others.

Some geographers are already responding by giving voice to marginalized groups who are central to the patterning, nature and implications of global fears (e.g. Dunn et al 2007, Hopkins 2007b, Pederson et al 2006). Further, research conducted with the goal of positive social change on people’s own terms by activist and participatory geographers, especially those identifying as feminist scholars, has explicitly deployed emotionality – what Kindon (2009) calls ‘affect with effect’ - for some time (on fear, see Cahill 2004, 2006; Pain et al 2008; Wright 2008). Conscientization provides a methodological strategy that underpins such efforts. As a process of learning that leads to change, it involves those traditionally considered teachers/students or researchers/researched working alongside each other in more even knowledge exchanges and theory building. Conscientization differs from consciousness-raising, as knowledge is not transferred from one (expert) group to another (disempowered) group, but is co-produced. This form of engaged and explicitly relational scholarship
has much to contribute to critical geopolitics. And unlike the affective geographies literature at present, where emotions are written as taking on a life of their own but still usually given life by the scholar’s monologue, conscientization suggests working from the ways in which people already speak for themselves.

Thirdly, and closely related, conscientization describes what people do with fear at many scales: mobilising emotions for action and social change. In the bulk of the literature on globalized fear, as I have argued, there is little mention of resistance to fear, of other emotions, or the work that they do in contesting and changing unjust situations and consequences. Yet fear can be a positive and galvanizing force as well as a harmful and divisive one: it changes people and places and their trajectories in different ways, and it is not just the already-powerful who harness these effects. Looking outside the academy, we can see that fear and hope are already being used to counter the metanarrative of globalized fear and the increasingly oppressive and unjust policies which the war on/of terror has led to in the west. These actions may be conscientized and conscious, planned, or of the moment. How we analyse and incorporate emotion into geopolitics partly depends on how we understand the scaling and relations involved in geopolitics. Here, I am building on Koopman’s (2008) notion of ‘alter-geopolitics’, which describes new proposals and practices that seek to challenge hegemonic geopolitics and create new geopolitics. Koopman’s emphasis is on grassroots movements that build international relations of solidarity. Activist struggles and new coalitions that are emerging in response to terror, hate crimes and community fears materialise varied geographies of hope (Ahmad 2002; Os lender 2007; Weber 2006; Wright 2008 ). We can add to this people’s strategies for resisting or contesting globalized fear in everyday life (Pain et al 2008), and practices that bridge racial and religious difference that have been described as everyday cosmopolitanism (Noble 2009).

VI. Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued for the development of an emotional geopolitics of fear as one tool to understand, reposition and respond to accounts of ‘globalized fear’. Identifying major limitations in the dominant discourse of globalized fear, I have examined how it is nonetheless manifested in recent work by geographers and others writing about the new geopolitics of fear. We know relatively little about these new
patterns of fear, or how they relate to older patterns. Notwithstanding that, important insights can be gained from three bodies of existing literature elsewhere: critical work on fear of crime; feminist accounts of globalization and geopolitics; and geographies of emotion and affect. These three fields provide a frame for gaining a fuller sense of the places, politics and possibilities of fear, with particular lessons for dismantling scale and analysing how emotions move; rethinking the relation of global/geopolitical and the local/everyday/intimate; charting the continuing significance of place to individual and collective emotional topographies; and the centrality of emotions to resistance, agency and action. I have used the concept of conscientization to underpin one agenda for an emotional geopolitics of fear, which involves engaged and emotional scholarship. As Askins (2008: 246) suggests, there are many ways in which our own work might shift towards seeking and enabling a ‘transformative geopolitics’ of fear.

Finally, it is worth reflecting on the gulfs between some of the bodies of literature reviewed here. They are complementary, and should be closely aligned, and yet the scale and persistence of the marginalisation of feminist work is staggering. This follows through political geography in general (as Sharp 2007 and Staeheli et al 2004 have highlighted), globalization and geopolitics (Mountz and Hyndman 2006; Nagar et al 2002), mainstream work on fear of crime (Pain 2000) and affective geographies (Bondi 2005); the list could go on beyond the remit of this paper; the exclusions reflect wider patterns of gendered knowledge construction. Academic scholarship is a microcosm of the processes and worlds we study; some themes and modes of analysis become ‘global’ very quickly, while others stay persistently localized. Many feminist scholars continue their efforts to dismantle the unjust scaling of resources in everyday life. Now the challenge of undoing and refocusing the scaling of academic endeavour might be taken up by others.

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Notes

1 This paper avoids ethnocentric shorthands such as ‘9/11’, ’11-M’ or ‘7/7’ for specific terrorist attacks on western targets.

2 The ‘war on terror’ which was declared by George Bush after the 2001 New York attacks is equally considered a war of terror by many left scholars. As Cowan and Gilbert (2008) argue, fear is central to its operation: as well as being a war on terrorism it has been, ostensibly, a war to protect from fear, in reality one which must invoke fear to succeed. They also discuss the ways in which the US regime governs through terror.

3 See also Koskela (2009) who uses this term in a slightly different way.

4 From transcript of a video message from al-Qaeda claiming responsibility for the March 2004 bombings in Madrid.

5 From an internet statement of the Secret Organization of al-Qaeda in Europe, who claimed responsibility for the July 2005 bombings in London.

6 ‘Global’ in this context, as for globalized fear, also means ‘western’: for example, the standard for ‘global’ excellence within Anglo-American geography is to be well known, circulated and cited within Anglo-American geography.

References


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