Chapter 1
The Promise of
Non-Representational Theories
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A Dream

I can't help but dream of the kind of criticism that would try not to judge but to bring an oeuvre, a book, a sentence, an idea to life; it would light fires, watch grass grow, listen to the wind, and catch the sea foam in the breeze and scatter it. It would multiply not judgements but signs of existence; it would summon them, drag them from their sleep. Perhaps it would invent them sometimes - all the better. All the better. [...] It would not be sovereign or dressed in red. It would bear the lightening of possible storms (Michel Foucault 1997a, 323).

It's the affirmation which gives the quote its force. The affirmation not just of one thing, one subject, one angle, but of many. And beyond this, an affirmation of life, of existence as such, as precarious, as active and as unforeseeable. We will move to a more traditional mode of introduction in a moment however for now let us stay with Foucault's dream. What would 'criticism' have to be to be capable of all these things, of this affirmation and this potential? It seems to us that it would have to be itself multiple, itself composed out of many things. It would have to work out how to move differently, how to step from one topic to the next, one matter to the next, and initiate new ways of relating, walk new routes without tripping, (or at least not often). It would have to take risks, invent new terms, new tones, new objects. It would draw new maps. Perhaps most importantly, it would have to continue changing, not settle in the satisfaction of a judgment but keep experimenting. Further on in the interview from which the quote above comes, Foucault suggests that

What we are suffering from is not a void but inadequate means for thinking about everything that is happening. There is an overabundance of things to be known: fundamental, terrible, wonderful, insignificant, and crucial at the same time (1997a, 325).
It is our view that non-representational theories\(^1\) are best approached as a response to such a situation. If one single thing can be said to characterise non-representational work in Human Geography over the past 15 years it is the attempt to invent new ways of addressing fundamental social scientific issues and, at the same time, displacing many of these issues into new areas and problems. In doing so we believe that it has multiplied ‘signs of existence’, helping to introduce all kinds of new actors, forces and entities into geographic accounts and, at the same time, aiding in the invention of new modes of writing and address and new styles of performing Geographic accounts. While the consistency of these attempts may sometimes be hard to see, an issue we will consider below, on a basic level what has linked this diverse body of work is a sense of affirmation and experimentation. In this we believe that they share the ethos of Foucault’s dream and, moreover, its invitation to do and think otherwise.

Of course non-representational theories have not done this alone. In the second section of this introduction ‘Context’ we shall offer a kind of origins myth for non-representational theory in geography, locating its emergence in and from social constructivism in the mid-1990s. However beyond this undoubtedly partial account the main aim of this introduction is to outline three shared commitments or problematics which we believe link together what is a diverse and still diversifying body of work. Our aim here is partly genealogical, taken sequentially one could read these three elements as stages of an evolution and in growing complexity. However the more important (and slightly less artificial) task is that they provide a kind of intellectual ‘primer’ for the rest of the volume: a chart onto which the reader may map the following chapters and so note their shared concerns and the different routes they plot across common problematics. Thus, following the ‘Context’, the first of the three substantive sections discusses ‘Practices’. Here we describe how and why non-representational theory has a practical and processual basis for its accounts of the social, the subject and the world, one focused on ‘backgrounds’, bodies and their performances. In particular this section is concerned with showing how non-representational approaches locate the making of meaning and signification in the ‘manifold of actions and interactions’ rather than in a supplementary dimension such as that of discourse, ideology or symbolic order. The next section ‘Life and the Social’ acts as an auto-critique and expansion on the issues just given, charting the movement in non-representational theory from practice based accounts to wider post-humanist accounts of life. Here the influences of Gilles Deleuze and Bruno Latour are most evident, as we attempt to describe the

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\(^1\) Throughout this introduction we will make use of the plural ‘non-representational theories’ to refer to disparate and potentially loosely connected bodies of thought which do not prioritise the role of representation in their accounts of the social and the subject, and the singular ‘non-representational theory’ to refer to the specific movement within predominantly British Social and Cultural Human Geography which we are attempting to introduce here. While it may sound a little circular, it should go without saying that non-representational theory is itself diverse, and composed of multiple theories.
consequences of non-representational theory’s relational-materialism for thinking about the composition and nature of the social. Following on, ‘Event and Futurity’ gives the final shared commitment or problematic; here we focus on the ‘non’ of non-representational theory, and consider exactly how the work gathered by the name is orientated by and to an open-ended future, an orientation through which it attempts to ‘bear the lightening of possible storms’. The introduction closes with a brief reflection and a look at the structure of the volume which follows.

Context

Beginnings are always arbitrary, always imagined. One can always extend the genealogy and go back further, or move off sideways seeking the skeleton in the closet, and we will, to some extent. However in this section of the introduction we outline a specific intellectual problematic as the spur behind non-representational theories. In doing so we keep within the recognised genre requirements of an introduction to an edited academic book: ‘storying’ the emergence of non-representational theories as a successor ‘paradigm’. The reasons for this choice are largely pedagogic and heuristic; feeling optimistic, we like to imagine this introduction’s primary audience as being composed of people who may not be so familiar with non-representational theories and so the onus is upon us to tell, reductive as it may be, a more or less believable intellectual narrative. However many other beginnings could be plausibly given, not least amongst them: the ongoing impact of post-structuralism on the discipline and, in particular, the avenues for thought opened by the translation of the work of Deleuze and Latour: an emergent concern for ‘everyday life’ and the forms of embodied practice therein: a specific confluence of energies, research interests and institutional setting focused on the School of Geographical Sciences in Bristol in the UK throughout the 1990s; the gathering together and elaboration of non-representational theories by Nigel Thrift; the crystallisation of desires to find new ways of engaging space, landscape, the social, the cultural and the political; the influence of the UK’S Research Assessment Exercise through which, in Human Geography at least, value was attached to single author papers and which promoted an academic climate wherein so called ‘theoretical’ interventions could be valued as highly as more ‘empirical’ studies: a simple generational shift between the New Cultural Geography and what would follow: an ever more extensive engagement by geographers with other social science and humanities disciplines; a cynical careerist fabulation. As with the account which follows, none of these beginnings are determinate, however all and more probably played a role. We could then classify the emergence of non-representational theories in the discipline as an ‘event’. (see below), one which, as with all events, arrives somewhat unexpectedly, whose outcome is never guaranteed in advance, and which is composed across but irreducible to a multiplicity of sites, desires, fears, contingencies and tendencies, an event housed within the term ‘non-representational theory’.
Still, for now, let’s imagine a beginning. It’s 1993:

When it was enthusiastically pointed out within the memory of our Academy that race or gender or nation ... were so many social constructions, inventions, representations, a window was opened, an invitation to begin the critical project of analysis and cultural reconstruction was offered. And one still feels its power even though what was nothing more than an invitation, a preamble to investigation has, by and large, been converted into a conclusion – e.g. ‘sex is a social construction’, ‘race is a social construction’, ‘the nation is an invention’, and so forth, the tradition was an invention. The brilliance of the pronouncement was blinding. Nobody was asking what’s the next step? What do we do with this old insight? If life is constructed, how come it appears so immutable? How come culture appears so natural? If things coarse and subtle are constructed, then surely they can be reconstructed as well? (Taussig 1993, xvi).

There can be little doubt that throughout the 1980s and the 1990s social constructivism was the dominant mode of social and cultural analysis, within Human Geography and beyond. ‘Social constructivism’ is, of course, a convenient shortcut: what is named with this term is less a specific body of work and more a general ontological and epistemological stance, a certain way of delimiting and apprehending ‘the social’. In this origins myth, social constructivism plays the somewhat thankless role of context and matrix for the emergence of non-representational theories. So, what traits distinguish social constructivism as an approach and for this dubious honour?

First and foremost social constructivism is distinguished by a preoccupation with representation; specifically, by a focus on the structure of symbolic meaning (or cultural representation). Social constructivism looks to how the symbolic orders of the social (or the cultural) realise themselves in the distribution of meaning and value, and thereby reinforce, legitimate and facilitate unequal distributions of goods, opportunities and power. Thus the primary ontological object for social constructivism is the collective symbolic order understood to be, as the anthropologist Clifford Geertz has it, ‘a set of control mechanisms – plans, recipes, rules, instructions (what computer programmers call “programmes”) – for governing behaviour’ (1973, 44). Or as geographers David Ley and Marwyn Samuels put it five years after Geertz: ‘All social constructions, be they cities or geographic knowledge, reflect the values of a society and an epoch’ (1978, 21 emphasis added). The collective symbolic order is that by which its members make sense of the world, within which they organise their experience and justify their actions. Hence James S. Duncan’s characterisation (after Raymond Williams (1981)) of landscape as ‘a signifying system through which a social system is communicated, reproduced, experienced, and explored’ (1990, 17).2 An important

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2 With the selection of this quote and those which follow the reader may well think that by social constructivism we mean the New Cultural Geography; however this both is
point here, one with extensive epistemological (and methodological) implications, is the separation made between the symbolic order and the particular situations within which that order is realised. As Tim Ingold writes; ‘Starting from the premise that culture consists of a corpus of inter-generationally transmissible knowledge, as distinct from the ways in which it is put to use in practical contexts of perception and action, the objective is to discover how this knowledge is organised’ (2000, 161). Epistemologically, this means that the ‘action’ is not in the bodies, habits, practices of the individual or the collective (and even less in their surroundings), but rather in the ideas and meanings cited by and projected onto those bodies, habits, practices and behaviours (and surroundings). Indeed the decisive analytic gesture of social constructivism is to make the latter an expression of the former. To critically depart, for example, from being ‘narrowly focused on physical artifacts (log cabins, fences, and field boundaries)’ and move towards an understanding of ‘the symbolic qualities of landscape, those which produce and sustain social meaning’ (Cosgrove and Jackson 1987, 96). A departure through which the objects of investigation – landscape, city space, place – become apprehended as ‘texts’, where ‘the text is seen in terms of the self-realisation or contestation of [ideas, ideologies and] identities, understood as part of the impulse to the self-realisation of the group, class or nation’ (Clark 2005, 17).

To sum up, social constructivism’s initial impetus and its considerable critical purchase in the 1980s and 1990s lay, in Human Geography at least, in two linked insights. First, in the recognition of the arbitrary nature of symbolic orders, in recognising the fact that they are ‘invented’ and not ‘natural’. Second, in the emphasis placed on the plural and contested (or at least contestable) nature of symbolic orders and the sites at which this occurred. The importance of these insights and the work which followed them is difficult to underestimate; contemporary Human Geographic investigation is unthinkable without them. And so, while we would characterise the emergence of non-representational theory as an ‘event’, we would also stress that non-representational theory has a debt to, in particular, the New Cultural Geography, one that has to a certain extent gone unacknowledged. There and is not the case. On the one hand, we do clearly implicate the New Cultural Geography within the broad outline of the social constructivism of the 1980s and 1990s; it seems to us that denials to the contrary it was and is wedded to, and indeed gains much of its impetus and insight from, social constructivist assertions about the nature of meaning and its relationship to the world, to matter and to events (see below). However, on the other hand and like non-representational theories, the New Cultural Geography was and is an internally diverse and dynamic movement which, on closer examination, often resists and confounds simplistic reduction. Indeed one may, for example, trace clear continuities between non-representational theory and the ethos and concerns of New Cultural Geography, particular in work on landscape (see Lorimer 2006, Rose 2002 and Wylie 2002), performance (Crang 1994), and mobilities (Merriman 2007; Cresswell 2003). Moreover, we believe that the critical interventions made by those involved in these movements are of ongoing importance and value, not least the founding critique of utilitarianism and functionalism in social and geographic analysis (see for example Cosgrove 1989).
is no doubt that non-representational theory inherits a number of the key insights of New Cultural Geography; that representation matters, that social order is not immutable, and that signification connects to extra-linguistic forces. However, as we shall see, it inherits by rearticulating these insights, framing them otherwise. Why? Because the insight and critical purchase of social constructivism comes at a cost.

Practices

The world and its meanings; this divide is the cost. On one side, over there, the world, the really real, all ‘things coarse and subtle’, and on the other, in here, the really made-up, the representations and signs which give meaning and value. It’s a classic Cartesian divide. Once established there can be no sense of how meanings and values may emerge from practices and events in the world, no sense of the ontogenesis of sense, no sense of how real the really made-up can be. Indeed in retrospect it may seem as though, as Ulf Strohmayer (1998, 106) observed, social constructivism’s and Human Geography’s preoccupation with representation was simply a ‘pragmatic’ response to the wider, preceding crisis of representation. A response which took critical advantage of the ‘constructed’ nature of all representation, but which, due to its own anti-realism, was never able to move beyond the crisis and account for the fact that ‘if life is constructed, how come it appears so immutable?’ An early, arguably defining trait in the identification and emergence of non-representational theory was a different way of framing and responding to this problem. Indeed this other framing gives us the most literal definition of the term ‘non-representational’ and the first way of recognising non-representational theories; they share an approach to meaning and value as ‘thought-in-action’:

These schools of thought all deny the efficacy of representational models of the world, whose main focus is the ‘internal’, and whose basic terms or objects are symbolic representations, and are instead committed to non-representational models of the world, in which the focus is on the ‘external’, and in which basic terms and objects are forged in the manifold of actions and interactions (Thrift 1996, 6).

Before asking of the consequences, it is worth taking a few moments to explore this difference a bit further.

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3 Non-representational theory is by no means unique in the recognition of this cost; it has been diagnosed in various places, at various times and in various ways across the social sciences and humanities, see for example Bennett (2001); Connolly (2002); Haraway (1991); Ingold (2000); Latour (1993); Law (1993); Massumi (2002b); Seigworth (2003); Stewart (1996); Taussig (1993).
‘The manifold of action and interaction’; what does this mean? One way to think about it is as a ‘background’. While we do not consciously notice it we are always involved in and caught up with whole arrays of activities and practices. Our conscious reflections, thoughts, and intentions emerge from and move with this background ‘hum’ of on-going activity. More technically, we could say that ‘the background is a set of non-representational mental capacities that enable all representing to take place’ and that conscious aims and intentions form, and have the form they do, only against such a ‘background of abilities that are not intentional states’ (Searle 1983, 143). You are late; you walk quickly into the classroom and sit down. When you walked into the classroom did you think about opening the door, or did you just open it? When you sat down did you have to remember what a seat looked like and how to use one? Of course we can think of examples where people do have to think about these things (a neurological condition may prevent object recognition, one may hesitate and reflect on opening the door due to being nervous, the chair may be an unfamiliar spring-loaded design), however the point is that most of the time in most of our everyday lives there is a huge amount we do, a huge amount that we are involved in, that we don’t think about and that, when asked about, we may struggle to explain. How did you know to come into the room through the door? How did you know that that was a seat? While such reflections may seem somewhat irrelevant to the real business of social and geographic investigation, in many respects nothing could be further from the case. If thinking is not quite what we thought it was, if much of everyday life is unreflective and not necessarily amenable to introspection, if, as shall be claimed below, the meaning of things comes less from their place in a structuring symbolic order and more from their enactment in contingent practical contexts, then quite what we mean by terms such as ‘place’, ‘the subject’, ‘the social’ and ‘the cultural’, and quite how ‘space’, ‘power’ and ‘resistance’ actually operate and take-place, are all in question. For now, however, our question becomes how are we to think of this ‘background’, how are we to characterise it beyond the somewhat limited and limiting definition ‘non-representational mental capacities’, and so gain some purchase therein?

Insisting on the non-representational basis of thought is to insist that the root of action is to be conceived less in terms of willpower or cognitive deliberation and more via embodied and environmental affordances, dispositions and habits. This means that humans are envisioned in constant relations of modification and reciprocity with their environs. Action being understood not as a one way street running from the actor to the acted upon, from the active to the passive or mind to matter, but as a relational phenomena incessantly looping back and regulating itself through feedback phenomena such as proprioception, resistance, balance, rhythm and tone; put simply, all action is interaction (Ingold 2000, see Gibson 1979; Clark 1997; Thrift 2008). Which is to say that the bodies which populate non-representational theory are, for the most part, relational bodies; ecological in form and etiological in apprehension (Lorimer, this volume; Bissell, this volume, Simonsen, this volume). Within such an understanding the world is never an ‘out there’, a meaningless perceptual mess in need of (symbolic) organisation, nor is it an
inert backdrop of brute things projected upon by our hopes, desires and fears, (but see Woodward, this volume, Saldanha, this volume). Rather we are always already ‘caught up in the fabric of the world’ (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 256); the world is the context from, with and within which what we call subjects and objects emerge, (ibid., see for example Harrison 2000, Hinchliffe, this volume, McCormack, this volume, Wylie, 2002, 2005, and this volume). As Ingold writes:

For any animal, the environmental conditions of development are liable to be shaped by the activities of predecessors ... The same goes for human beings. Human children, like the young of many other species, grow up in environments furnished by the work of previous generations, and as they do so they come literally to carry the forms of their dwelling in their bodies – in specific skills and dispositions (2000, 186).

Thus we may gain a wider sense of the ‘background’ described above, one not limited to the (no doubt important) realm of ‘non-representational mental content’, but which spills out into and across the body and its milieu. Indeed to speak of practices is to speak precisely of such ‘transversal’ objects, of arrays of activities which, like musical refrains, give an order to materials and situations, human bodies and brains included, as actions undertaken act-back to shape muscles and hone senses. This is the ‘anonymous, pre-personal life of our bodies’ which, for the most part, ‘remains invisible to us’ (Shotter 1995, 2).

What is being described here is a concern with and attention to emergent processes of ontogenesis, how bodies are actualised and individuated through sets of diverse practical relations. A recognisable early and abiding trait of non-representational work in the discipline was a concern for the practical, embodied ‘composition’ of subjectivities (see for example Rose 2002; Anderson 2004; Harrison 2000; McCormack 2003; Thrift 1996; Wylie 2002; Paterson 2006; 2007). Arguably, what distinguished such accounts was their refusal to search for extrinsic sources of causality or determination, an out-of-field ‘power’, a symbolic, discursive or ideological order for example. Rather the focus fell on the efficacy and opportunism (or otherwise) of practices and performances. It is from the active, productive, and continual weaving of the multiplicity of bits and pieces that we emerge: out of the ‘shapes and contours of our bodies, the recurrent verbal and behavioural patterns’ and ‘the recurrent diagrams of our emotions, attitudes and posturing’ (Lingis 1994, 155).

Equally, it is from such active, productive and continual weaving that ‘worlds’ emerge. Here, and acknowledging the phenomenological inheritance (see Heidegger 1962, see also Thrift, this volume; Simonsen, this volume), the term ‘world’ does not refer to an extant thing but rather the context or background against which particular things show up and take on significance: a mobile but more or less stable ensemble of practices, involvements, relations, capacities, tendencies and affordances. A zone of stabilisation within the ‘manifold of actions and interactions’ which has the form of a holding wave or recursive patterning.
If this sounds abstract and obtuse we do, in fact, use the term world in this sense in everyday life; in, for example, phrases such as ‘the world of business’, or ‘the world of radical politics’. As Alphonso Lingis explains, the term ‘world’ describes ‘not simply an experience of our perceived environment’ but, rather, the contexts and fields which are illuminated by our ‘movements of concern’ and which make ‘the multiplicity of beings about us an order, a cosmos’ (1996, 13). In this sense ‘worlds’ are not formed in the mind before they are lived in, rather we come to know and enact a world from inhabiting it, from becoming attuned to its differences, positions and juxtapositions, from a training of our senses, dispositions and expectations and from being able to initiate, imitate and elaborate skilled lines of action. Thus certain embodied gestures and action sequences, certain turns of phrase and idiomatic expressions, certain organisations of objects in space, do not ‘express’ or ‘stand-for’ certain cultural meanings, values and models: they are not ‘vehicles for symbolic elaboration’ (Ingold 2000, 283). Rather they are enactments; if there is elaboration it is conducted and composed by and in the on-going practical movements and actions, of which the symbolic is a part, but only a part. 4 In this sense non-representational theory may be understood as radically constructivist, in that, echoing Latour (1999), it avers that everything is really made-up, but is no less real for this (see Thrift, this volume). Indeed as the distinction between the world and its meaning which sustains social constructivism is collapsed the ‘real’ and the ‘really made-up’ are revealed as synonyms, their distinction itself an effect of certain practices. To close this section we want to outline two consequences from the discussion so far.

Firstly, the ‘background’ itself is hardly inert. If the description of practical bodies and worlds given so far sounds too naturalistic we need only think about the ways in which the human sensorium may be trained, cultivated and entrained. Non-representational theory was not the first to examine this ‘pre-personal’ dimension of existence. Through its sustained engagement with the phenomenological tradition. Humanistic Geography 5 constantly highlighted the importance of tacit and pre-

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4 Non-representational theory thus runs along with other turns towards performance and performativity which may be found occurring more or less contemporaneously across geography, the social sciences and humanities. See for example Butler (1990, 1993), Sedgwick (2003), Parker and Sedgwick (1995), Gregson and Rose (2000), Phelan (1993, 1997).

5 What goes by the name ‘humanistic’ or ‘humanistic’ is itself a variegated tradition, that still has a force in the present (e.g. Adams, Hoelscher and Till 2001; Mels 2004), particularly given the myriad processes of dehumanisation that damage and destroy humans. We could say the concern of humanistic geographies is something like the composition of environments that can reflect and enhance the variety of human experience (Relph 1976; Seamon 1979) and the means of developing an experientially rich account of lived experience (see Tuan 1977). The critiques are now well known – that a generic and essentialist figure of ‘the human’ and ‘human experience’ was centred and celebrated, and that the concept of place ignored process, power relations and remained too bounded (see Massey 1997; Rose 1993). For an account of the cultural politics of place that worked the
cognitive realms in the formation of selves, societies and places, and the myriad ways subjects inhabit the world before they represent that world to themselves and others. However compared to the accounts offered by non-representational theory, humanistic accounts can appear too naturalistic and normative. Perhaps a closer relative is to be found in Pierre Bourdieu’s (1977) account of habitus, which effectively historicises and politicises phenomenological accounts of the ‘background’. However, for all its insight and recognition of contingency and the importance of improvisation, Bourdieu’s account of the habitus remains curiously inert, constantly supplemented by determinate structural logics at the expense of the ‘slight surprise of action’ (Butler 1997, de Certeau 1984, Latour 1999). Perhaps closer still are Walter Benjamin’s (1992; 1997, see Latham 1999) accounts of our distracted, tactile and habitual means of ‘understanding’ the city and life in capitalist societies. In his famous city essays Benjamin describes a mobile, embodied, geo-historically specific, sensuous knowing; his object is not an individual but rather modes and moments of subjectification as they emerge across a distracted collective of habits and gestures, buildings and courtyards, speeds and slownesses. It is this account, both more open and more specific, which seems to us closest to those given in non-representational theory.

Secondly, if the ‘background’ is geo-historically specific and generative then it is open to intervention, manipulation and innovation. Thrift (1996, 2008), for example, has traced how many of the spaces of everyday life are increasingly being inhabited, in one way or another, by pervasive intelligent technologies, including biomedical, imaging, storage and recall, track and trace, computation and real-time modelling, as well as mixtures of all of the above:

Reach and memory are being extended; perceptions which were difficult or impossible to register are becoming routinely available; new kinds of understated intelligence are becoming possible. These developments are probably having most effect in the pre-cognitive domain, leading to the possibility of arguing that what we are seeing is the laying down of a system (or systems) of distributed pre-cognition (Thrift 2008, 164).

We may think, for example, of the increasing role of environmental sensors in the support and care of the elderly, involving new forms of unobtrusive remote monitoring and feedback such as bed and chair occupancy monitors, often coupled intelligent lighting networks, property exit sensors, and fridge content monitors. Through laying down ‘awareness’ or even ‘intelligence’ into the environment, each of these technologies makes the delivery of long term care in individual’s and family’s homes far more feasible, especially for those with dementia or increasing physical frailty. Of course, the development and implementation of such technologies need not be so benign. As the ‘background’ or pre-cognitive insights of humanistic geographies through a concern with social difference see Cresswell (1996).
realm is rendered visible so it becomes available to be worked on by a whole set of
new entities and institutions as, for example, in the increasingly refined attempts to
build in kinesthetic and affective experiences into specific commodities, political
figures or enquiring spaces (Thrift 2008; Adey 2008). Here we may think of Jane
Bennett’s (2001, see also McCormack this volume) analysis of the ‘swinging kahiks’
GAP advertising campaign, Brian Massumi’s (2002b) discussion of the attention to
body language and pathetic communication in the television appearances of former
US President Ronald Reagan, and Thrift’s (2008) discussions of the architectures
of anticipation at work in urban settings. While such work has been criticised for
reintroducing deterministic accounts of social and political action (see Barnett
2008), almost all work within non-representational theory maintains that while
‘background’, pre-cognitive realms may not always be straightforwardly amenable
to conscious reflexivity and representation, this does not make them completely
alien and determining. Rather, manipulation, where it is achieved, is always a
fragile and contingent achievement, ‘prone to failure and always reliant upon
being continually reworked in relation to creative responses’ (Ash forthcoming).
Allowing subjects to become more involved, more complex and less certain of
their boundaries and themselves need not lead to functionalism and behaviourism.
Indeed, practical existence is clearly available to many forms of self and group
‘fashioning’. From the ‘techniques of the self’ described in Foucault’s (1997b) later
work, to Ash Amin (2006) on ‘everyday cosmopolitanism’, and Jonathan Darling’s
(this volume) examination of practices of hospitality, it is clear the pre-cognitive is
not simply a realm for colonisation, domination and control but for cultivation and
intervention. Quite simply, however stable they may be at any one time in any one
place, background practices are open to change and reconfiguration.

In emphasising practical, lived experience, non-representational theory has
been identified as a form of Humanistic Geography, and charged with repeating the
same mistakes; the centring of a universal, unmarked, subject shorn of difference
(Nash 2000; Saldanha 2005; Tolia-Kelly 2006). However, the comments above
should go some way to disabuse this understanding as, insofar as it has a subject,
this is a subject that is radically contingent, which is always in and of the mixture
of many different elements, but which is also irreducibly specific in its existence
(see Harrison, this volume; Wylie, this volume). For us the more pressing question
here is what becomes of the subject and the social as such once constructivism is
radicalised in the manner described above and the human is understood to be part
of the on-going becoming of worlds? It is to this question we turn now.

Life and the Social

Thought is placed in action and action is placed in the world. This is the starting
point for all non-representational theories. Yet however important these beginnings
they are not the sum of non-representational theory. Throughout the 1990s and into
this century the initial attention to practices in non-representational theory morphed
into a concern with Life, and the vital processes that compose it (see Thrift, this volume). While a concern for practices and ‘worlds’ provides ways for rethinking the process of ordering, appearance and signification beyond the normative assumptions of humanism and the idealist confines of social constructivism, as well as injecting a degree of action and movement back into the composition of the social, these are still very much practices reckoned in terms of the human; carried out by humans in worlds which are for humans. And yet, as began to become clear towards the end of the last section, the figure of the human is haunted by all kinds of things, by all that which needs to be excluded for it to maintain its purity and exceptionalism. Humans, their desires and plans, are clearly not the only things active in the world, in fact often we may be very small players in much bigger trans- and non-human systems and complexes. Hence in 1999 we find Thrift writing about places as ‘spectral gatherings’; relational-material ‘crossroads’ where many different things gather, not just deliberative humans but a diverse range of actors and forces, some of which we know about, some not, and some of which may be just on the edge of awareness. The shift to thinking about Life is, therefore, a shift to thinking about how worlds may be arrayed and organised with humans, but not only humans. To arbitrarily stop relational understandings of phenomena at the boundary of the human is to re-inscribe precisely the divides between inside and outside, meaning and world, subject and site, which were first in question.\(^6\) If we are to rejoin and rethink these divides, it follows that the ‘missing masses’ must be allowed back into the social fold and the contingency of the human acknowledged. Hence in this section, the question is what becomes of the ‘social’ in this process? To start to give an answer this question we will first discuss the general implications of an expanded materialism before turning directly to the question of the ‘social’.

In distinction to phenomenologically inclined practice based approaches, we find a wider and wilder sense of a life in Deleuze’s joint writings with Guattari (see Dewsbury 2000; 2003). Deleuze’s (2001, 29) last piece of published writing – *Immanence: A Life* – is perhaps the touchstone for this work. Likened to a parable, aphorism and testament by John Rajchman, Deleuze writes of a life as

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6 This is not to suggest there is no debate about and reflection on these issues within non-representational theory, there clearly is. Indeed much recent work under this name has concerned precisely the status of and how to think about the human, but a human defined not by a putative essence or identity, that is to say debate around how to figure the human after or within the broader movement of anti-humanism. Compare for example Harrison (2008, 2009, this volume), McCormack (this volume), Rose (this volume), Thrift (2008), Wylie (2009, this volume). It is also interesting to note that as well as being critiqued for harbouring an implicit normativism humanism, as outlined above, in almost the same instant, non-representational theory has also been criticised for being too anti-humanist, (see for example Bondi 2005; Thien 2005). Without wanting to presage the on-going debates just noted, we would simply note how this situation suggests that, insofar as it has one, non-representational theory may have a new account of the human, one irreducible to either of the terms of critique.
an ‘impersonality’ that is unattributable to our particular identifications as people or selves:

A life is everywhere, in all the moments that a given living subject goes through and that are measured by given lived objects: an immanent life carrying with it the events of singularities that are merely actualised in subjects and objects (Deleuze 2001, 29).

Simply put *a* life is not *the* life of an already constituted individual or subject; *a* life is made up of singularities that are both outside and the possibility of the particular identifications that enable us to say ‘we’ or ‘I’. Just as all beginnings are imaginary so are all identifications. As such, the techniques, sensibilities and methods developed in particular through engagements with Deleuze and Guattari, and post-phenomenologists such as Lingis, have taken as their task to attend to a life that occurs *before* and *alongside* the formation of subjectivity, across human and non-human materialities and in-between distinctions between body and soul, materiality and incorporeality (after Seigworth 2003, 6; see Anderson and Wylie 2009; Latham and McCormack 2004; Greenhough, this volume; Hinchliffe, this volume; Lorimer, this volume; Roe, this volume).

This gives us to the second commitment through which we may recognise non-representational theories; following on from a concern with practices, *non-representational theories work with a relational-material or ‘associative’ account of *the social*’. Whilst this definition may not sound very precise this is, in many respects, the point; the social is a weaving of material bodies that can never be cleanly or clearly cleaved into a set of named, known and represented identities. More specifically, non-representational theories are concerned with the distribution of ‘the human’ across some form of assemblage that includes all manner of materialities. We would suggest that this approach involves three starting points; a commitment to an expanded social including all manner of material bodies, an attention to relations and being-in-relation, and sensitivity to ‘almost-not quite’ entities such as affects. In order to flesh out non-representational theory’s approach to the social and sociality it is worth addressing each of these points in a little more detail.

First, and learning from early explorations in actor-network theory, alongside the various embodied practices and capacities discussed above, the social is

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7 There are multiple uses of the term ‘assemblage’ in geography (see McFarlane 2009). For us, assemblage functions as a sensitising device to the ontological diversity of actants, the grouping of those actants, the resulting distribution of agentic capacities, and an outside that exceeds the grouping (after Bennett 2005). This retains the sense of assemblage as *agencement* (in the sense of arrangement) in Deleuze and Guattari (1987), without necessarily repeating the distinction between the actualised and unactualised that is at the heart of DeLanda’s (2006) realist development of Deleuze and Guattari’s morphogenetic account of life.
repopulated by objects, machines, and animals (see Bingham 1996; Hinchliffe
1996, Murdoch 1998; Whatmore 2002). These entities do not exist independently
from one another, neatly separated into discrete ontological domains; rather all co-
exist on the same ‘plane of immanence’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). Consider,
for example, the sheer multiplicity of materialities that are mixed together in
non-representational inspired empirical work; beliefs, atmospheres, sensations,
ideas, toys, music, ghosts, dance therapies, footpaths, pained bodies, trance
music, reindeer, plants, boredom, fat, anxieties, vampires, cars, enchantment,
nanotechnologies, water voles, GM Foods, landscapes, drugs, money, racialised
bodies, political demonstrations. What gives consistency to this proliferation of
whatever matters, what holds together this open ended list, is a simple affirmation;
materiality takes many forms (see Anderson and Wylie 2009; see Greenhough, this
volume, Roe, this volume; Hinchliffe, this volume). Non-representational theory
is unusual, then, in being thoroughly materialist. It does not limit a priori what
kind of beings make up the social. Rather everything takes-part and in taking-part,
takes-place: everything happens, everything acts. Everything, including images,
words and texts (Doel, this volume; Dewsbury, this volume; Laurier, this volume).
Hence a relational-materialist approach departs from understandings of the social
as ordered a priori (be it symbolically, ontologically, or otherwise) in a manner that
would, for example, set the conditions for how objects appear, or as an ostensive
structure that stands behind and determines practical action. In the taking-place
of practices, things and events there is no room for hidden forces, no room for
universal transcendentals or first principles. And so even representations become
understood as presentations; as things and events they enact worlds, rather than
being simple go-betweens tasked with re-presenting some pre-existing order or
force. In their taking-place they have an expressive power as active interventions
in the co-fabrication of worlds. Dewsbury, Harrison, Rose and Wylie (2002, 438)
put this well in one of the first commentaries on non-representational theory when
they stress that

Non-representational theory takes representation seriously; representation not
as a code to be broken or as a illusion to be dispelled rather representations are

8 The interest in matter and materiality has occurred as part of a broad concern with the
‘re-materialisation’ of British Social and Cultural Geography. Calls to ‘rematerialise’ were
themselves responses to the perceived overemphasis on signification in the New Cultural
Geography (Jackson 2000). It should be noted that there are now significant differences
within Social and Cultural Geography around how matter is theorised. Compare, for
example, the expansive sense of what counts as a material body in non-representational
theories to the concern for a circumscribed realm of objects in material culture studies, or
the continued use of ‘the material’ to refer to an ostensive social structure (for summaries of
different theories of matter and materiality see Anderson and Tolia-Kelly 2004; Cook and
Tolia-Kelly 2008). The closest connections to non-representational theory can probably be
found in the emphasis on the force of materiality in corporeal Feminism (see Slocum 2008;
Colls 2007).
apprehended as performative in themselves; as doings. The point here is to redirect
attention from the posited meaning towards the material compositions and conduct
of representations (Dewsbury, Harrison, Rose and Wylie 2002, 438).

Second, non-representational theory may be characterised by an attention to being-
in and being-of relation. An attention which begins from the ‘vital discovery’ that
relations are exterior and irreducible to their terms (Deleuze 2006, 41). The key
point here is that beginning from relations, ‘thinking relationally’, opens up ‘a
world in which the conjunction “and” dethrones the interiority of the verb “is”’
(Deleuze 2001, 38). In dialogue with Claire Parnet, Deleuze gives a sense of the
strange topologies and topographies that open up if one thinks with AND instead
of IS; that is, if one thinks of relations being as real as the different material bodies
that populate the social:

Relations are exterior to their terms. ‘Peter is smaller than Paul’, ‘The glass
is on the table’: relation is neither internal to one of the terms which would
consequently be subject, nor to two together. Moreover, a relation may change
without the terms changing ... Relations are in the middle, and exist as such. This
exteriority of relations is not a principle, it is a vital protest against principles
... If one takes this exteriority of relations as a conducting wire or as a line, one
sees a very strange world unfold, fragment by fragment: a Harlequin’s jacket or
patchwork, made up of solid parts and voids, blocs and ruptures, attractions and
divisions, nuances and bluntnesses, conjunctions and separations, alternations
and interweavings, additions which never reach a total and subtractions whose
remainder is never fixed (Deleuze 2006, 41).

The emphasis on relations resonates with a broad interest across Human Geography
in how everything, from places to identities, is ‘relationally constituted’ (see
2004 special issue of Geografiska Annaler B). The result is an emphasis on the
proliferation of diverse relations and a strong sense that the resulting orders are
open, provisional, achievements. However, pushing on, any simple definition
of ‘relation’ is immediately undone by the irreducible plurality of relations.
Indeed that relations are plural is the main lesson of an ‘after’ actor-network
theory literature, a lesson increasingly being taken up in geography and one that

9 There are many emerging questions and unresolved tensions in geography’s
treatment of ‘relations’ and ‘relationality’, including; how to bear witness to the plurality
of relations?; how to understand the ‘reality’ (felt or otherwise) of relations?; are relations
internal or external to their terms?; can relations change without the terms also changing?;
are actual entities exhausted by their relations?; and how to think what could be termed
the ‘non-relational’? (see for example Marston, Jones and Woodward 2005; Massey 2005;
has become central to non-representational theory. The consequence is that it is not enough to simply assert that phenomena are 'relationally constituted' or invoke the form of the network. rather it becomes necessary to think through the specificity and performative efficacy of different relations and different relational configurations (see Whatmore 2002; Hincliffe, this volume; Roe, this volume). Somewhat counter-intuitively perhaps, a general affirmation of relations seems to lead to focus on this specific relation.

Third, work in non-representational theory has examined how the social is composed of entities that are both present and absent; it has drawn attention to the role of 'objects' such as affects, virtual memories, hauntings, and atmospheres in the enactment, composition and durability of the social. There are debates within non-representational work around how to attend to absence (compare Wylie, this volume and Harrison, this volume to McCormack, this volume). Nevertheless, there is a shared concern for 'objects' that are both present and absent, neither one nor the other. Hence the constant attention to questions of affect in non-representational work, or, put differently, the capacities to affect and be affected of human and non-human materialities (Anderson 2006a; 2009; McCormack 2002; 2003; 2008; Thrift 2004; Bissell 2008; 2009; Simpson 2008; see Bissell, this volume and McCormack, this volume). Whilst undoubtedly contested, the term affect has come to name the aleatory dynamics of experience, the 'push' of life which interrupts, unsettles and haunts persons, places or things (Bennett 2010). The social is affective and it is often through affect that relations

10 Note, for example, the proper names that are given to just some of the shapes relations can take: 'encounter, arrival, address, contact, touch, belonging, distance, accord, agreement, determination, measuring, translation, and communication are some such forms of relation' (Gascié 1999, 11).

11 The emphasis on the fold between materiality and immateriality chimes with recent work on spectrality, haunting and the peculiar persistence of the past (see Pile 2005; Edensor 2005; Adey and Maddern 2008).

12 Debates around how to theorise 'affect' and 'emotion' have become something of a cipher for engagement with non-representational theory more broadly. We have deliberately downplayed the significance of affect in this introduction (and collection) because non-representational theories do much more than offer an account of worlds of affect. The debate about affect, emotion and their interrelation have turned around three points of concern and criticue: the apparent distinction between emphasising an impersonal life and the embodied experience of subjects; the relation between affect and signification; and the crypto-normativism that has arguably been smuggled into work on the politics of affect (see Bondi 2005; Thien 2005; Tolia-Kelly 2006; McCormack 2006; Anderson and Harrison 2006; Barnett 2008). Whilst we have our views on the tone and content of this debate, as well as different positions within it, we will leave it to the reader to navigate their own way through the discussion. What we do want to stress is that there is an 'affective turn' occurring beyond Human Geography where similar issues are being grappled with, in particular by Feminist and queer theory scholars working with a concept of affect (see for example Clough 2007; Puar 2007; Stewart 2007).
are interrupted, changed or solidified. Or so we learn through inventive work that describes how bodies dance together (McCormack 2003), attends to bodies seared by pain (Bissell 2009), or pays attention to the geographies of love (Wylie 2009). The attention to affect as a dynamic process that cuts across previously separated ontological and epistemological domains can be understood as a further repopulation of the social, this time with entities that are both much less and much more than present. We should not, however, be surprised at the intimacy a worldly, materialist thought has with reflections on immateriality. From the void of Epicurean philosophy through to the proletariat in historical materialism, spectres have haunted all materialisms (Pile 2005).

To return directly to this sections opening question: if the supposedly unique powers of the human have been problematised by a materialist emphasis on a more-than-human life, what then becomes of the term ‘social’? Perhaps we should jettison the term, despite or perhaps because of its current wide currency (Thrift 2008)? However this is, in some senses, to place the cart before the horse. To explain: in offering an associative understanding of the social, and breaking with a focus on collective symbolic orders, non-representational theory has affinities of method and sensibility with a whole series of ‘minor’ traditions in social geography; most notably, the longstanding attention to practice in time-geography (Hägerstrand 1973, 1982; Pred 1977; Latham 2003). Feminist work on performance and performativity (Gregson and Rose 2000), Erving Goffman’s dramaturgical account of social action (Thrift 1983) and Harold Garfinkel’s ethnomethodological investigations (Laurier, this volume). As with non-representational theory, all attempt to move away from a distinction between ‘individual’ and ‘society’ and all share an emphasis on the ongoing composition of the social from within the ‘rough ground’ of practices and the concrete richness of life.

Latour (2005) offers perhaps the sharpest account of the refigured notion of the ‘social’ that non-representational theories share, and which perhaps goes some way to distinguish them from the aforementioned traditions. The social, according to Latour, is a certain sort of circulation, where action is always dislocated, articulated, delegated, and translated; it is not a special domain or specific realm but ‘a very peculiar movement of re-association and reassembling’ (2005, 7). It is a type of connection between things that are not themselves social (ibid., 159):

At first this definition seems absurd since it risks diluting sociology to mean any type of aggregate from chemical bonds to legal ties, from atomic forces to corporate bodies, from physiological to political assemblies. But this is precisely the point that this alternative branch of social theory wishes to make as all those heterogeneous elements might be assembled anew in some given state of affairs. Far from being a mind boggling hypothesis, this is on the contrary the most common experience we have in encountering the puzzling face of the social. A new vaccine is being marketed, a new job description is offered, a new political
movement is being created, a new planetary systems is discovered, a new law is voted, a new catastrophe occurs. In each instance we resuffle our conceptions of what was associated together because the previous definition has been made somewhat irrelevant. We are no longer sure about what ‘we’ means; we seem to be bound by ‘ties’ that don’t look like regular social ties (Latour 2005, 5-6, *emphasis original*).

However, it is precisely the ‘holding together’ of different kinds of bodies that must be explained. ‘The social’ is, to paraphrase Latour, precisely what must be explained rather than that which can be invoked to explain the durability of this or that practical ordering. Quite simply, there is no order, there is only multiple orderings, and practices are the context for and necessary condition of those orders, each of which must be actively composed or fail (see Laurier, this volume; Hinchliffe, this volume; Bissell, this volume; Simonsen, this volume).

This does not mean, we would stress, that because there is no supplementary dimension to the social that there are no durable orders, or that those orders do not include many forms of damage, loss, suffering and harm. On the contrary, beginning from the social as a practical achievement provides a method for thinking through how systematic processes of harm *become* systematic. Systematic orderings are themselves multiplicities – composed of complex and shifting relations between seemingly discrete elements and types of elements (Connolly 2008). The only way to understand the durability of orderings (or collections of orderings) is to trace the relations between the heterogeneous elements that compose them, to follow how the resultant assemblage functions, and to map the encounters through which the elements within assemblages are brought into contact with forces outside of them. We see this insight being worked through most clearly, although by no means exclusively, in recent work on the formation of race and racisms, where racialised bodies are formed through the agglomeration of diverse elements, including, but never limited to, biological materialities such as phenotypes. Race is here addressed as an assemblage formed from within the heterogeneous materialities of bodies, technologies and places, racial difference being a heterogeneous process of differentiation, as Saldanha (2007) puts it. The task becomes to grasp how race, racial differences and potentially other social differences (Lim 2007), form, become durable and exert a force alongside the many other relations and relational configurations that make up the ‘social’ (see Saldanha 2006; 2007; Swanton 2008; Lim 2007: Saldanha, this volume; Darling, this volume; Simonsen, this volume).

As noted above, one of the promises of non-representational theory is that it offers a *radically* constructionist rather than *social* constructionist account of the ‘social’. As Massumi (2002a) stresses, constructionist accounts of ‘the social’ wonder about stasis given the primacy of process: how do things fit together and hold together across differences? How to think the irreducible contingency of order? Beginning from the primacy of process opens up the question of change: how are orders disrupted, how do orders fail, and how are new orders coming into
being, if only momentarily? It is to a consideration of change that we now turn in order to introduce the third and final way we may recognise non-representational theories; through their concern with events.

**Events and Futurity**

If non-representational theories begin from practices and advocate a relational-materialist analysis of the social, why the name ‘non-representational theory’? A name that has added to the sense of promise, wariness, and perhaps even irritation that has surrounded non-representational styles of thinking and doing over the past 15 years or so. As we have stressed above, and is hopefully apparent in Part II of this book, non-representational styles of thinking can by no means be characterised as anti-representation *per se*. Rather what pass for representations are apprehended as performative presentations, not reflections of some *a priori* order waiting to be unveiled, decoded, or revealed. But maybe the name was a mistake, maybe it is now time to dispense with it in favour of something more affirmative – ‘more-than-representational theory’ being one popular suggestion (Lorimer 2005; see Rose, this volume)? Perhaps though, and like actor-network theory, the promise of non-representational theory would have been betrayed by any name that enabled it to be easily summed up and reduced. We think there is something more in the name: a force to the prefix ‘non’ that hints to something vital to non-representational theories that is worth thinking with and affirming. The ‘non’ is frustratingly elusive, it cannot be thought as such. It leaves things incomplete. It manages to obscure what it affirms by studiously avoiding positive nomination (see Dewsbury, this volume; Harrison, this volume; Doel, this volume).

In these ways the prefix ‘non’ opens up the third way that we can recognise non-representational theories; *they are marked by an attention to events and the new potentialities for being, doing and thinking that events may bring forth*. ‘The event’ has been such an important concept and empirical concern for non-representational theories because it opens up the question of how to think about change. In the previous section we argued that non-representational theories share a reversal of the relation between stasis and process, we can now say more precisely that the task of a materialist analysis of the social is to understand the stability of form amid the dynamism of formation (Massumi 2002b). Within this thinking ‘the event’ is of importance because it allows the emphasis on the contingency of orders to morph into an explicit concern with the new, and with the chances of invention and creativity. As events have to do with ‘lighting fires’: with solicitations or provocations, with promises and threats that create:

>a transforming moment that releases from the grip of the present and opens up the future in a way that makes possible a new birth, a new beginning, a new invention of ourselves, even as it awakens dangerous memories (Caputo 2007, 6).
Fleshing out these comments requires, however, that we think carefully about what we mean by the term ‘event’. There are many occurrences which we might want to understand as events. There are also many ways in which ‘the event’ is conceptualised, addressed and handled not only within non-representational theories but also by architects, site specific artists, security professionals and other creators of both events and their opposite – recognised occurrences. Given this heterogeneity, let’s consider two examples of what we might take to be events in order to unpack what we mean by the term and present a couple of the different ways in which non-representational theories think the relation between orderings, events and change (though see Dewsbury, this volume; Doel, this volume; Woodard, this volume; McCormack, this volume).

First, consider a granite obelisk known as Cleopatra’s Needle that sits on the Charing Cross Embankment, London, UK. Placed in its current position on 12 September 1878, it may appear far removed from the dynamism and transitoriness we might want to associate with the concept of event. The process philosopher Alfred Whitehead thought differently. He saw it as a continual event, or better a complex of passing events:

If we define the Needle in a sufficiently abstract manner we can say that it never changes. But a physicist who looks on part of the life of nature as a dance of electrons, will tell you that daily it has lost some molecules and gained others, and even the plain man can see that it gets dirtier and is occasionally washed (2004 [1920], 167).

Here we find a first sense of the event – the event as a continual differing, if only in modest ways, that takes-place in relation to an ever-changing complex of other events. For, as Whitehead went on to stress, events have always just happened or are about to happen:

You cannot recognise an event; because when its gone, it is gone. You may observe another event of analogous character, but the actual chunk of the life of nature is inseparable from its unique occurrence. But the character of an event can be recognised. We all know that if we go to the Embankment near Charing Cross we shall observe an event having the character which we recognise as Cleopatra’s Needle (2004 [1920], 169).

Here the divergence and discord that events bring is not rare, nor is it some form of caesura, rather ‘wherever and whenever something is going on there is an event’ (Whitehead 1920, 78). Putting it in the terms of the previous sections (terms which are not necessarily Whitehead’s) we could say that events are primary in a world in which the background is open to modification and in which diverse material bodies are constantly being brought into relation. Here the term ‘event’ describes the escaping edge of any systematisation or economisation; the effects or affects of any ‘line of flight’ (see Deleuze and Guattari 1987). It is only with effort that
any such ‘slight surprise’ of action can be turned back into a reproduction of an existing order (Latour 1999; Massumi 2002a).

If we are caught within a world of becomings, where events can be found everywhere, then any ordering is always volatile. This is the basic insight at the heart of thinking with the event. However, there are other ways of conceptualising the relation between events, change and order. A slightly different sense of the event as a rare surprise that breaks with how the background is organised, or a specific social-material configuration is assembled, has animated other non-representational theories. Let’s consider a second example of what we might want to understand as an event – the event that has come to be housed within a date – September 11th – or a number – 9/11. For Derrida, it is the very brevity of this name and number that indicates that, perhaps, an event in the sense of an absolute surprise may have taken-place:

‘Something’ took place, we have the feeling of not having seen it coming, and certain consequences undeniably follow upon the ‘thing’. But this very thing, the place and meaning of this ‘event’, remains ineffable, like an intuition without a concept, like a unicity with no generality on the horizon or with no horizon at all, out of range for a language that admits its powerlessness and so is reduced to pronouncing mechanically a date, repeating it endlessly, as a kind of ritual incantation, a conjuring poem, a journalistic litany or rhetorical refrain that admits to not knowing what it’s talking about (Derrida 2003, 86).

Derrida goes on to stress that the ‘impression’ that 9/11 was a ‘major event’ has been reflected on, interpreted and communicated, and that this process is itself an ‘event’ in the sense of a modification. But is this the same as a ‘major event’? Whilst the movement of appropriation is ‘irreducible and ineluctable’, for there to be an event appropriation must falter at some ‘border or frontier’ (2003, 90):

A frontier, however, with neither front nor confrontation, one that incomprehension does not run into head on since it does not take the form of a solid front: it escapes, remains evasive, open, undecided, indeterminable. Whence the unappropriability, the unforeseeability, absolute surprise, incomprehension, the risk of misunderstanding, unanticipatable novelty, pure singularity, the absence of horizon (2003, 90-91).

If we accept this as the minimal definition of the event, then was ‘9/11’ an event? This is less certain, even if we agree with Whitehead that there is something of an event every time something happens, since an event of a ‘terrorist attack’ was foreseen, there were precedents and the event 9/11 was very quickly captured in geopolitical and biopolitical projects of war and security. Hence here the event is understood a little differently to in our previous example: here the event is an absolute surprise, something that brings ‘contingency, unpredictability, and chance
into the world' (Dastur 2000, 179). Events, on this understanding, must breach, shatter and overflow horizons of expectation or anticipation, and as such are scarce (Caputo 2007). Faced with this rarity and this alterity, we might, instead, focus on all the ways in which practical orders repeat and reproduce by making the unforeseeable foreseeable and the unrepeatable repeatable, that is all the ways in which events are foreseen, foresaid and foreclosed (see Derrida 2007, see also Harrison this volume; Rose this volume).

In both examples the event does not resemble, conform, or reproduce a set of a priori conditions. It does not represent those conditions. Rather, and in different ways, events break with their extant conditions, forcing or inviting us to think and act differently (Massumi 2002a, xxiv-xxv). It may be that like the prefix 'non' we can only define the event negatively – the event is the impossible which happens. The event 'always comes to us by surprise, or from that side whence, precisely, it was not expected' (Dastur 2000, 183). The shared sense of 'the event' as that which opens up the chance of something different is expressed well by Rajchman (1991, ix):

[The event] is not defined by a fixed beginning and end, but is something that occurs in the midst of a history, causing us to redistribute our sense of what has gone before it and what might come after. An event is thus not something one inserts into an emplotted dramatic sequence with its start and finish, for it initiates a new sequence that retrospectively determines its beginnings, and which leaves its ends unknown or undetermined.

The emphasis on the chance of the event means that it is not quite correct to characterise non-representational theory as a type of practice theory, even though, as discussed above, it places thought-in-action, nor as only offering a form of relational materialism, albeit one attuned to affect and other absent-present 'objects'. Although 'the event' is conceptualised in various ways, the concept is so central to non-representational theory because it offers a way of thinking about how change occurs in relation to the on-going formation of 'the social'. Hence the desire that has animated non-representational theory has been to find a means of attending to the difference, divergence and differentiation that events open up, or may open up. We see this across work that has attempted to bear witness to the potential for difference released by the taking-place of a range of events; the fleeting potential that follows the event of a sexually charged glance between two people (Lim 2007), the performative force and sense of mutability found in dance and the performing arts (Dewsbury 2000); the potential for better ways of being touched in moments of hope (Anderson 2006a), and explicitly political events that break with the state of an existing situation (Dewsbury 2007, Woodward, this volume). The lightening of possible storms.

The question of the event opens up a further set of issues about how to create and sustain events; how to bear and extend the potential that events open up, the sense of promise and futurity that they may hold? How, to put it differently.
to relate to the future without capturing it and neutralising it before it happens? Across tangible differences in theory and method, non-representational theories share an affinity of sensibility, what we could call a specific ‘existential faith’ that crosses various attempts to contribute, if only modestly, and always carefully, to the opening up of different futures (Connolly 2008). This existential faith finds ethical and political import in thinking about methods – understood broadly – as active interventions in the taking-place of events, whether by affirming (generously, hopefully) becoming or waiting (hospitality, anxiously) for the ‘to come’ (compare McCormack, this volume; Rose, this volume; Woodward, this volume). What this work shares is a commitment to critique as a means of creating turning points in the here and now and a conviction that in any given situation more is needed than critique if (certain) events are to be tended to and cultivated. Critique is necessary but always insufficient. It may be supplemented by a positive attachment to a world of becoming in which ‘wherever and whenever something is going on there is an event’. Hence the recent interest in enchantment (Bennett 2001b) or generosity (Diprose 2001) as two such ways of working on the ‘background’ of thought and life (see McCormack, this volume; Darling, this volume and Roe, this volume). It may also be supplemented by an affirmative, perhaps even utopian, relation with events, everyday or otherwise, that open up traces of radically different futures (Anderson 2006b; Kraftl 2007; Rose, 2007; see Rose, this volume).

Although usually considered to be very different, these ways of relating to the event have a series of affinities with other styles of anticipatory thinking and acting, most notably the attention to disruption that marks queer geographies (e.g. Brown 2008), an emergent Feminist and anti-racist literature attuned to the force of corporeal differences such as gender (Colls 2007), and the explosion of interest in poststructuralist participatory geographies seized by the potential of various micro-economic experiments (Gibson-Graham 2006). All are animated by the question of how better futures may be brought into being. Likewise, the attention to the event in Non-Representation Theory opens up the question of future geographies in a way that returns us to the sense of affirmation and experimentation that we find in Foucault’s dream:

How then can space function differently from the ways in which it has always functioned? What are the possibilities of inhabiting otherwise? Of being extended otherwise? Of living relations of nearness and farness differently? (Grosz 2001, 129).

Openings

To conclude: it seems fair to say that non-representational theories are a set of predominantly, although not exclusively, poststructuralist theories that share a number of questions or problems; how do sense and significance emerge from ongoing practical action?; how, given the contingency of orders, is practical action
organised in more-than-human configurations?; and how to attend to events – to the ‘non’ that may lead to the chance of something different or a modification of an existing ordering? In this understanding, non-representational theorists may include ethnomethodologists, (post)phenomenologists, Deleuzians, Corporeal Feminists, and actor-network theorists, amongst others. In other words we take seriously the multiplicity of theorists that Thrift (1996, 1999) identified with non-representational theory, and that when first using the term he uses the plural. This means that the problems and questions that non-representational theories pose are not only being encountered in Human Geography. For example, they are also being taken up in the development of an immanent naturalism in political theory (Connolly 2008), an enchanted materialism in political ecology (Bennett 2001), and a renewed attention to affectively imbued experience in cultural studies (Seigworth 2000).

The four sections we have organised the book around – Life, Representation, Ethics and Politics – are designed to draw out a series of problems, questions and imperatives that deepen our introductory remarks, engage in more depth with the debates that have emerged around non-representational theory, and pick up some of the threads we have only been able to touch on or hint at here. When we first invited contributions to the book we asked each author to address a specific concept, problem or question by way of a theory or set of theories that were important to non-representational theories. As you will see, each of the authors interpreted this challenge differently. We have deliberately retained this plurality of tone, style and voice. Differences coexist within non-representational theory, and we wanted to produce a collection that affirmed this in both content and form. Indeed not all of the contributors would agree with how we have characterised non-representational theory in this introduction. These differences mean that each section opens up a set of further questions at a time when non-representational concerns are in the midst of travelling across a range of sub-disciplines within Human Geography, changing as different concepts, sensibilities and methods are taken up in relation to different substantive and theoretical problems.\textsuperscript{13} We hope the book makes a modest contribution to this process. By way of a brief summary of each of the four sections, we want to conclude this ‘primer’ on non-representational theory by

\textsuperscript{13} See, for example, the emerging interest in everyday life, sensory registers and affect in political geography, particularly work on popular geopolitics and the biopolitics of security (Macdonald, Hughes, and Dodds 2009; Adey 2009; Sidaway 2009); nascent work on cultural economy, work and affect (Woodward and Lea 2009; Amin 2007); an attention to the importance of visceral in consumption (Hayes-Conroy 2008); attempts to think the relation between health, therapy and relational bodies (Lea 2008; Conradson 2005); the focus on matters of belief in work on religion (Holloway 2006); the various ways in which the urban is apprehended as an assemblage and architecture as an event (Kraftl 2006; Latham and McCormack 2004); and efforts to enliven children’s geographies (Horton and Kraftl 2006; Woodyer 2008). This is in addition to the now huge amount of work concerned with ‘everyday practices’ of one form or another as reviewed by Lorimer (2005: 2007: 2008).
introducing the set of issues around the encounter between non-representational theories and Human Geography that the chapters address.

Part I – *Life* – is organised around the move from practices to Life. It poses a set of questions that resonate throughout the book and follow from the three shared problematics or commitments that we have argued non-representational theories share. How to attend to the indeterminacy and complexity of the world (Greenough, this volume)? How to understand the intermingling of different types of lively material bodies (Lorimer, this volume)? How do affects and forms of signification intermix in specific practical orders (Bissell, this volume)? And how to think the relation between life and the formation of subjectivities (Wylie, this volume)?

Part II – *Representation* – explores how we might think representation once our attention turns to Life. It offers four partially connected ways of developing the insight that representations enact worlds; through an attention to language-in-use (Laurier, this volume); through an account of representation as transformation and differentiation (Doel, this volume); via the event of language (Dewsbury, this volume); and through a concern with the ‘failure’ of re-presentation and so the ‘failure’ of a world (Harrison, this volume). As a whole Part II aims to make the point that non-representational theory does not refuse representation *per se*, only representation as the repetition of the same or representation as a mediation. The hinge between the first half of the book and the second is an interview with Nigel Thrift in which he charts the development of his own interest in practices, reflects on some of the key problematics that open up once one considers Life, and the ethical and political import of non-representational theories in relation to contemporary capitalism and democratic politics.

The second half of the book – *Ethics* and *Politics* – unfolds some of the implications for ethics and politics of non-representational theory’s placing of ‘thought-in-action’, its materialist analysis of the social, and the attention to events. In no case does a politics or ethics simply unfold from a set of theoretical propositions. In each chapter specific problems, concepts, methods or sensibilities are brought into connection with worldly concerns, whether they be UK Asylum Seeker detention policy, the 1999 anti-capitalist protests in Seattle, community gardening groups, or the industrialized mass slaughter of animals. In *Ethics* the concern is with how to respond to social formations as they are in formation, where the social includes all manner of material bodies. In each case this involves (but is not limited to) exploring the relations between the affirmative and critical (McCormack, this volume) and experimenting with the corporeal sensibilities that are enfolded into how we learn to affect and be affected by the world, including relations with non-humans (Roe, this volume), and across recognised social differences (Darling, this volume; Simonsen, this volume). The chapters in *Politics* by contrast revolve around a slightly different problematic of difference; how to make a difference if we expand what counts as political and move beyond an exclusively representational politics? As one would expect, the means vary, and this section contains some of the most obvious tensions with chapters in previous sections, but all presume that politics takes-place in a world of differences;
including the force and materiality of social differences (Saldanha, this volume),
the multiplicity of partially connected orders (Hinchliffe, this volume); the opening
up to the new that events and certain ‘abrupt conditions’ may herald (Woodward,
this volume); and the change the future may bring (Rose, this volume).

Writing an introduction such as this is like trying to ‘catch sea foam in the
breeze’. As the chapters which follow demonstrate, non-representational theory
is on-going, diversifying and disseminating, and so attempting to define such an
ouevre is a largely thankless task. And this is why, in many respects, we have not
done so. Rather in this introduction we have attempted to suggest the animating
concerns, the conceptual, practical and existential commitments which bring
this work to life, but which do not determine or delimit its development. Indeed
recognisable across all three elements discussed above is a continual process of
de-limiting; of the human, of the social, of the material and of the future. In non-
representational theory each becomes multiple and many, contingent and fragile,
assembled and scattered. All the better, all the better.

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