CITIZENSHIP VERSUS PATRIOTISM IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY ENGLAND*

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ABSTRACT. This article explores some of the tensions and interaction between two rival conceptions of the relationship between citizenship and patriotism in twentieth-century England. The first was widespread among the intellectual elite and greatly qualified the role of patriotism in sustaining a higher ideal of citizenship. The second was generally the preserve of popular writers and activists who conceived citizenship in terms of patriotic attachment to the English and English-British nation. However, the article maintains that the Edwardian intellectual elite often assumed an homogeneous national culture as the basis of successful citizenship, both local and international. In this regard, despite subjection to increasing strain, continuity as much as change is apparent in conceptions of citizenship up to and including the interventions of Enoch Powell in the debate over mass immigration. Subsequent attempts to ground citizenship in difference rather than sameness have greatly intensified the tension with a more persistent culture of patriotism.

In a recent study Krishan Kumar has argued convincingly that a shared national identity in England is little more than a century old. Against a growing trend of medievalists to locate the origins of Englishness as far back as the age of Bede, and early modernists to favour the sixteenth century in this regard, Kumar emphasizes the ‘moment’ of English nationhood as the turn of the nineteenth century and the erosion of British industrial and imperial supremacy. Previously, English national awareness had been weak due to a range of competing loyalties – supra-national and sub-national; England’s ascendancy within the wider British nation also served to suppress its development. Even when national consciousness flowered in England in the late nineteenth century its expression was typically cultural, in the longer term remaining distinct from the more political varieties of continental nationalism to which — for a short while — it bore some resemblance.1

However, Kumar’s analysis considerably underplays widespread ambivalence among the intellectual elite towards the enhanced self-consciousness of the English nation at the end of the nineteenth century, unlike the active encouragement which many of its counterparts in continental Europe gave to similar

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developments there. This arose from a concern that the ideal of citizenship associated with the development of democracy should not be debased by an unreflective patriotism hitched to a strong sense of nationhood. Two distinct but interrelated cultures can be seen to have emerged from this clash: one centred on citizenship, the other on patriotism.

The concept of citizenship promoted by an academic community of philosophers, classicists, social scientists, and political thinkers was rooted in an attachment to the state as the supreme focus of collective loyalty, identity, and the common good. They were generally wary of the emotive language of nationhood, emphasizing instead the importance of democratic, liberal, and civic values based on reason. They by no means excluded the possibility that the will of society presently embodied in states would expand to form the basis of a sovereign international community, a development to be warmly welcomed. Indeed, advocates of citizenship often assumed a level of cohesion and patriotic charge akin to that of their own society as a precondition of widening social sentiment, while at the same time seeking to sublimate its ‘national’ character. Although the citizenship ideal was cultivated primarily in academic circles, it was successfully projected well beyond. For example, the Idealist philosophers Bernard Bosanquet and J. S. Mackenzie spread what was in effect a gospel of citizenship in the Charity Organization Society and the Civic Education League respectively; they also published with non-academic publishers and in non-specialist journals.

At the same time but in other quarters, vigorous attempts were made to define the citizen in terms of the English patriot. This ideal was championed by writers and activists who served broad public audiences. These audiences undoubtedly overlapped with those to whom the ethic of citizenship was addressed. However, quite plausibly, the audience for patriotism held up as that of its rival contracted as the pace of academic specialization and professionalization accelerated.

The ideal of patriotism emphasized the primacy of the nation over the state and the impossibility, indeed incoherence, of a world in which national ties had been significantly loosened. The support of avowed patriots for their state was not always guaranteed, especially when it threatened to subjugate other peoples,

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2 For example, for Idealist thinkers in this vein, see D. Boucher, ‘British Idealism, the state, and international relations’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 55 (1994), pp. 671–94.


for example, the Irish and the Boers. In this way English patriotism in the twentieth century was more than simply—in the words of Jonathan Clark—a ‘decorous, libertarian, non-aggressive’ substitute for nationalism, narrowly centred on political culture and institutions; it was often rooted in a conception of the English people as a distinct spiritual or cultural whole. As J. H. Grainger has written of the diverse patriotisms of Edwardian England, ‘Kings, Lords and Commons and Church articulated and represented the continuities, remained deeply expressive of ancient cohesion but did not set the patria in motion’. This is clear in the founding of the Royal Society of St George in 1894 by Howard Ruff, to ‘strengthen…and maintain…that spirit of nationality and sentiment of race which should associate all of kindred blood wherever dispersed’. For the Society—as for later figures such as George Orwell (briefly) and Enoch Powell—citizenship and patriotism were two, co-equal sides of a larger national coin. Patriotic identification with English nationhood at this thin end of a thick nationalist wedge—the concept of the English ‘race’ was not inherently racist and a seed-ground of intolerance—merits close examination; it does so particularly in relation to the ideals of collective national life pursued by academic thinkers. While the alignment of patriotism and English nationhood may not have led to a

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6 J. C. D. Clark, Our shadowed present: modernism, postmodernism and history (London, 2003), pp. 61–2, 88, 96. Clark both underestimates the strength of patriotism in England, Britain, and the United Kingdom and its basis in nationality. He claims that certain ‘group’ identities prevailed over the nation in all three contexts, rooted in ‘allegiance, shared history, liberty, law, superior civilization and the polity’s place within a scenario of the historical development of Christendom’: p. 93. This is undeniable but such bonds were arguably constitutive of, rather than alternatives to, the various senses of nationhood here.

7 J. H. Grainger, Patriotisms: Britain, 1900–1940 (London, 1986), p. 64. I draw upon but seek to extend this fine book in the present article.

8 Letter to the editor, signed by Alfred Bower, lord mayor, and nine other officers of the Society, The English Race, Journal of the Royal Society of St George, 38 (Aug. 1926), p. 6. In the early 1880s, dismayed by the lack of English national consciousness and also ignorance of the role which England had played in the building of empire, Ruff initiated the practice of wearing a rose on St George’s Day. He gave up farming and rural pursuits to devote himself full time to the cause of English patriotism, leaving the whole of his residuary estate on the death of his wife to Trustees for the Society he had founded: see his obituary, The English Race, 47 (Mar. 1929), pp. 8–9. The Society is overlooked by Kumar, Clark, and even Grainger.

separate political party, arguably it more than matched the citizenship culture in defining England – and Britain – as national communities, and shaping opinion on a wide range of issues for much of the twentieth century and beyond.

This article charts some of the tensions and interaction between these two cultures of citizenship and patriotism since around 1900, and emphasizes the weight of their historical legacy. Neither was particularly exercised by the significant race, class, and gender inequalities that compromised the legal definition of nationality and citizenship, especially in the first half of the twentieth century; however, this was potentially more serious for the citizenship paradigm, dependent as it was upon the possession and exercise of actual political rights for the expression of communal identity and will. It is also important to emphasize at the outset that both cultures were informed to varying degrees by a broad-based liberalism that cut across the boundaries of conservatism and socialism; consequently, polarization of the two cultures on Left–Right lines has been limited. The wider lines of division ran instead along an internationalist–nationalist axis that was by no means mutually exclusive, however weak at times the commitment to one side may have become on the part of those who prioritized the other. The article maintains that the two cultures remained relatively stable at a conceptual level until the late twentieth century when attempts to renew the culture of citizenship cast off much of the simultaneous concern with ethical, class, and (implicitly) national homogeneity that had sustained earlier citizenship discourse. In this context, conflict with a more persistent ideal of patriotism intensified; at the same time, the audiences of the two cultures finally broke apart.

I

Intellectuals in Britain had not always been hostile to the cause of the nation. Liberal nationalism with respect to oppressed nations abroad had been widely embraced by the mid- to late Victorian intelligentsia. As Peter Mandler has argued, while large parts of an essentially liberal elite had recoiled in horror from the 1848 revolutions in Europe, by the 1860s an equally significant number had warmed to the democratic principles, especially, on which the claims of the nation to determine its own destiny seemed to be founded. One notable voice of dissent – Lord Acton – approached nationalism from the combined perspectives of continental politics and Roman Catholicism. Significantly, he distrusted

10 For the view that English traits often became synonymous with Britishness after 1900, especially as the Protestantism on which British identity had traded heavily in previous centuries diminished in force, see J. K. Walton, ‘Britishness’, in C. Wrigley, ed., A companion to early twentieth-century Britain (Oxford, 2002), pp. 520, 529.

nationalism for the same reason that his contemporaries endorsed it: an inextri-
cable association with the popular will.\textsuperscript{12} Liberal nationalism was further
nourished by the communitarian temper of liberal radicalism during the second
half of the nineteenth century; this was expressed in the later writings of John
Stuart Mill and was central to nationalist debate in Scotland, Ireland, and Wales
towards the end of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{13}

However, even in this period of relative goodwill towards the nation, the in-
tellectual elite rarely encouraged a sense of British, much less English, nation-
hood; their concern was limited to explaining change in terms of national
characteristics and the essentially modern forces which had shaped them,
culminating in democracy.\textsuperscript{14} The great apostle of empire as the focus of English
national identity in the late Victorian period, J. R. Seeley, well illustrates this
wider indifference. For Seeley, ‘England’ was virtually meaningless outside of the
imperial state to which it had been harnessed; in this sense the pre-history of
England was far older than its history proper, and of little bearing.\textsuperscript{15} The strongest
invocation of English national character and identity as source rather than
consequence of empire came from J. F. Stephen. This was in reaction against the
resurgence of Catholicism in the latter half of the nineteenth century on the one
hand, and the perceived cosmopolitanism of popular liberals such as Richard
Cobden and John Bright on the other.\textsuperscript{16} But Stephen’s ideas found little response
among his contemporaries. More typical of the attitude of the intelligentsia
towards English nationhood was the view of his fellow lawyer, A. V. Dicey, that
the English people could take most pride in the absence of national pride,
particularly among their politicians and political intellectuals, if not poets and
writers; such signal lack of nationalist feeling was, at the very least, the source
of unparalleled freedom.\textsuperscript{17} While this essentially inverted form of nationalism
could be accompanied by a close identity with the Anglo-Saxon race, the
latter was frequently interpreted in terms of a widely dispersed people with
common ties and affections rather than biological race or nationhood more
narrowly.\textsuperscript{18} For Dicey, the Anglo-Saxon race provided the basis on which bridges
of ‘common citizenship’ could be built across geographical and constitutional
divides. He emphasized the value of binding England closer to her former
American colonies on the basis of ‘common legal conceptions’ and associated

\textsuperscript{12} See T. Lang, ‘Lord Acton and the insanity of nationalism’, \textit{Journal of the History of Ideas}, 63 (2003),
pp. 129–49.
\textsuperscript{13} See E. F. Biagini, \textit{Citizenship and community: liberals, radicals and collective identities in the British Isles,
\textsuperscript{14} Mandler, ‘The consciousness of modernity?’, p. 121.
\textsuperscript{15} R. N. Soffer, ‘History and religion: J. R. Seeley and the burden of the past’, in R. W. Davis and
\textsuperscript{17} See A. V. Dicey, \textit{Lectures on the relation between law and public opinion in England during the nineteenth
\textsuperscript{18} Kumar, \textit{The making of English national identity}, pp. 206–7.
beliefs and sentiments, not least strong aversion to the continental practice of conscription.  

By the turn of the century, the prior claims of citizenship over those of nationhood and patriotism struck the dominant note of liberal intellectual culture in Britain. Partly this was due to disquiet about the illiberal, racist turn of European nationalist movements. The British empire was also instrumental in heightening suspicion of the nation in such circles. Following reports of unseemly behaviour by the crowds on Mafeking night, the young J. M. Keynes identified a cult of ‘patriophobia’ in intellectual life, as strong – and even to his Liberal mind – as distasteful as that of ‘jingoism’ beyond. For progressive liberals such as L. T. Hobhouse, imperialism had corrupted patriotism by transforming legitimate pride in national independence into chauvinism and aggrandisement. At the same time the imperialist spirit of the triumphant nation threatened to subvert the movement of democratic citizenship at home, dependent as empire was on authoritative government abroad.

According to Hobhouse, liberalism sometimes had to take risks with nationalism and recognize the claim of subject peoples, like the Irish, to full political rights; their case was unanswerable, unlike that of the sectarian Protestant minority in the north. But whenever liberalism acted thus, it did so with a heavy heart.

It was left to the popular patriotic leagues of Edwardian England – for example, the Navy League, the Tariff Reform League, and the Victoria League – loudly to extol England’s achievements and the virtue of national loyalty, particularly in the context of empire. While liberal intellectual figureheads of the Leagues were not unknown – for example, Spencer Wilkinson, co-founder of the Navy League – their closest, albeit unacknowledged, ally was the Left. Since the 1880s, despite internal opposition, the Left had sought to regain the sense of common English and English-British nationhood that had


20 On the increasing pessimism of Bryce and Dicey – two followers of Mazzini in the 1860s – towards nationalism following the upsurge of ‘racial feeling’ within, see Rich, Race and empire in British politics, pp. 23–4; on their political disillusion more widely, see C. Harvie, The lights of liberalism: university liberals and the challenge of democracy, 1860–1885 (London, 1976).


been lost with industrial capitalism, if necessary through support for imperial expansion. Indeed, one force behind the upsurge of patriotism in the early years of the twentieth century was a belief that a major casualty of industrialization and urbanization had been the spontaneous attachment of ordinary people to their nation generated by idyllic, rural habitations.

Stephen Heathorn has recently argued that the failure of British socialism to shed the language of the nation before the First World War was a direct result of the teaching of ‘national’ literacy through basic literacy in elementary schools with the advent of popular democracy. It is evident from his meticulous research into English language textbooks that patriotic values and ideals of nationhood were certainly boosted by the teaching profession in this way. But nationalist sensibilities were filtered primarily through the ‘prism’ of citizenship, and with the interests of the state in ‘rational’ loyalty and obedience from a population still largely denied political rights kept firmly in view. In other words, nationhood was promoted in schools as a surrogate for full citizen status. Furthermore, as Heathorn makes clear, unease about too overtly nationalist an agenda was not unknown in educational circles, over and above a concern to avoid the propagandist and partisan aims of the patriotic Leagues. Finally, such provision as there was for nationalist education in Britain signal failed to satisfy the patriotic die-hards – for example, Arthur Boutwood, Lord Roberts, Lord Milner, and Lord Baden-Powell – who looked enviously at Germany, the United States, and Japan. These figures invested their hopes instead in youth organizations such as the Boy Scouts movement which were not hindered by the reluctance of public authorities to address the needs of the patria head-on.

Against this backdrop, the ideal of the rational citizen – both virtual and actual – clashed heavily with the engaged patriot as competing embodiments of political virtue before 1914. An alternative model of the engaged citizen in conflict rather than harmony with the state was developed by militant suffragettes and other disempowered groups who attacked the exclusivity of citizenship in the dominant liberal understandings of the term. But the overall fault lines between rational citizenship and patriotic attachment to the community of the nation remained intact. Of course, as we shall see, citizenship culture was never

27 Grainger, Patriotisms, p. 39. This was a key theme of Arthur Bryant, who, as will be seen, attempted to sustain the momentum of Edwardian patriotism after the First World War. See, for example, his weekly column, ‘Our notebook’ (which he inherited from Chesterton in 1936) in the Illustrated London News (hereafter ILN), 13 Dec. 1947, p. 650.
completely dissociated from the empire which stirred large parts of the patriotic imagination of late Victorian and Edwardian Britain, nor from its English and British national core. At the same time a progressive liberal such as J. A. Hobson could be cautiously receptive to the emotional life of crowds which underpinned patriotism and other ends transcending the self; this he saw as a necessary corrective to the abstractions of elite political theory.\(^\text{31}\) Nevertheless, the dominant liberal ideals of citizenship, at least, were distinctive for being articulated primarily in \textit{moral} rather than overtly \textit{national} and even \textit{legal} terms. The tone was well struck by James Bryce in his Yale Lectures on ‘the responsibilities of citizenship’ in 1909. Bryce emphasized the shortcomings of contemporary mankind with regard to civic duty, for which he believed a blind patriotism was partly to blame. Admonishing the people of both Britain and America for not ‘caring enough for [their] country’, he declared:

It is easy to wave a flag, to cheer an eminent statesman, to exult in some achievement by land or sea. But our imaginations are too dull to realize either the grandeur of the State in its splendid opportunities for promoting the welfare of the masses, or the fact that the nobility of the State lies in its being the true child, the true exponent, of the enlightened will of a right-minded and law-abiding people.\(^\text{32}\)

As Roberto Romani has emphasized, citizenship for Bryce was essentially a discipline for the lack of rational collective direction consequent upon democracy.\(^\text{33}\)

II

The concern to channel patriotic sentiment and duty into citizenship and away from nationhood was greatly enhanced by the neo-Idealist revival in Britain.\(^\text{34}\) Led by T. H. Green, an Oxford contemporary of Dicey and Bryce before his early death in 1882, Idealism provided a powerful philosophical foundation for the spirit of altruism, self-sacrifice, and obligation which seized the governing and intellectual classes in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In this context, the hopes for the future of society held by Idealist thinkers such as Sir Henry Jones were crystallized in the concept of citizenship as a dissolvent of class differences and the basis of self-realization within a wider social

\(^{32}\) J. Bryce, \textit{The hindrances to good citizenship} (New Haven, CT, 1909), p. 41.  
\(^{34}\) J. R. Gibbons has written that ‘the citizenship aspect of idealism, which placed priority upon the voluntary participation at a possible plurality of levels in the organization of the state, excludes all but the weakest forms of nationalism’. He emphasizes the contrast with the ‘exclusive’ nationalist path which Idealism took in other countries, for example in Germany through Fichte and in Italy through Gentile: see ‘Liberalism, nationalism, and the English Idealists’, \textit{History of European Ideas}, 15 (1992), pp. 491–7, at pp. 493, 496.
whole.\textsuperscript{35} Idealism was also an attempt to rescue Christian morality from the damaging influence of biblical scholarship which had recently brought the historical veracity of the gospels into question. Green thus turned to Aristotle’s \textit{Ethics} as the mainspring of the philosophy of human brotherhood centred on the state to which Christianity had merely given a new zeal and more extensive application.\textsuperscript{36}

Green was certainly not impervious to patriotism as a vehicle of his moral and political ends. In his \textit{Lectures on the principles of political obligation} (1879–80) he praised the spirit of patriotism – with its roots in ‘common ways of feeling and thinking’ – as an exemplar of the will for the common good which he believed was the source of all human perfection.\textsuperscript{37} For Green the ‘intelligent patriot’ was the key source of the moral life of society conceived in Kantian, universalistic terms; the intelligent patriot is the conscientious citizen of the posthumously published \textit{Prolegomena to ethics} (1883), whose moral strivings keep a society’s ethical ideals alive and growing.

Yet Green kept the ends of the state strictly in perspective: its purpose was not to enhance national power or cultural identity but to ensure the spiritual and material well-being of its citizens.\textsuperscript{38} He was once purported to have said that ‘he would rather see the flag of England trailed in the dirt than add sixpence to the taxes that weigh upon the poor’.\textsuperscript{39} It was a conception of ‘true’ patriotism that he reiterated before packed public meetings of Liberal Associations in and around Oxford in the late 1870s at the height of Disraeli’s foreign campaigns.\textsuperscript{40} Furthermore, ‘true’ patriotism required continuing democratic reform in the

\textsuperscript{35} On the contrast between Henry Jones and T. H. Marshall – a mid-twentieth-century sociologist who also emphasized the potential of citizenship to transcend the divisions of social class – see E. Low, ‘Class and the conceptualization of citizenship in twentieth-century Britain’, \textit{History of Political Thought}, 21 (2000), pp. 114–31. Marshall is considered briefly later in this article.


\textsuperscript{37} T. H. Green, \textit{Lectures on the principles of political obligation} (1886; London, 1931), pp. 130–1.

\textsuperscript{38} Contrast Green’s suspicion of nationhood, particularly when turned outwards, with the response of perhaps his only Conservative disciple, Arthur Boutwood, a civil servant. Writing against the backdrop of the South African war, Boutwood championed the virtues of patriotism and national sentiment as integral to good citizenship; citizens should not denounce their country before its enemies, even on the few occasions when ‘national policy’ was mistaken. Boutwood denied that (British) national policy was ever immoral: see H. Egerton (Boutwood’s pen-name), \textit{Patriotism: an essay towards a constructive theory of politics} (London, 1905), pp. 291–2. On Boutwood, see E. H. H. Green, \textit{Ideologies of conservatism: conservative political ideas in the twentieth century} (Oxford, 2001), ch. 2.


\textsuperscript{40} See Green’s speeches of 1878 and 1879 in Peter P. Nicholson, ed., \textit{The collected works of T. H. Green} (5 vols., Bristol, 1997), v.: \textit{Miscellaneous writings, speeches and letters}, pp. 262–3, 267–8, 313–15, and 352, see also in the same volume Green’s interesting undergraduate essay, ‘The principle of honour; its history and value in ancient and modern times’, pp. 6–8. This piece discusses the decline of the collective sense of national honour in large, heterogeneous states, resurfacing only in times of war. It was a positive development as far as Green was concerned. Crucial to the process was the establishment of the higher laws of ‘justice’ and equality of personal rights. In other words common citizenship has supplanted exclusive ‘common feeling’ and lack of any ‘regard for man as such’ upon which – Green believed – national honour thrives to the detriment of society.
interests of ‘full’ citizenship, a view which Green maintained even after the defeat of the Liberal party in 1874 on an extended suffrage.41

The spirit of Green’s views on citizenship and patriotism was reiterated by his disciple, Bernard Bosanquet, for all his greater optimism about social relations in Britain at the turn of the nineteenth century. Society, Bosanquet maintained, in his *Philosophical theory of the state* in 1899, was increasingly constituted by an ‘organic unity’ of experience across its diverse parts through internalization of a common good expressed in the General Will. Citizenship was thus rooted in sameness, the integration of differences and their ‘completion’ at a higher level in the state.42 Bosanquet did not rule out dissent and even disobedience in the attainment of this end, within the limits, that is, of broad acceptance of the state and its benefits which clearly distinguished his conception of citizenship from that of the suffragettes and other radicals. Like Green, he assumed a symbiosis between citizenship and democratic inclusion in the widest sense.43 However, this left little scope for the cultivation of nationhood per se, even pending the universal status of citizenship, as in elementary schools. Bosanquet could consistently support the League of Nations since in his view nations were simply ‘sovereign communities’ with common moral features as well as their own particularity.44 Patriotism was the handmaid of this unifying concept of citizenship, not a vehicle of national identity, military dominance, or opposition to the state; it enjoined a simple ethic of ‘daily sober loyalty’ to one’s fellow citizens, inspired by ‘love for our country as an instrument and embodiment of truth, beauty, and kindness, or, in the largest and profoundest sense of the word, religion’. For Bosanquet, Plato demonstrated conclusively the sense of country as ‘citizen-loyalty’ in Socrates’s refusal to evade the sentence of law passed on him at his trial.45

The relationship between citizenship, patriotism, nationality, and religion in British Idealist thought was thus complex and often difficult; moreover, it varied across several generations of adherents. A third-generation Idealist, the classicist, historian, and political scientist, Ernest Barker, was too late a Victorian to experience the crisis of faith that troubled Green and others of his generation.46

43 The importance of democracy to Bosanquet’s theory of the General Will – often denied by his critics – and his acceptance of dissent but within a wider context of appreciation of the state has been well emphasized by Peter P. Nicholson, *The political philosophy of the British Idealists* (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 211–21.
Accordingly, he played up the *sui generis* role of Christianity in forging the ties of citizenship at a higher level than had been achieved in antiquity. It did so not least through the auspices of the nation after the collapse of the Roman empire and the tribal society which succeeded it. For Barker, nationhood provided the basis of the civic ideal in its modern form by ‘enrich[ing] and dignify[ing] human personality’; while on the face of it negating the universalist ambitions of Christianity, the early European nation was, nevertheless, ‘*in eodem genere*’ on account of its essentially spiritual, rather than biological nature.47

However, for Barker, nations were created by states, not vice versa; as he explained in his Stevenson Lectures on Citizenship at Glasgow in 1925, they were products of the ‘accumulation of tradition’ in which states necessarily engaged in establishing the unity of their domain.48 Fashioned by ‘nurture’ rather than ‘nature’49 and imbued with Christian precepts, nationality had proved a force for unity and fluidity among mankind, and the equality of peoples. Nation-building had hence become the ‘mission’ of later imperial states, providing the most effective basis of self-government in the face of overwhelming religious and linguistic differences, as in the case of India.50 Earlier in his career he had stated that the nation in this mould underlay the character of British citizenship as ‘subjecthood’, or ‘indelible’ allegiance to the sovereign, not narrow racial, tribal, or – when pushed too far – civic identity.51 Modern citizenship conceived thus was characteristically superficial, but by that very fact, extensive in scope; by contrast, the ancient model exacted a high price of exclusivity for the intimate civic bonds it forged. The high price of the British empire’s ‘inclusiveness’ in terms of the negation of the subjecthood and hence citizenship of women upon marriage to an alien in the interests of imperial unity and their ineligibility for naturalization seemed unworthy of comment.52

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47 E. Barker, ‘Christianity and nationality’ (1927), in *Church, state and study* (London, 1930), pp. 135, 137, 143.
49 Ibid., pp. 7–8.
50 E. Barker, ‘The contact of colours and civilisations’, *Contemporary Review* (Nov. 1930), pp. 578–87, at p. 585. On the optimism of the British Idealists more generally towards the British empire, and their ‘ethical or sentimental’ conception of it, see Boucher, ‘British Idealism, the state, and international relations’, p. 682.
51 E. Barker, *The political thought of Plato and Aristotle* (London, 1906), pp. 296–300. The Naturalization Act of 1870 modified the notion of ‘indelible’ allegiance by recognizing the naturalization of British subjects elsewhere; but it left unaltered the principle of allegiance as the basis of citizenship. In 1914, it was given statutory definition in the ‘common code’ enshrined in the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, thereby binding together the empire in the face of the common enemy, see A. Dummett and A. Nichol, *Subjects, citizens, aliens and others: nationality and immigration law* (London, 1990) pp. 88, 124–5.
52 Barker mentioned the Naturalization Act of 1870 as modifying the principle of allegiance established in Calvin’s case (1608) but failed to acknowledge its considerable loosening of the principle in the case of married women: *Political thought of Plato and Aristotle*, p. 299 n. 2. On this provision of the Act – which was reinforced in the 1914 British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act – and the protest of feminist organizations in the empire during the interwar period, see M. Page Baldwin, ‘Subject to
For all their differences Idealist thinkers were united in a concern to detach citizenship from the idea of the nation as a discrete and ineluctable unit of society. In the first four decades of the twentieth century R. B. Haldane embraced a ‘Sittlichkeit’ of Britain, Canada, and the United States; Barker a Federal Order of Europe; and, as we have seen, Bosanquet supported the League of Nations. This is despite assuming a relatively homogeneous and stable national culture and character as the basis of civic life, broadly conceived. Moreover, they discussed nationhood in terms of national ‘minds’ (not ‘souls’), which eschewed the providential and romantic conceptions of England often found in contemporary patriotic discourse. When Bosanquet declared that ‘there is not, and never has been, a national mind more highly endowed than the English’, he supported his assertion with the example of ‘the great organized institutions which have sprung unaided from the brain of our wage-earning class’. Bosanquet’s resolutely intellectualist perspective on nationhood and patriotism would have failed to satisfy more passionate champions of these ideals as rooted in instinctive and particularist rather than rational and (potentially, at least) universal ties. Such advocates were constantly on their guard against attempts to weaken the sense of identity and belonging which in their view was generated uniquely by nations in general and England in particular.

III

The distance between the rational ideal of citizenship advocated by Bryce, Bosanquet, and others, and the emotionally engaged ideals of patriotism and the nation which it sought to undermine can be gauged by the reflections on English life of their near-contemporary, G. K. Chesterton. In his book, *Heretics* (1905), Chesterton tore a strip off the literary giants of the late Victorian and Edwardian period – Shaw, Wells, Wilde, Moore, and Kipling – for dismissing not just Christian orthodoxy but orthodoxy *tout court*. Their immersion in the ‘details’ of human life to the neglect of the wider cosmic processes which alone made those details intelligible typified for Chesterton the grip of agnosticism on the minds of the literary elite. Equally worrying was their indifference to those local and small-scale attachments which attained fullest expression in the nation; the nation was the epicentre of ordinary lives and was crucial to the imagining of universals,
whether of God or humanity.\textsuperscript{57} An arch little-Englander who detested the idea of the triumphalist nation spearheaded by the imperialist state, Chesterton projected Kipling as a cosmopolitan rather than a patriot: Kipling merely ‘admired’ England; he did not ‘love’ it.\textsuperscript{58} Neither was Chesterton impressed by fellow anti-imperialists such as Hobson (and by extension, Hobhouse); they were not true friends of the patria to which they occasionally appealed for opportunistic reasons but committed cosmopolitans. Implicitly, Chesterton put his finger on their higher Millite and Cobdenite allegiances.\textsuperscript{59} He was also distanced from them in his belief that the English nation had been progressively disenfranchised, not least by the people’s newly acquired citizenship in a state-centred society.\textsuperscript{60}

In this and other ways the contours of patriotism and associated conceptions of the English and British nation/citizensry were hotly disputed in the decade or so before the First World War. Chesterton himself attracted a wide following through his many journalistic outlets, not least his weekly column, ‘Our Notebook’, in the \textit{Illustrated London News}, which he wrote from 1905 until his death in 1936. The unique ‘spirit’ of each nation was the subject of his first column in which he cautioned readers against visiting only the famous sights at their holiday destinations. These attractions were uniform in their grandeur, fashioned in similar tastes and styles; by contrast, the Parisian café and the London hansom cab captured the essence of their respective societies and peoples. In its combination of luxury and danger the hansom cab was a symbol of the ‘aristocratic individualism’ that pervaded English life, encapsulating the ‘courage and commodiousness…which runs through innumerable English institutions’.\textsuperscript{61} The account was clearly meant to enhance awareness of and attachment to a distinctively English culture and the people who had shaped it.

However, the fortunes of the active, campaigning style of Edwardian patriotism were seriously affected by the First World War, after which it was widely

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  \item \textsuperscript{57} Grainger, \textit{Patriotisms}, p. 105; see also Vincent’s fascinating discussion of the relationship between religion and patriotism in \textit{Nationalism and particularity}, pp. 127–33. Dismissing patriotism for its dependence upon a religious duty of self-sacrifice that redounds solely to the advantage of the state, Vincent fails to take account of the sense in Chesterton and others of ‘love of country’ as a vital medium between individuals and universals regardless of the state. Nations and states are often out of sync, even when there is as near a congruence as possible between their boundaries.
  \item \textsuperscript{58} G. K. Chesterton, \textit{Heretics} (1908; London, 1905), p. 47.
  \item \textsuperscript{59} Grainger, \textit{Patriotisms}, p. 107. In 1915, Chesterton attacked Hobson and the other ‘professors of a clockwork politics’ who in his view currently ruled England for suggesting that Germany could only be ‘punished’ by international arbitration, not war. Chesterton denied Hobson’s charge that he was a ‘romantic’, arguing that his views corresponded with ‘all the other people of Europe’ who saw more clearly than Hobson that Germany was driven by the ‘“legend of the unconquerable man”’: \textit{The Nation}, 18 (4 Dec. 1915), p. 355.
  \item \textsuperscript{61} G. K. Chesterton, ‘Our notebook’, \textit{ILN}, 30 Sept. 1905, p. 454; see also his paean to the British lion, symbolizing ‘the aggregate good qualities of a kind of super-celestial country gentleman’ in the same column, 28 Oct. 1905, p. 594. For all Chesterton’s radicalism, he by no means discounted entirely the contribution of the aristocracy to English nationhood.
\end{itemize}
condemned for its alleged association with militarism and chauvinism. English national consciousness was certainly much strengthened as a result of the war, not least in opposition to all things German. Yet at the same time, the carnage in France seriously inhibited assertion of the claims and virtue of the English patria. The shame and discredit into which the patriotic nation was now brought would have been due in no small part to its eager annexation by popular advocates of citizenship with the outbreak of war. In 1914 the women’s suffrage movement, in particular, sought to ensure that no longer was citizenship synonymous with male service to the state but universal service to the nation, regardless of gender. But this reconfiguration of citizenship failed to survive the circumstances of war that produced it. The disquiet of the cultural elite in particular with public displays of patriotism is evident in the refusal of W. R. Inge, dean of St Pauls, and the cathedral chapter to allow the Royal Society of St George to hold further annual services on St George’s Day in the cathedral after the success of the event in 1923; permission only resumed with the new dean, W. R. Matthews, in 1935. The Society’s appeal for money and new members at the same time also fell on stony ground, a cause of some bitterness as its leaders observed the ease with which a public normally cold to ‘abstract ideals which it will not trouble to understand’ succumbed to ‘harrowing, blood-curdling, illustrated appeals on behalf of “starving” Russians and other potential enemies of our country.’

By contrast, the war strengthened the culture of citizenship still further, that is, once the patriotic heat by which it had recently been affected had been drastically turned down and in some cases, off. This can be seen in the foundation by a Scottish merchant and philanthropist, Sir Daniel Macaulay Stevenson, of the annual series of lectures on Citizenship delivered to both the university and city of Glasgow after the war. Reference has already been made to Barker’s contribution as Lecturer in 1925–6. The first series of lectures in 1922 was delivered by W. H. Hadow, vice-chancellor of the University of Sheffield;

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63 Grainger, Patriotisms, p. 329.

64 See N. F. Gullace, ‘The blood of our sons’: men, women and the renegotiation of British citizenship during the great war (New York, 2002). As Gullace makes clear, nationhood failed to deliver the promise of the vote to all women; instead, age and implicitly motherhood became the determinants of female suffrage in 1918. The prewar legacy of female citizenship was also lost, as Laura Mayhall makes clear in The militant suffrage movement, conclusion.

65 See the correspondence between Howard Ruff, honorary secretary of the Society, and Inge in the Society’s journal, The English Race, 37 (Mar. 1925), pp. 6–7. In 1923, the sermon at the annual service was delivered by the bishop of Durham, H. H. Henson. Ruff protested against the willingness of the dean and chapter to allow members of the Welsh church to hold their annual service in St Pauls on St David’s eve, a service ‘of a distinctly racial character, including a military band, Welsh soloists and choir’.

66 For Barker’s experience of delivering each lecture twice on the same day, first to university and then to city audiences, see his Age and youth: memories of three universities and father of the man (London, 1953), pp. 153, 194.
they set forth the Idealist theory of the state as a ‘self-determined reality’ along the lines of Hadow’s mentor, Sir Henry Jones, who had recently died.\footnote{W. H. Hadow, \textit{Citizenship} (Oxford, 1923), pp. 112, 216–22.}

Such echoes of this theory grew increasingly faint in the aftermath of Hobhouse’s scathing attack upon Idealism’s Germanic foundations during the war, and the development of logical positivism and other anti-Idealist movements in philosophy since the turn of the century.\footnote{However, the tenets of Idealism continued to inform social and public policy after the war: see J. Harris, ‘Political thought and the welfare state, 1870–1940: an intellectual framework for British social policy’, \textit{Past and Present}, 35 (1992), pp. 116–41.}

However, Hadow’s lectures set the tone for the renewal of the state’s primacy over the nation and emphasized the continued robustness of the wider ethic of civic duty – suitably detached from the sinister influence of nationalistic patriotism – which Idealism had done so much to promote. The Oxford historian and recent president of the Board of Education, H. A. L. Fisher, made this clear in a uniformly hostile lecture on patriotism which formed part of his Stevenson series in 1923. Arguing that patriotism was only serviceable to society when purged of every last vestige of instinctive primitive emotion, he asked his audience to consider whether we have not reached a stage of evolution in which it is necessary that our notions of patriotic duty should be revised, whether it is possible to maintain in full vigour the old exclusiveness of the nation, whether war has not become so great a menace to civilization that greater authority should be attached to such machinery as may be contrived for averting it.\footnote{H. A. L. Fisher, \textit{The common weal} (Oxford, 1924), pp. 98, 114.}

Fisher’s life-long liberal accomplice and intellectual mainstay of the League of Nations Union, Gilbert Murray, would have affirmed both the possibility and necessity of this movement in accordance with the twin pressures of ‘liberality and civilization’ at work in human history.\footnote{G. Murray, \textit{Liberality and civilization}, The Hibbert Lectures (London, 1938), pp. 41–6.}


in tone. Nevertheless, Hellenist-inspired views of citizenship were still worlds away from the stronger culture of patriotism and associated spirit of nationhood, now under a dark cloud.

Yet the province of patriotism more narrowly focused on the nation in the interwar years was by no means confined – in Grainger’s words – to a few ‘obsessed individuals’: Churchill, Mosley, Beaverbrook, Rothermere, Hugh Sellon, Hilaire Belloc, Lord Eustace Percy, Lord Lloyd, and Sir Arnold Wilson, for example. Or at least if it was, some of these figures enjoyed marked public success in beating the patriotic drum against considerable odds. As a result, two distinct and mutually suspicious cultures remain perceptible.

One individual who pursued indefatigably the cause of patriotism in this way was the historian and Conservative party activist, Arthur Bryant. He developed a substantial middlebrow audience in the interwar period through pageants, journalism, and historical biography – much of this inspired by the historian, G. M. Trevelyan, one of few figures among the intellectual elite who actively sought to enhance English patriotism and national identity.

Bryant’s ‘Greenwich Night Pageant’ in 1933 which celebrated England’s historic mastery of the sea in the shadow of the Washington Naval Treaties involved a cast of 2,000 and ran for ten nights before audiences of 12,000. His biographies of Macaulay, Charles II, and Pepys consciously played the patriotic card to considerable commercial and critical acclaim, as did the weekly column in the Illustrated London News he inherited from Chesterton in 1936. Growing up before the war in the precincts of Buckingham Palace where his father was a court official, he was influenced by both Chesterton and Kipling; in the adverse climate of the interwar period he sought to reconcile their local and imperial conceptions of patriotism.

The outbreak of new hostilities between differing conceptions of the relationship of citizenship to patriotism and their respective publics is especially apparent in Bryant’s role in the Association for Education in Citizenship (AEC) in the mid-1930s.


73 Grainger, Patriotisms, pp. 353–5.

74 For Bryant’s relationship with Trevelyan in the 1930s, see J. Stapleton, Sir Arthur Bryant and national history in twentieth-century Britain (Lanham, MD, forthcoming), ch. 3.

75 On the Greenwich pageant see The Times, 17 June 1933, p. 9a; King Charles II (London, 1931) sold 27,000 copies within eighteen months; the third volume of Bryant’s biography of Pepys, Samuel Pepys: the saviour of the navy (Cambridge, 1938), was serialized in The Sunday Times. However, Bryant’s patriotic writings for the Illustrated London News were mercilessly criticized by the Left, especially as they underpinned his support for appeasement and sympathy for Nazism and fascism in the late 1930s: see R. H. S. Crossman, ‘Sedatives, mild and strong’, New Statesman and Nation (19 Feb. 1938), p. 294.

The Association had been formed in 1934 with the Liberal MP for Wythenshawe, Ernest Simon, as first president. He was succeeded by W. H. Hadow a year later. Seeking a conservative balance to its predominantly liberal and progressive shade of political opinion – and one which would recommend the Association to the deputy prime minister, Stanley Baldwin – Simon invited Bryant to join the executive committee. Foremost among the AEC’s concerns was the defence of democracy against the rising tide of dictatorship in Europe; to this end, Simon and influential associates such as William Beveridge began a campaign to introduce citizenship education in schools, universities, and extra-mural teaching. High on the Association’s agenda was the cultivation of independent judgement in citizens, together with the moral qualities necessary to ensure the survival of democracy; echoing earlier antipathy in Britain to inculcating patriotism in the nation’s youth directly, it eschewed the narrow teaching of ‘civics’ along with the crude political education that underlay the nascent authoritarian states of Europe. As Barker (a member of the AEC’s council) argued in a lecture of 1936, ‘civic training has its place’, but it is ‘secondary’ to the end of educating ‘whole’ men – not ‘miles pro patria [soldiers for the fatherland] nor even cives pro civitate [citizens for the state]’. He continued, If civic training be pressed to the detriment of humanity, in the highest and finest sense of that word – and that is what seems to me to be happening in Germany – it will go badly with our Universities, as I think it is going badly in Germany, and it will go badly with our national culture.

Bryant would not have disagreed with this principle; however, he did challenge its application in the statement of the AEC’s ‘aims’. His main point of dissent centred on the suggestion that citizens of Britain should identify with the wider world as well as their own country, and that they ‘must be prepared to make sacrifices for international goodwill and co-operation’. Bryant’s response emphasizes the division of the two cultures along Left–Right lines under the

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77 On the connections between Simon’s vision of democracy and the class prejudices that informed his judgement of the Wythenshawe housing estate with which he and his wife were closely associated, see A. Olechnowicz, ‘Civic leadership and education for democracy: the Simons and the Wythenshawe estate’, *Contemporary British History*, 14 (2000), pp. 3–26.
78 Hadow’s main contribution to the Association was the compiling of its *Bibliography of social studies: a list of books for schools and adults* (London, 1936).
79 Simon to Bryant, 27 Nov. 1934, Bryant papers, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London, C/28, file 1. Bryant’s close relationship to Baldwin in the 1930s is explored in Stapleton, *Sir Arthur Bryant*, chs. 5 and 6, passim. Baldwin became president of the Association when he retired from politics in 1938. There are hints of political difficulties within the Association during Baldwin’s presidency in G. Batho, ‘The history of the teaching of civics and citizenship in English Schools’, *Curriculum Journal*, 1 (1990), pp. 91–100, at p. 95.
80 Executive committee of the Association for Education in Citizenship, ‘The aims of education’, Bryant papers, C/28, file 1.
mounting strain of interwar politics. At issue was his opposition to disarmament, a goal which pervaded citizenship culture in many of its diverse interwar forms. It was a stance which constituted a running theme in his efforts to save Britain from those on the Left whom he perceived as too ready to surrender the country’s status as a world power and force for international good, as much as those on the Right for whom the associated ‘glory’ had become an end in itself.\textsuperscript{83} He suggested that Simon remove the offending phrase. ‘We all agree with it’, he declared,

but unfortunately the Opposition to the present Government have made, what I might call the waving of the Peace Flag, a party prerogative, in rather the same way as the older Tories made the waving of the Union Jack, so that, coupled with the [mainly Liberal and Labour] names on our note-paper this phrase also may suggest to some a tendency to the Left.\textsuperscript{84}

Bryant’s influence on further drafts of the Association’s ‘aims’ is unclear. His concern to test the cross-party aspirations of the AEC’s leadership to the limit certainly paid off when he secured – against much opposition – the Conservative party’s adult education college at Ashridge as the venue for the first conference of the Association in 1937.\textsuperscript{85} However, the difficulty of accommodating Left and Right on the issue of citizenship and democracy in the tense ideological climate of the late 1930s is evident in the aftermath of the conference proceedings. A shortened version of Bryant’s address appeared in \textit{The Highway}, the journal of the Workers’ Educational Association (WEA). Here, he discussed the nature of citizenship in the context of democracy as practised in ‘old England’.

Every one of us who has English blood can be certain, whatever his social rank or birth, of having in his ancestry many humble progenitors who probably could neither read nor write, but who served their year as parish constable or some other village officer, and learned thereby the hard lessons of self-government. They learned that government is not a mere question of making rules and giving orders, but of patience, persuasion and compromise.\textsuperscript{86}

This struck just the right note as far as the goal – pursued by the AEC and the WEA alike – of strengthening democratic involvement throughout all classes of society was concerned. Far less successful was Bryant’s insistence on contrasting

\textsuperscript{83} Bryant was an early opponent of disarmament: see his \textit{The spirit of conservatism} (London, 1929), pp. 168–9. He continued to regard Britain as the greatest force for peace and international unity after 1945; by contrast, he held a low view of the United Nations. This is evidenced by his support for the Suez venture, on which see \textit{ILN}, 17 Nov. 1956, p. 834, 29 Sept. 1956, p. 494, and 26 Jan. 1957, p. 130.

\textsuperscript{84} Bryant to Simon, 6 Dec. 1934, Bryant papers, C/28, file 1.

\textsuperscript{85} The full conference proceedings appeared in E. Simon et al., \textit{Constructive democracy} (London, 1938). On the opposition Bryant encountered to the choice of Ashridge as conference venue, see his letter to Sir Geoffrey Fry dated 19 Jan. 1937 in Bryant papers, C/53. The successful outcome for Ashridge was recorded in the minutes of the education committee, 15 Apr. 1937, Bryant papers, C/53.

the historic, English experience of democracy with its contemporary practice in ‘Red Spain’. This provoked vitriolic outrage among internationalist readers of The Highway, who regarded citizenship as a matter of working-class honour which knew no national bounds. Even the editor was embarrassed.\textsuperscript{87} The episode indicates that at some points relations between the discourses of patriotism and citizenship just before the outbreak of the Second World War were at breaking-point.

IV

Conflict on the issue of the relationship between patriotism and citizenship in education along Left–Right lines continued unabated during the Second World War. Harold Laski – a member of the AEC’s council – used one of his wartime polemics to castigate a report on the educational aims of Reconstruction published by the Conservative party in 1942. Emboldened by the threat to national survival of the previous two years, the Conservative sub-committee on education chaired by Sir Geoffrey Faber called for a conscious sense of nationhood to be imparted in schools, alongside clear religious instruction. No longer could the country afford to be suspicious of these ends, as the Spens committee on secondary education had been between 1932 and 1938 against the backdrop of Nazi and fascist extremism and a succession of attempts to undermine the influence of denominational religion. The education sub-committee was confident that the fascist subordination of the individual to the state could be avoided; it was not a case of the state manufacturing a national \textit{esprit de corps} but of recognizing the ‘recovered fact of national solidarity’ in peacetime educational policy. One element of the proposal was to ensure a ‘warmly felt understanding on [the citizen’s] part of his country’s place and task in the world’.\textsuperscript{88} At the same time, the report assumed an equivalence between national consciousness and identity on the one hand, and loyalty to the state on the other.

This unabashed identification of nationhood with statehood in the context of full citizenship was a significant development in patriotic and citizenship discourses alike. It was, however, a minority view. For Laski, the Conservative party report was wholly at odds with the true ethos of citizenship – correctly perceived by the Spens committee – in which the state was merely an instrument of the development of individual citizens; the state was not an end in itself defined in spurious national terms which thinly disguised the interests of property. The whole tone of the report, Laski maintained, was indicative of the ‘counter-revolution’ sweeping across Britain no less than the European continent; this was the fascist attempt to re-enthrone the rule of privilege against the struggle for

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{87} W. E. Williams, ‘The Bryant affair’, The Highway, 30 (Feb. 1938), pp. 97–100.
\item \textsuperscript{88} ‘Looking ahead’: educational aims: being the first interim report of the Conservative sub-committee on education (London: The Central Committee on Post-War Reconstruction set up by the Conservative and Unionist Party Organization, 1942), Conservative Party Archives, Bodleian Library, Oxford, p. 12.
\end{itemize}
personal and class liberation which had been waged since 1917. What is so astounding is that many in the higher echelons of the Conservative party agreed, including the minister of education – R. A. Butler – who had commissioned the report and an accompanying one on youth training. The Green and White Papers which formed the basis of the 1944 Education Act were drawn up largely on the advice of civil servants and eschewed the strong corporate and religious ideals that had exercised the sub-committee. As José Harris has argued, a major factor in William Beveridge’s success as a wartime social reformer was that – unlike Faber’s committee – he reigned in the ‘organicist’ presuppositions of his argument, giving greater prominence to their ‘contractualist’ counterparts. This may explain Beveridge’s popularity in elite circles, ever suspicious as they were of the sliding scale between ‘organicism’ and nationalism.

In his essay *The lion and the unicorn* of 1941 George Orwell famously saw things differently from Marxist intellectuals such as Laski, ‘severed’ as they were from the ‘common culture of the country’. Unlike Laski, he believed that the ‘existing pattern of vested interests’ had developed something that was widely acclaimed in English society: a ‘belief in “the law” as something above the State and above the individual’. Orwell regarded national identity more broadly as a force which cut across the boundaries of class, especially with the recent expansion of the middle class, in much the same way that the progressive elite had looked to shared citizenship based on a conception of the common good for the best part of half a century. Hitherto, the nation’s destiny had been determined by the privileged few; but now, amid the perils of wartime, it required the input of an England ‘that is only just beneath the surface, in the factories and the newspaper offices, in the aeroplanes and the submarines’. For Orwell at this time, socialism, citizenship, and democracy were inseparable from patriotism: ‘no real revolutionary has ever been an internationalist’, he defiantly remarked.

During the war Orwell’s intervention strengthened the faith of other non-Marxist thinkers on the Left in the capacity of the mass of the English people to retain their political and cultural independence while identifying with, and participating fully in, the wider nation: Tom Harrison of the Mass Observation movement and J. B. Priestley are cases in point. Subsequently, he was praised by E. M. Forster for his down-to-earth patriotism and belief in “the people”.

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who, with their beefy arms akimbo and their cabbage-stalk soup, may survive when higher growths are cut down’. However, his attempt to ground socialist conceptions of revolution and solidarity in English national culture made little wider impact. Orwell himself beat a hasty retreat and in 1947 embraced the idea of a socialist ‘United States of Europe’. When socialism found a new, ‘revisionist’ voice in Anthony Crosland and Roy Jenkins, class conflict was again resolved in common citizenship, as it had been earlier in the century. But although not directly attacked, national identity and patriotism barely featured in this revival of an earlier discourse; citizenship was focused instead on shared standards of living in conditions of rising prosperity. Recent research has shown that Crosland was sensitive to socialism’s traditional concern with the ‘improvement of minds’ as well as material conditions, and to the happiness and psychological well-being that were central to earlier conceptions of citizenship. However, he gave priority to a functional rather than ethical/national view of the state on which citizenship discourse had traded – if obliquely – previously. This was accompanied by a shift of perspective away from the public status of citizens to the quality of their private lives.

A major influence on this development was the post-war sociologist, T. H. Marshall. For Marshall, citizenship denoted merely the equal right to certain benefits and services ensured by legislation – the culmination of a movement which had extended first civil rights, then political rights, and finally social rights to the population as a whole. Citizenship, in its final, mature phase in mid-twentieth-century Britain, was a form of social integration based not on the ‘sphere of sentiment’ which prevailed in the kinship system of pre-feudal societies, nor the ‘patriotic nationalism’ engendered by political reform, but a common level of ‘material enjoyment’. Marshall’s conception of citizenship accorded well with the authority which the British state enjoyed in the immediate post-war period, eclipsing the various component nationalisms within the United Kingdom. But at the same time it squeezed the culture of patriotism that had found new heart and voices during the Second World War.

In this context the British Nationality Act of 1948 met little effective opposition among British intellectuals of either the Right or the Left. The Act replaced the status of British subjecthood in the common code of 1914 with a new category of United Kingdom and Colonies Citizenship (CUKC).  

With the exception of Enoch Powell neither the Conservative nor Labour party intelligentsia rushed to the defence of the embattled patria in the face of the mass immigration which followed (although the response of the Labour party, at least, was not without considerable ambiguity). The ensuing controversy reopened the division between intellectual and popular opinion in Britain that had developed earlier in the century, although on a far more explosive scale. This casts doubt on a recent claim by Kathleen Paul that public opinion could have been ‘educated’ by political elites into accepting mass immigration, with all the attenuation of the sense of cultural Englishness that this implies. Instead, she claims that policy makers deliberately set about fostering a climate of public hostility towards immigrants; this would ease the path towards the ‘racist’ immigration control these leaders sought to take, and did take in 1962 with the passing of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act under R. A. Butler, now home secretary. But she underestimates Powell’s differences with other members of the governing elite; also, the weight of patriotic tradition he succeeded in tapping in Britain.  

While government ministers, officials, and politicians may have been ‘racist’, their concern about mass immigration did not extend to its possible effect in weakening patriotism and the common loyalties and attachments that had traditionally underpinned nationhood in Britain. This, however, was central to Powell’s attack. At the same time, the extent of the departure of Powell’s arguments against the scale of immigration in post-war Britain from previous conceptions of citizenship, nationhood, and patriotism should not be exaggerated.

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98 See the illuminating recent book by R. Karatani, Defining British citizenship: empire, commonwealth and modern Britain (London, 2003), p. 117. On the racist, sexist, and class bias in the common code in practice, see K. Paul, Whitewashing Britain: race and citizenship in the postwar era (Ithaca, NY, 1997), ch. 1. For details of the background of the common code, see n. 51 above.  

99 On this ambiguity, see S. Fielding, ‘Brotherhood and the brothers: responses to “coloured” immigration in the British Labour party, c. 1951–1965’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 3 (1998), pp. 79–97. Philip Lynch’s claim that Enoch Powell’s conception of British citizenship was inimical to the task of ‘modernization’ in the 1970s fails to take account of the receptivity of Labour leaders such as Hugh Gaitskell, Michael Foot, Peter Shore, and Tony Benn also to a conception of the distinctiveness and independence of England-Britain, however loath they were to invoke it against mass immigration: see his The politics of nationhood: sovereignty, Britishness, and Conservative politics (London, 1999), p. 46.  

100 Paul, Whitewashing Britain, ch. 5. Powell’s position, according to Paul, “usually identified as “extreme”, which became synonymous in popular lore with opposition to “coloured immigration” in the 1960s and 1970s actually fell within the realm of established “official” conceptions of British nationality”: p. 178.
In siding with popular opinion, Powell sought to define citizenship in terms of nationality and patriotism, and that of a distinctly English kind. As Karatani has recently emphasized, only Powell among anti-immigration MPs lobbied for a form of citizenship that was exclusive to the United Kingdom; most were concerned simply to limit immigration from the new commonwealth, not least to relieve pressure on public services. Powell’s hostility to the British empire and commonwealth aside, he did so in much the same way as Bryant had defended English identity in the 1930s and continued to do through his prolific journalism and stream of patriotic histories in the post-war period. Both men emphasized that English patriotism – its latency so long a source of national strength – was now at an alarming discount. To Bryant’s mind, at least, this was due to concerted campaigns of disparagement over several generations by the intellectual elite, a point to which we will return in the final section of this article. Powell and Bryant alike were committed to reigniting English national pride, if necessary through treading on increasingly raw Scottish, Welsh, and Irish nerves. Powell shared fully Bryant’s romantic conception of English nationhood and stressed its roots in instinct rather than reason. Neither in Bryant’s writings nor Powell’s speeches was there a simple association between nationalism, patriotism, and raison d’État, as the opposition of both men to Britain’s entry to Europe and the dirigisme of post-war social democracy well illustrates.

At the same time, Powell was not so distant from the assumption – albeit tacit – of the pre-war liberal elite that national homogeneity and allegiance are integral to all good citizenship. Most of all he reiterated their view that citizenship entails a primary relationship between individuals and national polities which

101 Karatani, Defining British citizenship, pp. 152–3. Support for Powell’s policies – if not his inflammatory language – came from unexpected quarters, for example his fellow Wolverhampton MP and admirer of Eastern Germany, Renee Short. She called for limits to immigration and the dispersal of fresh immigrants away from areas of high concentration: see her obituary in The Daily Telegraph, 20 Jan. 2003.


103 Bryant, ILN, 14 June 1958, p. 996, and 1 Nov. 1958, p. 738; Powell, speech to the Royal Society of St George, 22 Apr. 1961, in J. Wood, ed., Freedom and reality (London, 1969), p. 257. Simon Heffer gives the correct date of the speech as 1961 (Wood gives it as 1964 in Freedom and reality) in Like the Roman: the life of Enoch Powell (London, 1998), p. 982. Although a member of the council of the Royal Society of St George, it is not clear if Bryant attended the dinner at which the speech was delivered, although many years later he quoted from it in ILN, May 1978, p. 31.

104 Powell’s conception of English nationhood is emphasized by Heffer in Like the Roman, pp. 153, 336–40; for an example of Bryant’s similar conception, see The age of elegance, 1812–1822 (London, 1950), p. 282.

105 Powell’s conception of the greater wisdom of the (English) people over corporate acts of government is illustrated by a speech he gave in Bromsgrove in 1963, see J. Wood, ed., A nation not afraid (London, 1965), p. 26. While Bryant believed that Powell was too inflexible an advocate of laissez-faire, he was likewise concerned about the adverse effects on English freedom of the increasing regulation of British society by the post-war state: see, for example, ILN, 22 May 1965, p. 12, 5 Dec. 1970, p. 12, and 9 Jan. 1960, p. 42.
cannot conflict with other identities and loyalties, although it might not exclude them altogether.\textsuperscript{106} His conception of citizenship as rooted in individual allegiance explains his opposition to the Nationality Act of 1948 which grouped together nine commonwealth legislatures in the new category of CUKC, thus severing the direct link between subject and sovereign.\textsuperscript{107} As he remarked in debate on the second reading of the Royal Titles Bill in 1953, the duty of allegiance integral to citizenship overruled all ‘individual, local, and partial interests’. He certainly departed from earlier theorists in insisting that citizenship was not a rational tie; it embodied ‘that minimum, basic, instinctive recognition of belonging to a greater whole which involves the ultimate consequence in certain circumstances of self-sacrifice in the interests of the whole’\textsuperscript{108} This did not rule out immigration per se, although it did exclude large concentrations of immigrant communities within the wider nation.\textsuperscript{109} For Powell, the mediation of a person’s citizenship by sub-national identities would undermine the universal nature of citizenship within societies, generating the communalism that had plagued India.\textsuperscript{110} However, in this he echoed Barker’s view earlier in the century that an overarching nationalism was a precondition of citizenship and the only prospect for democracy in India. There are also strains in Powell of the wider view of the Idealists that citizenship signified identity in difference: for Bosanquet, the state based on citizenship gathers up at the same time as it transcends group difference in one ‘unifying’, integrating sovereignty.\textsuperscript{111}

The affinities between Powell and earlier intellectuals do not of course imply that they would have expressed themselves in quite the same way in the face of mass immigration: the Idealists and others were never challenged by events or critics to examine the beliefs about nationhood which underpinned their ideal of ‘common’ citizenship. But the assumptions they shared with Powell are important; arguably these commonalities outweigh more obvious differences of political style and temperament when compared with developments in citizenship discourse in the late 1980s and beyond.

\section*{VI}

The unity which Powell sought to forge between citizenship, patriotism, and English identity in post-war Britain found its sharpest critics on the Left in the last decade of the twentieth century, when the immigration debate had subsided. This challenge to Powell was part of an attempt to make citizenship integral to a new egalitarian vision based on reform of the state as much as economic power. Committed to multiculturalism on the one hand and radical democracy on the other, thinkers on the Left reinterpreted citizenship as the recognition of

\begin{itemize}
\item On Powell’s conception of the individual basis of citizenship, see Heffer, \textit{Like the Roman}, p. 450.
\item Ibid., pp. 194–5 (my emphasis).
\item Heffer, \textit{Like the Roman}, p. 474.
\item See his unrepentent remarks on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Birmingham speech quoted in Heffer, \textit{Like the Roman}, pp. 939–40.
\item Bosanquet, \textit{Philosophical theory of the state}, pp. liv–ix.
\end{itemize}
difference not sameness and the empowerment of groups rather than the participation of individuals in a scheme of rights and duties common to all members of society.  

Traditional, stable, inherited identities at national level cut little ice here. Citizenship defined in terms of personal allegiance fostered by a broad spirit of patriotism and tied to a unitary national culture was ruled out ab initio in favour of European attachments, especially. This entailed the jettisoning of the ideal of citizenship developed by liberal intellectuals at the turn of the last century as a ‘creed’ and instrument of national cohesion, as much as the stronger culture of the nation associated with Conservative concepts of citizenship from the 1960s to the 1980s. Citizenship was now a function of composite and shifting national identities. At one level the only patriotism contemplated as its handmaid was of a specific, constitutional kind: loyalty to a constitution and set of political procedures. This has given the recent impetus to citizenship education in schools focused squarely on the organization of political power; in turn it has encountered considerable opposition on a range of fronts, not least its exclusion of wider moral and cultural perspectives centred on ‘community’ values. The distance between Sir Henry Jones and Sir Bernard Crick, who has inspired much of this effort to develop a new culture of citizenship, could not be wider. This is despite a continuing emphasis on universal rights determined by supra-national principles.

Some political thinkers have expressed unease with so radical a revision of the concept of citizenship. For example, David Miller has written extensively in the last decade on the need for the connections between citizenship, patriotism, and nationalism to be maintained in at least something of the range of their conventional form. He argues that constitutional patriotism is an inadequate basis for citizenship in complex modern societies; instead, the stronger cement of national culture is required. But the national culture he envisages is essentially porous, requiring the ‘adapt[ation of] the inherited culture to make room for minority communities’. Miller stops short of multiculturalism in insisting that the civic education that is to serve such societies should contain a ‘unitary core’, in addition to a ‘periphery that is flexible to serve the needs of minorities’. In recent work he defends a participatory, republican model of citizenship against a less exacting liberal (and libertarian) one, but emphasizes


the importance of a shared national identity to its success.\textsuperscript{117} Yet like the multiculturalists he believes that citizenship is mediated through a welter of communal identities and is always provisional, in terms of both its internal structure and the allegiance it can command.

If the legacy of intellectuals earlier in the century concerning the ideal of citizenship has been obscured by multicultural conceptions of nationhood on the one hand and narrower, political understandings of citizenship on the other, its patriotic rival has proved more resilient, if ever defensive. The championing of homogeneous English nationhood and the patriotic values to which it was once securely hitched is evident in recent historiography.\textsuperscript{118} It is also apparent in attempts to renew conservative thought by philosophers, journalists, and substantial parts of the Conservative party itself.\textsuperscript{119} Much of this movement has grown out of opposition to increasing integration with Europe; devolution and the perceived shallowness and instability of multicultural visions of Britain have played their role too, as has the lowering of the tone of patriotism in football hooliganism and other areas of popular culture.\textsuperscript{120}

The close affinities between this resurgence of English national consciousness and a similar movement a half-century and more earlier can be seen in Roger Scruton’s recent ‘elegy’ for England. Scruton sets out to explain what England was before its strengths and successes were sapped by derision and repudiation from within, particularly by the intelligentsia. Like Jonathan Clark, he rejects the idea that England has ever been subject to a process of ‘nation-building’; but unlike Clark he emphasizes England’s possession of ‘corporate personality’ shaped by time, circumstances, and, above all, place. Chief among the factors which transformed place into ‘home’ was religion. ‘This religion grew with the language, which it profoundly influenced, and by which it was influenced in turn. It determined the musical, architectural and storytelling traditions of the country at large, and was the single most importance source of the customs whereby English society renewed itself.’\textsuperscript{121} This strikes resonant chords with the central claim of Bryant’s histories in the 1950s and 60s that the English people developed into a distinct and cohesive national whole by their conversion to, and missionary extension of Christianity, equated with no less a cause than civilization itself. It was St Boniface, Bryant confidently asserted, who ‘wrote the first chapter in the history of the expansion of English ideals beyond the seas’.\textsuperscript{122} The sense of both

\textsuperscript{117} D. Miller, \textit{Citizenship and national identity} (Cambridge, 2002), ch. 5.
\textsuperscript{118} R. Fraser, \textit{A people’s history of Britain} (London, 2003).
\textsuperscript{119} Kumar, \textit{The making of English national identity}, pp. 264–8.
\textsuperscript{122} A. Bryant, \textit{The story of England: makers of the realm} (London, 1953), p. 91. He was moved to write of St Boniface that ‘No Englishman’s work has had a greater influence on the world. The German Gothic cathedrals, the testimony of Luther, the Christian music of Schultz and Bach all sprang from
Scruton and Simon Heffer that England has been heavily undermined – in Scruton’s case beyond recall – by the contempt of the intellectual elite and a range of publicists also has strong parallels with Bryant: concerned to rescue the national pride and integrity of ‘humble’ English people from the sneers of Bloomsbury and intellectuals on the Left, Bryant became the devoted literary champion of the patriotic classes.\(^\text{123}\)

None of the more recent defenders of Englishness, or Britishness thinly veiled as Englishness, eschew the language of common citizenship; indeed, the journalist Peter Hitchens makes powerful reference to it. He picks up the discourse of virtue that has dropped out of the culture of citizenship in its refocusing of community on ‘rights’ and the recognition of diversity. But he does so in connection with what was lost in the accelerated process of destruction in the late twentieth century of both the culture and landscape of a determinate ‘people’, once so vigilant about the habits, institutions, religion, and ideas by which they self-consciously defined themselves.\(^\text{124}\) Despairing of the Conservative party’s ability ever to resolve its state of chronic internal division, he has argued the case for a British movement to help raise the old England-Britain, phoenix-like, from the ashes.\(^\text{125}\) The spirit behind Hitchens’s understanding of the term ‘common citizenship’ contrasts sharply with the recent Report into the future of multi-ethnic Britain chaired by Bikhu Parekh. This views citizenship in terms of accommodating a welter of cultural differences in public life, and looks askance at the idea that there was ever a public culture that was truly reflective of the beliefs and outlook of a discernible ‘majority’.\(^\text{126}\) It is a salutary reflection that few readers are likely to absorb both Hitchens and Heffer on the one hand, and Parekh and Miller on the other, except for polemical purposes. By contrast, it is not inconceivable that their early twentieth-century equivalents, for example Chesterton and Barker or Gilbert Murray, would have partially shared a common audience in forums such as The Nation and the Home University Library.

Clearly, tension between concepts of citizenship and of patriotism deeply embedded in English nationhood continues to exist, albeit at changed levels and through shifting audiences. Equally clearly, it continues to feed off the historical legacy of division between intellectual opinion and that of wider publicists, to whom an enhanced sense of English identity formed the basis of their sense of citizenship. Current efforts to resist the multicultural, devolutionist, and

the seed this west-country saint sowed.’ On English nationalism as ‘missionary’ or imperialist nationalism, see Kumar, The making of English national identity, pp. 34–5.


European tide have to be understood against this century-old backdrop of English collective imagining which survived alongside the post-war British state. Just as it was invoked in the Powell years against the perceived threat of mass immigration and EEC membership, its recent assertion has much to do with concern for alleged abuse of the immigration and asylum-seeking system, the widespread denigration of English national culture, and the increasing loss of British national sovereignty to Europe. If English national consciousness fails to develop into full-blown political nationalism, the visceral patriotism that has been its moving force hitherto remains a significant obstacle to citizenship in many of its contemporary forms: multicultural, European, cosmopolitan, and associationalist, to name but a few.\textsuperscript{127} The ideal of citizenship risks becoming exclusive and ineffective if it loses touch with nations and the patriotism which sustains them, as is now being recognized in the United States.\textsuperscript{128}
