Interpretations of the Body Politic and of Natural Bodies in Late Sixteenth-Century France

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Abstract:
This essay demonstrates that in sixteenth-century France the body politic metaphor was extremely flexible, providing answers – including contradictory ones – to a range of heated contemporary debates. As absolutist and constitutionalist conceptions of monarchy jostled for precedence, the metaphor could either locate sovereignty uniquely in the ‘head’ or disperse it through the body. At a time of civil war, it could be harnessed to support peace or, conversely, the resumption of hostilities. The healthy body could represent the unified French body politic but, as France became increasingly divided in the wars, a resemblance between disease and disharmony was highlighted as much as that between health and harmony. In addition, nature could constitute the target domain rather than the source, and interpretations of the metaphor in one domain influenced those in the other. This essay highlights historically specific factors behind the use of the metaphor, which include not only particular conceptions of monarchy or war or bodies but also the way in which a political body is understood to be ‘like’ a natural body, that is, the perception of the metaphor’s ‘propriety’.
Finally, I show that the seventeenth century witnessed a more radical adaptation of the
metaphor, as a mechanical and artificial ‘person’ provided a solution to problematic interpretations of the natural body.

1. Introduction

The human body as political metaphor can be traced back to Aristotle, Plato and beyond (Hale 1971, pp. 18-47 and Zavadil, this volume), and continues to be used in contemporary political discourse (Musolff, 2004, pp. 58-71). Thinking about both nature and politics has changed enormously but, to use a metaphor from evolutionary biology, the body metaphor has evolved to adapt to new semantic or conceptual environments. This essay will examine reasons for the success of the body metaphor in late sixteenth-century France. These reasons are varied: for example the metaphor expresses diverse conceptions of the French constitution and diverse understandings of the French Wars of Religion. On the other hand, the factors behind the metaphor’s use may be historicised to some extent: different ones are dominant in the late sixteenth century from those in the seventeenth century or in later periods. These factors comprise not only the sorts of arguments in which the metaphor appears – for example, concerning the benefits or drawbacks of monarchy – but also the way in which a political entity is understood to be ‘like’ a natural body, in other words, the perception of the metaphor’s ‘propriety’.

The case of the body metaphor suggests that while metaphors may ‘adapt themselves’ better to expressing some meanings than others, their meaning is not predetermined. It is for this reason that notions from evolutionary biology have at least a heuristic value: they emphasise the variability and adaptability of metaphors rather than their supposedly inherent suitability to express one particular meaning; they invite us to explain the reasons for healthy ‘populations’ of a metaphor while expecting that these
reasons – like the metaphor itself – will vary and evolve in accordance with a wider conceptual environment. In this limited sense I respond to Susan Blackmore’s invitation to ‘take a meme’s eye view’, that is, a ‘view that looks at the world in terms of opportunities for replication’ of memes (Blackmore 1999, p. 37).\(^i\)

2. Conceptions of the Body Politic

Ernst H. Kantorowicz (1957, pp. 207-32) argued that, from the thirteenth century, political bodies were conceived – on the model of the Church – as “mystical” bodies, so that bodies politic and mystical bodies became “almost interchangeable notions”. The metaphor of the body thus immortalised the new, quasi-national states, and was particularly important in France where it fitted well with the traditional mysticism of French kingship. The notion of the *corpus mysticum reipublicae* (*mystical body of the commonwealth*) could exalt the king or, conversely, the constitutional forces which limited royal power.

By contrast, according to Arlette Jouanna (1989, pp. 281-312), the body metaphor inherently supported the political agents who counter-balanced royal power. Jouanna suggests that the metaphor was intrinsically tied up with support for mixed monarchy, that is, monarchy which contained some elements of aristocracy and democracy through the power of the nobles and the estates respectively. Since the ‘limbs’ of the political ‘body’ played important roles, the metaphor suggested that sovereignty belonged to the *whole* body, and was therefore a useful tool for those who opposed nascent absolutism in late sixteenth-century France.

Both of these accounts demonstrate important applications of the body metaphor. However, it should be emphasised that the metaphor served a wide variety of
semantic needs in sixteenth-century France. Kantorowicz discussed bodies conceived in terms of organs such as the head and limbs, but the body natural, and hence the body politic, could also be thought about in relation to the humours of Galenic medicine. Whereas the organological body, used also as a metaphor for the eternal Church, could bestow dignity and durability upon bodies politic, a central implication of humoral theory was that humoral conflict caused illness and, ultimately, death.

For early Greek thinkers, and for Machiavelli, the bodily humours represented the desires of different members of the body politic which, like humours, might conflict with one another and thereby threaten the ‘body’ as a whole (Parel, 1992, pp. 102-54). Similarly, in his Monarchie de France, published in 1519, Claude de Seyssel reminded the young Francis I of the problem of conflicting political “humours”; the king should maintain the humours in harmony by satisfying all three estates and ensuring that no one estate exerted excessive power over the others. Seyssel did refer to bodies politic as “mystical bodies” but this did not immortalise them. Rather Seyssel explicitly stated that “mystical bodies” resembled “material human bodies” which could die because of humoral conflict. Since bodies were ultimately subject to death, the king needed to protect France as much as possible by preventing any of its humours from transcending the others (Seyssel, 1960, pp. 108, 154-5). As the sixteenth century progressed and France was ravaged by the Wars of Religion, depictions of the French body politic more frequently referred to disease and death, tending to present the former as a reality and the latter as an imminent threat. This is a far cry from the immortalisation implied by the body metaphor in the form discussed by Kantorowicz.

Similarly, the link between the body politic and mixed monarchy is not a necessary one. For Jouanna, the clearest expression of ‘the theory’ of the body politic is a 1575
justification of resistance which supported mixed monarchy and which depicted France as an imperfect body lacking some of its ‘limbs’ because princes and royal advisers were estranged from the king and thus prevented from playing their proper roles (Anon. 1575, especially p. 98; comp. Jouanna, 1989, pp. 285-6, 291-2, 293-4). However, the metaphor was also used with contrasting implications. For example, in the following year, 1576, Arnault Sorbin responded to those engaged in resistance by asserting that the monarchy was a body of which only the monarch could be the head (Le Vray Reveille-Matin des calvinistes, cited by Church, 1969, pp. 125-6, n. 17).

Here the body metaphor reaffirms the supreme authority of the king rather than the share in sovereignty of the ‘limbs’.

In fact, the body metaphor was highly adaptable and appealed widely to proponents of a variety of political views. Penny Roberts (2007, pp. 152-164) has shown that it was used to support arguments both for war against the Protestants and also, conversely, for peace and the toleration of the Protestants: appeals were made to the king as the body’s ‘head’ or as its ‘doctor’ to ‘cure’ the body either by ridding it of its Protestant ‘poison’, ‘disease’, ‘plague’ or ‘cancer’, or, conversely, by protecting all of its constituent parts. The metaphor was also used, for example by Montaigne in his Essays, to depict the suffering of bodies politic without endorsing a particular solution or appealing to the figure of a doctor (O’Brien, forthcoming; Clark, 1970, p. 353). Or, the metaphor could be employed to discuss taxation and the allocation of resources: for the good of the body, the body parts needed to share nourishment, and thus the body politic should also share resources among its constituent parts.ii In addition, the clergy and jurists made competing claims to be the ‘eyes’ of the kingdom (Roberts, 2007, pp. 149-150).
Furthermore, in disputes about war and peace, the body metaphor was even more adaptable than Roberts suggests, since even the king’s status as ‘head’ or ‘doctor’ could be changed. The Huguenot Guillaume de Saluste Du Bartas used an innovative formulation of the body metaphor to express some of the ideas of the Protestant monarchomachs, who argued that royal power should be constitutionally limited and that kings who abused their power could legitimately be resisted. In the 1570s, following the St. Bartholomew’s massacres of 1572 in which the royal family were implicated, Protestant monarchomach theories were influential amongst both Protestants and moderate Catholics. In Du Bartas’s bestselling poem of 1578, La Sepmaine, the poet highlighted the danger of unbridled royal power by depicting the king not as head or doctor of the body politic but rather as one of the four humours. Like Seyssel, Du Bartas employed the medical notion that bodies die when one humour becomes excessively dominant; however, for Du Bartas, this forceful political humour was the king. According to Du Bartas, kings sometimes massacre the citizens of their kingdom, the ‘vassalic humours’, thus ultimately bringing about the ‘death’ of the entire body politic (Du Bartas, 1935-40, vol. II, pp. 193-440, Day II, ll. 75-112). In Du Bartas’s formulation, the body metaphor undermines the notion that royal power is beneficial and that the king may ‘cure’ France’s ills, suggesting instead that he is their source.

Thus the body metaphor was modified to serve new conceptual needs created by (a particular perception of) civil conflict and especially the St. Bartholomew’s massacre. While the body metaphor could be used to glorify the king, or to vilify the Protestants as poisoned humours, it also worked well to support criticism of the king: humoral conflict could be harnessed to imply that a ‘healthy constitution’, and indeed ‘life’ itself, were dependent upon the restraint of the dominant political ‘humour’, that is,
the king. Another writer, probably Etienne Pasquier, closely imitated the entire passage (22 lines of poetry) in a 1585 Apologie pour la paix (Apology for Peace), a pamphlet drawing a number of arguments for peace from analogies with the natural world.

At around the same time, another writer with a very different – and much more aggressive – political position also found it useful to depict the king as a harmful bodily fluid. The hard-line Catholic League blamed the king for not doing enough to eradicate Protestant ‘heresy’, and became particularly powerful after the Protestant Henri de Navarre became heir to the throne in 1584. Adapting some of the arguments of the Protestant monarchomachs, League writers justified resistance to the monarchy even to the point of regicide, an act which would occur in 1589. An anonymous pamphlet in this vein called for the continuation of war in its title, ‘Origin of the Illness of France with the remedies proper to cure it, with an exhortation to the continuation of war’ (Origine de la maladie de la France, avec les remèdes propres à la guarison d’icelle, avec une exhortation a l’entretenement de la guerre). The pamphlet argued that killing the king could ‘cure’ France. In order to justify this conclusion, it repeatedly depicted France as a body which needed to be ‘bled’ by the murder of the king, who was said to be allied with the body’s ‘bad humours’, namely the Protestants; readers were invited to play the role of France’s ‘doctor’, a role which had previously been that of the king himself (Anon, [1589]).

The frequent use of the body metaphor in sixteenth-century France was not simply due to its ability to represent effectively one or the other rigidly defined and monolithic interpretation of, for example, kingship or France. Employing the metaphor did not inherently or consistently suggest a perception of the king or of France as glorious, or the notion that the king should, or should not, have absolute
power. Instead, the recurrent use of the metaphor reflects its versatility as a tool for voicing a wide variety of answers to contemporary questions, often concerning the nature of France and its constitution. The metaphor could celebrate the body politic’s glory or, on the other hand, lament its problems; it could be used to support absolutist conceptions of monarchy as effectively as constitutionalist ones. Furthermore, while the metaphor undoubtedly shaped conceptions of the body politic and of kingship, it was also itself shaped by them: for example, contemporary apprehension of the Wars of Religion led to a new emphasis being placed upon the body politic’s subjection to disease and death, and upon a variety of ‘diagnoses’ of these ‘illnesses’ and suggestions for ‘cures’. The metaphor’s widespread use was indebted to its ability to be thus moulded in a variety of ways.

3. Political Conceptions of Natural Bodies

The metaphor could also be used in discussions of nature rather than of politics: the body politic could be invoked as a way of describing the human body, or even natural bodies more generally. Du Bartas’s poem is entitled La Sepmaine, ou la creation du monde – The Week, or the Creation of the World – and constitutes a description of the natural world structured by the seven-day Creation narrative recounted in Genesis. The body politic appears in the text when the poet explains that God separated the four elements (fire, air, water, and earth) into their respective cosmic realms because when the elements combine in cosmic bodies those bodies inevitably die. The poet employs as an example of this the human body, in which the excessive dominance of one element or humour (terms used interchangeably by Du Bartas) brings about its
death, just as, according to the poet, a body politic can be destroyed by an excessive use of royal power.

Du Bartas no doubt uses the metaphor of the body politic because it enabled him to slip a polemical political argument into the midst of a very long poem about nature and God. However, the human body itself was also of great interest to Du Bartas. The creation of man is central to the Genesis narrative, and later in his poem, as he recounts that creation, Du Bartas discusses at length the powers of the human body (Du Bartas, 1935-40, vol. II, pp. 394-402, Day VI, ll. 483-708). In the section referring to the body politic, Du Bartas is concerned with the issue of human death, which he depicts in detail. Four possible deaths are described, one for each humour which might become too dominant. In each case the poet emphasises the suffering caused by that particular mode of death, evoking for example difficulty in breathing, fever, and unquenchable thirst. Each of the four passages concludes with an almost identical rhyming couplet stating that the suffering does not cease until man’s bones are enclosed in a ‘frozen’ tomb (Du Bartas, 1935-40, vol. II, pp. 226-227, Day II, ll. 119-20; 127-8; 135-6; 143-4). Such a refrain is unique in the whole of Du Bartas’s work (and his two longest poems alone constitute approximately 20,000 lines).

The body metaphor as formulated by Du Bartas thus functions as part of a baroque emphasis upon human death, a common theme in late sixteenth-century literature (Rousset (1954, pp. 81-117), Braunrot (1973, pp. 115-23)). Furthermore, nature more generally is a primary concern in the Sepmaine, and humoral conflict in the human body features as an example of elemental interaction, a subject which is discussed at great length. The emphasis placed upon elemental (and thus humoral) discord – and, more importantly, upon elemental discord imagined metaphorically as violent conflict – may be inspired by the Roman poet Lucretius’s depiction of ‘conflict’ between
atoms: Lucretius’s *De rerum natura*, like the *Sepmaine*, is a long epic poem about the cosmos, and Du Bartas imitated passages from it (Fraisse, 1962; Kany-Turpin, 1991; Lamacz, 2002).

The body metaphor was used in a similar way in a discussion of medicine also published in the 1570s: “Alcmaeon holds that the equality of the faculties of the human body, like wetness, heat, dryness, cold, bitterness, sweetness, and some others, preserve and maintain health: and that, by contrast, *monarchy, that is to say, predomination of one of these, creates illness*: for this domination and principality brings about the corruption of the others, and is cause of illnesses” (Plutarch/Amyot, 1572, f. 460v; translation and italics: KEB). This passage is from the *De placitis philosophorum* which (although now generally believed to be the work of Aëtius) in the sixteenth century was ascribed to Plutarch and appeared as part of his *Moralia*, a work very popular in the translation by Jacques Amyot (Aulotte, 1965, p. 256).

Amyot chose to retain the metaphor of ‘monarchy’ to denote humoral dominance, and so, as in Du Bartas’s poem, the metaphorical equivalence between natural bodies and political ones appeared in a discussion of the former.

The semantic exchange between the “natural” and “political” domains of the body metaphor appears to have been particularly strong in the sixteenth century. Either could constitute the source domain or target and, furthermore, interpretations of the metaphor in one domain could influence those in another: for example, Du Bartas’s application of it in his discussion of nature was ‘recycled’ by the author of the aforementioned *Apologie pour la paix* in his discussion of politics (Anon., 1585, p. 25). Adaptations of the metaphor could move very swiftly between the discussion of nature and that of politics, thus further increasing the possibilities for the metaphor’s
“replication”, as well as the strength of semantic influence of both domains upon each other.

4. Other Motivations of the Body Metaphor

In his discussion of “Tacitism” in the history of political thought, Peter Burke suggests that the body metaphor reflected a desire to establish ‘scientific’ laws for politics like those which existed in medicine (Burke, 1969, pp. 167-8; 1991, pp. 482, 486). In other words, in the texts Burke studies, the metaphor’s success was indebted to a particular understanding of politics as a ‘science’. However, the metaphor was also used in discourses where theorising was a less important impetus than polemic. Such discourses included ones intended to persuade through rhetorical strategies employed orally rather than through texts which could be re-read and subjected to careful scrutiny: Simon Vigor, perhaps the most famous preacher in Paris during the 1560s, used corporeal images to argue that the French king should not tolerate the “putrid infection of heresy”, which threatened the entire social order (Diefendorf, 1991, pp. 153-8). While many of the thinkers whom Burke discusses were strongly inspired by the contemporary applicability of the ‘laws’ they were establishing, and while polemical arguments did gain strength from the ‘laws’ of medicine, current relevance was arguably a much stronger impetus for Vigor than any conception of politics as a ‘science’: his statements about the ‘body politic’ were designed to support arguments about what should be done in France. Thus, for some, including Vigor, any ‘laws’ concerning the body were more than usually motivated by the immediate concerns of the ‘scientist’ in question, whereas, for others, abstract knowledge was a more important incentive.
Moreover, the term ‘body’ was an obvious one to use, whether or not one ‘dreamt of a science of politics’. In my discussion I have referred to ‘bodies politic’ and ‘natural bodies’ rather than to ‘bodies’ (understood to be natural ones) and ‘states’. The term *état* (state) was usually used to describe the condition of a body politic; according to Howell A. Lloyd, the idea of the state as a distinct and substantive entity was formulated in the 1570s by Jean Bodin but Bodin himself used the term inconsistently, and subsequent sixteenth-century thinkers continued to refer to the *corpus mysticum reipublicae* rather than the *état* (Lloyd, 1983, pp. 146-71).

Furthermore, the similarity between the body politic and the body natural seems to have been considered an ontological one, that is, one regarded as real rather than heuristic or figurative. It is part of a wider equivalence perceived between the natural world and the human one, between nature and society; another example of this is the similarity between the king and the sun. The epistemological importance attributed to similarity in the sixteenth century varied from discourse to discourse (Maclean, 1998); nonetheless the similarity between the human body and the political one was convincing enough that royal doctors gave advice on how to ‘cure’ France, and other doctors composed treatises on this subject, as if their knowledge of the human body equipped them to diagnose the political body (Soll, 2002; Burke, 1991, pp. 482, 486). By contrast, in more recent years, while the body metaphor appears for example in the form of heart-based metaphors in debates about the European Union (Musolff 2004a, pp. 83-114), I know of no heart surgeon who believes that their profession qualifies them to comment upon the way in which the European Union should function.

This ontological status of the body metaphor was, I would argue, an important force behind its massive replication in the sixteenth century. Any metaphor shapes
perceptions of its target domain, whether or not the similarity implied is grounded in the way I have described. However, in the contemporary period one can at least attempt to resist this process by highlighting the metaphorical status of particular utterances. This is precisely what Susan Sontag does powerfully with reference to illness: “only in the most limited sense is any historical event or problem like an illness”; “Of course, one cannot think without metaphors. But that does not mean there aren’t some metaphors we might well abstain from or try to retire” (Sontag, 1991, pp. 85, 91).

More generally, we tend to consider that “reality […] can be best described in simple, non-metaphorical terms” and that “figurative or poetic assertions are distinct from true knowledge” (Gibbs, 1994, p. 1). It is for this reason that highlighting the cognitive importance of metaphor can be considered to undermine an entire edifice of Western thought based on ‘reason’ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, pp. 195-222). It is more difficult to locate an opposition between metaphorical language and logic in sixteenth-century thinking. The sixteenth century saw the humanist introduction of figures based on analogy into the discipline of logic (although this was resisted by more traditional scholastic thinkers). Furthermore, metaphors were logically grounded in similarities perceived to exist between, for example, the natural world and the societal one. As J. Rousset stated, “the old analogical cosmos […] logically grounded the validity of the metaphorical spirit depending upon the similitudes and correspondences between all orders of reality, from stones to man and from man to the stars’ (Rousset 1976, p. 67; translation: KEB). Thus, use of the body metaphor was supported not simply by a perceived equivalence between two domains but also by the notion that such equivalences were ‘real’.
The strong perception of a similarity between natural bodies and political ones seems to have been so ‘self-evident’ that it did not need to be stated: discussions grounded in this underlying similarity did not always explicitly refer to the body politic as a ‘body’. References to a body per se signify much (although ‘body’ acquired more specific overtones in certain contexts, for example those of mortality in apocalyptic discussions of the general decline of the world). On the other hand, extending the metaphor, or using related metaphors of ‘limbs’ or ‘illness’, for example, could be used to make more specific – and polemical – arguments, such as locating the source of France’s problems in the ‘poison’ of ‘heresy’. Thus, while the strong apprehension of similarity between body natural and body politic was arguably important in encouraging the use of the body metaphor, the development of the metaphor was often motivated by the desire to depict France in more specific – perhaps controversial – ways.

5. Evolution of the Body Metaphor

While the late sixteenth century saw a wide variety of interpretations of the body metaphor, the depiction of a natural body was ubiquitous. By contrast, in seventeenth-century European thought, the state tended to be considered as a person as much as a body (Lloyd, 1983, p. 22), and natural metaphors were combined with mechanistic ones. In the genre of political thought at least, the political body in the seventeenth century was less exclusively a natural one than in the sixteenth. The new metaphor of a person expressed a new concept of the state; however, it would be misleading to assume that the changes in metaphorical thinking were secondary to changes in political thought. Indeed, the new version of the body metaphor can be seen to
respond to interpretations (and interpretative problems) of the old one, firstly, the conflict between absolutist and constitutionalist analyses and, secondly, the emphasis upon disease and death.

Lloyd (1983, pp.146-68) suggests that the new idea of the state was needed because the concept of a body composed of members of the political community could give rise to conflicting interpretations of the location of authority, a problem which became very acute in late sixteenth-century France. Indeed, actual uses of the body metaphor show that it served to locate sovereignty either solely in the ‘head’ or also throughout the ‘body’, and that these contrasting interpretations had become increasingly controversial and polarised rather than leading the discourse community towards any solution which might be shared. By contrast, in Hobbes’s seminal *Leviathan*, the concept of the state as artificial person locates sovereignty firmly in the sovereign chosen to represent that person: in order to avoid the warfare inherent in living in the condition of nature, the multitude instituted the artificial person of the state, and authorised the sovereign to represent that person (Hobbes, 1996, pp. 111-115; Skinner, 2002, pp. 177-208).

Late sixteenth-century body metaphors suggest that the image of the natural body was also problematic insofar as it was increasingly interpreted as diseased and threatened by death. Especially in texts which did not appeal to a ‘doctor’ to employ a particular ‘medicine’, the body metaphor served to analyse the political situation but not to point to a solution. Where writers depicted bodies politic in general (rather than the French body in particular), the French wars did not appear as an exception to any general rule of harmony in bodies politic: instead, in Du Bartas’s case for example, it was a general rule that royal choices (in favour of the king’s own desires rather than the law) might destroy bodies politic. Furthermore, a pessimistic ‘baroque’ conception of the
body natural – that is, one which emphasises the omnipresence of death – could reinforce a conception of the body politic as ‘living’ a precarious and threatened existence.

In short, the body metaphor suggested that political problems, such as royal violence, were ‘natural’. The anonymous author of the 1585 Apology is clearly uneasy about this. Having argued that nature teaches us to live in peace (pp. 23-35), he acknowledges that nature also contains violence, attempting to circumvent the apparent contradiction by observing that violence is an imperfection caused by the Fall of Man (pp. 75-83); arguably, though, the problem nonetheless weakens the argument. Thus the body metaphor creates a bleak image of bodies politic; the fatalistic and aggressive illness metaphors which Sontag ascribes uniquely to the modern period (Sontag, 1991, 77-87) are used, but in a context in which their power is less likely to be diminished by arguments against metaphor.

The problem of disease can be solved by the concept of the state as an artificial person for whom mechanistic metaphors as well as organic ones are appropriate. When, in the opening lines of his Leviathan (1996, p. 9), Hobbes explains that the commonwealth is ‘an Artifciall Man’, he is quick to add that this artificial man is ‘of greater stature and strength than the Naturall’. Later he explains that ‘diseases’ can be avoided if this artificial man is properly created (1996, p. 221). The natural body is less central to the body metaphor, so that the difference between the (artificial) state and the (natural) body can be highlighted. In the face of civil warfare depicted as a natural disease of bodies politic, Hobbes’s artificial person is crafted so as to enjoy a greater longevity than natural bodies. Arguably, writers about politics were henceforth less likely to tar nature and politics with the same brush. By contrast, in late sixteenth-century France, natural bodies were central to the replication of the
body metaphor; as we have seen, the metaphor also owed its success to religious discord, to conflict between constitutionalist and absolutist conceptions of monarchy, to the desire to establish ‘scientific’ laws for politics, and to a perceived ontological similarity between political bodies and natural ones.

References


Anon. ([1589]). *Origine de la maladie de la France, avec les remedes propres à la guarison d’icelle, avec une exhortation a l’entretenement de la guerre* (Paris: Jacques Varangues).


Lycosthenes, C. (1614). *Parabolarum sive similitudinum, quae ex Aristotele, Plutarcho, Plinio ac Seneca, gravissimis authoribus, olim ab Erasmo Roterodamo collectae, ... loci communes* (Lyon: Joannem Gazeau).


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i Memes were posited by Richard Dawkins in his *Selfish Gene* (1976) and denote a second “replicator” in addition to the gene; memes are elements of culture that compete with other memes to replicate themselves through imitation in human hosts. For critical discussion of the meme concept in conceptual history and discourse history see Roslyn Frank (this volume).

ii In 1560, this argument was used by Jean Lange, the speaker for the third estate at the Estates of Orleans (Church, 1969, p. 98, n. 52), and also by Etienne Pasquier in his *Pourparler du prince* (1560, ff. 95r-96v).

iii Roberts describes the king as the ‘undisputed head’ of the body politic (2007, pp. 149, 164).
See my *Cosmos and Image* (in press).

Anon. (1585, p. 25). For the attribution to Pasquier see Thickett 1956, pp. 13, 75; 1979, pp. 105-6.

It appears after almost 1000 lines of a poem approximately 6500 words long.


My use of ‘ontological’ in this context is not to be confused with that which refers to the metaphorical consideration of events, emotions or ideas as entities and substances (for example Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, pp. 25-32): ‘ontological’ here refers to the status of the similarity rather than that of a source domain which is more concrete than the target one. See my *Cosmos and Image* (in press).

For example, one commonplace collected by Erasmus reads as follows: “just as God in the heavens created the sun as the most beautiful and most delightful image of himself, so in the republic he created the king to represent him through his wisdom, his justice and his liberality” (Lycosthenes, 1614, p. 97; translation: KEB).

Sontag is thus mistaken to suggest that in the early modern period metaphors of illness always gave optimistic ‘prognoses’ and presented ‘disease’ as manageable, thus reinforcing a general rule of harmony from which illness was a deviation (Sontag, 1991, pp. 77-80).