We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. By continuing to browse this repository, you give consent for essential cookies to be used. You can read more about our Privacy and Cookie Policy.

Durham Research Online
You are in:

Does high leverage impact earnings management ? evidence from non-cash mergers and acquisitions.

Alsharairi, M. and Salama, A. (2011) 'Does high leverage impact earnings management ? evidence from non-cash mergers and acquisitions.', Journal of financial and economic practice., 12 (1). pp. 17-33.


Using a sample of US noncash acquirers, we find significant evidence of upward earnings management prior to announcing merger and acquisition deals. In this event study, we adopt an industryadjusted leverage proxy. No evidence of premerger earnings management is found in highly leveraged firms. The results indicate significant evidence of a negative relationship between earnings management and leverage. The evidence remains robust after replacing the leverage proxy with a highlow leverage binary variable, as well as after controlling for the relative size of the deal and profitability of acquirers. No evidence on earnings management by cash acquirers is reported. These findings are consistent with Jensen’s Control Hypothesis as well as advocate the view that creditors play crucial roles in monitoring the firm, which would increase the credibility of corporate reports and restrict the use of management’s discretionary power to manipulate earnings prior to special business events such as mergers and acquisitions.

Item Type:Article
Keywords:Earnings management, Leverage, Accruals, Mergers and acquisitions.
Full text:Full text not available from this repository.
Publisher Web site:
Record Created:07 Feb 2011 16:20
Last Modified:16 Jan 2013 13:23

Social bookmarking: del.icio.usConnoteaBibSonomyCiteULikeFacebookTwitterExport: EndNote, Zotero | BibTex
Look up in GoogleScholar | Find in a UK Library