Mertzios, G.B. (2009) 'Fast convergence of routing games with splittable flows.', International Conference on Theoretical and Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (TMFCS- 09) Orlando, Florida, 13-16 July 2009.
In this paper we investigate the splittable routing game in a series-parallel network with two selfish players. Every player wishes to route optimally, i.e. at minimum cost, an individual flow demand from the source to the destination, giving rise to a non-cooperative game. We allow a player to split his flow along any number of paths. One of the fundamental questions in this model is the convergence of the best response dynamics to a Nash equilibrium, as well as the time of convergence. We prove that this game converges indeed to a Nash equilibrium in a logarithmic number of steps. Our results hold for increasing and convex player-specific latency functions. Finally, we prove that our analysis on the convergence time is tight for affine latency functions.
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|Record Created:||22 Feb 2012 16:05|
|Last Modified:||09 Mar 2012 10:54|
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