DREAMing the Ordinary: Daily Life and the Complex Geographies of Citizenship

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Abstract:

This paper intervenes in scholarly debates over citizenship by introducing the concept of ‘ordinary’ to analyze citizenship’s complexities. Ordinary is often taken to mean standard or routine, but it also invokes order and authority. As such, conceptualising citizenship as ordinary trains our attention on the ways in which the spatiality of laws and social norms are entwined with daily life. The idea of ordinariness, thus fuses legal structures, normative orders and the experiences of individuals, social groups and communities, making citizenship both a general category and a contingent resource for political life. We explore this argument using immigrants as an example, but the conceptualization of citizenship extends more broadly.

Keywords: Citizenship, law, social norms, daily life, immigrants, ordinary
I Jesus’ Dream

In August 2002, Jesus Apodaca found himself in the middle of a political nightmare that threatened to result in the deportation of his family from the United States. Just two months before, he had been living an American dream. In June, he graduated from high school in Aurora, Colorado, with academic honours and as valedictorian. He came from an immigrant family, struggling to make ends meet, and the family was proud of his accomplishments. Jesus was offered admission to the University of Colorado and was given a scholarship. Then, it all unravelled.

In August, the University withdrew its offer of financial assistance and told Jesus he would have to pay out-of-state tuition, because he entered the country illegally with his family when he was 12 years old. When the story was reported on the front page of The Denver Post, there was outrage. While some people were upset that a child who had achieved so much would be punished because of the acts of his parents, others were incredulous that the schools had educated an “illegal alien.” The University responded that the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act tied its hands. Title V, Section 505 of the act explicitly prohibits “eligibility for preferential treatment of aliens not lawfully present on basis of residence for higher education benefits”.

And that was as it should be, according to Tom Tancredo, a staunch critic of American immigration policies and, at that time, a Colorado member of the US House of Representatives. Tancredo announced that Jesus and his family should be deported, and he notified the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (INS) to that effect. Almost immediately, private relief bills were introduced by Colorado Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell and Representative Mark Udall. Private relief bills stop immigration proceedings for named individuals, placing a hold on deportations. Unless the bills are passed, however, the individuals remain in a sort of legal limbo, unable to obtain permanent residence, but given leave to remain in the country. Neither bill was passed, or importantly, defeated. While the bills are tabled, no action can be taken against the named individuals.

Jesus’ dream was like those of many other children: he wanted to continue his studies at a university. But federal legislation prohibited him from paying the lower fees that other residents of the state of Colorado paid when they went to publicly funded
universities, because that would give him “preferential treatment.” While Jesus’ dream quickly became a nightmare, his case was not unusual. In recognition of the problem – which predates Jesus’ specific case – a bi-partisan bill had been introduced in the 2001 Congress called the “Development, Relief and Education for Minors Act.” The DREAM Act, as it was known, would have given states the option to allow people like Jesus to pay in-state fees for tuition. The bill was never debated, and so died. It was re-introduced in subsequent Congresses, but never passed. In 2006, it was included as part of the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act, but was defeated. It was reintroduced in 2007 and failed to get past a procedural hurdle; it was then included as an amendment to the Defense Authorization Act, but was ruled as non-germane to the act. In 2010, an amendment was again attached to the Defense Authorization Act; the bill, however, included a number of amendments unacceptable to social conservatives, and the bill was defeated. Activists in several states have proposed their own DREAM acts, but all have foundered. Some universities have allowed undocumented students to pay in-state fees, but they recognise this violates federal legislation and their actions could not be supported if challenged. Other universities have tried to establish privately funded scholarships for undocumented students, but with limited success.

Something that seems so ordinary for thousands of American high school graduates each year – going to a publicly funded university in the state of their residence – is in fact extra-ordinary for thousands more who cannot attend. For students with good grades, whose parents have worked hard and have contributed to their local community, and who have lived in the US all or most of their life, the inability to pay resident fees seems both an insurmountable and an unfair hurdle. It seems insurmountable because the fees are so high and financial assistance is not available. It seems unfair because something that has become an expectation as a social right of citizenship is not available to those who are citizens in all but legal status.

Citizenship, like the ability to attend university, is simultaneously ordinary and extra-ordinary. This odd pairing emerges from the complexities of citizenship and the many influences on it. Citizenship is a status in law that is framed through norms, constitutions, laws, and policies. More than a legal attribute, however, it is also experienced as people move through their daily lives and as opportunities afforded by citizenship are opened and forestalled for particular individuals at particular moments. Significantly, these experiences of citizenship might seem to be unrelated to legal standing, and in some cases, the experience of citizenship might actually contradict legal
and normative ideals. There is also a spatiality to citizenship that makes it ordinary and extraordinary. Citizenship is located in multiple sites, some of which are material places, some of which are metaphorical, and some of which are institutional. And the people who hold citizenship enact their own spatial practices, confounding the territorial framing of citizenship codified in law. Despite its seeming incoherence, citizenship — as a legal standing, as a set of practices, and as characterised by a complex spatiality — is bound up with the processes and relationships that structure lives and politics in ways that cannot be ignored and that also provide the basis for political struggles.

In this paper, we offer a way to understand the complexities of citizenship through the concept of ordinariness. Ordinary is often taken to mean standard, routine, or average, but it also invokes a kind of order and authority, including legal authority. As we will argue, conceptualising citizenship as ordinary trains our attention on the ways in which laws and social norms are entwined with the routine practices of daily lives. The idea of ordinariness, thus fuses legal structures, normative orders, and the experiences of individuals, social groups and communities, making citizenship both a general category and a contingent resource for political life.

To build the case for the importance of understanding citizenship as ordinary, we first delineate the reasons that citizenship must be seen as a complex concept in which its spatiality is integral and that is bound up with the encounters of daily life. We then develop this notion of the daily life of citizenship through the concept of ‘ordinariness.’ Throughout the paper, we illustrate our arguments using the example of immigrants. Immigrants are not the only people who must negotiate the oppositions and ambiguities inherent in citizenship. They provide a lens into such negotiations, however, because they have no claims or political standing except those granted by societies and by states (Ngai, 2004). Yet as Honig (2001) demonstrates, the figure of the ‘foreigner’ casts a light on the quality of democracy and the possibility for an expansive citizenship.

II The Complexities of Citizenship in Law and Daily Life

This is the point in a paper when it is common to review different theoretical perspectives on citizenship and analyse their philosophical underpinnings. In this strategy, the differences between liberal, republican, communitarian, radical, feminist, post-colonial (and on and on) theorizations would be explored. We have chosen not to follow this strategy for several reasons, not least of which is the profusion of citizenships
that have been offered in recent years (see Isin and Nielsen, 2008). With this proliferation, it would be difficult to provide a coherent discussion in a short article. More importantly for our purposes, however, many of these theoretical and philosophical discussions offer little purchase in understanding the interrelationships between legal status and practice that order the lives of citizens in the places to which they feel they belong and in which they live. This ordering involves the status and rights of citizenship, but also conveys norms of social behaviour and the relationships that hold within various sites and communities. This combination is what we call “ordinary citizenship.”

To lay the foundation for this argument, we demonstrate the ways that citizenship is framed through the combination of several elements, including: laws and policies; normative frameworks related to justice and care; theories held by individuals about the political subject called ‘citizen’; and the spatiality of the relationships that construct citizenship as it is experienced and enacted. While the state is present in each of these, we argue that it is in the interaction between state, community, and daily life that citizenship is animated and given meaning.

Legal Frameworks for Citizenship

Jesus’ story is one in which the importance of law and legal frameworks of citizenship are very important. Indeed, many people who voiced an opinion argued that the law was the only relevant issue in his case. But ‘the law’ was neither fixed nor coherent, as a variety of legal arguments have been advanced and many efforts to change it have been launched. Jesus’ experience highlights that the accretion of constitutions, laws, jurisprudence, and policies mean that legal frameworks within any country are likely to be complex, spatially differentiated, and internally inconsistent. This complexity is amplified when the broad range of legal frameworks from multiple countries, from international law, and from localities are considered.

To make sense of this complexity, we begin with the analysis provided by legal theorist Linda Bosniak (2006). She argues that there are two types of constitutional and legal practices that define and delimit citizenship; these include rules that define who is a member and rules about how members are to be treated. Rules governing the delimitation of citizenship include how membership is distributed, the characteristics of those deemed worthy of citizenship, and the territorial units to which citizenship is attached (e.g., the nation). Rules governing the ways members should be treated include
the rights and responsibilities of citizenship and the relationships between the state, polity, and individuals. While Bosniak argues that the two sets of laws and practices delimiting citizenship are distinct in a legal sense, we argue that there is considerable overlap as people move through their daily lives. This can be seen in several ways.

First, if some rules define who is a member, and other rules define how members are to be treated, then there can be confusion as to whether rules about how citizens are to be treated apply to immigrants who are not officially members. Bosniak argues that relatively few countries have explicit rules delimiting the rights of non-citizens, and even fewer are consistently applied. For example, some legislation in the United States limits the ability of immigrants to receive social benefits, such as social security or access to primary and secondary education. Yet those laws are at odds with employment legislation that requires immigrants with permanent residency to pay taxes for social security and with federal legislation that requires that children have access to the education system irrespective of their legal status. Many pieces of legislation have been rescinded or struck down in the court system, yet some of the legislation remains part of the law, even if legally unenforceable. The result in this, and other cases, is a hodgepodge of rules that are inconsistently applied and that therefore add to the complexity of citizenship that individuals and families negotiate. The issue of families is very important here, as in countries where citizenship is granted to anyone born in the country, families may have a variety of legal standings; rules that apply to individuals, then, are experienced through families and households that are positioned with respect to the law and the communities in which they live in multiple ways (Bosniak, 2006).

While it might be nice to have clear and consistent rules, the complexities as discussed above may nevertheless create opportunities for individuals that may work to some people’s advantage, and often in surprising ways. Jesus’ saga is an example. The law that was interpreted as barring him from receiving a scholarship was a federal immigration law passed in 1996. When it became clear that students such as Jesus would be deemed ineligible, the initial DREAM act was introduced specifically to rectify this problem, a problem that was estimated to affect about 50 students per year. When the targeted bill failed, amendments were attached to other federal bills and state legislatures tried to amend their laws. And of course, court cases have abounded. While the confused legal terrain in this single example is perhaps overwhelming, it does provide some opportunities precisely because of its complexity. When last Jesus’ family appeared in the Denver papers, it was because a judge had issued an order that halted deportation
proceedings and ordered that family members receive the same benefits as if they were legal residents. This offers relief, even if the ruling appears to make the legal waters even murkier, since it goes beyond what is typically granted while private relief bills are tabled, but not acted upon.

Second, in countries with complex legislative and judicial systems, it is not always clear which elements of the system should be used for immigrants. Coleman (2007) has noted that many immigration proceedings in the US are governed by civil law, where there is a lower standard of proof, even though decisions are often enforced by police power and criminal penalties. This comes about because some parts of the process are deemed to be a matter of defining who is a member and thereby whether they can stay; constitutional and legal protections in this part of the process are minimal, precisely because individuals are not recognised as citizens. Yet other parts of the process draw on state powers to punish and enforce penalties as though the individuals were citizens. The effect is to create a legal space of lawlessness, where the laws and provisions to protect human rights no longer apply (see Agamben, 2005; Humphreys, 2006; Dikeç, 2009).

Third, adding to the complexities of citizenship is the spatiality of law and legality, even when the discussion is focused on one country. In Jesus’ case, the legal framework is shaped by the US Constitution, legislation and executive orders at the federal level, constitutions and laws in all 50 states, and laws and ordinances enacted in a host of counties and local governments. This legislative apparatus is complicated further by a judicial structure that comes to a peak at the US Supreme Court, but that includes appellate and district courts under the federal judiciary, and then an equally complex set of court systems in each of the states. Power, politics, and the potential to challenge issues are built into this structure. The history of US politics and government is often narrated – and adjudicated – through the lens of states’ rights vis-à-vis federal powers, which is evident in both the legislative and judicial arenas. This is why several states have initiated their own DREAM acts in seeming contravention of the federal immigration laws. While some challenges to federal legislation represent an attempt to liberalise immigration policies, there are other locally initiated efforts that attempt to keep out immigrants (Walker and Leitner, forthcoming).

Finally, new security regimes in the US, Britain and other countries treat everyone as potentially liable to revocation of citizenship or to the diminution of the protections offered by citizenship. For example, enhanced scrutiny aimed at immigrants is also applied to citizens, precisely because it is not possible a priori to know whether someone
is a citizen. Furthermore, a federal appeals court in San Francisco ruled that the US Justice Department can revoke citizenship of naturalised immigrants through closed administrative hearings outside the court system. As a result, the distinction between rules that define membership and those that describe the treatment of members is blurring.

Law and legal systems are often described as being our best approximations of abstract ideals of justice in ‘the real world.’ It is not surprising that they are not perfect approximations; it would be more surprising if they were. The contradictions hidden beneath the veneer of abstract justice and law, however, contribute to a lack of coherence in the ways citizenship is constructed and enacted in practice (Smith, 1997), or in our terms, in daily life. This complexity reflects and embeds into law differing views of what citizenship should entail and how it is theorised in a normative sense. These theories are constructed and reinterpreted by the broad public as they move through their daily lives.

Normative Frameworks for Citizenship: Justice and Care

Debates over citizenship – in law, in academic writing, and in public discourse – often hinge on the ways in which competing normative values are activated, combined, and interpreted. Abstract theories and political oratory are often judged on the basis of internal consistency and universal application, but in practice, laws and public debate typically draw upon multiple normative values. It is the ways that values are assembled and mobilised in specific instances that contributes to the complexity of citizenship and, as before, presents certain political constraints and opportunities. While this holds in general, we argue that it may be particularly important in the – often unarticulated – theories of citizenship that circulate in public debates.

One way into these debates is to think of them as prioritising either justice or care as the way to evaluate the characteristics of citizenship and its ability to foster self-development and well-being. Justice involves several, subsidiary principles, including fair and equal treatment of all individuals qua individuals, decision making and behaviour that is governed by the rule of law, and impartiality. But justice can be seen as more than a matter of law, but also as extending into the social relationships of daily life and as applying to everyone, regardless of legal status. Academic proponents of this broad notion of justice as the normative foundation of democratic citizenship include Bauböck
Sitting alongside justice-based norms of citizenship are theories that emphasise an ethic of care. Care rests on a complex notion of equality that is based on the satisfaction of situated and particular needs that arise from the recognition of difference and the practices of accommodation (Jaggar, 2001). Proponents of an ethic of care are often sceptical of the idea that consistent and universal application of procedures will inevitably lead to optimum outcomes, because the particular needs of individuals will vary. Instead, proponents of care argue that socio-political practices and relationships and individuals’ positioning within them need to be considered in building a democracy that can foster the well being of the citizenry; while the procedures and rights discussed in many justice-oriented theories are important, they play a complicated role in the relationships and practices that condition the outcome of democratic citizenship (Tronto, 1993; Sevenhuijsen, 1998; Held 2005). Philosophies of care often combine the importance of individual and human rights with recognition of the importance of mutual obligation and reciprocity.

Participants in debates over citizenship may not articulate the normative values that underlie their positions or worry about the internal consistency of their arguments; this is particularly likely to be the case for theories that members of the public construct and articulate through debate and enact in daily life. Yet these values and norms are important. According to Olson and Sayer (2009, p 184), they “can be thought of as generalised, sedimented valuations of things, or dispositions towards them. They are about something. Our values guide particular evaluative judgements but can be reviewed and modified in the light of anomalous evidence arising from these particular evaluations.” In this way, norms can be seen to underlie public debates or experiences of the world, but also to change in response to what is observed. Norms may be ‘sedimented’ in law, but are not perfectly defined or completely settled by law. Instead, they are activated, expressed, and tested in a variety of domains.

We can identify at least two domains in which norms of justice and care in relation to citizenship are evident, are experienced, and are contested: norms in relation to the boundaries of belonging – including how membership is distributed – and norms in relation to the rights and responsibilities of citizens. These domains are frequently discussed together in terms of the substantive aspects of citizenship, but their normative bases are less frequently explored. The discussion to this point has become increasingly
abstract, rather than grounded in daily life, so it might be useful to ask: “what would all
this mean for Jesus?” His case helps to both ground the abstract discussion, but also to
crystallise what is at stake. In so doing, it is possible to anticipate how norms would be
combined in different domains to render certain perspectives on Jesus’ experiences
interpretable (see Table 1).

----- Table 1 about here ----- 

If justice is held to be the normative foundation of citizenship and the issue of
boundary of membership was deemed to be most important in the case, it would be
reasonable to argue that states set the rules of entry to a polity and thereby to citizenship
rights. Jesus’ parents did not follow the rules, so it is appropriate to deny rights and
benefits to Jesus. If, however, one were focused on justice as it overlaps with the rights
and responsibilities of citizenship, one could reasonably argue that Jesus was not
responsible for his parents’ actions and so should not be punished. The parents might
have crossed into the US without permission, but while in the US, they had lived as
responsible members of the community, paid taxes, worked hard, and followed all the
rules, except those governing entry. Since the Apodacas had lived in the US for several
years without transgressing other laws or expectations, punishing Jesus for an action he
was compelled by his parents to commit would not be consistent with ideas of justice.

A normative stance prioritising care in citizenship could lead to a similar
conclusion, arguing that the boundary issues should be irrelevant at this point, in part
because deportation would sever the relationships between Jesus, the family and the
community that had been built and fostered over the years. The family was already
within the borders of the US, so the relationships that tie them their community should
surely take priority. Furthermore, by all accounts, the family and Jesus were active,
responsible members of the community. Responsibilities go two ways, an advocate of
care might argue. The community has responsibilities to those who have lived in and
contributed to it as members, including the responsibility to support their nurture and
development. From an ethical stance emphasising care, it would not be appropriate to
deport the family, and so family members should be treated as though they held the
formal status of citizen.

This is obviously a crude, simplistic assessment that relies on oppositions, but it
provides a way of thinking about the ways in which different dimensions or aspects of
citizenship are assembled in daily life and may inform the ways in which differently positioned individuals and groups frame and subsequently animate their theories of citizenship. The example also points to the contested and often uneasy relationships between individuals, groups, communities, and the state that together constitute the citizen-subject.

The Citizen-Subject

The framings of citizenship in law and in normative debates suggest different ideas about who is, who should be, who can be a citizen, and how they can be citizens. If the distribution of membership is one of the primary activities undertaken by human communities, as Walzer (1983) argues, then questions about who can be a member are of critical importance and are important for all kinds of reasons. They are important because membership in communities offers access to resources held by communities, but also because the denial of membership will have ethical and material implications that are important to the quality of democracy within and across communities. Not surprisingly, then, questions about membership have been at the root of many struggles – in both the state and communities – and conflicts through history.

Struggles to extend membership are almost invariably group struggles (Phillips, 2007; Shklar, 1990). The history of suffrage, for instance, is one in which people have struggled on behalf of groups – not on behalf of specific individuals – to be included in the electorate. In these struggles, abstract and idealised figures of individuals might be put forward, and these figures might look like and might be represented by real individuals. “Lady Liberty” was an important figure in the women’s suffrage movement in the United States, for instance, and she was paraded through streets of cities around the country. In those parades, an individual woman was often carried on a float, but that woman did not represent herself so much as she represented women and a fuller state of liberty (Ryan, 1992). Similarly, Ghandi and Mandela came to personify – but not individualise – the struggle for freedom and for new understandings of what it meant to be recognised as belonging to a community. They became iconic figures for their virtue, but again, a virtue and ideals of justice and care that extended beyond their individual selves to the group, to broader political communities, and to the state.

Yet many theories of citizenship and debates about extending membership conceptualise individual citizens qua individuals, as the iconic figures of citizenship. Much as been made in liberal democratic theory of the citizen who is unencumbered and
rational (Habermas, 1990; Meeham, 1995; Anderson, 2006). Also in this framework, the rights and standing conferred by citizenship – including the right to participate in deliberation – are attached to individuals, rather than to groups. So we are left in the contradictory situation in which individuals are extended rights of citizenship because of their membership in groups deemed worthy of membership. Yet as individuals, they exercise those rights irrespective of their personal virtues and capabilities or whether they identify as a group member. In the United States, a young person born in the country is not granted the right to vote because he or she is shown to be of good moral character or because he or she has demonstrated the ability and willingness to participate in rational deliberation. A young person can claim the right to vote – and other rights of citizenship – when he or she turns 18-years-of-age, or in other words, because he or she has become a member of a group that is granted particular rights that will be exercised by individuals.

Why is this significant? First, while citizenship rights might be extended to groups, they are often withdrawn from individuals. In many places, for instance, failure to vote in successive elections leads to individuals being dropped from electoral roles; commission of serious crimes can also disqualify people from voting and from receiving other social rights, in addition to the withdrawal of freedom through incarceration. It is rare that a class of individuals has rights withdrawn, and even rarer that their rights are withdrawn as a result of actions of an individual. Second, immigrants have often been treated differently than other group members when citizenship is extended. Jesus, for instance, was not able to vote when he turned 18, because his membership in the group ‘alien’ was superior to his membership in the group ‘age of majority.’ And in situations where membership is made possible for immigrants through changes in rules that affect the group, individuals typically must show they qualify, often by passing some sort of naturalisation test or interview. Naturalisation procedures, for example, have recently been developed in many European countries to allow people of the group ‘alien’ to demonstrate their integration into the group ‘citizen’ and thereby to claim the rights of citizenship in the country (Odmalm, 2007).

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this suggests the importance of understanding citizenship as based on relationships between individuals, social groups, communities, and the state. Many of the arguments just recounted rest on an idea of citizenship as a status signifying membership that is conferred by law. Citizenship, however, is more than a status. It is also a feeling and a practice that is conditioned by
law, but not reducible to it (Benhabib, 1999; Osler and Starkey, 2005; Leitner and Ehrkamp, 2006). Again using immigrants as an example, laws clearly demark an individual’s alienage, thus limiting their ability to participate in public life or perhaps to earn a living, but law does not fully determine the way that an individual will live in a place. Social norms and morés, interactions with other people, the demonstration of respect for difference, and a host of other social practices may make an immigrant (or any other individual, for that matter) feel more or less welcome and embraced by a community. Those same norms, interactions, and practices may lead some members of a community to make other immigrants feel unwelcome. In other words, how individuals are positioned relative to other people in the community and with respect to the community as a whole can create permeable boundaries of inclusion whereby some people will be seen as members under certain conditions or by certain people, and will be seen as outsiders under other conditions or by other people. These feelings of belonging are affective, and as indicated previously, not reducible to legal status, or simply to ‘objective’ social and personal characteristics. This is why supporters of Jesus and his family could argue that family members were citizens, even though they lacked formal legal standing. Their feelings and experiences – their subjectivities – were constructed in and through a series of relationships, including relationships that incorporated the family in the community of citizens.

The importance of affective relationships, often constructed through everyday encounters and relationships, are hard to overstate in the ways that citizenship is constructed. Citizenship can be theorised and idealised as purely rational and as unencumbered, but as citizenship is practiced, performed, and lived, it is anything but unencumbered. The vitriolic debates and fear-mongering about some types of people, the tendency to draw boundaries and harden the edges around polities, and the acceptance of practices that deny liberties to some people are difficult to explain from the perspective of the idealised (and probably stereotyped) rational, unencumbered citizen. Similarly, it is difficult to understand why there is any support at all for extending the rights of citizenship to people who are not seen as members of a polity unless relationships of obligation, mutuality, and interdependence are reckoned with. These relationships undergird both the subjectivities of citizens and also the places in which it is lived; they also connect citizens in one place to citizens in other places. The lived, relational nature of citizenship and of citizen subjectivities suggests that citizenship is not
The Spatiality of Citizenship

The spatiality of citizenship is important both in normative and practical terms. Normatively, one would want citizenship to be located in the sites where commitments to the polity and to other citizens and where self-development can best be encouraged (Delanty, 2000; Bauböck, 1994). Practically, structures of governance mean that territorialized forms of citizenship are the most feasible way to regulate citizens for particular ends and to create institutional forms that citizens can access to make claims. But as we argued with regard to the spatiality of law and legal systems, what seems so clear on the surface is much more complex in practice.

Much of the literature seems to assume that the “natural” location of citizenship is in the nation-state, even though there is little basis for this linkage in most theories (Bosniak, 2006). The reason for this linkage, of course, has to do with the roles that constitutions, law, and jurisprudence have played in the past 250 years in giving citizenship particular institutional and national forms. But in recent decades, there have been several arguments – in academic texts and in public debates – about the changing territoriality of citizenship that has accompanied globalisation, migration, and the development of human rights regimes (Soysal, 1994; Jacobson, 1996; Brubaker, 2001). The effect of these trends, advocates often argue, is to challenge national citizenship in important ways (Appadurai, 1996). Globalisation and the temporally coincident rise of what has been called “neo-liberal governance” is often linked to the reduced capacity and willingness of national governments to support the social rights of citizenship, such as welfare provision (Ward and Gleiditch, 2004; Leitner and Preston, 2010). International migration is linked with new bi-national, transnational, and even cosmopolitan or post-national conceptualisations of citizenship that reflect the ways in which migrants develop multiple attachments to countries and that challenge assumptions about the linkage between citizenship and a single, territorially-rooted nation-state (Bauböck, 1994; Hannerz, 1996; Joppke, 1999; Soysal, 2000; Smith and Bakker, 2008). And finally, the supranational institutions associated with human rights and international governance provide an additional, higher jurisdiction in which citizens can press claims, and, it is argued, may lead to instrumental notions of citizenship in which rights are prioritised over identification, obligation, and responsibility (Brubaker, 2001). Citizenship, from this
perspective, seems not to involve a deep sense of membership or to rely on bonds between citizens.

Despite – or perhaps because of – these challenges, many states have reinforced their borders, more tightly bounding their territories and controlling the population within them, effectively making the entire country a border zone (Nevins, 2002). Young (2003) argues that states play on the insecurities that accompany globalisation and economic and social change, using those fears to justify the creation of protectionist security states. One manifestation of this can be seen in stepped up border enforcement that reinforces the territorial edges of citizenship. But rather than limit border enforcement to the boundaries of the state, new technologies have created metaphorical – but nevertheless strictly enforced – border zones within countries. Winders (2007), for instance, has documented the ways in which border enforcement has moved into the interior of the US and is enacted through a host of rules and institutions that are not obviously or historically imagined as sites of the border; these include state agencies that grant drivers’ licenses and institutions that are tasked with monitoring financial transactions. In addition, local and state governments in the US have played more prominent roles in immigration control and policies since 9/11, thus effectively pushing the border inward (Coleman, 2007; Varsanyi, 2008). These legal technologies are enhanced by biometric technologies that locate borders and boundary enforcement in the bodies of individuals, no matter where those bodies may be located at particular moments and no matter what citizenship is attached to them (Amoore, 2006; Sparke, 2006). The significance of these monitoring technologies for the territoriality of citizenship is that individuals are subject to disciplining – and in the case of immigrants, to deportation – no matter where they may be. For citizens and non-citizens alike, the fear of discipline can have indirect effects on the exercise of rights associated with citizenship, such as protest or challenging the state or a host of mundane acts associated with daily life. In this sense, the security state that is justified by fear is enhanced by an internalised sense of fear that regulates the exercise of citizenship in an expanded border zone.

The spatiality of citizenship involves more than its location in a particular national territory, however. Citizenship is also located in communities and acts of participation. Such discourse reflects two reinforcing conditions. It recognises the ways that relationships developed in place can enhance a feeling of mutuality, obligation and care on the part of individuals toward each other that, somewhat romantically, can be the
basis of community and polity; in Osler and Starkey's (2005) terms, these relationships foster both a feeling of being a citizen and the practice of citizenship. In seeming contradiction, however, fears of migrants' multiple attachments and their transnational/translocal ties are used to justify communities’ suspicion toward migrant neighbours. Citizens' protests and political initiatives against mosques and minarets in numerous places are a case in point (Ehrkamp, forthcoming). Those who view themselves as rightfully belonging to a place and nation-state (by birthright citizenship or long term residency) question the loyalties and commitments of those who maintain ties to an ‘elsewhere.’ Locally and nationally based communities, thus, often use the complex spatiality of migrants’ lives as grounds of exclusion. This exacerbates the exclusionary potential of neo-liberal governance, which has come to depend on the ability to activate feelings and relationships in localised communities in order to provide targeted social services and to ensure the social rights of citizenship (Fyfe and Miligan, 2003; Trudeau, 2008).

These arguments and policies have important, but complex, spatial bases and a bewildering variety of implications (and interpretations). For instance, governments often argue that local provision of services allows greater flexibility to meet the specific needs of individuals, by activating principles of care and expressions of mutuality. But there are competing claims that pushing responsibility for providing the social rights of citizenship onto localities diminishes the rights themselves, as the localities with the greatest needs will be least able to meet those needs (Amin, 2004). Some people argue that fostering the affective sense of citizenship – rooted in mutuality, responsibility, membership, belonging, and care – is most easily accomplished at the local level through residence and engagement with the places of daily life (Kemmis, 1995; Barber, 1998). But there are counter arguments that local provision of services may make it less likely that needed services will be extended to ‘newcomers’, particularly when the newcomers are culturally or socially different to those who are currently ‘members.’ There are further questions about whether deeper engagement with struggles in neighbourhoods and communities will foster a localism that eschews broader political struggles and entraps neo-liberal citizens in narrowly circumscribed communities. Yet other people argue that local activism and citizenship can highlight the structural inequalities of capitalist development and represent efforts to promote more radical democratic possibilities that extend beyond localities (Purcell, 2007). That many of the debates just recounted are waged using competing examples from local case studies suggests a further element of
citizenship’s spatiality, and the uneven development of capacities to construct a form of citizenship with particular qualities or connectivities. One can ask, for instance, why some localities and states are willing to advance legislation that extends social rights to undocumented immigrants (e.g., the DREAM acts that have been passed by different states and the extension of human rights protections to immigrants by many cities) or to build alliances between migrant and non-migrant workers (Sziarto and Leitner, 2010). By the same token, one can ask why it is that other localities have passed or attempted to pass legislation that curtails the freedoms of migrants. Even more perplexing, how is it that in the same state or metropolitan area, localities can enact both inclusionary and exclusionary laws and practices. Pima County, Arizona, for instance, has twice elected a sheriff that refuses to follow US rules that extend certain liberties to migrants, even as it is home to an active Sanctuary movement supported by mainstream churches.

The varied processes that create such unevenness and seeming contradictions exist simultaneously, creating citizenships that are multi-local and polyvalent (Ehrkamp and Leitner, 2003). This is because all aspects of citizenship are polyvalent. Rather than being constructed through an internally consistent and reinforcing set of legal frameworks, norms, practices, and subjectivities, citizenship is an amalgamation of each, converging in some respects and contradictory in others (Bosniak, 2006, p. 35). We need, therefore, to understand citizenship in all its complexity, rather than in terms of its various elements. In so doing, we need to avoid the separation of legal standing from standing in communities, to eschew the distinction from formal and substantive aspects of citizenship, and instead, to look at the ways in which citizenship reflects and reinforces particular kinds of orders that structure both law and daily life.

III Ordinariness and the Daily Life of Citizenship

Think about citizenship from Jesus’ perspective. His story is obviously one in which law and the more formal aspects of citizenship are important. But Jesus’ life is not reducible to the law and the way it structures citizenship. There are also the bonds of membership and belonging that were activated when he was denied the scholarship and when friends agitated to draw attention to his situation, leading to the media coverage of his case. There were the opportunities he would be afforded with a college education, as well as the different opportunities he might forgo without it. Yet the feelings of obligation and bonds of mutuality were at some moments to of secondary importance and conveyed less power than the rules surrounding his legal status. There were also
arguments about his “true” citizenship that were independent of legal status; this citizenship was built locally through participation, moral behaviour, and demonstrable respect and care for others in his community and school. And there are the territorial aspects of his citizenship, whereby his legal citizenship was in Mexico, a country in which he has lived less than half of his life. Citizenship was something that he had not thought of for most of his life, but that became central to him at a critical moment. All of these aspects of citizenship and the debates surrounding each of them were woven together in his life such that they became inseparable.

One way to make sense of all this is to think of citizenship as ‘ordinary.’ There is a profusion of writing these days that seems to celebrate the banal (e.g., Billig, 1995; Katz, 2007), the prosaic (e.g., Painter, 2006), the quotidian or everyday (e.g., Mountz, 2003) and the ordinary (e.g., Amin and Graham, 1997; Robinson, 2006). The purpose of this writing, of course, is to show how the boring, banal, prosaic or ordinary are anything but what is implied by the descriptor; it is to show just how important daily life and the “taken-for-granted” are to broader processes that shape our world.

The taken-for-granted practices and relationships that guide our lives provide a kind of order, even as they may be difficult to pinpoint or articulate; they are part of what Waldron (2006, p. 83) describes as the “dense thicket of rules” that sustain our collective lives. The rules he points to are only sometimes laws; they are sometimes social norms that may complement, or in some cases, be more powerful than law (p. 85). There are two elements of these norms and their relationship with law that are particularly important for our argument. First, these norms guide interactions between strangers such that we can function; daily life in the world, Waldron notes, is not anarchy. Second, he argues there is duplication between cosmopolitan norms and municipal laws that opens a space for democracy and citizenship beyond what national law might imagine or construct. As such, the citizenship of daily life is not fully constrained by law, but instead fuses law with abstract norms and the behaviours, relationships and interactions of daily life. These interactions and encounters can lead to conflict and exclusion, but they can also lead to feelings of conviviality, to understanding, to belonging, or to simply getting on with each other (Amin, 2002; Gilroy, 2004; Watson, 2006; Keith, 2008; Valentine, 2008; Clayton, 2009). In other words, the ordinary, the quotidian, the everyday has a powerful role to play in the way citizenship is structured, practiced, and enacted.
In advocating an ordinary understanding, we do not winnow out the complexities and contradictions that are present in the debates over citizenship, for the very term “ordinary” incorporates those complexities. Consider the definitions of ordinary that come from the dictionaries in our homes. There is the definition in the Oxford Concise English Dictionary which defines the term in the following way:

**Ordinary**

**Adjective**
1. with no special or distinctive features; uninteresting; commonplace
2. exercising authority by virtue of office, not by delegation

**Noun**
1. what is commonplace or standard
2. inferior quality, second-rate, little merit

Dictionary.net includes another definition of the noun: “norms, normal and according to established order; methodical; settled; regular.” And the Random House Dictionary of the English Language adds the definition of “customary”. Importantly, it traces ordinary to the Middle English word *ordinarie*, which in turn comes from the Latin words for “order” and “pertaining to”.

In these definitions, we can see the ways that ordinary takes on its full meaning for citizenship. It is commonplace, standard, customary. Many of us quite happily live our lives without thinking about our citizenship for extended periods of time. But citizenship is also involved in establishing the order that we need so that we can go about our lives; arguments about the boundaries of citizenship and the responsibilities of citizens are fundamentally about order. And citizenship is typically granted as a form of birthright, drawing either from where an individual is born or to whom the individual is born (Shachar, 2009). As such, it carries its authority by virtue of standing, rather than because we necessarily did anything to earn it. In other words, citizenship is part of daily life, something we enact, even as it is part of a broader system by which order is maintained. It is always present as an ordering framework, even if we do not give it special attention until it seems to be imperilled or denied as a standing.

The addition of “ordinary” to “citizenship” highlights the importance of authority, standing, office, custom, what is commonplace and standard. This expanded conceptualisation entwines legal status with the everyday and the unremarkable. In so doing, the concept draws attention to the ways in which law and ordering are normalised through daily life. At the same time, the concept
directs attention to the ways that citizenship struggles draw on a range of resources and claims beyond the law. These are resources and claims rooted in family, in community, and in an expanded range of moral universes; some of these claims are powerful, while some may seem second-rate and to have little purchase before the law. Jesus’ high standing in the community did not provide the basis for claims on the statutory rights of citizenship in the US. Yet a private relief bill was introduced because of the affective bonds of citizenship that were evident in the case; these bonds were also important to the broader mobilisations around the claims he, and other immigrants, came to represent in the DREAM Act.

In addition, the concept of ordinary allows us to consider values and rationalities beyond those associated with liberal democracy, that are mobilised in political debate and contestation, and that are enacted in the everyday. For instance, we might suppose that citizens are motivated by rationalities in addition to the rationalism in abstract debates about justice. Situating citizenship in daily life allows other rationalities and other values to enter politics as legitimate and normal, such as values of care, mutuality, love, respect, and other-regardingness. These values are important motivations in many struggles, and they offer a kind of power. They might, for instance, be part of a struggle for social justice and well-being, linking process and outcome in ways that are different than they might be in liberal theories of democracy and citizenship. The linkages, however, often emerge from and are important to the lives of citizens and their efforts to build more democratic polities and societies. Theoretical and political arguments over citizenship need to account for those lives and values.

There are also important spatialities to ordinariness. As we have argued, the relationship between citizenship and the nation-state is imperfect. Citizenship is “located” or “mapped” at different sites. The ways we live and understand citizenship are not fully defined by nation-states, even though its institutions are important, as Waldron (2006) notes. Homes (whether where an individual currently lives or elsewhere), families, neighbourhoods, villages, cities, and nations are all important to the geography of citizenship. So, too, are communities that are not easily mapped or that might be described as placeless, such as cyber-communities or activist networks. We need, in other words, a more complete geography of citizenship that includes the geographies of daily life and of attachment. This more complete geography needs to include the obvious and institutionalised spaces of
citizenship – such as public spaces, places of government – as well as citizenship’s hidden spaces – such as homes, workplaces, and houses of worship. It needs to include feelings of belonging to localities – both ‘here’ and ‘there’ – and to communities and to the broader world. It also, however, needs to include the connections and networks that link the different sites of citizenship. The sites we have mentioned do not exist in isolation, and so the spatiality of citizenship includes the relations and mobilities through which the everyday and the law are enacted.

IV Conclusion

The geography of ordinary citizenship, then, is really the geography of social relationships, including political and economic relationships. Very often, citizenship is described as something that is unencumbered by social relationships and that is both a social and a geographic equaliser. Citizenship is anything but that. It is not everywhere the same. Citizenship varies across place, across time, and for different people. It is inseparable from the geographies of communities and the networks and relationships that link them, with their attendant inequalities, imperfections, and opportunities. Citizenship is constructed in part through the geographies of our lives, and so cannot equalise or transcend our differences.

As a way of understanding citizenship, our insistence on its ordinariness – its commonness and its ordering function – builds a messiness and untidiness into theoretical arguments. Yet this approach recognises and incorporates the contingencies that are an ineluctable element of citizenship. To say that ordinariness imposes an order does not mean it is everywhere and always the same. That order is continually challenged and contested in large and small ways, through law, through custom, and through the practicalities of everyday life; these challenges are the source of the disorder, of change large and small, that we see over time and that are part of the spatiality of citizenship. Ordinary citizenship, thus, focuses our attention on the ways that a variety of agents, drawing on different forms of power, negotiate the frameworks that order lives, communities and societies. In this way, and as Jesus experienced it, citizenship is both ordinary and extraordinary.
Notes

i In the US, each of the 50 states runs its own university system. In most cases, lower fees are charged for students from the state than from students who come from out of the state. Out-of-state tuition at the University of Colorado was about 600% of in-state tuition at that time.

ii Although see Isin and Woods (1999), Kofman (2003) and Staeheli (2010) for reviews.

iii It is for this reason that much of the discussion about law and legality is centred on the US system. We attempt, however, to make broader points about law and legality, of which the US experience is simply an example.

iv Lady Liberty is an allegorical figure, usually represented by a woman in classical robes carrying some combination of a torch, the scales of justice, or a tablet of laws.

References


Table 1: Framing Citizenship: Evaluating Jesus’ Situation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domains of Citizenship</th>
<th>Normative Foundations of Citizenship</th>
<th>Justice</th>
<th>Care</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Boundaries</strong></td>
<td>States can set rules of entry to and exclusion from the territory and society. -- The parents did not follow rules. -- It is appropriate to deport violators and/or to deny benefits.</td>
<td>-- There was no effort to deport family previously, so boundary issues are subsumed to relationships built in new community -- Family should not be deported; decision about benefits not relevant to boundaries.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Rights and responsibilities</strong></td>
<td>-- Jesus was not responsible for the actions of his parents. -- Parents have fulfilled other responsibilities of citizenship. -- Jesus should be allowed in-state tuition.</td>
<td>-- Family are active and responsible members of community. -- The community has responsibilities to people who have lived there for years. -- Family should not be deported. -- Jesus should be allowed in-state tuition.</td>
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