

Durham Research Online

Deposited in DRO:

31 August 2012

Version of attached file:

Accepted Version

Peer-review status of attached file:

Peer-reviewed

Citation for published item:

Koranyi, James and Wittlinger, Ruth (2011) 'From diaspora to diaspora : the case of Transylvanian Saxons in Romania and Germany.', *Nationalism and ethnic politics*, 17 (1). pp. 96-115.

Further information on publisher's website:

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13537113.2011.550248>

Publisher's copyright statement:

This is an electronic version of an article published in Koranyi, James and Wittlinger, Ruth (2011) 'From diaspora to diaspora : the case of Transylvanian Saxons in Romania and Germany.', *Nationalism and ethnic politics*, 17 (1). pp. 96-115. *Nationalism and ethnic politics* is available online at:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/openurl?genre=article&issn=1353-7113&volume=17&issue=1&page=96>

Additional information:

Use policy

The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:

- a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
- a [link](#) is made to the metadata record in DRO
- the full-text is not changed in any way

The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

Please consult the [full DRO policy](#) for further details.

From Diaspora to Diaspora: The Case of Transylvanian Saxons in Romania and Germany

This paper will investigate the relationship between Transylvanian Saxons (Siebenbürger Sachsen) and their perceived “external homeland”. The authors will consider the history of German minorities in East-Central Europe and, more specifically, will briefly outline the history of Transylvanian Saxons. Against this backdrop, this paper will examine the changing nature of minority policies promoted by the Federal Republic of Germany until the present day, whilst juxtaposing this with Transylvanian Saxon discourses on identity and nationhood. In so doing, this paper will argue that the discrepancy between the mutual expectations of the FRG and Transylvanian Saxon émigrés became very pronounced after 1989. This then has led to what appears to be the end of the Saxon community, as émigrés have found themselves torn between assimilation and a longing for a return to Transylvania.

After an overview of the German diaspora in East-Central Europe and parts of the former Soviet Union, we will briefly provide the relevant historical background for the case study of this article – the Transylvanian Saxons – from their arrival in Romania in the twelfth century until the fall of communism at the end of the 1980s. A discussion of West Germany’s external minority policy after 1945 will then show how the continued application of *ius sanguinis* and the realities of the Cold War order fostered a relationship between the Federal Republic and its diaspora in Romania which allowed Transylvanian Saxons to cultivate notions of an “external homeland” that encouraged its diaspora to return “home”.

The article will then look at contemporary issues. It will examine the changes to Germany’s external minority policy in the post-Cold War period and analyse the effects of the immigration and citizenship reforms from the 1990s onwards on this group. In particular it will chart the shift away from Germany’s welcoming stance towards ethnic

Germans abroad to a notion of Germanness no longer solely based on ethnicity. Against this backdrop, this article will then highlight the emerging disconnect between Transylvanian Saxon immigrants and German society as ideas of identity, citizenship, and memory cultures differed between the host society and the new migrants, with the result that a reimagining of their former homeland – Romania – as their new “external homeland” has been taking place.

The German diaspora in East-Central Europe and parts of the former Soviet Union

Apart from a small number of countries in Western Europe (Denmark, Belgium, France and Italy), the German diaspora can be found in most Eastern and Central European states as well as in some of the successor states of the former Soviet Union. Ethnic German minorities have lived – and albeit in much reduced numbers still live – in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, Serbia, Croatia, Hungary, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

As Stefan Wolff has pointed out, the reasons for the historical and continued presence of ethnic Germans in Central and Eastern Europe are due to three at times interrelated processes of conquest and colonization, migration and border changes. German settlers, for instance, moved to Bohemia (now Czech Republic) and parts of what is now Romania (Transylvanian Saxons) as colonizers in the 12th and 13th centuries. There were also mass migrations of German colonizers to the Russian Empire, invited by Catherine the Great in the 18th century, and of Banat Swabians who in the 18th century moved to what is now western Romania. The existence of German minorities in Eastern and Central Europe due to border changes, on the other hand, is largely a phenomenon of the 20th century and a result of the new political order which emerged at the end of the two world wars.¹

The situation of these ethnic German minorities became particularly difficult in the 20th century. In the interwar period and during the Second World War, many of the German minorities throughout Europe became radicalized and were instrumentalized by

the Third Reich as contributors towards its plans for German hegemony in Europe. This was partly due to the fact that some governments, such as in Hungary, augmented the German minorities' alienation by curtailing some of their rights, but also due to independent radicalization that took place within these ethnic German groups.² In a largely undemocratic Europe, mutual aggression continued to encourage radicalization and further shifts to the right.

As a result of Hitler's aggressive expansionism and the Second World War, many ethnic Germans in Eastern and Central Europe faced expulsions towards the end of the war and its immediate aftermath. Several million ethnic Germans were expelled and fled from a number of countries in Eastern and Central Europe, e.g. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Romania. As a response to Hitler Germany's aggressive occupation of Eastern and Central Europe, in which ethnic Germans had at times played an instrumental role,³ ethnic Germans from a number of Central and Eastern European states were also deported to the Soviet Union and condemned to several years of forced labor there. The German minority in the Volga Region, for example, was collectively deported to Siberia and Central Asia as early as 1941, when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union and Stalin feared that ethnic Germans would show loyalty to Hitler and undermine the Soviet Union's defense. A second wave of deportations took place at the end of the war, with some only coming back as late as 1956. Experience and memory of privilege – enjoyed not just in the 20th century under Hitler but also previously as colonizers – but, more importantly, experience and narratives of suffering towards the end of the Second World War and during the Cold War thus constituted key pillars on which the collective identity of these ethnic German groups was based and which provided the foundation for their relationship with the “homeland”.

From privilege to oppression: The Saxon diaspora in Romania

This article focuses specifically on Transylvanian Saxons (*Siebenbürger Sachsen*), as they represent an exceptional case study of a group that experienced a number of events and currents during the Cold War on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Whilst other ethnic German groups were present as expellees or refugees in the early Federal Republic and

thereafter, Transylvanian Saxons remained, by and large, in Romania until the latter stages and end of the Cold War. Moreover, considering their long-standing history in the region, it would thus seem likely that this group was able to develop a more autonomous identity (or indeed identities) relatively independent of the nineteenth century debates surrounding nation-building in Germany (and indeed Austria). Yet despite this geographical distance to the German Lands, Transylvanian Saxons maintained links in various guises, particularly from the sixteenth century onwards. In order to appreciate current identity debates within this community and in (West) Germany, it is imperative to offer a brief outline of the history of Transylvanian Saxons and thereby locate points of continuity and rupture.

The *Siebenbürger Sachsen* first arrived in present-day Transylvania in the twelfth century as settlers from mainly the region of Moselle-Franconia in Western Germany.⁴ Most academic literature on the topic suggests that the majority of early settlers colonized the area following a call by the Hungarian King Géza II (1141-1162) acting as “defenders” of Christianity and, later, of the Kingdom of Hungary.⁵ This position also guaranteed a set of privileges that lasted into the nineteenth century.⁶ However, it was a second wave of settlers in the sixteenth century – made up of former Hansa traders and other Burghers – that transformed Transylvania into a truly “modern” region.⁷ This wave of migration helped to cement the Saxon position within the flourishing financial sector and also led to the conversion of Saxons to Protestantism.⁸ This then determined Transylvania’s official makeup of society. Three distinct groups (Hungarians, Szekler, and Saxons) were recognized as nations (*nationes*), and were thus granted particular privileges.⁹

The rise of nationalism across the wider region in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century began to undermine the existing social order. In this environment, Saxons felt increasingly marginalized as their privileges were being gradually eroded from several quarters.¹⁰ The revolutions of 1848/49 did not result in any form of national emancipation for Transylvanian Saxons, in fact their special standing became rather more limited. Following the Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867, aggressive Hungarian policies towards minorities and Magyarization policies undermined the rights of all minorities in the region.¹¹ The established public body of the *Universitas Saxonum*, the

embodiment of Saxon privilege, was abolished in 1876, and it was perhaps as a result of this that the so-called *Sachsentsag* (the Saxon assembly) voted in favor of Romanian unification with Transylvania in 1918 as a way of securing their rights.¹² The Hungarian treatment of its minorities in the nineteenth century had alienated them to such an extent that any alternative to Hungarian rule seemed preferable to the status quo.

See separate attachment

[Image 1: Unified Romania in the interwar period.]

The early *détente* within the new state of Romania soon began to fall apart. While both Saxons and Swabians (*Banater Schwaben*) had hoped for a degree of autonomy in Romania, Romanian politicians introduced a more centralized state system using the French model as their prototype.¹³ During the interwar period, the Transylvanian Saxon community stood in-between the so-called *bürgerliche Parteien* (mainstream political parties) and the rising nationalist, fascist movements across Europe.¹⁴ Whilst still the subject of historical debate, the radicalization of Transylvanian Saxons occurred not merely as a result of the rise of the National Socialists in Germany and of the right in Romania during the 1930s, but also due to internal currents and processes.¹⁵

The so-called *Erneuerungsbewegung* (rejuvenation movement) under the leadership of Friedrich Fabritius gained much popularity among Transylvanian Saxons and paved the way for the subsequently unconditional alliance of Saxons, and Swabians, with Nazi Germany.¹⁶ The Romanian German community thus became “*gleichgeschaltet*” (coordinated) with the *Hauptamt Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle* (the central office for ethnic German matters) and the policies of the Third Reich.¹⁷ By the end of World War Two, approximately 54,000 ethnic Germans from Romania (Saxons and Swabians alike) had joined the Third Reich’s military force, the *Waffen-SS*, and many of those who survived ended up in prisoner of war camps in the Balkans and the Soviet Union.¹⁸ The end of the war therefore also marked the beginning of the dissolution of the Romanian German communities.

Of the 750,000 Germans living in present-day Romania at the beginning of the twentieth century roughly 250,000 were Saxons. Following World War Two, this figure

declined considerably.¹⁹ In January 1945, around 75,000 ethnic Germans between the ages of 17 and 45 were deported for up to five years to the Soviet Union to carry out what was called reconstruction work.²⁰ Those Germans who stayed behind in Romania were also subjected to harassment and persecution in the immediate post-war period.²¹ Romanian German property was expropriated and deportations within Romania continued right into the 1950s.²²

Despite some efforts by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej's government (1948-1965) to reintegrate Saxons into Romanian society, the relationship between Saxons and Romanian society deteriorated further. With the ever-growing pressure of emigration from Romania to West Germany, the economic and political situation in Ceaușescu's Romania (1965-1989), and the financial assistance offered by West Germany to Romanian Germans, the end of the Cold War culminated in the mass emigration of Saxons from Romania.²³ At the height of German emigration between 1989 and 1991 nearly 200,000 Germans in total left Romania, most of whom settled in the Federal Republic of Germany.²⁴ While their integration into Germany has been far smoother than, for example, the *Russlanddeutsche* (Russian Germans) or indeed many non-ethnic German immigrants, their position in German society has left many of them in a void.²⁵ Far from "returning" to Germany, many Romanian Germans have experienced the disintegration of their original communities in Romania and have come to recognize that their image of Germany did not match the realities they encountered.

A welcoming homeland? West Germany's external minority policy

By 1950, around 12 million ethnic German refugees and expellees from Central and Eastern Europe had migrated to Germany, i.e. all occupation zones/both German states. Although there were some refugees and expellees in the Soviet zone/East Germany,²⁶ the majority fought their way to the Western zones/the FRG, at least eventually. In proportion to the population as a whole, however, the East had 25% refugees and expellees whereas the West only had 16%. The refugees – who were after all fleeing from the advances of the Red Army – were unlikely to want to stay in areas that already were or were likely to come under Soviet control. Many of the refugees and expellees, whom

the Allies had assigned to live permanently in the GDR, thus decided to leave for the West while the border was still permeable, i.e. before the Wall was built in 1961. Even though their numbers caused significant pressure on scarce resources in the Soviet zone, particularly in the early years after the war, in absolute terms their numbers were much lower than in West Germany.

Domestically, the main challenge for West Germany was the economic and social integration of these large numbers of migrants.²⁷ Externally, however, the question was what status to grant the German diaspora in communist Eastern and Central Europe and parts of the Soviet Union. Should they be left to their own devices in states that became increasingly repressive or should the West German state acknowledge responsibility and show loyalty and obligation towards these ethnic Germans by offering them special conditions if they were willing and able to migrate or “return” to the Federal Republic? In view of the fact that the same issue also applied to millions of East Germans, it was rather convenient to continue in the tradition of a law from 1913 which based Germanness on descent rather than place of birth. Until the citizenship reforms in the 1990s, German citizenship was thus based on ethnicity and determined by descent. *Ius sanguinis* (contrary to *ius soli*, i.e. the place of birth determines nationality) as laid out in the Citizenship Act (*Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz*) of 1913, determined that only those with German parents qualified as Germans. The continued application of the principle of *ius sanguinis* thus allowed the Federal Republic (as it had the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich) to foster links with ethnic Germans living outside the West German nation-state, even though the possibilities were very restricted due to Cold War realities. It enabled the West German state – which, after all, claimed to be the sole legitimate successor of the Third Reich – to grant West German citizenship to GDR citizens and ethnic Germans from Eastern and Central Europe and parts of the former Soviet Union. The Basic Law of 1949 confirmed the perception of the nation based on ethnicity rather than common territory, as laid down in the Citizenship Act of 1913. Article 116, paragraph 1 of the Basic Law prescribed that “... a German within the meaning of this Basic Law is a person who possesses German citizenship or who has been admitted to the territory of the German Reich within the boundaries of December 31, 1937 as a refugee or expellee of German ethnic origin or as the spouse or descendant

of such person.” Together with the Expellee and Refugee Law (*Bundesvertriebenen und Flüchtlingsgesetz*) of 1953 and the Law on the Regulation of Questions of Citizenship (*Gesetz zur Regelung von Fragen der Staatsangehörigkeit*) of 22 February 1955, it stipulated that ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe but also Germans from the GDR would qualify for West German citizenship.

As Rogers Brubaker has pointed out, three distinct German terms were used to distinguish between different ways of belonging to the German nation: formal state-membership (*Staatsangehörigkeit*), participatory citizenship (*Staatsbürgerschaft*) and ethno-cultural nation-membership (*Nationalität* or *Volkszugehörigkeit*).²⁸ This provided the main distinction between those Germans who belonged to the West German civic nation/state, those in the GDR, and those in former German territories or of German descent. For ethnic Germans who could claim Germanness by descent, this meant not only that they could gain formal-legal citizenship of the FRG but also financial support, as well as access to programs that would aid their integration. What this amounted to was that ethnic Germans could obtain West German citizenship without having been born there, ever having lived there, let alone having been a citizen of a German state or speak the language. Nevertheless, the communist threat, efforts by West German governments, particularly through *Ostpolitik* in the 1970s, and some ethnic German communities’ preparedness to imagine themselves as part of this mythical nation have resulted in a rather strong ethnic German identity in many communities in Eastern and Central Europe.

The fact that the FRG needed to keep open the option of allowing resettlers from the GDR (*Übersiedler*) and East-Central Europe (*Aussiedler*) to move to West Germany and gain full citizenship, made it politically nearly impossible to change German citizenship laws before unification. It would have meant letting down those Germans in the GDR who were prevented from enjoying political liberties and the benefits of widespread affluence that increasingly characterized the Federal Republic and who suffered the consequences of German crimes committed between 1933 and 1945 much more than their Western co-nationals. Similarly, in the case of ethnic Germans in Central and Eastern Europe, it would have meant abandoning those people who were subjected to

discrimination, some of whom had even faced deportation and forced labor, due to their belonging to a perceived German ethnicity.

Whereas the provision for ethnic Germans to be allowed to migrate from communist Eastern and Central Europe and be able to gain citizenship in the FRG was considered a human rights issue, offering it to East Germans who managed to leave the GDR also added (welcome) political pressure on the GDR, as evidenced in the exodus of GDR citizens via Hungary and German embassies in Eastern and Central Europe before the fall of the Wall in 1989.²⁹

West Germany's commitment to ethnic Germans in Eastern and Central Europe in its external minority policy until 1989 can be interpreted in different ways. It can be seen as "*Deuschtiemelei*" (the petty attempt at preserving an alleged German ethnicity), but it can also be seen as an acknowledgement of responsibility for the consequences of the Second World War, the suffering caused to these people towards the end of the war and its aftermath, and the way their status as victims was never really acknowledged in the context of the new Cold War realities. As Joyce Mushaben has pointed out, "the effective integration of countless co-ethnics prior to the 1990s owed more to Germany's willingness to accept historical responsibility for WWII victims and its desire for reconciliation with neighboring states than to the binding influence of a unique *Kulturnation*."³⁰ At the same time, however, the continued application of *ius sanguinis* allowed the West German polity to deny other migrants citizenship status, for example the "guest workers" it had recruited in large number in the 1960s and 1970s. This, in turn, helped to maintain the illusion which was reiterated well into the new millennium that (West) Germany was 'not a country of immigration' (*kein Einwanderungsland*). In reality, however, there was a considerable number of immigrants without an ethnic German background who were unable to obtain German citizenship. This did not result in their departure but merely in a degree of legal uncertainty over their continued stay.³¹

In summary, the main focus of West Germany's relationship with ethnic German communities in Eastern and Central Europe was to allow as many ethnic Germans as possible to migrate to West Germany. Before Germany's new citizenship law of 1993 made migration to the Federal Republic much more difficult, just over 3 million ethnic Germans (3,067,730) had migrated to Germany from Eastern and Central Europe and the

(former) Soviet Union.³² In view of the generous nature of the West German citizenship law vis-à-vis ethnic Germans, it is hardly surprising that the impression gained prominence that Germany was indeed welcoming its diaspora “home”. The expellee organizations (*Landsmannschaften*) further contributed to constructing the image of a “homeland” that was warmly welcoming its ethnic minorities from abroad. As the following section will show, it was by and large possible to maintain this image until the collapse of communism in the late 1980s.

Maintaining the myth of the homeland

It is of particular interest to note that Transylvanian Saxons chose the Federal Republic of Germany as their “external homeland”.³³ As mentioned above, this was partly due to a longer term connection with Germany, but also due to pragmatic reasons and the special circumstances created by the new political climate in Cold War Europe. Far from limiting the links between West Germany and Romania, the political division in Europe during the Cold War in fact strengthened ties with Germany. Visits from relatives and to the West, letter writing, and Western goods all contributed to the hardening of specific images of the Saxons’ external homeland.³⁴ Furthermore, as more and more Germans left Romania, the pressure grew on the dwindling community to follow suit. This then culminated in the mass exodus of the 1980s and early 1990s,³⁵ which had a “feedback effect” (*Rückkoppelungseffekt*) on the German communities and the infrastructure in Romania.³⁶

The cross-border connections and exchanges between Romanian German émigrés in Germany and non-émigrés in Romania generated a rather serene and romanticized image of West Germany amongst those Germans still living in Romania. For many Saxons, (West) Germany represented both the “free” West and the notion of a *Kulturnation*. The classical works of Goethe, Lessing, or Kleist, combined with Western consumerism, helped construct a rather skewed view of Germany and German society. Although German books were available in Romania, friends and relatives often brought literature with them as gifts. This then added to a heavily romantic image of Germany, one which led *Siebenbürger Sachsen* to imagine Germany “in terms of Goethe and

Schiller".³⁷ Both contemporary sources of the period before mass emigration and subsequent interviews with Romanian Germans point to a proliferation of images of an historic Germany, which were transposed onto West Germany. While studies have highlighted the construction and carriers of said images, particularly though not exclusively in the first few decades of the Cold War,³⁸ interviews with Saxon émigrés have exhibited the same use of such an imagined Germany when recalling the process of contemplating emigration.³⁹ The FRG was thus used as a point of reference – the GDR was excluded from this for political reasons – and as a means to critique their lives in communist Romania. Shortage was juxtaposed with abundance, Romanian and “Balkan” conduct with German high culture, and surveillance with political freedom.⁴⁰

Indeed, these imagined links appeared to be reciprocated by the West German government and other institutions. In 1977 the Helmut Schmidt government reached an agreement with Romania whereby up to 12,000 Germans (Saxons inclusive) were allowed to emigrate from Romania against a payment per person (according to the economic “value” of each individual) by the West German government.⁴¹ Not only did this render the impression that the West German government was welcoming them with open arms, but that in fact their “actual homeland”, Romania, was trying to rid itself of its German population.

Moreover, the *Landsmannschaft* – that is the homeland society of particular ethnic German groups in the FRG – had actively been pushing for large-scale emigration as a means of “survival”. To be sure, this did not go unchallenged and does indeed shed some light on changing perceptions of belonging and identity amongst Transylvanian Saxons during the Cold War. Against the backdrop of the attraction of Western consumerism and the pressure exerted by the *Landsmannschaft*, a group called *Licht der Heimat* (Torch of the Homeland), an organization attached to the Lutheran church in Transylvania, argued during the 1970s against immigration to Germany.⁴² Intellectuals and representatives within this rival organization, such as the eminent pastor Gerhard Möckel, saw emigration to West Germany as being the greatest threat to the integrity of the Saxon community.⁴³ They were particularly concerned by the lure of consumerism and its impact on the (spiritual) community of Transylvanian Saxons. Yet the dispute was not merely about religiosity and secularism; it was far more concerned with the fundamental

question of where the Saxon community belonged. While the *Landsmannschaft* envisaged their external homeland as tantamount to the community's future, this clerical organization insisted on binding the community to Transylvania and its established religious institutions.

Nonetheless, Western consumerism and notions of belonging to the German *Kultur*, as well as pragmatic considerations such as financial assistance from the West German government and other institutions, tilted that particular debate in favor of leaving Romania. Furthermore, living conditions in Romania had deteriorated drastically in the 1970s and especially the 1980s.⁴⁴ While images of Germany and the West played a very significant role in reconfiguring the Saxon community's relationship with their actual and external homelands, these conditions on the ground greatly contributed towards an increased push for emigration. Therefore, during the last decade of the Cold War, Saxons began to leave *en masse*, which culminated in the mass emigration of Saxons (and Swabians) at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s. The special sense of belonging to, not to mention being welcomed by, West Germany was, in the end, too strong in the face of the adverse economic and political situation in Romania. Saxons emigrated with a "hard image" of Germanness, namely one that was quite specific and determined by an ethno-cultural view, coupled with naïve ideas of freedom and choice.

Still a community of Germans?

Whereas West German laws which allowed ethnic Germans to gain full citizenship worked well while communist party states in Central and Eastern Europe severely restricted the number of ethnic Germans they would allow to emigrate, things became more difficult when these restrictions on emigration were eased after 1989. And whereas West German policy until 1989 towards ethnic Germans in Central and Eastern Europe but also the GDR was mainly concerned with helping as many as the respective regimes would allow to migrate to the Federal Republic, usually against hard currency, united Germany's policy towards its diaspora started to concentrate on significantly reducing the influx of ethnic German migrants by ensuring that they would be granted minority rights in their respective countries and ensuring financial support for initiatives aimed at

improving their lives there. This was only in part aimed at helping ethnic Germans abroad by stabilizing their situation there, however. It was clearly also self-serving in the sense that it was aimed at easing the pressure on Germany's resources due to the large-scale migration of ethnic Germans into the country.

With the collapse of communism in Eastern and Central Europe and German unification in 1990, the rationale for keeping *ius sanguinis* had disappeared. With German unification all former GDR citizens had turned into citizens of the Federal Republic and with the transition to democracy of the countries in Eastern and Central Europe, there was no more need for granting ethnic Germans privileged access to Germany on human rights grounds.

With the large-scale migration of ethnic Germans to the Federal Republic which had become possible after the fall of communism, the paradox of Germany's citizenship law based on *ius sanguinis* had also become ever more apparent since it granted descendants of ethnic Germans – whose families might never have set foot in German Lands since the twelfth century – German citizenship, whereas Turkish “guest workers” who migrated to Germany from the 1960s onwards and their children – even if they were actually born in Germany – were unable to gain German citizenship.

In view of this, a consensus emerged that Germany's citizenship law had to be changed. With the fall of the wall it was considered to be too easy for German *Aussiedler* to gain citizenship and too hard for those immigrants like the Turkish “guest workers” who had lived and worked in (West) Germany for decades. Neither the “guest workers” themselves nor their children, even if they were born in Germany, were eligible for German citizenship. At the same time as the citizenship reforms made it harder for ethnic Germans to gain German citizenship, the German government tried to ensure that a number of bilateral agreements with Eastern and Central European countries contained commitments to the protection of the respective German ethnic minority (between Germany and the Soviet Union in 1990; Germany and Poland in 1991; Germany and Hungary, Romania and Czechoslovakia in 1992).

A number of laws were thus introduced which made migration into Germany much harder and also less attractive, and which severely restricted the number of *Aussiedler* migrating into Germany. The Law on the Modification of Integration Benefits

(*Einwanderungsanpassungsgesetz*) of 22 December 1989, for example, reduced the benefits for *Aussiedler*, in particular regarding the entitlement to language courses, training and housing. Putting much more stringent criteria on the eligibility for German citizenship, the Law on the Acceptance of *Aussiedler* (*Aussiedleraufnahmegesetz*) of 28 June 1990 required potential candidates to apply for the status of *Aussiedler* while still in their country of origin by submitting their application to the local consulate or embassy. The form required information and details regarding the applicants' command of German, e.g. whether it was spoken at home. These forms were then passed on to Germany where initial decisions were made. Once their status was approved provisionally and they were allowed to enter Germany on that basis, their *Aussiedler* status had to be confirmed. Looking at the numbers after 1990, this law appears to have had an immediate effect in terms of reducing the influx into Germany. Whereas 1990 still saw just over 397,000 *Aussiedler* gaining German citizenship, in 1991, the figure had nearly halved and gone down to around 222,000.⁴⁵

Most importantly, the War Consequences Conciliation Law (*Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz*, KfbG) of December 1992/January 1993, which amended the Federal Expellee Law and created a new category, the *Spätaussiedler* ("late repatriates"), further tightened the conditions to qualify for this status. "Germanness" in terms of language skills and the preservation of German culture and customs now had to be demonstrated and was to only apply to ethnic Germans who were born before 1 January 1993. Furthermore, evidence of discrimination was required and conditions for relatives of approved and confirmed *Spätaussiedler* to also migrate to Germany were made much more rigorous. In 1996 a further piece of legislation ruled out the free choice of place of residence for the initial period of the migrants' stay.

On the whole, the measures taken in the early 1990s made it much harder for ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe to qualify for German citizenship. On the one hand, the criteria to qualify for German citizenship became more stringent and the number of *Aussiedler* that could be admitted annually was capped at 220,000. On the other hand, migration was made a lot less attractive since benefits for *Aussiedler* had been significantly reduced, in terms of the financial help to which they were entitled, but also in terms of language courses and other programs that used to support their

integration in German society.⁴⁶ It is debatable whether these measures achieved the desired effect or whether the respective diasporic communities had simply shrunk to a degree that more emigration was simply not possible. In any case, numbers have clearly been decreasing, especially from those countries that have become members of western multilateral institutions like NATO and the EU, e.g. Poland, Hungary, Romania. Whereas in 1990 111,150 ethnic Germans still migrated from Romania to Germany, the figure for 2008 is only 16!⁴⁷

Furthermore, the German Nationality Act, which was passed in 1999 and came into effect in 2000, provided a new understanding of what it means to be German, at last leaving behind outdated notions of an organic concept of citizenship based on ethnicity. It constituted the biggest change to the 1913 citizenship law and its guiding principle, *ius sanguinis*, and finally undertook a long overdue reform to comprehensively liberalize and modernize German citizenship in line with other European countries. Even though it made the definition of German citizenship more inclusive for many migrants, it further dented the privileged status of ethnic Germans migrating to Germany. On the whole, ethnic Germans have lost their privileged status and rather than making their migration to Germany easy, governments have concentrated their efforts on supporting the protection of German ethnic minorities abroad.

Transylvanian Saxons in the 21st century

The fall of communism has had a dramatic effect not only on the concept of Germanness in reunified Germany, but, crucially, on German diaspora communities in Central and Eastern Europe. Since the reforms in the 1990s, ethnic Germans in Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union have found it very difficult to migrate to Germany. In contrast to the Cold War period, they have lost their privileged status as migrants into (West) Germany. The mass exodus of ethnic Germans from Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s casts severe doubt over the continued existence or survival of these communities, even though the German government continues to show commitment towards supporting the minorities.⁴⁸

In contrast to relations with Poland and the Czech Republic, Romania's ethnic Germans have not contributed to difficult bilateral relations between Romania and Germany.⁴⁹ Yet whilst victimhood discourses about deportation and expropriation have not played a role in governmental relations, they have begun to play a bigger role among Transylvanian Saxon émigrés. In May 2007, a Romanian German organization called *Restitution in Rumänien e.V. (ResRo)* was set up with the aim to regain German property that had been dispossessed during the post-war period. The strong focus on land ownership and expropriation has been mainly due to the fact that many Saxons were also land owners. The organization drafted a petition addressed to the European Parliament, among other organizations, in which they called for a return of German property.⁵⁰ While the Romanian government has passed laws on the return of property expropriated by the communist government irrespective of ethnicity from 1948 onwards, *ResRo* has identified this as a specifically German problem by couching it in terms of Romanian dispossession of German property, irrespective of ideology or government. By tapping into notions of human rights, Transylvanian Saxons have continued the Cold War narrative of needing to address the lack of human rights in the East through institutions in the West. More importantly, however, it has also signaled something entirely different: Despite the fact that the majority of Saxons had decided to migrate to (West) Germany – with its image of being both an historic and affluent country – following a good decade of integration, Transylvanian Saxons have also begun to turn their attention back to their ancestral homeland, Transylvania.

Far from encountering the land of Goethe and Schiller, many Saxons came across a “westernized” country that did not resemble the image that had been conjured up during the Cold War (and in fact predated that period, too). The affluence for which many yearned was gradually reinterpreted as decadence, and the contemporary culture they witnessed was viewed with skepticism.⁵¹ More important, however, were the contrasting and often contradictory memories many Saxon émigrés were confronted with. Having left what many perceived to be an anti-German environment in which anti-fascism determined public discourses on the past, the majority of émigrés arrived in (West) Germany during the “boom” of Holocaust memory.⁵² This has proved to be a slightly perplexing experience for some Saxons, as this has been interpreted as a challenge to

their own strong notion of victimhood and their depoliticized memory of Saxon involvement during the war. Moreover, the absence of a critical forum in which to discuss, publicly at least, experiences during communism in Romania has left sections of the émigré community feeling marginalized in reunified Germany.

The response to this has been varied: One option has been to retreat into online forums devoted to matters of interest for Transylvanians.⁵³ Tellingly, these online discussions have tended to centre on issues in their former homeland Romania and not so much on current developments in Germany, even though the majority of users live in Germany.⁵⁴ A number of Saxons have expressed a real desire for a return to their roots in Transylvania “offline”, too. This has come to the fore not by moving back to Romania – the number of returnees has been largely insignificant – but rather through a greater engagement with their former homeland. While the appearance of so-called *Sommersachsen* (“Summer Saxons”) in Transylvania has been a source of humor, other involvement in initiatives such as *ResRo* or cultural events such as Sibiu/Hermannstadt 2007 has had a distinctive cultural-political edge.⁵⁵ Programs such as Sibiu 2007 have not just been about celebrating the Saxon heritage, but have constituted a broader trend amongst Saxons to “rediscover” Transylvania and assert economic and cultural leverage over their former homeland.⁵⁶

In addition to this, the emergence of prominent Romanian German figures such as Herta Müller (albeit Swabian), the winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 2009, or Klaus Johannis, the Saxon mayor of Sibiu and erstwhile Prime Ministerial candidate in 2009, seemed to have swayed the émigré community away from German matters and closer to their former homeland. Even Saxons who have been thoroughly integrated into German society have been turning their attention to Romania once again. The rock star Peter Maffay appears to have rediscovered his Saxon roots, despite being apparently fully integrated, by expressing an interest to buy a fortified Saxon church in Transylvania. This has been viewed as part of his “social engagement” (*soziales Engagement*) with the region.⁵⁷ Since Saxons have not really had to contend with problems of integration in Germany, the reasons for this reinvention of Romania must therefore lie elsewhere. Certainly the increasing emergence of “transnational awareness” in projects such as heritage conservation has played its part.⁵⁸ It is also true to say that prominent figures

such as Peter Maffay have contributed towards a greater responsiveness amongst Saxon émigrés in Germany towards their previous homeland.⁵⁹ Yet at the heart of this reimagining lies the breakdown of previously established images of Germany following emigration.

What does this tell us about shifting notions of citizenship and identity in the Berlin Republic? First of all, it points to the fact that this renegotiating of the Saxon relationship with Germany and Romania is not merely a form of nostalgia – that is the longing for a bygone era – but about the physical constitution of their former homeland. Unlike phenomena such as *Ostalgie* in the former GDR where the past is reimagined as a critique of the present, Saxon re-engagement with Romania has not been about rehabilitating the past.⁶⁰ The loss of homeland thus also refers to the physical and not just temporal loss of it. This has been echoed in a large number of publications on the natural geography and architecture of Saxon Transylvania.⁶¹ Saxons are remembering the appearance of Saxon Transylvania as a counterpoint to the urban experience in (West) Germany in much the same way that West Germany acted as a counterpoint to their experiences in Romania. Whilst West Germany was once an idealized version of an historic Germany, Transylvania has, to some extent, become re-imagined as a place bound up with a harmonious past.⁶² Exploring Rogers Brubaker's model of a minority's triangular relationship with its external and actual homelands a little further, the case of Transylvanian Saxons suggests that home has always been located elsewhere.⁶³ Their role as a minority has led Saxons to retain a certain distance towards their respective actual homeland (be it Romania or Germany). Home is thus never the actual homeland, but the other, external and imagined homeland. It is in this context that Romania and (in particular) Transylvania has become such a focal point for the émigré community of Saxons in Germany.

Yet this reimagining of a lost homeland has not merely been about the loss of territory. It has also served as a commentary on the disappointment which sections of the émigré community have experienced since immigration to Germany. As discussed above, Transylvanian Saxons left Romania with the distinct impression of being subjected to an anti-German public narrative.⁶⁴ However, whilst Saxons had expected a wave of sympathy from fellow Germans, they quickly found themselves lumped in with right-

wing revisionist circles and discourses in the latter stages of the Cold War. Stories of German victimhood existed rather more on the margins of public discourse. Instead, perpetrator stories and memories appeared to receive most attention in the public domain towards the end of the Cold War. Since then, reunified Germany has been marked by fragmented and often competing – perceived or otherwise – narratives and identities, and it is within this memory landscape that Transylvanian Saxons have been able to reassert their stories and identity discourses. Having seemingly escaped the “backward” East, the last two decades have been characterized by deeper European integration, which has, in turn, seemingly undermined their decision to leave Romania in the first place. The reaction to this has been twofold. On the one hand, Saxon narratives of Romania have hardened and they have reaffirmed their views on the “backwardness” of Romania.⁶⁵ On the other hand, Europeanization has also signaled to many Saxons the apparent need for their return to Transylvania. As such, Saxons have frequently portrayed themselves as a bridge between East and West.⁶⁶ Their key role has therefore been understood as actors in Romania and not in their new homeland Germany.

Finally, it is worth noting that Germany is a very different country to what it was during the Cold War period. “New” immigrants from Turkey and elsewhere have challenged and in fact altered older perceptions of an ethnic and ethno-cultural “Germanness”. For Saxon émigrés, particularly of the first and second generation, this has posed some difficulties and, as outlined above, has led to a realignment and re-identification (however vexed it may be) with their former homeland. Maybe somewhat surprisingly, neither the newly-gained prominence of Romanian Germans in Germany – Herta Müller, Eginald Schlattner, Klaus Johannis, Hagen Rether – nor the renewed interest in German victimhood in Germany seem to have had any major impact on the way sections of the émigré community view their position in Germany. Though it is perhaps premature to anticipate the full effect Herta Müller’s critical and renowned work might have on images and perceptions, Saxon identity and notions of Germanness in the 21st century still seem to suffer from a mutual disconnect. While there does seem to be more space for the “critical engagement” with the past that many Saxons have been calling for, the émigré community itself seems once again torn between two homelands and various strands of identity. In so doing, they have moved from diaspora to diaspora.

Perhaps the *Landsmannschaft*'s ominous prediction of *Finis Saxonae* (the end of the Saxons) during the Cold War has been proved right after all.

The authors would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers as well as Dr. Claire Sutherland and Dr. Elena Barabantseva for their very helpful comments and suggestions.

¹ See also Stefan Wolff, *The German Question since 1919* (Westport: Praeger, 2003), p. 7 and Stefan Wolff 'From Colonists to Emigrants: Explaining the "Return-Migration" of Ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe' in David Rock and Stefan Wolff (eds) *Coming Home to Germany? The Integration of Ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe in the Federal Republic* (Oxford: Berghahn, 2002), p. 4.

² Wolff, *The German Question since 1919*, p. 6.

³ These include, for example the *Bessarabiendeutsche*. On ethnic German minorities in general, see Mariana Hausleitner (ed.), *Vom Faschismus zum Stalinismus: Deutsche und andere Minderheiten in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa 1941–1953* (Munich: IKGS, 2008).

⁴ Harald Roth, *Kleine Geschichte Siebenbürgens* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2003), pp. 30-33.

⁵ See for instance Tudor Sălăgean, 'Romanian Society in the Early Middle Ages (9th – 14th Century)', in Ioan-Aurel Pop and Ioan Bolovan (eds), *History of Romania Compendium* (Cluj-Napoca: The Romanian Culture Institute, 2006), pp. 162-165.

⁶ The settlement area was declared as a *Königsboden* (*fundus regius*) or 'Royal Lands', which gave the Saxons a high level of autonomy. Furthermore, the so-called *Andreanum* of 1224 was one of the first constitutions in Europe, which set the Saxons apart from other groups very early on. See Harald Zimmermann, 'Die deutsche Südostsiedlung im Mittelalter', in Günther Schödl (ed.), *Deutsche Geschichte im Osten Europas: Land an der Donau* (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1995), p.41.

⁷ Balázs A. Szelényi, *The Failure of the Central European Bourgeoisie* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 43-51.

⁸ See *ibid.*, Konrad Gündisch, 'Die "Geistliche Universität" der siebenbürgisch-sächsischen Kirchengemeinden im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert', in Volker Keppin and Ulrich A. Wien (eds), *Konfessionsbildung und Konfessionskultur in Siebenbürgen in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2005), pp. 105-114, and Gustav Binder, 'Die Reformation in Siebenbürgen', *Siebenbürgische Semesterblätter*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1987), pp. 37-55.

⁹ Roth, *Kleine Geschichte Siebenbürgens*, pp. 49-51. The official setup was as follows: The aristocracy (the Hungarians), the Szekler (administration), and the Saxons (economic and financial sectors) were classified as three equal groups, while the Romanians remained serfs and unrecognised as a group. See also Chris Hann, *The Skeleton at the Feast: Contributions to East European Anthropology* (Kent: CSAC, 1995), p. 78.

¹⁰ Robert John Weston Evans, *Austria, Hungary, and the Habsburgs: Central Europe c. 1683 – 1867* (Oxford: OUP, 2006), pp. 218-225.

¹¹ This included the standardisation of language in education. See Anton Sterbling, 'Minderheitenprobleme und interethnische Konflikte in Siebenbürgen nach 1867', *Siebenbürgische Semesterblätter*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1996), pp. 109-124.

¹² Roth, *Kleine Geschichte Siebenbürgens*, pp. 105-122.

¹³ Roth, *Kleine Geschichte Siebenbürgens*, p. 125.

¹⁴ See Karl M. Reinert, *Zur politischen Entwicklung der Deutschen in Rumänien 1918 – 1928: Aus einer siebenbürgisch-sächsischen Sicht* (Thaur: Wort und Welt Verlag, 1993), pp. 108-296 and Roth, *Kleine Geschichte Siebenbürgens*, pp. 132-134..

¹⁵ See Reinert, *Zur politischen Entwicklung der Deutschen in Rumänien*, p. 133. See also, Thomas Şindilariu, 'Sportpolitische Impulse aus dem "Dritten Reich" und der Strandbadbau in Siebenbürgen 1936 – 1939', in Marina Hausleitner and Harald Roth (eds), *Der Einfluss von Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus auf Minderheiten in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa* (Munich: IKGS Verlag, 2006), pp. 163-182.

¹⁶ Valdis O. Lumans, *Himmler's Auxiliaries: The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German National Minorities of Europe 1933-1945* (Chapel Hill: UNCP, 1993), p. 109.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 107-113.

¹⁸ Paul Georgescu, "'Volksdeutsche" in der Waffen-SS', *Südostdeutsche Vierteljahreshefte*, Vol. 53, No. 2 (2004), pp. 117-123.

¹⁹ Roth, p. 142.

²⁰ For an excellent study of the deportation of Transylvanian Saxons see Georg Weber et al (eds), *Die Deportation der Siebenbürger Sachsen in die Sowjetunion 1945 – 1949*, Vol. I., II., and III. (Cologne: Böhlau, 1995).

²¹ Michael Kroner, 'Zwei aufschlussreiche Zeitungsurteile über die Behandlung der Siebenbürger Sachsen im Jahre 1946', *Südostdeutsche Vierteljahreshefte*, Vol. 53, No. 1 (2004), pp. 31-36.

²² The last wave of internal deportations occurred in 1951, as *Banater Schwaben* and other groups near the Yugoslav border were deported to the Bărăgan Plain for up to five years. See Smaranda Vultur, *Germanii din Banat: Prin Povestirile Lor* (Bucharest: Paideia, 2000) and Hannelore Baier, 'Arbeitslager für die deutsche Bevölkerung im Innern Rumäniens nach 1945', *Südostdeutsche Vierteljahreshefte*, Vol. 54, No. 4 (2005), pp. 379-387.

²³ Stefan Wolff, 'The Politics of Homeland: Irredentism and Recognition in the Policies of German Federal Governments and Expellee Organizations toward Ethnic German Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe, 1949 – 1999', in Kirsta O'Donnell, Renate Bridenthal, and Nancy Reagin (eds), *The Heimat Abroad: The Boundaries of Germanness* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2005), pp. 287-313.

²⁴ Roth, pp. 147-151 and Anton Sterbling, 'Die Aussiedlung der Deutschen aus Rumänien in die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und andere Migrationsvorgänge in und aus Südosteuropa', in Edda Currle and Tanja Wunderlich (eds), *Deutschland – ein Einwanderungsland? Rückblick, Bilanz und neue Fragen* (Stuttgart: Lucius, 2001), pp. 206, 207.

²⁵ Anton Sterbling, 'Dazugehörende Fremde? Besonderheiten der Integration der Rumäniendeutschen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', in Christoph Köck, Alois Moosmüller, and Klaus Roth (eds), *Zuwanderung und Integration: Kulturwissenschaftliche Zugänge und soziale Praxis* (Münster: Waxmann Verlag, 2004), pp. 109-124.

²⁶ In line with the Cold War's alliance system victim status was not granted to those suffering at the hands of socialist neighbors and particularly the Soviet Union. Accordingly, refugees and expellees were called *Umsiedler*, i.e. 'resettlers' rather than refugees or expellees.

²⁷ For an insightful study which traces the relationship between the expellees and their organizations and the West German government within the wider context of its relations with Eastern Europe, see Pertti Ahonen, *After the Expulsion: West Germany and Eastern Europe, 1945-1990* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); see also Rock and Wolff (eds), *Coming Home to Germany? The Integration of Ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe in the Federal Republic*.

²⁸ Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992).

²⁹ Marc Morjé Howard, 'The Causes and Consequences of Germany's New Citizenship Law', *German Politics*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2008), p. 42.

³⁰ Joyce Marie Mushaben, *The Changing Faces of Citizenship: Social Integration and Political Mobilization Among Ethnic Minorities in Germany* (Oxford: Berghahn, 2008), p. 89.

³¹ See also Eli Nathans, *The Politics of Citizenship in Germany: Ethnicity, Utility and Nationalism* (Oxford: Berg, 2004), pp. 254-257.

³² Christoph Bergner, 'Herausforderungen und Perspektiven zukünftigen Aussiedler- und Minderheitenpolitik' in Christoph Bergner and Matthias Weber (eds) *Aussiedler- und Minderheitenpolitik in Deutschland: Bilanz und Perspektiven* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2009), pp. 237-260, pp. 251-252.

³³ This is Rogers Brubaker's concept of a triangular relationship between a minority, its 'actual homeland' (in this case Romania), and its 'external homeland' (in this case the FRG). See Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: CUP, 1996).

³⁴ See Christian Härtel and Petra Karbus (eds), *Das Westpaket* (Berlin: Christian Links Verlag, 2000).

³⁵ Anneli Ute Gabanyi, 'Die Deutschen in Rumänien: Exodus oder Neuanfang?', in Hans Rothe (ed.), *Die Siebenbürger Sachsen in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Cologne: Böhlau, 1994), pp. 89-104.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

³⁷ Interview with Johann Simon (pseudonym), Sibiu, Romania, 24th February 2005.

³⁸ See, for instance, Annemarie Weber, *Rumäniendeutsche? Diskurse zur Gruppenidentität einer Minderheit (1944-1971)* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2010) in which the author charts the development of German-language newspapers in Romania during the Cold War period and thereby draws out the mythical images of an imagined historic Germany. See also Bénédicte Michalon, *Migrations des Saxons de Roumanie en*

Allemagne: Mythe, Interdépendance et Altérité dans le Retour (Thesis: Université de Poitiers, 2003) for a useful discussion of the construction of Saxon group identity in the web of migration, imagined Germanness, and otherness; many thanks to the anonymous reviewer for recommending this thesis.

³⁹ This is based on research for a doctoral thesis. 41 out of 79 interviewees were émigrés living in Germany. Almost uniformly the respondents presented their imagined Germany prior to emigration precisely in notions of an historic Germany – a *Kulturnation* – which is also reflected in contemporary sources of the Cold War period – be it in publications or correspondence. See James Koranyi, *Between East and West: Romanian German Identities since 1945* (Thesis: University of Exeter, 2009).

⁴⁰ Rainer Ohliger, 'Vom Vielvölkerstaat zum Nationalstaat – Migration aus und nach Rumänien im 20. Jahrhundert', in Heinz Fassmann and Rainer Münz (eds), *Migration in Europa: Historische Entwicklung, aktuelle Trends und politische Reaktionen* (Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag, 1996), pp. 287-296.

⁴¹ Rainer Münz and Rainer Ohliger, 'Deutsche Minderheiten in Ostmittel- und Osteuropa, Aussiedler in Deutschland: Eine Analyse ethnisch privilegiert Migration', *Demographie Aktuell: Vorträge, Aufsätze, Forschungsberichte*, No. 9 (1998), pp. 7-11, <http://www.demographie.de/demographieaktuell/da9.pdf> [accessed: 17 April 2010].

⁴² See Maria Müller, 'Die Vertreibung aus der Heimat', *Siebenbürgen Institut*, B 1 51, Vol. 2 [2].

⁴³ See, for instance, Andreas Möckel (ed.), *Gerhard Möckel: Fatum oder Datum? Aufsätze und Briefe* (Munich: Südostdeutsches Kulturwerk).

⁴⁴ See, for instance, Liviu Chelcea, 'The Culture of Shortage during State-Socialism: Consumption Practices in a Romanian Village in the 1980s', *Cultural Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2002), pp. 16-43.

⁴⁵ Bergner, 'Herausforderungen und Perspektiven zukünftigen Aussiedler- und Minderheitenpolitik', pp. 251-252.

⁴⁶ For a detailed discussion of the changes, see Amanda Klekowski von Kloppenfels, 'The Decline of Privilege: the Legal Background to the Migration of Ethnic Germans' in Rock and Wolff (eds), *Coming Home to Germany? The Integration of Ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe in the Federal Republic*, pp. 102-118.

⁴⁷ Bergner, 'Herausforderungen und Perspektiven zukünftigen Aussiedler- und Minderheitenpolitik', p. 252.

⁴⁸ Wolff, *The German Question since 1919*, p. 123.

⁴⁹ See, for instance, Christoph Cornelißen, Roman Holec, and Jiří Pešek (eds), *Diktatur-Krieg-Vertreibung: Erinnerungskulturen in Tschechien, der Slowakei und Deutschland seit 1945* (Ústí nad Labem: Albis International, 2007).

⁵⁰ The full petition can be viewed in German at 'Petition', *ResRo*, <http://www.resro.eu/dokumente/petition.pdf> [accessed: 14 April 2010] or in Romanian at 'Petiție', *ResRo*, <http://www.resro.eu/dokumente/petitie.pdf> [accessed: 14 April 2010].

⁵¹ See Koranyi, pp. 96-154.

⁵² See, for instance, Jeffrey Herf, *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997) and Ruth Wittlinger, *German National Identity in the Twenty-First Century: A Different Republic After All?* (Basingstoke: 2010), pp. 26.

⁵³ See, for instance, *Siebenbürger.de* (*sic*) – the website of the main Saxon émigré newspaper, which hosts dynamic online discussions, <http://www.siebenbuerger.de/forum/> [accessed: 17 April 2010].

⁵⁴ For details, see <http://www.siebenbuerger.de/benutzer/benutzer.php> [accessed: 17 April 2010].

⁵⁵ This is referring to the European Capital of Culture in 2007; for details see *Sibiu 2007*, <http://www.sibiu2007.ro/> [accessed: 17 April 2010].

⁵⁶ Annina Braumann, *Kulturtourismus – Möglichkeiten der Iagemodifizierung am Beispiel der europäischen Kulturhauptstadt 2007: Sibiu / Hermannstadt* (Norderstedt: GRIN Verlag, 2007).

⁵⁷ See 'Peter Maffay will Kirchenburg kaufen', *Siebenbürgische Zeitung*, 24 March 2008, <http://www.siebenbuerger.de/zeitung/artikel/interviews/7588-peter-maffay-will-kirchenburg-kaufen.html> [accessed: 17 April 2010].

⁵⁸ See, for instance, Brian Graham, G. J. Ashworth, and J. E. Tunbridge, *A Geography of Heritage: Power, Culture, and Economy* (London: Arnold, 2000) for a good overview and discussion of cultural heritage and its relation to identity – national or otherwise.

⁵⁹ The main publication for Transylvanian Saxons, *Siebenbürgische Zeitung*, reflects this trend in the articles it publishes on the aforementioned individuals. Since the subscription rates are relatively high

(26,000 in 2004) and the number of hits on its website even higher (3.600 a day in 2005), the influence this has on raising awareness of developments in Transylvania is quite high.

⁶⁰ That said, the physical make-up of Saxon Transylvania with its fortified churches and Saxon villages conjures up in itself notions of a 'Golden Age'. For more on the phenomenon of *Ostalgie* see Paul Cooke, *Representing East Germany since Reunification: From Colonization to Nostalgia* (Oxford: Berg, 2005).

⁶¹ See, for instance, Arne Frank, *Das wehrhafte Sachsenland. Kirchenburgen im südlichen Siebenbürgen* (Potsdam: Deutsches Kulturforum Östliches Europa, 2007) and Harald Roth, *Hermannstadt: Kleine Geschichte einer Stadt in Siebenbürgen* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2006).

⁶² For an early example of this process of reimagining, see Gustav Zickeli, *Bistritz Zwischen 1880 und 1950: Erinnerungen* (Munich: Verlag Südostdeutsches Kulturwerk, 1989).

⁶³ See Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*.

⁶⁴ See Lucian Boia, *History and Myth in the Romanian Consciousness* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2001), pp. 162 – 165.

⁶⁵ See, for instance, Peter Pastior, 'Die Not der Landsleute in Siebenbürgen halt an', *Siebenbürgische Zeitung Online*, 23rd October 2007,

<http://www.siebenbuenger.de/zeitung/artikel/drucken/index.php?id=7115> [accessed: 17 April 2010]

⁶⁶ See 'Kemper zum Heimattag der Siebenbürger Sachsen',

http://www.bmi.bund.de/nn_898278/Internet/Content/Nachrichten/Archiv/Reden/2005/05/BA__Kemper__Heimattag.html [accessed: 17 April 2010].