French, S. and Vickers, P. (2011) 'Are there no things that are scientific theories ?', British journal for the philosophy of science., 62 (4). pp. 771-804.
The ontological status of theories themselves has recently re-emerged as a live topic in the philosophy of science. We consider whether a recent approach within the philosophy of art can shed some light on this issue. For many years philosophers of aesthetics have debated a paradox in the (meta)ontology of musical works (e.g. Levinson ). Taken individually, there are good reasons to accept each of the following three propositions: (i) musical works are created; (ii) musical works are abstract objects; (iii) abstract objects cannot be created. However it seems clear that, if one wants to avoid inconsistency, one cannot commit to all three. Following up recent developments courtesy of Cameron ([2008a]), we consider how one might respond to the corresponding set of propositions in the (meta)ontology of scientific theories.
|Full text:||(AM) Accepted Manuscript|
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|Publisher Web site:||http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axr011|
|Publisher statement:||This is a pre-copy-editing author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in British journal for the philosophy of science following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version French, S. and Vickers, P. (2011) 'Are there no things that are scientific theories ?', British journal for the philosophy of science., 62 (4). pp. 771-804 is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axr011|
|Date accepted:||No date available|
|Date deposited:||12 February 2013|
|Date of first online publication:||2011|
|Date first made open access:||No date available|
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