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Kant's theory of punishment.

Brooks, Thom (2003) 'Kant's theory of punishment.', Utilitas., 15 (2). pp. 206-224.

Abstract

The most widespread interpretation amongst contemporary theorists of Kant's theory of punishment is that it is retributivist. On the contrary, I will argue there are very different senses in which Kant discusses punishment. He endorses retribution for moral law transgressions and consequentialist considerations for positive law violations. When these standpoints are taken into consideration, Kant's theory of punishment is more coherent and unified than previously thought. This reading uncovers a new problem in Kant's theory of punishment. By assuming a potential offender's intentional disposition as Kant does without knowing it for certain, we further exacerbate the opportunity for misdiagnosis – although the assumption of individual criminal culpability may be all we can reasonably be expected to use. While this difficulty is not lost on Kant, it continues to remain with us today, making Kant's theory of punishment far more relevant than previously thought.

Item Type:Article
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Status:Peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0953820800003952
Publisher statement:© Copyright Cambridge University Press 2003. This paper has been published by Cambridge University Press in 'Utilitas' (15 : 2 (2003) 206-224) http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=UTI
Date accepted:No date available
Date deposited:16 May 2013
Date of first online publication:July 2003
Date first made open access:No date available

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