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A confrontation of convergent realism.

Vickers, P. (2013) 'A confrontation of convergent realism.', Philosophy of science., 80 (2). pp. 189-211.


For many years—and with some energy since Laudan’s “Confutation of Convergent Realism” (1981)—the scientific realist has sought to accommodate examples of false-yet-successful theories in the history of science. One of the most prominent strategies is to identify ‘success fueling’ components of false theories that themselves are at least approximately true (judging by our current understanding). In this article I develop both sides of the debate, introducing new challenges from the history of science as well as suggesting adjustments to the divide et impera realist strategy. A new ‘recipe’ for the prospective identification of (at least some) working/idle posits is considered.

Item Type:Article
Additional Information:Published by the University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association.
Full text:(AM) Accepted Manuscript
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Publisher statement:© 2013 by the Philosophy of Science Association.
Date accepted:No date available
Date deposited:23 May 2013
Date of first online publication:April 2013
Date first made open access:No date available

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