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The entailment problem and the subset account of property realization.

Gibb, S. C. (2014) 'The entailment problem and the subset account of property realization.', Australasian journal of philosophy., 92 (3). pp. 551-566.


Proponents of the subset account of property realization commonly make the assumption that the summing of properties entails the summing of their forward-looking causal features. This paper seeks to establish that this assumption is false. Moreover, it aims to demonstrate that without this assumption the fact that the subset account captures an entailment relation—which it must if it is to be of any use to non-reductive physicalism—becomes questionable.

Item Type:Article
Keywords:Non\-reductive physicalism, Property realization, the subset account, Entailment.
Full text:(AM) Accepted Manuscript
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Publisher statement:This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis Group in Australasian Journal of Philosophy on 28/11/2013, available online at:
Date accepted:01 January 2013
Date deposited:12 June 2014
Date of first online publication:28 November 2013
Date first made open access:28 May 2015

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