Scarre, Geoffrey (2013) 'The continence of virtue.', Philosophical investigations., 36 (1). pp. 1-19.
Many recent writers in the virtue ethics tradition have followed Aristotle in arguing for a distinction between virtue and continence, where the latter is conceived as an inferior moral condition. In this paper I contend that rather than seeking to identify a sharp categorical difference between virtue and continence, we should see the contrast as rather one of degree, where virtue is a continence that has matured with practice and habit, becoming more stable, effective and self-aware.
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|Publisher Web site:||http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phin.12003|
|Publisher statement:||This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Scarre, G. (2013), The Continence of Virtue. Philosophical Investigations, 36(1): 1–19, which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phin.12003. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.|
|Date accepted:||No date available|
|Date deposited:||19 June 2014|
|Date of first online publication:||January 2013|
|Date first made open access:||No date available|
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